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 I became interested in a longer range interpretation of the Berlin crisis while researching 
a seminar paper for Dr. Guenter Bischof at the University of New Orleans.  I was familiar with 
the Wall and the Airlift, but hadn‟t understood that the crisis began in 1958 with Nikita 
Khrushchev‟s demands for a „free city‟ (without Western troops) and a German peace treaty.  
The fact that Khrushchev suspended his deadline, once Geneva negotiations were in session, 
seemed an important progression from containment and diplomatic estrangement towards 
détente.  For my thesis, I argued that the US leaders had to balance alliance problems with 
pragmatic understanding of the limits of forceful response, which included possible use of 
nuclear arms.  They pragmatically chose negotiated resolution.  I learned that period only 
concluded the first visible arc of a much longer diplomatic experience.   
While collecting source material from the National Archives and reading good authorities 
like Marc Trachtenberg‟s A Constructed Peace, John Lewis Gaddis‟s Now We Know, William 
Taubman‟s Khrushchev, and Hope Harrison‟s Driving the Soviets up the Wall, I saw that 
Khrushchev used his demands as leverage for a peace conference that ostensibly could be used to 
discuss disarmament.  Clear connections were apparent between the Khrushchev‟s 1959 visit, the 
Paris 1960 summit and the Berlin problem.  I found a strong link between the Berlin problem and 
arms control and test-ban issues.  Berlin also catalyzed differences between the US and its 
European allies, who wanted more control of nuclear deterrence but were unwilling to make 
conventional force commitments.  Berlin became a transitional issue for US-Soviet relations, 




These impressions were even clearer after reading recent published Khrushchev-era 
narratives  like Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali‟s Khrushchev’s Cold War, Sergei 
Khrushchev‟s Creation of a Superpower and Vladimir Zubok‟s A Failed Empire.  These authors 
had been able to work in the Soviet archives, which provided new insights into Kremlin decision 
making.  They showed how important an issue Berlin was for Khrushchev, both as a potential 
threat to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European hegemony and a source of leverage for other 
concerns, including disarmament. Michael Beschloss‟s Crisis Years, also benefiting from post-
Soviet sources, gave more indications of an ongoing, though troubled, effort to sustain 
negotiations.  Nikita Khrushchev‟s Statesman provided another important account, with details 
missing from his previous memoirs. These works also indicated original and secondary sources 
worth investigating for a dissertation on Berlin-crisis negotiations.   
I saw that Berlin negotiations were ongoing from 1958-1963.  These talks did not resolve 
the Berlin  and German questions, but averted war and gave an opportunity to begin high level 
discussions between the superpowers.  It was an imperfect process that gave rise to incidents like 
the Wall and Missile Crisis, but it created a template for discussion.  Expertise in Soviet thinking 
was gained by individuals like Ambassadors Llewellyn Thompson, and Charles Bohlen, as well 
as analysts like Walt Rostow, Gerard Smith, Paul Nitze and Foy Kohler.  They helped form a 
core of well informed Soviet observers.  Leaders like Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, and 
eventually even Kennedy and Secretary Rusk created a tense but closer and more stable US-
Soviet relationship.  Ironically, Berlin‟s situation - the catalyst, the artificial stimulus - was never 
resolved with satisfaction for any side.  When other concerns replaced Berlin, none of them 
produced the same level of diplomatic relationship.  As Berlin‟s importance diminished, so did 




 The present work is an attempt to synthesize themes of Berlin as a transformative 
issue in allied and Soviet relations.  By telling the story of how negotiations were arranged and 
conducted, at a number of levels, I seek to show changes in how the US, Allies and Soviets dealt 
with each other.  The role of disarmament in these proceedings is a  major subtext, though 
specific  UN disarmament discussions never reached the scope and intensity of Berlin talks.  
Berlin-era contingency planning for a limited war with nuclear options, as well as force buildups, 
reveals basic shifts in US and NATO strategic doctrines.  Alliance problems, US domestic 
pressure and Soviet politics are further subtexts that continue through the whole history of the 
Berlin crisis, with lasting effects.  In the Berlin crisis, we see a redefining of the US-British 
„special relationship,‟ beginnings of de Gaulle‟s isolation from NATO, as well as West 
Germany‟s growing importance and first taste of Ostpolitik. 
Much of the basic narrative here is based on the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) collections, which provide a good record of important meetings, correspondence, papers 
and statements.  As useful a guide as FRUS is, there are many influential revealing meetings, 
cables and proposals not covered.  My main sources for the „rest of the story‟ have been 
Presidential Libraries, particularly the various national security and White House office file 
series on Germany and the Soviet Union.  Particularly useful material has included National 
Security Council memos, State Department Policy Planning Staff material, CIA reports, 
ambassadorial working group meetings, briefing books, embassy cable traffic, position papers, 
and unofficial correspondence.  Cross-referencing this material with the FRUS record has, I 
hope, provided a thorough and well-grounded chronology.   
This chronology, also heavily based on secondary sources discussed earlier, also draws 




Two Strategies for Europe, Frank Mayers‟ Adenauer and Kennedy, and Nigel Ashton‟s Kennedy, 
Macmillan and the Cold War are good accounts of these very influential and distinctive leaders.  
Wilfrid Loth‟s Europe, Cold War and Co-Existence and Christian Nuenlist‟s Globalizing de 
Gaulle are very useful anthologies on European relations with each other, as well as with the US  
and Soviets.  David Mayer‟s The Ambassadors is an excellent history of the US diplomatic 
missions to the USSR and the various emissaries, as well as Soviet views towards them. 
Frederick Marks Power and Peace, Saki Dockrill‟s Eisenhower’s New Look, and Richard 
Immerman‟s Waging Peace make insightful cases for Eisenhower-era inclination against force, 
an impression also gained from Eisenhower‟s own memoirs and Stephen Ambrose‟s biography.  
Joseph Whelans‟s Soviet Negotiating Techniques provided a long range perspective on Soviet 
diplomacy 
  I have found consistent, well documented narratives the most useful sources, even in 
specialized topics. Glen Seaborg‟s Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban and Robert Divine‟s 
Blowing in the Wind provide well documented histories of the disarmament talks concurrent with 
the Berlin dialogue.   Anatoly Dobrynin‟s In Confidence  connects other Soviet narratives with 
diplomatic field experience.  Robert Slusser‟s Berlin Crisis of 1961 may overplay  its case 
against Khrushchev‟s domestic critics, but does show strong domestic pressures that affected his 
Berlin strategy. Frederick Taylor‟s The Berlin Crisis and Andreas Daum‟s Kennedy and the Wall 
are helpful, if not critically deep, chronicles of the Berlin situation.  Even Berlin histories 
embedded in topical surveys like Mark White‟s Kennedy: the New Frontier Revisited or Marc 
Trachtenberg‟s History and Strategy have been very helpful.  Many other sources of good 
supporting evidence are cited throughout, but the books discussed above have been especially 




A combination of published and unpublished primary document series and secondary 
narratives account for most of my documentation.   National Archive State Department 
collections provided a basic orientation, especially the central decimal files and Policy Planning 
Staff material.  The long range of years documented in the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library 
helped me connect the early Eisenhower phase of the crisis with the decisive Kennedy period.    
Further work at the Johnson, Eisenhower and Kennedy libraries provided most of my archival 
sources.  These sources provided background for the events covered in the FRUS record, and 
showed important influences not indicated in other literature.  The combination of FRUS, 
Presidential Library and secondary readings form the supporting evidence for my own narrative. 
The core purpose of this project is a documented history that I believe supports 
conclusions listed in each chapter and summarized in a concluding chapter.  My argument is 
simple but I believe well supported: choosing negotiations over force to solve Berlin was a 
significant step in a new direction, those negotiations changed from a multilateral to a bilateral 
approach, and US, Allied and Soviet relations were transformed as a result.  Arms control, basic 
strategic doctrine and alliance politics were strongly linked to the course of negotiations, but 
Berlin remained the most important issue between the involved countries from 1958 to 1963.  
Though never resolved, Berlin provided a template for the later US-Soviet bilateral détente on 
disarmament.  I believe the progress of events outlined here illustrates these conclusions.  If 
successful, this history will provide a comprehensive reference on Berlin crisis negotiations, the 
importance of which has not been fully appreciated but deserves greater attention. 
The Berlin Crisis may understandably seem of limited importance today, in a post-Soviet 
world where rubble for souvenirs is all that is left of the Wall and the EU is as much a rival as a 




nearly four decades.  Unlike the leadership of the Berlin Crisis participants, many of today‟s 
European, American and Asian leaders are women, with a different perspective perhaps on 
negotiation and war, limited and nuclear.  Superpower rivalries are considered more selfish 
hegemonic rivalry than profound national responsibilities. Such changes in thinking might have 
seemed almost unimaginable to the heads of state, ministers and even advisors who shaped the 
decisions of the Berlin Crisis.  Berlin remains significant because it was the first major conflict 
since the war to be, if not resolved, then mitigated and deferred by negotiations.  Unlike Korea, 
Suez or Dienbienphu, these leaders, most importantly Nikita Khrushchev, Dwight Eisenhower 
and John Kennedy, did decline to use force and did consistently pursue high level negotiation to 
resolve the problem.  In doing so, these holders of nuclear force departed from their conventional 





As important as the sources above have been in the progress of  this work, I have been 
fully as influenced by the encouragement and criticism of my teachers at Louisiana Sate 
University and at the University of New Orleans.  It is essential to acknowledge and thank them 
for their support.  My advisor Dr. David Culbert‟s LSU seminar in 20th century American 
history helped greatly in getting me „up to speed‟ for professional work in history.  Dr. Culbert 
had taught me many years previously at LSU and I am very pleased and fortunate to have him as 
my advisor.  He brings a tremendous range of experience to bear and I am still amazed at the 




My other committee members Dr. Paul Paskoff, Dr. Charles Royster, and Dr. Charles 
Shindo provided excellent seminars in American history, of which I am afraid I still had only a 
woefully inadequate understanding as I entered doctoral studies.  These are all recognized 
authorities in their respected fields and outstanding teachers. I am very grateful to have such an 
experienced and capable committee, and to have had them as professors.   Hopefully, this 
dissertation will not reflect badly on their attempts to overcome my innate denseness and 
wayward writing habits.  
I have also benefited greatly from other LSU teachers, notably Dr. Gaines Foster, who 
taught a challenging course in historiography.  My minor field teachers, Dr. Victor Stater and Dr. 
Suzanne Marchand were not only excellent guides to English and European history, but were 
most helpful in helping me get started in my LSU coursework.  All these teachers have made me 
write better, research more thoroughly, and analyze more critically.  I have tried their patience 
and turned in some „clunkers,‟ but I have appreciated their criticism and encouragement.  I must 
also acknowledge the great help I got from teachers I have assisted, including Dr. David 
Lindenfield, Dr. Reza Pirbhai and Dr. Louise Walker, all excellent teachers and historians. 
 I must give special acknowledgement and thanks to Dr. Guenter Bischof for 
continuing to share his impressive knowledge of Cold War and European diplomatic history.  He 
is also a rigorous critic, but his encouragement has been invaluable since I started studying 
diplomatic history at UNO.  He has directed me to the best archival sources and literature and 
facilitated my research, providing valuable opportunities for study and insisting on the best work 
possible.  Working for his colleague and Eisenhower professor at UNO, Colonel Allen Millett  
was also a formative influence of key importance to my development as a historian.  Col. Millett 




I would also like to thank the staff of the National Archives and Records Administration 
at their College Park Maryland facility and at the Eisenhower, Johnson, and Kennedy libraries 
administered by NARA.  I am particularly grateful to David Haight, senior archivist at the  
Eisenhower Library for providing a most useful overview of Eisenhower‟s staff structure, 
guiding me through the collections and pointing out important secondary sources 
 I would also like to thank my mother, Mrs. Trudy Williamson for her love and support in 
starting this work, helping me get through Hurricane Katrina, reading many drafts of this 
material, and listening to me drone about Khrushchev and company.  Without her, I would have 
no dissertation.  I would also like to thank my late father, Ernest L. Williamson for teaching me 
many important lessons about work, knowledge and people.  Without his love and hard training, 
this dissertation would not be possible.  My sisters, Judy and Nan, and brother Dave, as well as 
my aunt Nan Glasgow, have also been great supporters, for which I thank them.  
I also thank friends at LSU, UNO and elsewhere who have encouraged my history 
studies.  Bill Bertolette, Adam Pratt, Ashley Baggett, David Lilly, Kat Sawyer, Nathan Buman, 
Alan Forrester, Yvonne Brown, Todd Borque, Matt Wilson, Brian Morrow, Kristi Whitfield and 
other fellow students have been good comrades in this work.  I thank them, as well as old friends 
like Mark and Cheryl Wall, Russell Desmond, the late Bill Mallory, Rob Beckley, Randy 
Johnston, Karen Anklam, and others who have kindly supported my doctoral studies.  I am 
grateful to all my teachers, family and friends, and apologize to any that I have overlooked.  I 
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"Berlin and the Origins of Detente" is a diplomatic history of the Berlin Crisis from 1958-1963.  
'Berlin Crisis' usually means the events surrounding construction of the Berlin Wall in August 
1961. The Wall, erected just two months after US President John Kennedy and the Soviet 
Union's Chairman Nikita Khrushchev met at Vienna,  physically divided East Berlin from the 
Western sectors of the US, Britain and France, who kept occupation forces under the 1945 
Potsdam accords.  This work covers the events leading up to the Wall and after, when the focus 
shifted from multilateral Allied diplomacy in the Eisenhower-era to bilateral US-Soviet 
engagement in the Kennedy period.  Salient events include the 1959 Geneva foreign ministers 
conference and Western ministers/head of state meetings principally concerned with Berlin.  It 
covers ambassadorial meetings, papers and proposals, correspondence  and historiography based 
on Khrushchev, Eisenhower and other leaders, European and Allied issues.  The Wall was the 
most visible part of a dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain and France 
who occupied West Berlin.  In 1958, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the West: end the 
occupation of West Berlin, turn it into an open 'free city' and recognize the (Eastern) German 
Democratic Republic through a 'peace treaty' that would supersede the Potsdam agreement.  
Principals displayed a readiness to use force if necessary, to defend their position, but attempted 
a diplomatic approach to resolve the Berlin issue, which was related to disarmament.  Berlin 
acted as a catalyst in the US, USSR and Allied relationships.  Diplomatic approaches lessened 
tensions and brought brief, tentative periods of detente.  Negotiation renewed US-Soviet 




centered on disarmament.  No other issue led to summit conferences or engaged the US, Allies 






Introduction: The US, USSR and Berlin, 1953-1958 
 
 
 Before Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev began his Berlin initiative in 1958, 
US and Soviet relations had been distant and indirect for most of the period after Joseph Stalin's 
death in 1953.  Stalin had surprised the West with an April 1952 proposal for German self-
determination to create a reunified, neutral country.
1
  Stalin's unattractive terms were declined, 
partially because the Germans themselves were not ready to change the current arrangements.  
The West assumed, probably correctly, that the Soviet proposal was simply a delaying maneuver.  
Overall, the Soviets did not seem interested in renewing the wartime diplomatic engagement  
seen at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences. As US Ambassador  in Moscow George 
Kennan observed in September 1952, "the Soviet leaders have broken diplomatic relations with 
the Western world."
2
  Kennan hoped to renew a more cooperative relationship, but found little 
encouragement in either Moscow or Washington, especially after he made careless remarks 
about the Soviet environment and over-zealous anti-Communist blacklisting at home.
3
  
When former Supreme Commandant of Allied European Forces General Dwight 
Eisenhower  replaced Harry Truman as US President in early 1953, the Soviets  waited to see 
how American policy might change, especially regarding Germany.  Kennan's appointment was 
not renewed by the new US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who turned instead to Charles 
Bohlen, thought to be more prudent.  John Lewis Gaddis says that Dulles wanted to relax 
                                                 
1
 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton 
University press: 1999), p.129-30. 
2
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3





tensions and dramatically scale back US and Soviet forces in Europe, leaving a neutral, unified 
but disarmed Germany, as well as lower US defense costs.
4
  Eisenhower thought Bohlen might 
be able to strike a safe deal to in the period after Stalin, before a harder regime might emerge.  
Both Eisenhower and Dulles were averse to nuclear war.  They were also skeptical of the 
summitry that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was endorsing.  Dulles thought summits 
created problems between allies.  He also worried that Berlin could cause alliance problems.
5
 
Like Kennan, Bohlen had been in a team of specialists trained by Estonian and  White 
Russian nationalists in the 1920s and assigned to Moscow after diplomatic relations were 
established in 1934.  They were both in Moscow during the difficult years starting with Stalin's 
purges and continuing through the war. Despite his experience and talent, Bohlen was not able to 
earn more confidence from either the new Soviet or American leadership.  To the Soviets he was 
an errand boy for containment doctrines, to the Americans, an appeaser who accepted the 
permanent division of Germany.
6
  East Germany was firmly under Soviet control, but the heavy 
handed control of Party chief Walter Ulbricht produced strong popular resistance and a 
disastrous economy.  The Soviets attempted relaxation of controls in East Germany in June 1953, 
when NKVD head Lavrentia Beria briefly seemed to be Stalin's likely successor,  but the 
„reforms‟ were short lived.  When Beria was liquidated within weeks, reforms were replaced by 
harsh official counter-measures by the client authorities.  The Soviets used armor to quell worker 
strikes and food riots, discouraging any hopes for a real rapprochement.
7
   
 After Stalin died in mid-1953, one likely successor, Politburo Central Committee 
veteran Georgi Malenkov, revived Stalin‟s proposals for a German „peace treaty‟ that would 
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„normalize‟ the wartime arrangements of Potsdam.  West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
had shown interest in these proposals, though his conditions involving all-German self-
determination were unacceptable to the Soviets.  Other Soviet insiders like Communist Party 
chief Nikita Khrushchev and Deputy Premier Dimitri Molotov forced Malenkov to abandon the 
German overtures.
8
  Malenkov's tentative warming to the West also included an invitation to the 
West to begin exploratory discussions to reduce tensions.  Malenkov did not prevail in the post -
Beria power struggles.  Khrushchev won out over rivals Molotov, Malenkov and  Nikolai 
Bulganin, who he would later purge as a Stalinist 'antiparty' group.  First Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs Anastas Mikoyan, a Bolshevik and Central Committee member longer than any of the 
others, never vied for the leadership but would later be influential in the Berlin Crisis years.
9
   
When Khrushchev began to project his new authority in 1954, he too experimented with 
the German peace treaty idea, along with other initiatives designed to present a more conciliatory 
Soviet image, particularly with the post-colonial regimes in India, Indonesia and other emerging 
Third World Powers.  Khrushchev established the Warsaw Pact, a Soviet bloc of Eastern clients 
as a formal alliance to counter the Western NATO military alliance.  He formalized relations 
with East Germany, while keeping the „peace treaty‟ concept alive.  When the USSR did not 
contest the normalization of a neutral Austria in 1955, hopes rose for a new round of summit 
diplomacy which might lead to a less hostile relationship,  increasingly termed „detente.‟ 
10
  
 Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were cautiously 
interested in detente, particularly in hopes of easing the expense and tensions of the Cold War 
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standoff still firmly entrenched after the 1949-1952 Korean conflict.  Detente was understood to 
mean an ongoing environment of close communication, diplomatic negotiation and head-of-state 
encounters that could defuse conflicts and lay the ground for normalized relations, disarmament, 
increased trade, conflict resolution and constructive exchange.  Détente challenged hard-line 
security polices sufficiently to arouse critics in the West and East alike.  Though in public they 
projected a tougher line against the Soviets, in private, Dulles and Eisenhower privately 
considered cautious steps to detente.
11
  
Even status quo containment proved to be very expensive.  Rollback would be 
unsustainably so and dangerous, possibly involving long-term inconclusive  struggles like 
Korea.
12
  Dulles and Eisenhower both had decided that nuclear weapons were the solution given 
budget pressures and desired deterrent strength.  Like the post-Stalin Soviets, the Americans 
faced expensive, unpopular defense costs. The US was spending nearly $40 million a year in 
support of West Berlin.  These costs, said National Security Council paper No. 5404, issued in 
January 1954, reflect the concern of the Congress for "Berlin's unique position and our special 
responsibilities there." 
13
 The paper, approved by Eisenhower, reaffirmed US support for West 
Berlin.  Dulles said in February 1953 that the US was "vitally interested in the  welfare and 
security of this city."  US High Commissioner for Germany Hugh Conant's stated a few weeks  
later that "the new administration in Washington will not abandon Berlin ... the US is pledged to 
do its part to see to it that this city continues as an unshaken outpost of the Western world ... the 
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Eisenhower's responsibility was ensuring American security while reining in the defense 
spending that accompanied the early years of the Cold War.  As a former military leader of US 
and Allied forces, Eisenhower was especially concerned about the costs and hazards of military 
intervention.
15
  Having worked with Russian generals in the war, he understood them 
realistically.  He knew the political leadership could be intractable and often undependable.  
While the Western public may not have realized it, Eisenhower knew that the Soviets faced 
similar arms-costs problems. His "New Look" policy aimed to roll back defense commitments 
and spending, in part through a viable nuclear deterrent. The president faced a strong defense 
lobby and congressional pressure to stem an amorphous global Communist threat.   Although he 
made the final decisions, he delegated most foreign-affairs policy and action to his Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles.
16
 
  Dulles enjoyed his image as the stern New England Presbyterian minister‟s son, 
best law student (on the continent, too) and diplomatic journeyman with a resume including both 
Versailles and Dumbarton Oaks.  He may have been unlovable in public, but he knew what he 
was doing, had the President‟s confidence and ran a clearly organized State Department.
17
  He 
recruited and  retained excellent personnel and assigned them effectively, including Bohlen and 
later Llewellyn Thompson as Ambassadors to the Soviet Union and David Bruce to Germany.  
Dulles appointed Robert Bowie and then Gerard Smith to the Policy Planning staff, Livingston 
                                                 
14
 National Security Council paper No. 5404/1, January 25, 1954. NARA, RG 273, Box 23, folder '160-61.' 
15
 Richard Damms, The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953-1961 (London: Longman, 2002). p.27-28. 
16
 Ibid, p.31-32. 
17
 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an enduring Cold Warty 




Merchant, Foy Kohler and Douglas Dillon as Undersecretary of State.  Dulles' State Department 
grew experienced and efficient, especially in Eisenhower's second term.
 18
 
Eisenhower and Dulles had many other concerns besides the Soviets.  Eisenhower and 
Dulles promoted a European Defense Community (EDC) which require the Allies to shoulder 
more of their own defense.  The EDC was not popular, in part because the US was willing to 
grant control of nuclear weapons.
19
 In the Pacific. Dulles took a very hard-line against Red China 
and believed in the „domino‟ theory, which held that Communist gains in one country would 
destabilize neighboring countries,  He understood that there were differences between China and 
Russia but did not realize how serious that friction was.  He famously refused to shake Red 
Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai‟s hand in 1954, which the Chinese took as a national 
insult.  Dulles offered only passive support for the French in Indochina, but he also laid 
groundwork for American involvement.  He also understood that anti-communist partners like 
Korean president Syngman Rhee could be harsh, corrupt and unreliable partners.
20
   
Britain and France tried to maintain their empires and used unattractive tactics that cost 
them support in the colonies, even if they were popular at home.  Dulles extended only reluctant 
support for the British in Egypt, Iran and Iraq, while also approving initiatives to gain American 
influence in the Mideast.  He had respect but dwindling patience for British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollett.
21
   He developed a particularly strong rapport 
with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who remained in office throughout Dulles‟s 
term.  Adenauer was very pro-American and Dulles had confidence in his leadership.  Both 
leaders were disappointed when the other Allies resisted their strong lobbying for a European 
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Defense Community, which would have eased American commitments in Europe, furthered 
European integration and bolstered West-German resistance to invasion from the East.
22
 
Adenauer won a skillful victory in gaining West German admission to NATO in 1954.  
Although both East and West were interested in neutral, unified Germany, the potential 
advantages of a armed portion of Germany were also attractive.  As Policy Planning Staff head 
Robert Bowie had told Dulles in 195, neither side wanted to risk all of Germany deciding the 
balance of European power,.
23
  At the Geneva summit, Adenauer attempted to make German 
unification the central issue, even though he was not a participant.  But the East Germans 
upstaged him by signing a 'treaty of recognition' in Moscow.  This fell short of the peace treaty 
but did not please Ambassador Bohlen or the Western Heads. The Federal Republic of  Germany 
(FRG) responded with the Hallstein doctrine: the FRG reserved the right to break relations with 
countries recognizing the German Democratic Republic (GDR).   Adenauer advanced his own 
plan for a demilitarized Germany, but found little interest.
24
  
  NATO's formation inspired Khrushchev to organize the USSR's East European satellites 
into the Warsaw Pact later that year.  First Secretary Walter Ulbricht‟s East Germany lagged 
behind the West and its neighbors.  Ulbricht complained that Soviet reparation demands had not 
helped, nor did the continuing exodus of skilled workers to the West.  The Soviets had little more 
patience than Dulles did with his weaker partners and allowed only limited independence.  Its 
economy was arguably more dynamic than the British and French, though the Soviet Union's 
political status was still that of a junior nation.
 25
 Within the Warsaw Pact, nations like Poland 
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had less strict controls than East Germany, partly because their leaders were not as hard-line as 
Ulbricht.  Even the Soviets advised Ulbricht that he could improve production with some 
relaxation, especially in the post-Stalin era. 
26
 Other satellites like Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
attempted considerably more independence, which would in 1956 result in harsh Soviet reprisal 
with Ulbricht‟s warm approval. 
 Tensions relaxed enough that leaders of same nations who had gathered at Yalta 
to convene a Four Power Summit in Geneva in 1955.  Eisenhower, Soviet Premier Bulganin, 
French President Edgar Faure and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden met in hopes of relaxed 
global tensions but without a fixed agenda.  Soviet authority Vladimir Zubok says the Soviets, 
then in good relations with their Chinese rivals, wanted to assert their leadership in the 
Communist world and to probe Western unity, particularly on Germany.
27
 The West had no 
common front, because there were no real issues of specific common interest, except in the most 
general terms.  The most substantive problems were Germany and disarmament, but all sides 
were very apprehensive about unfocused discussions that might lead to unwelcome 
commitments.
28
  Moreover Dulles and Eden were personally antagonistic to each other, Faure‟s 
authority was uncertain, and the West Germans anxiously tried to project influence.  Eisenhower 
mostly wanted to showcase his „Open Skies‟ program for UN-supervised aerial inspections, 
which he hoped would slow the expensive arms race, which was costing the US about $300 
billion a year or 10% of GDP.
29
  
Disarmament, peaceful exchange and normalized trade were discussed superficially, but 
there were few agreements that could be signed.  Bulganin was head of the Soviet state in an 
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ornamental sense only and had no real negotiating authority.  Party Secretary Khrushchev 
represented the real power and controlled Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko who did the 
practical negotiating.
30
  Khrushchev nearly disrupted the conference with his denunciation of 
Open Skies as a sinister American scheme  Eisenhower and Dulles were disappointed by their 
allies‟ lackluster support and inability to work together.  Russian obstruction and British and 
French weakness and self-interest seriously discouraged the American president and his 
Secretary of State from further summit negotiation for the foreseeable future.  Khrushchev 
mistakenly thought Eisenhower was Dulles' puppet but realized that the United States 
represented the West's decisive strength.  He wanted to pursue bilateral talks with the Americans 




Neither Eisenhower or Dulles  were impressed by Khrushchev and they were not 
convinced of Soviet good intentions. These  doubts were only worsened by crises involving 
Hungary and the Suez Canal the next year.  In the meantime both Eisenhower and Khrushchev 
had to validate their leadership for the rest of the decade.  Eisenhower won re-election on a 
campaign of peace through toughness with the Russians, coupled with a reasonable pursuit of 
peace and restrained military spending.
32
  Adlai Stevenson raised the new issue of atmospheric 
nuclear testing,  which Eisenhower thought a necessary danger, he did not have the president‟s 
charisma.
33
  Eisenhower's most pressing concerns after re-election were domestic, not foreign 
policy related. Civil rights cases, notably involving housing and school segregation, and an 
economic recession would not mobilize support for  military intervention.  Eisenhower resisted 
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calls for major military actions in Iraq and other areas in 1957 and 1958. Nor did Eisenhower did 




 In 1956, Berlin appeared to be a stable situation.  The Operations Coordinating 
Group of the National Security Council observed, in NSC No.174, that the Soviets were 
gradually transferring more jurisdictional authority to the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany)., including "police and protective powers of control over East German borders and 
lines of communication to the Western garrisons in Berlin."  NSC174 also noted the Soviets 
were trying to formalize the partition of Germany and "prevent reunification except on terms 
promoting Communist control of all Germany," a policy seen at Geneva and continuing 
afterward.  GDR internal security had toughened, they noted, even as their economy deteriorated.  
Since Geneva, the report said, the Western allies had reaffirmed their goal of German 
reunification and repudiated USSR-GDR agreements of September 1955, recognizing a divided 
Germany.  Those agreements were seen as part of a long term strategy to force Western 
recognition, but no near-term East-bloc action on Germany was anticipated.
35
 
Nikita Khrushchev‟s charisma was a much blunter instrument than Eisenhower‟s.  He 
secured his power by 1955 through convincing both party and military factions that he would 
stand up to the Americans while still expanding Soviet influence and trade through peaceful 
means.
36
   One of his first moves was to make clear that the Soviet Union would ensure that East 
Germany remain a separate Communist state.
37
  With his speech denouncing Stalin at the secret 
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 Party Conference in Moscow in 1956, he signaled liberalization and modernization.
38
  But 
his authorization of brutal Soviet suppression of Hungarian  resistance showed that  his  reforms 
had strict limits.  Hard-line factions remained influential.  The military was particularly 
suspicious of Khrushchev because he wanted to cut conventional forces in favor of nuclear 
weapons and missiles.
39
  The Red Chinese and Yugoslavians were also increasingly critical of 
Khrushchev's foreign policy, including both his intervention in Hungary and  overtures to 
negotiate with the West.
40
  Khrushchev‟s talk of peaceful coexistence outraged Chairman Mao 
Zedong, who exploited it for propaganda favoring his own leadership in the Communist world.  
Walter Ulbricht was among those, such as the Albanians, sympathetic to Mao‟s denunciation of 
the new Soviet direction.
41
     
De-Stalinization was Khrushchev‟s project but the initiative also reflected widespread 
desire for some kind of closure on the old terror.  Hard-line reaction was contained by public 
desire for consumer goods, less threat of war, and better social conditions.  Khrushchev  travelled 
throughout the Communist bloc and made overtures to Third World leaders  like India's 
Jawarahal Nehru and Egypt's Gamel Nasser.
42
 Khrushchev assumed the title Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers which signified that, like Stalin, he embodied the Party and the state 
leadership.  He expanded the Praesidium to include his supporters but tightened the Central 
Committee to give him closer oversight.  Khrushchev was a good party administrator, but an 
erratic executive.  He embarked on several expensive and troublesome ventures.  He intensified 
Soviet missile research which helped the Soviets to launch the first orbital space vehicle, 
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  The missile program survived many tribulations, including a launch-pad 
explosion which wiped out many top engineers and military men.  Khrushchev tried to open new 
agricultural lands with his „Virgin Lands‟ program but the costly program bred only 
environmental ruin.  He banked on increased production, the absence of which aggravated 
shortfalls caused by other agricultural mistakes and drought.  By 1958, Khrushchev was the 
single most powerful Soviet leader but still lacked Stalin‟s absolute authority.
44
  
Khrushchev gradually gained foreign policy experience while securing his leadership in 
1957-58.  Within days of weathering intense criticism for his crackdown on Hungary, he noisily 
interfered in the Suez Canal crisis.  Neither episode enhanced his international prestige; he was 
criticized by both the liberal West and Communist East.  Public opinion in the peripheral nations 
was harder to gauge but clearly the Soviet leader had embarrassed both himself and his nation.  
Old-line Bolsheviks  - the "Anti-Party group" - attempted a coup in 1957 and Khrushchev soon 
purged military rival Marshal Zhukov, the only Soviet leader who knew Eisenhower well.
45
 
 Fortunately for Khrushchev, he had a knack for ignoring his errors and shifting attention 
to bold new moves.  He needed to sustain momentum, confound the opposite camp when he 
wished their assistance for their plans, and silence rivals with decisive action.  He was a fearless 
face to face negotiator in many encounters, especially when he thought he had some advantage, 
as with the Red Chinese.
46
  Though Mao was able to humiliate Khrushchev, Mao was unable to 
operate outside of China.  Khrushchev furthered Soviet influence in the 1950s to a degree more 
than Stalin had. This was an advantage for the Soviet leader, but he had to work vigorously to 
exploit this edge.  Khrushchev became visibly critical over what he considered as Chinese 
                                                 
43
 Matthew Brezinski, Red Star Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Age ( New York: 
Henry Holt, 2007), p. 52-54. 
44
 Edward  Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career (New York: Avon Books, 1966), p.266-67. 
45
 Sergei Khrushchev, Creation of a Superpower, p. 211;234;244;249. 
46




adventurism in episodes such as the Chinese shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu.   But he also knew he had to challenge the West, though it would help if he could be seen 
as just and peaceful in his demands.  In 1958, he revived the issue of a divided Germany, which 




In 1957 and 1958, the Allies slowly repaired relations badly fractured over Suez.  
American reluctance to intervene was compounded by poor relations between Anthony Eden and 
Dulles.  Eisenhower still had little confidence in the other Allied leaders and was long since 
impatient with their refusal to end their colonial empires.  The post-Suez ascension of Harold 
Macmillan and Charles De Gaulle to power in Britain and France offered hope that cooperation 
could be set back on track.
48
  Konrad Adenauer remained Chancellor in the FRG and had made 
tentative contact with the Soviets.  In 1957, the Western allies had formed Four-Power 
(UK/US/FRG/France) working groups to discuss issues like collective security, disarmament, 
and collective security.  Dulles sought to treat these subjects discretely but because they were 
fundamentally related, the working groups only made fractious progress trying to deal with them 
separately.  The Germans clearly thought the issues had to be considered together.
49
  The 
inefficiency of the 4-power working groups and the problem of dealing with inter-related topics 
separately forecast problems that would best the Allies throughout the coming crisis over Berlin.  
Direct negotiations with Khrushchev, on the other hand, seemed all but impossible.  His 
mercurial temperament and un-tempered stubbornness  were obstacles enough, but his proposals 
offered no attraction for the West. Along with very low-key ambassadorial contacts, the annual 
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United Nations sessions represented the extent of US-Soviet diplomatic engagement. 
Eisenhower's response to mid-1958 overtures from Khrushchev for a summit, was that UN 
Security Council meetings were the only summits needed.
50
  The UN also provided an umbrella 
to begin arms-control talks. By 1957, the US and Soviets, along with other nations, had begun 
low-level, UN-sponsored nuclear arms control panel discussions.  Public concern, along with the 
costs and hazards of nuclear deterrence spurred new interest in disarmament.  Talks held in 
Geneva in July 1958 determined that atomic tests could be monitored with a global net of 
inspection stations.  Further Geneva conference sessions were held a few months later, but the 
US and Soviets rushed to complete as many tests possible in the Operation Hardtack series in 
late 1958.  These included not only atmospheric testing of then high yield 9 megaton hydrogen 
bombs, but the first delivery of a thermonuclear warhead by a missile, an Atlas-Redstone rocket, 
for explosion beyond the atmosphere.
51
 
Berlin and Germany seemed quiet issues, though Konrad Adenauer wanted a nuclear 
deterrent, even if under American control.  NSC No. 5803, issued on February 1958 detailed 
how the West Germans (Federal Republic of Germany or FRG) had been contributing steadily 
smaller shares of their NATO defense costs, while receiving larger amounts of US support( $408 
million fiscal 1957).  Overall, defense spending on West Germany had increased and that trend 
was expected to continue.  The increase costs were borne disproportionally by the US. The FRG, 
noted the report, was limited in arms development and production by the Brussels Treaty (which 
established NATO), but was thought to be exploring nuclear weapons development with France 
and Italy, as well as developing and manufacturing their own short-range missiles.  The US did 
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not encourage the weapons research but did encourage the missile development.  The FRG had 
indicated they wanted more missiles integrated into their territorial defense systems. 
52
 
 Existing treaties obliged the Western allies to defend Berlin if access was 
blockaded but the UK and France would be reluctant to take forceful action unless absolutely 
necessary.  Two important points are spelled out: "if either side miscalculates, the situation could 
easily grow into war, even though neither side desires it" and "most courses of action can be 
carried out only with the united effort of the allies."  However, they note, "although US actions 
must seek to retain Allied cooperation, the United Sates must be prepared to act alone if this will 
serve its best interests."  The report also observes that "the period between initiation of 
aggressive actions and the 'showdown' is likely to be short."  No imminent action was forecast; 
recommendations included improved intelligence gathering, a visible commitment of support for 
West Berlin and persuasion of the France and Britain to adopt US policies on Berlin.
53
                                                                                                                                                
 Nuclear weapons on East and West German territory were central to the security 
equations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but neither side was comfortable with their reliance on 
this deterrent.  In 1958, Nikita Khrushchev was concerned that NATO had approved the 
stationing of missiles in West Germany, just as East Germany  was also receiving nuclear 
missiles strictly under Moscow's control.  Walter Ulbricht was pressuring Khrushchev for 
economic assistance and an end to the refugee exodus through West Berlin.
54
 These concerns, 
along with other problems,  led him to re-open the German question in November 1958, through 
the issue of Allied occupation troops in West Berlin and a treaty to recognize a permanently 
divided Germany.
55
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   Chapter 1: " A Free City," November 1958 - May 1959 
 
Introduction  
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev‟s 1958-59 proposals to remove Western troops 
from Berlin and revise the existing German settlement challenged the balance of power in 
Europe and Western allied unity.  The United States could not allow Khrushchev to unilaterally 
abrogate the Potsdam occupation agreements without a serious erosion of American influence in 
Europe.
56
  President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had to 
reconcile longstanding goals, such as the reunification of Germany and  reduced troop presence 
in Europe, with the difficulties of effectively using military force to assert Allied treaty rights.   
They pragmatically pursued a diplomatic solution that consistently resisted pressure from 
Allied and U.S. military leaders to exercise force.  In the early stages of the conflict, Dulles‟ 
personal command of the situation neutralized military assertiveness.  When Dulles was replaced 
by Christian Herter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made a more determined effort to extend their 
influence.  But Eisenhower was not going to change course at a point when negotiations were 
indicating a near-term resolution to the crisis.
57
  At the same time, the President made it clear to 
the Soviets that the United States would not allow its occupation rights to be nullified.   
This restrained but tough course maintained the viability of the status quo in Germany 
without armed conflict.  It provided cautious hope for diplomatic resolution of Berlin's status and 
the German question.  The United States was able to neutralize the Soviet threat without 
unacceptable retreat or use of force.   
Thus, most of the US and Soviet actions regarding Berlin were conducted at the 
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diplomatic level.  Khrushchev‟s November 28 proposal to for a Western withdrawal from Berlin 
and a new German settlement was a diplomatic challenge not a military confrontation.
 58
  
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles went to Europe in December for consultations with 
America‟s European allies. From these meetings, the US, France, Britain and West Germany 
drafted communiqués  and delivered them to the Soviets at year‟s end.
59
 Soviet Deputy Premier 
Anastas Mikoyan visited Washington in January to present a more belligerent and impatient 
response, including a draft German peace treaty.
 60
  In response, the ailing Dulles made a final 
trip to Europe in February to restore some Allied coherence.
61
  However, Prime Minister Sir 
Harold Macmillan‟s subsequent solo venture to Moscow
62
 and other differences during March
63
 
skewed these gains to some degree.    
Dulles‟s cautions to French President Charles DeGaulle and West German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer for coolness and flexibility strained  Allied relations.  But his patience also 
established a framework for his replacement, Acting Secretary Christian Herter, to build upon. 
Direct diplomatic contact continued between the US and USSR throughout the spring of 1959, 
including further tough hints from Moscow about their own nuclear resolve.
64
  The worst was 
over by then.  By late April, tensions with the East and among the allies dissipated in the 
preparations for Foreign Minister‟s Conference between the US, the USSR, Britain, France, and 
Germany
65
.  These talks also provided some opportunity for one of Khrushchev‟s key aims, high 
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level bilateral talks with the U.S., involving “some questions worthy of examination.”
66
 
This brief summary of the November 1958 to May 1959 diplomatic events does not 
challenge conventional interpretations.  We have to closely examine the original material on 
which the  interpretations are based  The archival records and relevant historiography covering 
this Cold War show the difficulty of coordinating military action with the Allies. Confusion and 
uncertainty over the effectiveness of force were principal reasons for choosing negotiations.  
Another reason was the essentially diplomatic foundation of the original 1945 agreements on 
Berlin.  The Allied powers, in fact, made adherence to these agreements the cornerstone of their 




 The record provides copious examples of Dulles‟s emphasis on considering force during 
Berlin II as an option of last resort.  The evidence contradicts the image of Dulles as a 
“brinksman” who aggravated tensions.  Instead, he enforced a general discipline of diplomatic 
and military restraint.  That discipline, of course, carried the ultimate authority of the President.  
Eisenhower succeeded at an important level in making the Soviet Premier wait before getting his 
summit meeting.  He used the seasoned coolness of Dulles and his deputies to ensure that there 
was a low risk of war.  He did not want closer encounters with Khrushchev until Soviet attitudes 
improved.  
 
Background to Khrushchev's Ultimatum 
Actual military hostilities leading to this period began with a rash of US-East German 
confrontations at Berlin inter-zonal checkpoints in August and September over inspection issues. 
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These were minor but messy. On September 13, the East Germans detained a British Soldier at 
Helmstedt checkpoint, then transferred him to a Soviet car for delivery to Marienborn.  There, he 
was released at the British checkpoint.
68
 A West German man was beaten by the East Germans 
when he attempted to return to the U.S. sector at Dresdener Strasse crossing on September19.   
An East German crowd gathered and interceded on the man‟s behalf to help him escape; he took 
an East German truncheon with him but returned it, although the volkspoleizei refused to return 
the man‟s identification papers.
69
   
 David Bruce, the US Ambassador in Bonn,  requested hat Washington allow them 
authority to take 'prompt and decisive action' short of military intervention.  Bruce noted that 
military action would not improve the situation but taking no action would be 'inviting' further 
incidents.
70
  US Embassy Counselor Bernard Gufler urged that a diplomatic response should 
emphasize that Soviet occupation responsibilities included guaranteed inter-zonal access for 
Berliners.
71
  On the 24th,two American soldiers on an East German train were detained, as were 
British soldiers who had strayed into East Berlin a few days While the harassments did not 
appear to be planned, Soviet complicity may have represented a testing of Western willingness to 
insist on a strict interpretation of the occupation agreements.  Those protocols dated from 
Potsdam and had been clarified in 1949 after the airlift. 
The continued exodus of East Germans through Berlin to the Western sectors and 
resettlement outside of the Communist domain caused growing friction.
72
  The loss of so many 
professional and skilled workers annoyed the East German authorities who started taking their 
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frustrations out on hapless American soldiers.  Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, “The 
resulting drain of workers was creating a simply disastrous situation.”  He added, “If things had 
continued much longer like this, I don‟t know what would have happened.”
73
 
Pre-November access incidents were taken very seriously by the US mission in Bonn and 
in Washington.  These incidents almost exclusively involved US personnel.  While worrisome, 
they still did not directly suggest an imminent regional conflict.   Just a few weeks before the 
crisis, the NSC had approved a new master policy statement, for West Germany, Berlin, and East 
Germany which did not anticipate any near-term change in Berlin‟s status quo. 
74
 NSC 5803 
reflected no change in inter-German relations.  It put the blame for reunification‟s stalled 
progress firmly at the Soviet door and expressed concern over the alternative concept of 
confederation.  The report touted Berlin‟s economic recovery and downplayed Communist 
provocations as diversions to aid East German morale and Walter Ulbricht‟s power.  NSC 5803 
did not anticipate active, imminent conflict over Berlin.  Only two active-response strategic 
options were discussed: nuclear deterrence and small-scale conventional war.  Soviet efforts to 
transfer occupational authority to the GDR were dismissed as a propaganda effort more than a 
diplomatic problem. 
75
   
Even though Germany did not loom as an expected theater of war in mid-1958, Dulles 
had already been studying concepts of limited war with nuclear weapons.  A July 3, 1957 memo 
from State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS) director Gerard Smith to his PPS colleague 
Elgon Matthews noted that Secretary Dulles was impatient with Defense limited-war papers.  
Dulles thought “military matters should be an instrument of political policy and not vice versa.”   
                                                 
73
 Nikita S. Khrushchev, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbot, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co.,1970), p. 454-55. 
74






Smith also thought the Secretary‟s thinking was becoming “more fluid”, seen in his disagreement 
with the military doctrine that limited war capacity varied directly with total war capacity.
76
   
These memo records may refer to the “The Philosophy of Limited War,” a brief for a meeting of 
State‟s Army Policy Council dated 9 October, 1957.   This paper is notable for its references to 
private strategists like Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger, and because of the way it defines the 
terms limited war: “one in which…one or more restrictions applies in some degree”.
 77
   
Limited-war doctrines represented a transition from the massive retaliation doctrines 
Dulles had been long been identified with and Eisenhower.  These restrictions in Germany would 
include protection of civilians and vital infrastructure, logistic difficulties in fielding large 
conventional forces, difficulties in holding territory and political considerations.  Limited war 
options included tactical nuclear weapons delivered by artillery, fighter-bombers, short and 
medium range missiles.
78
  General war would entail use of intercontinental bombers and 
submarines, which the United States had advantages in.  Even after Khrushchev's force 
reductions, the Soviets still had overwhelming infantry and artillery advantages already in East 
Germany and much shorter supply lines from home.  The Soviets, it was thought, might also be 
trying to build an ICBM  missile fleet to outmatch the West's fast long-range jet bombers like the 
new B-52 and British Vulcan. 
An April 1958 protest by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko over U-2  
surveillance was an early indicator of Soviet jumpiness over missile construction.
 79
  The Soviet 
leadership, especially Khrushchev. was very apprehensive about any form of inspection on their 
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territory.  Aerial inspections, such as Eisenhower had suggested both sides carry out under an 
'Open Skies'  policy were particularly unacceptable.
80
  Khrushchev considered U-2 flights as a 
calculated territorial insult.  In August 1957, a U-2 had located the launch site of the mammoth  
R-7 booster rocket which would a few months later launch the Sputnik satellite.  That 
development would allow photographic surveillance from space within five years, but in the 
meantime the U-2 would be a most valuable but risky intelligence tool  for the United States.  
Khrushchev had accelerated development of the SA-2 surface-to-air missiles capable of reaching 
the U-2's 70,000 foot cruising altitude.
81
  Those missiles would later have considerable disruptive 
influence when they brought down U-2s before the Paris Summit and during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 
Limited war doctrines were still not influential on Dulles and Eisenhower, neither of 
whom sought US combat situations, but neither of whom would relinquish US options for 
massive nuclear deterrence.  Despite his own earlier hawkishness, Dulles had become impatient 
with those who refused to consider the inherent limits of particular conflicts.  Germany was such 
a case.  Dulles was becoming increasingly aware that the threat of war was often more 
constraining than anticipated.  He had little confidence in the feasibility of limiting nuclear 
combat.  The new private strategists like Kissinger chided Dulles‟ over-reliance on massive 
assured destruction.
82
 But he was skeptical of optimistic scenarios of tactical nuclear force. He 
understood how rapidly a local war could spark a general war.  The Eisenhower administration 
had already avoided intervention in several limited wars, notably in Suez and Hungary in 1956.   
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Private debate over defense force structure and spending, such as emanated from the 
Council for Foreign Relations, did have some influence over the development of American 
strategic policy. America‟s ability to project force remained a topic of much discussion.  By the 
next year‟s Fourth of July, 1958, Smith and Matthews were preparing yet another updated set of 
limited war options, this time explicitly incorporating nuclear capabilities.  Days before, Defense 
officials had optimistically estimated that limited nuclear exchanges would last no more than 30-
60 days.
83
  But under questioning, they admitted that these estimates had not been based on the 
certain probability of in-kind retaliation.  
Scenarios about possible small wars were still largely theoretical in 1958.  Limited wars 
seemed more likely in post-colonial hostile situations.  The U.S. did not yet have any large scale 
involvements to shore up colonial regimes.  Deployments in response to unexpected provocation 
were the exception rather than the rule. The few military interventions Eisenhower had approved 
were intended to be demonstrations of surgical precision, like the deployment of the U.S. Army 
and Marines to Lebanon.
84
  Laos was beginning to loom as a possible new theater of combat, but 
Germany seemed an improbable battleground.  US occupation forces were usually just doing 
routine base  duty, such as the jeep-driving GI Elvis Presley.  Containment in Europe maintained 
a tolerable status quo , except for the flood of refugees from East Germany.  
Several incidents in September involving inspections at border checkpoints may have 
forecast increased hostilities over Berlin.  These were apparently instigated by the East German 
volkspolizei with a least tacit Soviet approval.  A message from Ambassador David Bruce to 
Dulles on September 2 details a proposed note, planned in conjunction with the British and 
French, to the Soviets, “bring to your attention serious situation concerning life in this city…(re) 
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measures now being imposed”  by permitting them, the Soviet authorities are deepening the 
division of Germany”.
85
  The same day, an American soldier had his camera taken at an 
inspection point by the vopos.  He struck back at a vopo who then, in pursuit of the soldier” 
crossed the checkpoint barrier into the West.  When told by the West Germans that he was now 
on their territory, the East German fled back across the border with the American‟s camera.
86
   
Further tripartite meeting summaries reveal that such harassment had become an ongoing 
problem.   British Foreign Service counselor Peter Wilkinson observed, “unless we were 
prepared to submit to Soviet inspection procedures, we will probably be blockading ourselves in 
Berlin.”
87
  At a meeting with acting Soviet political advisor Shilov two days later, the U.S. 
embassy‟s legal counselor Bernard Gufler “emphasized increasing brutality of Soviet sector 
police.”   Shilov replied that, “this was a matter entirely outside Soviet competence”.  He then 
cited a similar incident the previous month as evidence of the Soviet distancing themselves from 
responsibility for security in Berlin.  When the US advisor inquired whether Shilov‟s statement 
constituted definite unilateral abrogation of Soviet obligation to protect members Western allied 
forces while in East Berlin, Shilov answered affirmatively.  He said he “could not use influence 
to return camera, matter out of his control.” 
88
  In quadripartite (US/Britain/France/FRG) 
meetings a  few days later, West Germany‟s Dr. Northe stated that the “Germans were impressed 
with apparent confusion in GDR circles on East German prerogatives re controlling passage into 
East German enclave.” 
89
  There may have been a slight breakdown between responsible East 
German and Soviet diplomatic and military authorities.  The provocations were mainly against 
Allied military personnel, but there was no clear chain of command for the West to address their 
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complaints.  The situation had neither a ready military nor diplomatic remedy. 
  At this point, Dulles sent the Bonn mission an excerpt from his September 9 news 
conference, which he directed to be forwarded to West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt.  Brandt 
queried Dulles: “Mr. Secretary, is it a fair understanding that …you and the President regarded 
the threat of aggression in Quemoy and Matsu equal to the threat to the Western World in Berlin 
and…are we again prepared to resist aggression?”  Dulles replied: “…the two situations are 
comparable…Perhaps Berlin is another example of a forward position which…could not be lost 
in the face of a frontal attack without consequences which were unacceptable.
90
  
 Unfortunately, the situation did continue to deteriorate at the local level, chiefly because 
of East German efforts during August and September 1958 to incorporate the neighborhood of 
Steinstuecken, near the outer border of West Berlin, into their jurisdiction.  This de facto 
redrawing of the Potsdam-authorized borders was a serious concern in its own right, magnified 
because of the unstable inspection and checkpoint climate.
 91
  In a message of concern from the 
embassy to Dulles and other missions and military installations, Bruce specifically emphasized 
that, “approval for the use of armed forces must emanate from the highest level of the US 
government.”   He also noted that “the time required to obtain this authority after an act of 
aggression would preclude effective and timely reaction on the part of the US in Steinestucken.”  
Despite the dilemma of needing to be able to „take immediate action with…deliberate 
violations,” Bruce stated forcefully that “not think it essential ... (US Berlin Commander) be 
given prior and unconditional authority to undertake military action”  He concluded 
pessimistically that “one constant factor is that there is no REPEAT no stable modus vivendi in 
Berlin…only proposal might improve situation would be (if) generally known that if incursion 
                                                 
90
 Dulles cable to Bonn, September 10, 1958, 762.0221/9-858, Box 3534, RG 59, NARA. 
91




took place US armed force would be used to restore situation.” Bruce concluded, “for all 
practical purposes, our position is not such we can improve it fundamentally from military 
standpoint. …situation hardly conducive to that.” 
92
 However, over some objections from both 
Allies and the JCS, Dulles would only consider possibly conducting a light “garrison” airlift of 
essential military and diplomatic personnel and materiel.  
A more serious interruption took place on October 8 at Marienborn checkpoint when 
Soviet, not East German, guards detained a large US truck and its driver.   Bernard Gufler 
protested to the new Soviet political advisor Colonel Dimitri Markushkin.   Markushkin‟s 
frequent cooperation with Bruce was generally a great asset to both sides all through Berlin II. 
Though Markushkin could also be unhelpful when his superiors so directed, he helped in this 
case.  The truck was released the same day.  The Steinestuecken dispute continued to occupy 
much of the US mission‟s attention particularly from October 22 to 28. 
93
 On November 23, 
Ambassador David Bruce issued general instructions that no inspection challenges, unauthorized 
convoys, or retaliations of any kind were to be attempted by US personnel.  He concluded with 
this sobering caution: “any course of action designed to maintain freedom of Berlin will finally 
depend upon our determination, if necessary to use force.”
94
   
 Contingency planning for armed combat over Berlin and along the inter-German borders 
was challenging for both the US and USSR.  Restrictions included the necessity to limit 
collateral damage to civilians, economic assets, and infrastructure.  A confined war zone could 
nullify force advantages.  The USSR‟s in situ advantages in conventional war assets were well 
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  The Americans would be limited by their inability to match and 
mobilize conventional assets into the region quickly.   Military targets for all parties would have 
to be selected very carefully.  The Soviets had had an awkward time in both Poland and Hungary 
in 1956, and was now wary of heavy tactics.  Their relations with the East Germans had been 
strained ever since 1953.  East German leader Walter Ulbricht complained to Khrushchev that he 
needed economic help as well as assistance in stemming the refugee problem.  Khrushchev 




Khrushchev's  November Speeches 
 By the fall of 1958, the Soviets had begun installations for R-5 ballistic missile systems 
in East Germany near Berlin.  These intermediate-range missiles (IRBM) could reach Paris and 
London and gave the Soviets a forward based rapid-delivery nuclear capability to match the 
West's.
97
 That capability, along with strong Soviet conventional force advantage, gave 
Khrushchev the muscle to back up his proposals.  He wanted to remove the "bone in the throat" 
of the West's Berlin occupation troops within East Germany.  In a speech at Moscow's Sports 
Palace on November 10, Khrushchev announced his intent to sign a separate peace treaty with 
East Germany.  This treaty would supersede the Potsdam accords, nullifying the basis for 
occupation.  Berlin would be transformed into a neutral 'free city.'  He set a six-month deadline 
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Consultations with European allies in the days after Khrushchev‟s November 10  p, 
indicated wide divergence of opinion about practical options.
99
  The United States and British 
urged an immediate strong note of protest be sent but the French were reluctant to respond 
immediately.  West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt, noting that the Allies seemed to be caught off 
guard, urged the West German government in Bonn to break off diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
100
 The Europeans wondered if the Americans would abandon Germany for better 
relations with the Soviets. The Americans wondered if the European allies, including West 
Germans, had any idea what the costs of conflict would be.  If one of Khrushchev‟s aims, which 
might include summit talks with the U.S., was to sow dissension among the American, French, 
British and West Germans, as US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed, the gambit was 
succeeding. 
101
 Dulles would demonstrate that Allied unity was a greater priority for Eisenhower 
than accommodating the Soviets.  That unity included visible solidarity with West Germany.
102
  
US Ambassador In Bonn David Bruce told Dulles that he believed it "unlikely that (Khrushchev) 
would carry his purpose to the bitter end." Instead, Khrushchev wanted "to force a summit 
conference and to create an epoch of detente which he needs for his economic plans." 
103
   
 Dulles was in no hurry to involve the West in a Berlin conflict where they had 
about 11,000 troops against the East's 38,000 in the immediate Berlin vicinity.  Hoping to defuse 
Khrushchev's demands through compromise, he made public comments that the West could 
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consider some East German border presence as 'agents' of the Soviet Union.
104
  This would not 
be a major concession in practical terms, but anything that implied recognition of East Germany 
was anathema in Bonn and West Berlin.  This flexibility on Dulles part, reflecting Eisenhower's 
own inclinations, was an early indication of the tactics he would try to set as basic Western 
strategy to deal with Khrushchev.  Already, however, the US ran into resistance from the West 




Khrushchev underscored the seriousness of his intent with a formal statement of his 
peace treaty/free city demands which he had his ambassadors deliver on November 28.   
Although the West Germans remained suspicious of Dulles' flexibility on the 'agency' principle, 
Ambassador Bruce found general interest in negotiations that might lead to serious reunification 
discussions. 
106
 The French saw only three options, all unviable - refusing the note, finding a 
Berlin-only solution or attempting an all-German plebiscite wanted to delay any response 
pending inter-allied consultation. 
107
 Talking with French ambassador Herve Alphand in 
Washington, Dulles noted the overtly hostile tone of the new Soviet statement.  He said there 
would have to be tripartite discussions in December, when the Western foreign ministers would 
be in Paris for NATO sessions.  In practice, Dulles would have to temper French attempts to lock 
the West into difficult stances that hindered negotiation. 
108
 The West Germans would not 
participate yet in these meetings because they were not occupying powers  in Berlin.  In coming 
months, they became much more involved in negotiations, though indirectly.   
The tripartite focus on Berlin tied in with French President Charles de Gaulle's 
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inclinations.  Dulles used that angle to get the French interested in a negotiated Berlin solution. 
For the moment, the British reaction seemed more calm and steady than the US's other European 
allies but they would seen by seen as too willing to negotiate.   Unlike Eisenhower or de Gaulle, 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan would send a personal letter to Khrushchev, on 





Importance of Individuals in the Berlin Situation 
 Khrushchev's individual nature and personality would be the most decisive and constant 
element of the whole Berlin campaign, but his Western counterparts were also very distinctive, 
experienced politicians and national leaders.  Charles de Gaulle's  ascension to the French 
Presidency three months earlier already portended trouble for Washington.  De Gaulle had 
already indicated to Eisenhower and the new British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that he 
wanted a triumvirate of Anglo-French-American global leadership, to which NATO would be 
subordinate.  Convinced that Khrushchev did not want war, de Gaulle hoped to lead the West's 
Berlin response away from the negotiations Macmillan wanted. 
110
  West German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer was eager to establish good relations with de Gaulle, as was the General, and 
maintain a united front against Communist expansion.   Adenauer and Khrushchev were already 
adversaries, veteran but excitable politicians who used each other for propaganda.
111
  The West 
Germans, along with the Belgians, Dutch, Italians and the rest of NATO, including the US and 
Britain, viewed de Gaulle's vision with apprehension.  Macmillan had his own dreams of 
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restoring British influence and US ties after the setbacks of Suez.  Eisenhower had a more 
reserved but still authoritative  style of leadership, made possible by his military background.  Of 
these Allied leaders, only Eisenhower had any experience with Khrushchev and even that had 
been limited to the strained formal settings of the Vienna summit.
 112
 
What were Khrushchev‟s other aims, besides discord and a new summit?  Would they 
limit his tactics? Not even his fellow Russians knew.
113
  Certainly he did not want a total war, 
and probably not even limited war.  He had not been pleased with the few limited war situations, 
like Hungary, the Soviets had gotten embroiled in on his watch.  Like Eisenhower, he had 
trimmed conventional bases and forces and even moderated heavy arms purchasing.  He needed 
to preserve imposing conventional strength, yet keep costs manageable.
114
   The Soviet force in 
East Germany included theater nuclear missiles requested by Ulbricht.  Khrushchev had to 
mollify Ulbricht who was losing control over Berlin as thousands of educated workers fled west.  
German unification had essentially been a moot question since the establishment of the German 
Democratic Republic and Warsaw Pact and the growing viability of West Germany as a renewed 
commercial and political power.  Khrushchev‟s surprise proposals for a new Berlin and German 
settlement may not have been realistic, but they offered some  political advantages.
115
  Ulbricht‟s 
complaints about the drain of human resources from Berlin to the West had to be addressed.
116
   
Berlin was the one place where Russia and the Western Powers were all still in close contact.   
By focusing his challenge there, Khrushchev could also advance several domestic and 
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Communist-sphere aims, including reinforcing his strength with the new Politburo.
117
  In 
challenging the Potsdam agreement, he could challenge the final European judgment of the War, 
and recognize a new status quo with two independent Germanys and a non-aligned Berlin under 
UN auspices.
118
  He wanted to be seen as a peacemaker.  Berlin was increasingly viewed by both 
the Americans and Russians as something of a liability - symbolic but dysfunctional.  It was a 
safe target for political provocation.  Berlin would be especially attractive if it could be acquired 
without any danger to the Cold War landscape.  He hoped it might be worth a U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
summit meeting to Eisenhower as ransom for continued access.   Culturally symbolic and 
functionally superfluous, it could be demanded without disrupting essential commerce and 
contact.  The Warsaw Pact countries could be brought forth as diplomatic partners.  Eastern 
European involvement would especially bother the West European allies, who tried to avoid 
initiatives like the Polish Rapacki plan.  That plan would have made much of Europe a nuclear-
free zone, and was viewed as a open door for Soviet conventional force advantage.  Western 
governments still did not politically recognize East Germany and were not keen on doing 
business with Warsaw Pact client governments
119
 
The new Moscow Politburo, finally purged of most of his rivals and old-line Stalinists, 
was astounded and bewildered by the Berlin initiative.
120
 Khrushchev‟s impulsiveness had gone 
beyond the internal Russian upset of de-Stalinization to a whole new level of international 
mischief that might be dangerously unsustainable.  But he did have control over his foreign 
policy apparatus.  Veteran Praesidium member and Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan had been 
among the few to argue against the Berlin campaign and was later delegated to travel to the 
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United States on unofficial visits intended to press Khrushchev's demands but also repair 
relations in a  more reasonable voice than Khrushchev used.  Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
obediently pursued the free city/peace treaty objectives with determination and little variation 
from the original formula for the next five years..
121
 
Khrushchev's November statements marked the beginning of an sustained diplomatic 
campaign that lasted from November 1958 to a little after November 1963.  The campaign required a 
ready military back-up which he did not expect to use but which was already on hand with extensive 
contingency plans already established.  The West would also have to present  a viable deterrent, but 
did not have forces afield or good planning.  Khrushchev hoped to slow NATO nuclear 
deployments, remove the West's toehold in eastern Germany, and quiet critics like Ulbricht and his 
own generals, without actually having to go to war.
122
  Khrushchev could concentrate his own efforts 
on speeches and letters, as well as contacts with Western ambassadors like the American Llewellyn 
Thompson or the visiting US Senator Hubert Humphrey.   
Life magazine covered Senator Hubert Humphrey‟s December 1st visit to Moscow, a 
week before Dulles would go to Europe, as a bigger event than it was.  Life gave Humphrey his own 
byline and lots of pictures.  No real negotiations took place.  To Humphrey, who had presidential 
aspirations for 1960, Life‟s feature provided great publicity, but it was meant as a wake-up call to the 
administration.  But, Time showed how Khrushchev easily neutralized Humphrey.  A scathing 
critique, “Khrushchev‟s Plan,” was followed by, “The Cancer of Freedom,” contrasting Khrushchev 
with Willy Brandt.  Khrushchev and Brandt had more in common than the Luce magazines would 
acknowledge; they were party politicians before they were statesmen.
123
 
Reasonable and belligerent often in the same conversation, Khrushchev could mix formal 
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statements and informal contacts to keep the West guessing about his real intentions.  Gromyko and 
Mikoyan would be his main representatives, along with ambassadors.
124
  His US Ambassador 
Mikhail Menshikov had only been in Washington since January 1958  but already earned the 
nickname "Smilin' Mike" for his baleful manner; Eisenhower was among the few who found 
Menshikov agreeable.   He was not a persuasive diplomat but he was faithful to his boss.  
Where Khrushchev had initially hoped for an early 1959 summit with more following, he 
would have to wait  eighteen months only to abandon the conference with Eisenhower.  Khrushchev 
never imagined the Berlin diplomatic operation would take  so long.
125
  His initial timetable was six 
months, a deadline he suspended and would later re-impose, but suspend again.  Even though the 
West did not agree to his demands even after  many months, it kept them distracted and provided 
him with leverage for other issues, most notably disarmament.  Disarmament was related to the 
German problem, because of the recent nuclear deployments.  The diplomatic campaign for Berlin 
was much cheaper than a war and was intended to accomplish the same  desired changes.  It was 
offered as an alternative to war but with an indefinite threat of force to ensure its demands. It 
involved very little new military effort, unless things went awry.
126
   The campaign became time-
consuming for leaders and diplomats on all sides with almost no gains, but they became much 
familiar with their counterparts.  That sizing-up was also a key Soviet aim in the Berlin campaign.   
 The grand sweep of Khrushchev's ambition as well as his tough language was also 
a challenge to Red China‟s Chairman Mao Zedong.  Mao remained angry over the de-
Stalinization program and Russian refusal to share nuclear technology.  He ridiculed 
Khrushchev's talk of peaceful coexistence.  Mao had treated  Khrushchev rudely on the latter's 
state visit to China some months before.  Mao had recently probed the Western presence in the 
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offshore territories.  Post-Soviet Russian historians Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, 
who stress the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Khrushchev‟s decision making, have pointed out that 
Ulbricht had heard Dulles‟ recent comparisons of the Chinese offshore island situation with 
Berlin.  In October 1958, possibly to goad Khrushchev, Ulbricht suggested the next issue of 
superpower contention might be Berlin‟s status. 
127
   
President Eisenhower was dubious over Berlin‟s strategic value and not at all inclined to 
summitry with Khrushchev, especially under duress.
128
  He regarded the previous summit of 
1955 as a failure and did not think foreign-minister conferences very useful.  Though Geneva 
was the first post-war US–USSR summit, it had not been productive.  Eisenhower remained 
bitter over Khrushchev‟s subsequent abrogation of summit promises in both Poland and 
Hungary, as well as his interference in the Suez crisis.
129
  Eisenhower believed in executive 
authority but also delegation of command.  His “New Look” policy aimed to replace expensive 
“containment” strategy with a leaner, more responsive defense capacity.  He wanted to eliminate 
costly self-perpetuating bureaucracies and force redundancies.  He was disinclined to wholesale 
weapons system purchases premised on suspect intelligence.
130
  This economical approach to 
maintaining sufficient defense assets also demanded a flexible foreign policy that looked to 
negotiation in crisis situations.  To avoid such interventions, a reliably subordinate security 
establishment was required.    Stephen Ambrose has described the President as an advocate for 
military caution and limits.  More recent examinations of Eisenhower strategic policy such as 
Bowie and Immerman‟s Waging Peace have further argued that the “Ike” White House was 
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systematically inclined to restraint and prudent.  The President was averse to military risk-taking 
and committed U.S. forces carefully, if at all.
 131
 
Eisenhower did not regard the State and Defense Departments as rivals, but rather as 
equally subordinate institutions.  Bureaucratization - whether at State or Defense - added a 
deadly inertia and drag on decision making. 
132
  That could slow presidential authority unless an 
expediter like Dulles could whip and cajole Washington‟s security fiefdoms into cooperation.  
By 1958, Eisenhower had a sound grasp of Dulles‟ basic geopolitical instincts.  After earlier 
heated experiences and disagreements, they were well seasoned and understood each other.
133
  
Their instincts about the Berlin situation were very similar. Both men thought this was an 
indirect maneuver by Khrushchev, who had forecast and loudly proclaimed his moves.  The 
Kremlin leader established an extended timeline of six months, instead of simply occupying all 
of Berlin as a fait accompli.  But Eisenhower was also under considerable political pressure from 
military and Congressional leaders wanting a more aggressive U.S. reaction.
134
  Their martial 
allies in the press such as columnist Joseph Alsop advocated action.   
Dulles's perceived direction of foreign policy insulated Eisenhower, reinforcing 
presidential gravitas.  The National Security Advisor role was less important than it had been 
under Truman and would increasingly be with McGeorge Bundy and Henry Kissinger.  Dulles 
ran a more centralized and influential foreign policy apparatus than the next few Secretaries of 
State.
135
  He relied heavily on a few capable subordinates like Undersecretaries Livingston 
Merchant and Policy Planning Staff head Gerard Smith.  In addition, he benefitted from 
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experienced ambassadors like David Bruce in Germany and Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow.  
Charles Bohlen and Foy Kohler were also experienced analysts of the Soviets and would remain 
involved for most of campaign 
While de Gaulle and Macmillan actively involved themselves in the negotiations, 
Eisenhower, with confidence, delegated much of the US response to John Foster Dulles.  As 
Secretary of State from Eisenhower‟s inauguration till his death from cancer in May 1959, 
Dulles enjoyed considerable leeway in carrying out policy yet could faithfully execute 
presidential directives.  His opinion was valued, though he had his disagreements with 
Eisenhower.  By 1958 his views were becoming especially more congruent with the 
President‟s.
136
  At least in the preserved diplomatic record, there is little indication of divergence 
between the President and Secretary over the U.S. response to Khrushchev‟s proposals for a new 
German settlement.   
Another reason for the executive branch‟s preference for diplomatic resolution was 
conflict between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Secretary of Defense Neil 
McElroy was a weak partner of the Chiefs more than he was a forceful leader like Dulles.  
McElroy could not lobby for his Department or for the JCS as effectively Dulles did for the State 
Department.
137
  The State Department‟s “Militarization of Foreign Policy” noted the Defense 
Department‟s divergent security goals and resistance to Eisenhower‟s “New Look” drawdown 
and streamlining of American defense positions.
138
 That growing conflict between the State 
Department and the Joint Chiefs (and disagreements between the various Chiefs themselves) 
represented an unacceptable obstacle to Eisenhower's control over negotiations.  The diplomatic 
table, not Berlin and Germany, had to serve as the field of battle, with the nuclear backup kept 
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both ready and contained.  This would require Dulles, Merchant, Thompson, Kohler and others 
to continuously have to deal with both domestic as well allied attempts to influence the situation.  
Dulles' pragmatism and patience proved very constructive in the early, pivotal stages of the 
campaign.
139
  He would however not live to see even the foreign ministers conference he helped 
arrange, Dulles helped establish a Western consensus perhaps better than his successors would; 
that lack of consensus would help ,prolong the campaign and make progress near impossible.  
 Though the U.S. and U.S.S.R. ultimately achieved some political resolution without 
escalation to general conflict, the course of the 1958-59 Berlin negotiations did involve a high 
degree of military planning and readiness.  This coldest of Cold War conflicts had to be 
conducted at the diplomatic level because the operating limits and resultant options for both sides 
were so restrictive.
140
  Military confrontations consisted of only a few East German and Soviet 
detentions of U.S. soldiers and vehicles over inspection rights.
141
   
One indication of differences between State and Defense in the initial reaction period 
came from Undersecretary Merchant.  He wrote concerning an interruption on November 14, 
1958 of an American  military convoy at Soviet checkpoint Babelsberg in Berlin.  Merchant 
noted that such harassment had become chronic.  Merchant stressed that the Bonn mission and 
the Department agreed that “this is the wrong time, place, and issue on which to resort to force.”
 
142
   But he discouraged plans for a full scale airlift as too visible a military commitment.  He did 
mention again the possibility for a light garrison airlift.  He summarizes topics of a meeting with 
the JCS as: Soviet determination to inspect American trucks, allied reluctance to actually use 
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force, prospects for further allied disunity, and efforts to restore unity.  The considerable Soviet 
surface advantages were discussed as well as the “awkward” American staging environment.  
Merchant added that the JCS were firmly against a new airlift, but also committed to defense of 
convoys by force: “The JCS are following two lines of thinking that cause us considerable 
concern.”
143
The Merchant memo shows the rough frontier between military and diplomatic 
positions in Washington.   
In Berlin, State Department staffers Finlay Burns and Bernard Gufler were seriously 
pursuing the “little airlift” option which appealed to the allies as well. This is significant because 
it shows the diplomatic corps taking the leadership regarding the degree of force to be used. It 
was remarked at the time that detentions were almost always targeted against the Americans and 
with full Soviet oversight.
 144
   It also seemed as though the Soviet military and diplomatic 
offices were not always in full communication.   
 Khrushchev cast his November 10 and 28 proposals as a timetable for Berlin to 
become a demilitarized “free city”.
145
  It was a surprise move, even given the hostilities over 
Steinestuecken.  But, initial US review of the Sports palace speech noted that the East German 
leader Ulbricht had been trying to dismiss the legal foundations for the occupation for over a 
year.
146
  Khrushchev co-opted Ulbricht idea of challenging the occupation protocols with his 
“Free City” concept, which he claimed as his own innovation.
147
  The “free city” idea vaguely 
evoked the peaceful transition Vienna had made from an occupied city to a neutral capital.  In 
Vienna, however, the Soviets had really had little reason to continue occupation, whereas in 
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Berlin they were naturally dominant with nearly four times as many troops as the Americans had.  
The real significance of his “free city” proposal may have been its non-military format, 
delivered as a diplomatic message.  The Soviets did not want a  military reaction.  They made  no 
lightning thrusts such as in Hungary, or as their Egyptian clients had done at Suez.  This was a 
long-course diplomatic challenge, yet with a potential nuclear threat.   This diplomatic course 
was likely chosen because it was less hazardous or expensive than military options.  As 
Khrushchev told his son Sergei after the second speech, “No one would start a war over 





US  & Allies Consult in Europe (December 1958)  
In December, Gerard Smith summarized a briefing led by Defense Secretary McElroy as 
an indication that “in the immediate future the U.S. military capacity for meeting limited 
aggression would rapidly decline.”  Smith added that there would “likely be (a) number of 
situations in which a strong foreign policy position will be difficult to maintain…”  He stressed 
the “necessity for strengthening our limited war capabilities”.
149
  To avoid accidental escalation 
into total war and still pursue their respective interests, both sides confined their challenges to 
official notes and resisted more than token military activity.  But in November and December, it 
was unclear whether or not the crisis could be contained diplomatically.   
This meant containment of destabilizing military activity.  In mid-December, retired 
General Lucius Clay, who as US Commander in Chief for Europe in 1949, had masterminded the 
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original Berlin airlift, promoted the idea of an armed convoy from West Germany to Berlin.
150
 
This option was endorsed by the French and West Germans but was directly overruled by Dulles, 
who was relaying the President‟s wishes.
151
 Eisenhower had no intention of conducting another 
full scale airlift.  This would have likely only provoked Khrushchev to take more forceful 
measures.  By preserving the status quo as much as possible, Khrushchev‟s challenge was 
diminished and he could less credibly accomplish his indirect aims.   
Throughout, the basic centrality of Germany to the crisis was more in German eyes, East 
and West, than to the other allied nations.  France and Britain considered Khrushchev‟s proposal 
a challenge to them as much as to the Germans.  A unified Germany would diminish their place 
in the new European system. Not that Berliners were particularly pleased with the status quo.  As 
the West German Interior Minister Joachim Lipschutz emphatically told the American military 
journal Combat in December, they were open to a new political situation but not under Soviet 
ultimatum.
152
 To the Soviets, their role as victors over Germany and guarantors of the European 
settlement was a cornerstone of their international stature.  They still considered Berlin, Potsdam 
notwithstanding, as their rightful prize.  However, both the East and West German government 
governments had eagerly sought and received the first installations of theater range nuclear 
missiles.
153
  The rearmament of Germany prompted the Soviets to confirm their leadership – and 
protect their western flank -  by calling for demilitarization in Berlin and later for all of  
Germany. 
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Soviet primacy in German occupation matters had to be reasserted against the new 
nuclear backdrop.  Soviet military doctrine had come to regard nuclear weaponry as 
indispensable for the time being.  But their leadership was beginning to acknowledge its risks.
154
   
Tactical nuclear missile deployment was still controversial in America and in the Soviet Union.   
Morton Halperin describes the conflicting views on this topic. Advocacy of the tactical nuclear 
deployment had to be considered alongside arguments against America placing its main reliance 
on the unpredictable nuclear strategies.  The latter “examined the political costs of initiating the 
use of nuclear options and have found them very substantial.”
155
  Unwilling to encourage 
military proposals for Berlin, Dulles turned down General Clay‟s request for an interview before 
his departure for a mid-December NATO Foreign Minister meeting. 
156
  Acting Secretary 
Herter‟s brief from Washington in advance of the Dulles trip did provide some window for 
possible military action.  Herter observed that “Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed 
to entertain doubts as to our determination to use limited force if need be…”  He emphasized that 
the “purpose of (such) resort to is…test Soviet intentions”
157
   
Ambassador David Bruce had recently reported that even amidst Adenauer‟s resolve to 
“take a firm position,” other extenuating factors needed to be evaluated first.  These included the 
possibility that Khrushchev was trying to deflect attention from internal difficulties in Russia as 
well as trying to impress the upcoming All Party Conference.  Adenauer also suggested that 
Khrushchev was acting out of frustration at West German influence with DeGaulle in the wake 
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of Soviet disappointment about their unaccepted advances the previous May.
158
  Adenauer and 
Lipschutz had little to say about how firmness would translate to force projections or defensive 
positions.  
 Unsatisfactory practical applications of conventional power were often based on naively 
assuming military means could be used for political goals while underestimating predictable 
problems.  Eisenhower was determined to avoid being ensnared in a dangerous quagmire over 
dubious territory.  The President had deep reservations about Berlin‟s worth.  He told Dulles: 
“This was another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions 
which are wholly illogical”.
159
  Eisenhower and Dulles still hoped to contain the situation 
through middle range diplomatic engagement. At the NATO conference, Dulles would lay  down 
the law: The United States would not support unauthorized military ventures or even full scale 
planning or deployment and they would consider Khrushchev‟s proposals at face value.  
Eisenhower and Dulles thought that the Soviet leader‟s own positions could be used against him.   
Dulles willingness to discuss compromises with the Soviets disturbed the Allies, 
particularly DeGaulle .
160
 Meetings with the other foreign ministers indicated little consensus. 
This resistance did not prevent communiqués from NATO on December 15 and 18
th
.  The final 
communiqué asserted resolve “not to yield to threats.” The Allies also indicated they too sought 
a „solution to seek just settlements of the German problem…”  This would include “European 
Security arrangements… (and)…controlled disarmament. 
161
 The US cover statement left no 
doubt that Dulles was acting at Eisenhower‟s direction; “The President reiterated our ... firm 
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purpose” as a Four Power guarantor of Berlin‟s freedom.
162
  After these communiqués, though 
there was a period of apparent relaxation, with some hints from Soviet aides that there was not 
likely to be any war over Berlin. 
 
A Hard Soviet Reply and Strains on Allied Restraint (January-February 1959) 
In January, Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Washington, ostensibly on vacation 
and to renew trade discussions .  Allowing an extended goodwill and trade promotion visit by as 
high ranking an official as Mikoyan  was itself a sign that tensions with the Soviets, had relaxed 
since 1956.
163
  Dulles and Mikoyan had a generally friendly meeting, though Mikoyan made 
clear he was also in the US  to receive "acceptable proposals" on Berlin.  Mikoyan also visited 
with Vice-President Nixon; both these number two men expressed his country's desire for better 
relations and the importance exchanges and discussion.  They did however engage in some 
ideological debate.  Their discussion on Berlin was a little more pointed, with Mikoyan asking 
why the Americans could not believe the Soviets did not want Berlin for themselves.  Nixon said 
the Western allies could not countenance a unilateral change over Berlin but, "the main thing 
was to reach a mutually acceptable settlement  so that we do not arrive in six months at an 
intolerable position." Mikoyan said he hoped the question could be resolved earlier. This was 
only an informal visit but Berlin had not interfered with the general expressions of mutual 
interest in trade and cultural exchanges.
164
 
On his return to Washington on  January 16, Mikoyan met again with Dulles and his top 
lieutenants.  They discussed a number of global issues, such  as the Near East, Iraq, Laos, 
Taiwan and Korea, contrasting the worthiness of each other's clients.  Mikoyan vigorously 
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protested Western bases in Iran and Turkey.  Dulles said the Soviets need not worry and anyway, 
"with the increased range of missile, it made no practical difference whether a base were nearby 
or away.  The USSR perhaps could annihilate the US from one of its own bases."
165
   Mikoyan 
asked if the US intended to provide the West Germans with atomic weapons? Dulles said the US 
government  was prohibited by law from doing so, despite many allied requests. They also 
briefly discussed suspending atomic testing.  Dulles indicated the US was open to comprehensive 
test suspension talks and possible agreements, which Mikoyan  welcomed readily.  Again, the 
tone was cordial and business like.  Mikoyan did not relax Khrushchev's demands on Berlin. If 
anything, he made clear a un-negotiable Soviet point: in the event of a treaty, the East Germans 
would be in control of access to and from Berlin.  Allied occupation troops would have to leave 
because they would be encircled by East Germany which had to regard them as hostile.
166
  
Khrushchev was slightly upping the stakes; there was more at stake than just Berlin.  Thus the 
Soviet message on Berlin in January was tougher.  It was also the same whether it came from 
Khrushchev in an angry mood or Mikoyan at his most charming.   
Mikoyan met with the President the next day. He delivered a more forceful message on 
Berlin than Eisenhower probably expected.  He presented an expanded version of the November 
proposals that now included calls for a possible demilitarized unified German settlement.  He 
made it clear to Dulles that the Soviets  had problems with the U.S. in non-German matters, 
particularly the possible U.S. bases being planned for Turkey and Iran.
167
 Mikoyan was 
particularly strident on the subject of West German nuclear deployment.
168
 But the Americans 
simply asked Mikoyan in return if the Soviets were really ready for open elections in Germany.  
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They received no direct answer from Mikoyan, who simply repeated the official  concerns about 
nuclear encirclement and intent to resist such containment.  The meeting  was friendly, despite 
some tenseness on Berlin and they again emphasized positive effects of trade and exchanges. 
Mikoyan's visit convinced the Americans that the Soviets did not want war but seemed 
not only contractible on Berlin but very confident nevertheless.  One reason for that confidence 
might have been serious differences of opinion were openly splitting the allies.  Another might 
have been that increased harassment, often with some Soviet component, was raising tensions in 
Berlin.  On January 13, Willy Brandt raised the prescient possibility of the East Germans 
"possibly sealing off Sector-Sovietzone and Sector-Sector borders without blockade."  This 
would indeed be Ulbricht and Khrushchev's main solution to stabilize East German losses 




The Allies were demanding more detailed contingency planning than Dulles was willing 
to support.  De Gaulle want to commit to a military strategy , to "resist force by force."  In the 
event of  a blockade, he wanted a garrison airlift of troops.
170
  Macmillan was equally reluctant 
to commit his country's troops, .  Even Adenauer, whose country would be most disrupted by a 
blockade, was troop-shy.  All these leaders had criticized Dulles in December for daring to 
consider the agency principle.  Macmillan had already opened his own backchannel tot 
Khrushchev.  Livingston Merchant told British Foreign Secretary Sir Harold Caccia to be careful 
not to tell many more journalist like Joseph Alsop that the British had second thoughts on 
resorting to force to maintain Allied occupation. rights.
171
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 The US represented a middle position, inclined to negotiate but only with well-
measured and supportable force.  The US took a cautious attitude to mobilization and 
negotiation, unlike respectively the British and French.. But they wanted promises of American 
nuclear intervention in the event of a shooting war.  Eisenhower, always reluctant to expose the 
US to the dangers and costs of overseas deployments, was not content with the imbalance of 
commitment and naive ides of containing and supporting limited wars.  Only through Allied 
cohesion could the West use diplomatic means to deflect Khrushchev's demands enough to make 
him lift his deadline for Berlin.
172
  Macmillan's planned solo trip to Moscow and  de Gaulle's 
agitation for some military gesture  disrupted the cohesion and made it easier for Khrushchev to 
try and reach separate understandings among the Allies.  Eisenhower remained unmoved towards 
heads of state diplomacy under the circumstances. Although nearly too ill to travel from his 
worsening cancer, Dulles nevertheless returned to Europe to bring the allies together.   
However, almost as soon as he arrived, another serious incident occurred, involving a 
more extended detention.  This again required Soviet political aide Markushkin‟s assistance after 
direct entreaties to Soviet Commander Shilov were ignored.  The incident also revealed some 
dissonance between the Soviet military and political authorities in Berlin.  On February 2, the 
Soviets detained an American truck convoy on the Autobahn, which allegedly refused 
inspection. The complaint was somewhat dubious since the rear of the trucks was open and the 
contents - jeeps – were plainly visible.  The British also suffered a detention the next day.
173
  In 
each case, the soldiers were not detained but the vehicles were, suggesting a very nuanced 
attempt at deliberate provocation.  Bruce wired Dulles that “this is an obvious move to force 
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 In his next-day follow-up, he noted that “we either submit to any inspection 
demand or resort to self-imposed blockade”.
175
  
This was the most serious actual military contact of the early phase of the crisis. Luckily 
–or perhaps by design – it did not occur at a point where armed hostilities were likely to flare up; 
inspection checkpoints are defensive more than forward positions and the US vehicles were 
minimally armed.  The detention is conspicuously marginal in most accounts of the Berlin 
sequence, but it was of serious concern at the time to the US and British embassies. The French 
offered to run some trucks through instead.  Although Bruce considered the suggestion “worth 
considering,” it was not followed up on.  Perhaps they were concerned about escalating the 
incident.  As brinksmanship goes, it was not a particularly saber-rattling moment.  General Lewis 
Norstad, US NATO commandant, presented a plan for five light tanks to test the checkpoint.  
This would be followed by a reinforcement battalion of light infantry.   
But this escalatory idea was deferred in favor of Bruce‟s appeal to Markushin.  Bruce and 
Markushin visited the site, and after Bruce demonstrated that only a jeep was being transported, 
Markushin replied: “It is cold.  I will not detain you further…” He added, “you and I are not able 
to settle the issues involved. It must be taken to a higher level.” 
176
  Markushin also let him know 
the release was a personal favor.  The inspection issue was still open, but less experienced and 
adept representatives might not have been able to defuse the situation so peacefully. 
Before higher level discussions with the Soviets could resume, the Allies needed to 
develop a joint approach. Dulles had to analyze what the Soviet actions were really about.  His 
first stop was London where he was surprised to find that Prime Minister Sir Harold Macmillan 
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and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd had a much “softer” attitude than the U.S. expected.
177
 
While the US had surprised the Allies in December with their flexibility, the U.S. was still not 
prepared to recognize the GDR, especially since the Soviets were not going to recognize the 
FRG.  While still in London, Dulles also met with Norstad and raised the question of how 
garrisoning nuclear weapons in Germany would affect understandings with other allies. Norstad 
noted that it was a major step but also cautioned against putting the move up for approval with 
the other nations.  He also complained of delays in deployments.  Undersecretary Livingston 
Merchant commented that the “Rubicon with the Soviets will be crossed when the Soviets get 
atomic weapons” in the field, only a few months away.
178
 The Soviets did not have to go far 
forward to do that. 
At the next day‟s round, Dulles stated that he was convinced that the Soviets did not want 
to go to war over Berlin and they had to be careful not to back them into changing that position.  
He also reiterated his opposition to any “thinning out” of forces without corresponding moves 
from the opposition. But most significantly a diplomatic solution to the crisis began to surface 
with discussion of a Foreign Ministers conference, possibly as early as May.  Macmillan now 
made public his intent to engage in his own personal shuttle diplomacy, including a trip to 
Moscow.  That prospect left both Dulles and Eisenhower aghast with disbelief.
179
 
Fortunately, Dulles found French President Charles De Gaulle and Prime Minister Regis 
Debre less shaky.  Ever the effective diplomat, Dulles pleased de Gaulle with his reference to the 
France‟s role as a victorious occupying power.  He knew that de Gaulle resented the erosion of 
tripartite prestige after French blunders in Suez and Indochina.  It is interesting that Dulles also 
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referred to a problem we now call the “leverage of the weak” when he says “we could not 
permit…the vanquished to…rule the victors.”
180
  Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson cabled 
Dulles from Moscow to advise that raising the vehicle inspection problem either tripartitely or 
unilaterally with the Soviets would be “disastrous.”  He added that the Soviets would back off if 
not pressed to avoid further harsh publicity 
181
  Further talks with the French now went smoothly, 
emphasizing the economic cooperation between France and the FRG as a natural basis for 
influence, without Dulles having to make unsupportable concessions to the French. 
Dulles‟ next stop in Germany was more troubling.  Chancellor Adenauer frankly 
described his apprehensions about Western unity and NATO‟s will and ability to stand up to 
Soviet backed aggression.  He wanted specific commitments of US military support from Dulles, 
but acknowledged that "if force were used, the crisis would become acute."   Dulles replied that 
in the event of serious armed incursion, the West must be prepared to dispatch an armored 
division to secure a land route to Berlin.  Such a condition would equate to a general war 
situation where the allies must consider the use of nuclear weaponry.  Failure to show 
commitment would “invite defeat on a purely conventional battleground.”
182
  Adenauer replied 
that he feared there was little public support for such scenarios, while Dulles assured him that 
there was indeed such public will in the United States.  Dulles also contrasted the US position 
with the softer British views and harder French view, and asked what the West German thoughts 
were for a provisional resolution.  Adenauer wanted the deadline postponed and NATO‟s 
planned mission extended.
183
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Explicitly committed to forceful resistance as Dulles was with Adenauer, he remained 
non-confrontational with the Soviets.  Dulles was serious in his commitment to Adenauer.  But 
his reassurances that the U.S. would not bargain its ally away were matched by his continuing 
determination to avoid war.  The inspection issue was then effectively sidelined, for the time 
being, by the use of sealed supply trains instead of the more ostentatious convoys.
184
  Dulles 
impressed Adenauer with his perseverance on West Germany‟s behalf in the face of obvious 
physical pain.
185
  The Secretary then returned to Washington with some confidence that the 
alliance had been effectively shored up.  He was, however, soon back in the hospital, and Acting 
Secretary Christian Herter began to assume full time responsibility for crisis management. 
 
Compromises Emerge (March and early April 1959) 
Dulles‟ efforts for Allied unity were well received by Eisenhower, whereas Macmillan‟s solo 
diplomacy renewed concerns.  Inter-zonal friction continued to simmer but involved no new 
important disputes.  The Soviets did reassert their “rights of inspection”, but conveyed this by 
diplomatic messages, which the Americans countered by referring back to the original 
occupation agreements.
186
  The British and French were willing to cede leadership on the issue to 
the Americans.  A possible additional option, a passive embargo dubbed a “pacific counter-
blockade” was presented to Herter but only limited actual contingency planning was initiated.
187
  
Herter now had to consider just how onerous the agency principle might be in the case of 
document stamping by GDR replacements at Soviet checkpoints.  Herter, with State‟s legal 
counsel concurring, was unwilling to entertain full stamping authority.  Since that would be de 
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facto recognition of GDR authority, such a possibility was being very quietly considered.
188
 
There was still a very good chance that the Soviets would make good on their ultimatum. 
 With Dulles incapacitated in the hospital, American military advocates for a more  
forceful response saw an opportunity to make their case anew.  On March 13, Herter and his staff 
held a meeting on Berlin contingency planning with Secretary McElroy, his deputy Donald 
Quarles, General Nathan F. Twining, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, White House 
liaison, Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster and representatives of each service.  The 
military wanted to clarify reports they had gotten on a State Department meeting the day before.  
They told Herter they were very concerned about plans for the cut-off point (May 27) and also 
about his statement that in no circumstances should the US initiate general war.  Herter explained 
to the Chiefs‟ satisfaction that the policy remained the same: to leave military options open but to 
be resorted to only in the event of the situation deteriorating to point of no return.
 189
    
But McElroy and Twining belittled continuing the limited-use of force policy as being of 
no deterrent value, with Twining even opining , “we have the capability to lick the East 
Germans”.  McElroy was concerned about getting ensnared in fighting satellites with the Soviet 
armed forces so close at hand.   The JCS protested laxity in preparedness in the US European and 
NATO allies‟ forces.  Twining presented a long list of more forceful recommendations, 
including a large scale deployment of 7,000 troops to Europe. McElroy overruled that, sdaying 
the President would veto the move as a waste of strength.  Macmillan‟s pilgrimage to Moscow 
had also stirred up the JCS.
190
  
Diplomatic and legal alternatives to military force created their own difficulties.  The 











level and scope of negotiation -  ministerial or heads-of-state, Germany-specific or broader 
ranging - was a very sensitive topic.
191
 Skeptical hopes for assistance from the UN in stamping 
cases were answered with plans to refer cases to the International Court of Justice. While the 
stamping issue seems arcane in many ways today, it was then crucial in cross-border transfers of 
any kind.  A deadlock in stamping would seal the borders.  Such a standoff was potentially 
destabilizing enough to worry everybody but Walter Ulbricht who was still hoping for escalation.  
The UN had been of only peripheral assistance in resolving the crisis anyway.  UN Secretary 
General Dag Hammerskjold‟s reluctance during the worst of the crisis to take sides cost the UN 
any role in negotiations or  the Foreign Minister‟s conference.  The US mission in Berlin also 
had to contend with a protest from the Soviets about armed “escorts” dispatched by the US Army 
to observe convoys.
192
   
 Negotiations with the Soviets towards the Foreign Minister‟s Conference 
proceeded slowly.  The Western ministers, meeting in Paris in early April, were still hoping to 
bring uip in disarmament, but could not agree on whether or how to link arms control with 
German questions.  The Germans objected to any compromises on reunification.
193
  The Soviets 
preferred a specific German settlement conference and/or a summit meeting with the United 
States. 
194
  Harold Macmillan, having helped arrange a foreign ministers meeting, then lobbied 
for a summit; the ministers might be more inclined to progress if it would enable a productive 
summit.  Acting Secretary Herter urged Eisenhower to provide assurances that the US would 
participate in a summit following the conference. The President did indicate some willingness to 
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Macmillan, but would not make a binding commitment for a summit.
195
 
 Macmillan was still worried, though for his own political reasons. He had taken 
Eden‟s seat after the failures of  Suez and knew he could be just as vulnerable himself.  
However, he made good on his intent to visit Moscow.  It was an uncomfortable visit.   
Khrushchev stood him up so to entertain visiting Iraquis (who had recently overthrown a  
British-backed king in Baghdad).  He then taunted the Prime Minister at official dinners and 
generally subjected him to a very public display of how far British foreign influence had 
diminished.  Khrushchev did take the opportunity to lift his May 28 deadline, though it is 
unlikely that that decision was hastened by Macmillan‟s visit.
196
  Still, Macmillan had mollified 
the Russian leader somewhat with praises of Khrushchev‟s war record as political commissar 
and supply expediter.  Macmillan‟s message was sufficiently muted to assure Khrushchev that 
Britain was no threat in this matter.  
Macmillan, along with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd and Ambassador Harold 
Caccia briefed Herter in Washington within days.   The Foreign Minister‟s conference now 
seemed a certainty.  On many points the British and the US attitudes were agreeable.  Herter and 
Eisenhower easily deflected Macmillan‟s suggestion that the most effective course would be to 
actually negotiate with Khrushchev, which was, of course, not on the US agenda at all.
197
 When 
Macmillan reported on what seemed to him certainly a great step forward, Eisenhower 
congratulated him for good intentions and determination.  But the ailing John Foster Dulles gave  
the Prime Minister a very undiplomatic appraisal of his solo diplomacy with the Soviets.
198
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In the wake of Macmillan‟s visit, Herter received the first rumblings of the next 
challenge.  Polish and Czech envoys were demanding conference participation equal to Britain, 
Germany, and France.  Herter expressed his doubts as to Soviet good faith and the follies of 
dividing the world into “two hostile camps.”
199
  On March 30 in Moscow, Gromyko hand-
delivered the Soviet endorsement of the East European bids to Thompson at the US embassy in 
Moscow.  The good news was that the Soviets were hinting at resolution; the bad news was they 
were not letting the West off the hook as easily had been hoped. 
200
  The Soviets were officially 
demanding full participation for the Poles and Czechs, and even made reference to their status as 
victims of Hitler‟s Germany, a neat reversal of the Allied invocation of World War II era legal 
precedents.  Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson observed that the Soviets were no longer chiefly 
concerned with German reunification, but wanted to harden their line across Europe in order to 
prompt negotiations on a broader level.  Despite the recent gains, Thompson concluded that “the 




Arranging and Conducting a Foreign Minister’s Conference (late April-May 1959) 
But Allied relations did continue to improve in the weeks leading up to Foreign 
Minister‟s Conference.  The April 18 quadripartite meeting was less tense than January‟s 
sessions when deep mistrusts existed among all four camps. 
202
  General Norstad suggested that 
the US lead joint tripartite and NATO contingency planning dubbed “Live Oak,” with direct 
intermediary command being delegated to British and French commanders.  No mobilization or 
action would be undertaken pending the foreign ministers meeting, but plans were drawn up for 
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armed probes in the event of a new Berlin blockade and further measures suggested, including 
deployment of atomic submarines, if necessary.
203
  Live Oak planning would end up outlasting 
the May deadline as the basic framework for Berlin contingency planning. 
Ambassador Thompson wired Herter that the Soviets "have shown obvious pleasure and 
relief that foreign ministers meeting has been arranged and [Deputy Foreign Minister] Zorin 
adopted almost pleading attitude for a summit meeting." Thompson noted that Gromyko was 
afraid disarmament discussions would 'bog down' the conference.  Thompson also saw 
uncertainty among the Soviets about post-Dulles US objectives.
204
  Ambassador Bruce had to 
reassure the West Germans that the Allies would not bargain away reunification for Germany.  
However, he said, the Four-Power working group could not recommend plans, like phased-
unification, which the Soviets would not accept. 
205
The British and French helped arrange use of 
UN Secretariat facilities in Geneva,  placating UN officials hoping to have some role.
206
 
The briefing book prepared for the conference provides a good picture of the US agenda. 
Primary goals included, “standing firm against pressure…stabilizing military situation 
…effecting retraction of Soviet power…ascertaining Soviet intentions… furthering substantive 
agreements…relaxation of intentions.”
207
  These are adaptive tactics, not proactive initiatives.  It 
is very significant however that the only topics listed for discussion concerned Berlin and 
Germany. 
208
 The instructions to delegates are enumerated very specifically along with specific 
references to limited and general war potentials, as well as intelligence opportunities, in their 
briefings.  Acting Secretary Herter wrote Merchant, “we are concentrating on the wrong danger, 
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interference with allied access to Berlin …(instead of) East German interference with West 
German  access to Berlin.”  Difficulty in simply seating participants to general agreement was 
even one more reason why the US team limited its response to diplomatic means. 
209
  
Simultaneously in Geneva alongside the ministerial parleys, the US and Soviets also held 
bilateral discussions and began to lay the framework for Khrushchev‟s late 1959 visit to the 
United States.  These discussions were often tedious.  The tenacious Gromyko had a deft touch 
for turning the tables on American strategy. When the Americans insisted on limiting discussion 
to German issues, he replied by insisting that a German settlement was purely a matter for the 
Germans.  An exasperated Herter asked what happened to other questions the Soviets had said 
they wanted to discuss, like the growing nuclear stockpiles in Germany.   But Gromyko was too 
opaque for Herter to be able to engage more deeply.  The Russians may have wanted to ensure 
that these private bilateral talks could not substitute for a summit meting.
210
 
Unfortunately, the architect of reason did not survive.  John Foster Dulles died in 
Washington and was buried with honors.  All the Foreign Ministers attended his funeral in 
Washington on May 28, one day past Khrushchev‟s original deadline.  Their comity on the 
occasion was proof that, in this last assignment as both architect and instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy, Dulles had pursued the most effective course to defuse tensions constructively.
211
   
Acting at Eisenhower‟s direction, he deflected a challenge that would not only have ended the  
Allied presence in Berlin, but would have shredded their unity and global standing. 
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What Was At Stake in Berlin  
Several good reasons made Berlin an important and also unique concern.  Though largely 
ornamental as a theater of influence, Berlin was especially valuable as an intelligence center for 
the America in Central Europe,
212
  Veteran intelligence operatives David Murphy and Sergei 
Kondrashev argue that the Soviets actually ran a far more effective operation there than the U.S.   
But Berlin also offered a  an easy route for defection. General leakage of Communist assets to 
the west was one of Ulbricht‟s most persuasive complaints with Khrushchev.
213
  The flow of 
refugees was an uncomfortable advertisement for the Western alternatives to socialism and this 
also may have motivated Khrushchev.
214
 But, in 1958-59, the value of German reunification and 
occupation to either the Americans or Soviets was secondary to greater concerns about nuclear 
armaments and peripheral situations.  Influence in the peripheral areas of Asia, Africa and South 
America, where the situations were less fixed than they were in Europe, demanded close 
attention as well.   
Germany‟s primacy as the Cold War's political epicenter has been the main area of 
research for historians like Marc Trachtenberg.  He said that Khrushchev‟s Berlin initiative “was 
rooted in the USSR‟s concern with Germany as a whole and above all with what was going on in 
West Germany…”  Moscow “wanted the former allies to keep West Germany from becoming 
too powerful.”
215
  Despite trade advances and the successful re-equipping of its army, West 
Germany was still the junior partner of the Allies, not significantly threatening to anyone.  
Indeed, it was supported in great measure by the United States.  Any challenge to the Potsdam 
agreements would have at least as much to do with the United States as the West Germans.   
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Regardless of whether or not Khrushchev‟s primary concern was Germany, the resolution 
of this challenge meant the most powerful players would  have to use all military capabilities 
available in case diplomatic activities did not succeed. The mix of military and diplomatic 
options involved considerations extending far beyond Germany. Hope Harrison notes that while 
the United States had not “confirmed the presence of Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in 
the GDR in 1959, U.S. suspicions were enough to deepen U.S. apprehension.”
216
  Even medium-
range missiles, however, invoked the possibility of either side making intercontinental nuclear 
attacks.  John Gaddis states that “NATO strategy had come to rely increasingly upon the first use 
of nuclear weapons in the event of a war.”
 217
  If that was the case, then it may be understandable 
why the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy kept NATO on the periphery of their response.   American 
insistence on controlling NATO nuclear weapons, especially in Germany, grew stronger and 
complicated contingency planning throughout the crisis.
218
 
Nevertheless, Berlin is not generally considered as a textbook example of pragmatic 
restraint where diplomatic resolution was emphasized. Authoritative modern historians such as 
Marc Trachtenberg, Hope Harrison, Thomas Schwartz and John Gaddis have generally viewed 
the crisis as a primarily European problem, aggravated by Dulles penchant for brinksmanship.
219
  
The question of whether the American strategy was a success or failure of in terms of allied 
relations or resolution of the German problem may be irresolvable.
220
  The historiography is 
contradictory in evaluating what is usually considered as a marginal interlude of Cold War  
history before the Wall‟s construction.    
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But there are other perspectives than the prevailing German emphasis.  One is the crisis‟ 
role in the developing rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao.  Berlin is also an important event in 
the careers of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, French President Charles DeGaulle, and 
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.  These leaders all played active, but not necessarily 
decisive, roles.  The interpretations of their roles in Berlin present their own challenges.  For 
instance, Gordon Craig suggests that it was DeGaulle‟s unwillingness to compromise that 
preserved West German independence, of which Adenauer remained very proud.
221
 
 These were all veteran leaders greatly familiar with war and the limits affecting the 
effective application of force.  But perhaps most essential to the success of diplomatic process 
over actual war were the formidable experience, talents, and inclinations of Eisenhower and 
Dulles.  Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev‟s own strong disposition against needless war  also 
encouraged a diplomatic solution.  Though projecting a more threatening public image,
222
 he was 
relatively restrained in delivering his proposals.  He also kept the Soviet forces in Germany 
restrained, for the most part, during the crisis.  Although he had a much colder relationship with 
his diplomats –Taubman reports that Gromyko was terrified of Khrushchev – they did function 
very efficiently on his behalf. 
223
  
Eisenhower and Dulles were faced with many problems in using force with necessary 
precision.  Eisenhower was already dissatisfied with the Defense Department‟s efficiency and 
reliability and had ordered organizational review in June 1958.
224
  His frustration was increased 
by disagreements among the allies over strategy and by pressures to increase military spending.  
Competition between the Departments of Defense and State for influence both in Washington 
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and in the field, as well as inter-service conflicts within Defense compounded his frustration.  
The ability to use military force effectively was essential because there was no guarantee that 
negotiation would succeed or that the Soviets would not present new provocations.  Effective 
military capability had to be preserved and not squandered through ill-considered displays of 
force.  Eisenhower told a congressional group during this period “the Communist objective is to 
spend ourselves into bankruptcy.”  He went on, “This is a continuous crisis: Iran, Indochina, 
Formosa, Iraq.”
225
  Instead of airlifts or heavily armored convoys through East Germany, the 
Allies needed to conserve their forces and show firmness through readiness and cohesion.  
Achieving this proved almost as intimidating as the prospect of Warsaw Pact tanks rolling across 
western plains.  Eisenhower and Dulles had similar basic instincts about their allies' limited 
capacity to effectively muster and use force.  Handling the allies was a delicate proposition even 
before the state of alarm.  Because Eisenhower‟s and Dulles‟s views were congruent, the 
American President could send his Secretary of State to Europe as his direct emissary to allied 
heads of state.
226
   The able work of the American diplomatic staff in Europe, such as Bruce and 
Thompson, greatly facilitated Dulles‟s efforts. The United States successfully avoided a possible 
nuclear conflict through negotiation.  The US may have been summoned to the summit  table 
under duress, but consistently urged mid-level negotiation to avoid forceful conflict.  This 
allowed the Soviets to present the East Germans as their partners at the same table in Geneva as 
the western allies, without either side having to extend formal recognition.  The US and its allies 
had outlasted Khrushchev‟s original six-month deadline and continued their presence in Berlin 
without any loss of military stature or position.
227
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The early months of the Berlin crisis were a pivotal Cold War moment for the United 
States, its Allies and the Soviet Union.  Though ostensibly involving all four western powers, it 
quickly evolved into a bipolar dispute between the US and Soviets.  It was the first major 
encounter between the superpowers since Korea to carry the active potential of nuclear combat.  
Khrushchev wanted negotiations, not war.
228
 The success of the US's diplomatic response, with 
restrained contingency planning, established a template of negotiation with the USSR as a course 
of first resort.  Eisenhower‟s New Look defense policy emphasized flexibility, instead of 
aggressive containment.
229
  His leadership style allowed him to benefit from new policy ideas 
while managing to channel their influence.
230
  He could withhold force without appearing weak. 
Khrushchev had similarly drawn down the Soviet Union‟s armed forces yet was anxious 
to be able to project Soviet military strength if desired.  There were compelling economic, 
political and strategic reasons for the Russian streamlining.  But, as with the Americans, they 
also created some concern over maintaining effective strength.  Nuclear deterrence involved 
considerably more risk than conventional forces but it also provided capabilities that seemed 
essential for superpower strategy.  The writings of private nuclear strategists like Henry 
Kissinger, Edward Teller and Robert Osgood reflected new rationales for risking fallout and 
mass casualties. 
231
 The nuclear capacity provided the diplomats with a „big stick‟, but the 
uncomfortable reality for both sides was that any conventional action would be hard to sustain 
and nuclear exchanges would negate the value of the territory.   If diplomats could just invoke 
the potential of nuclear weapons while trying to forestall the need for that recourse through 
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negotiation, many problems associated with limited wars could be avoided. 
Growing distance between the United States‟ diplomatic and military establishments in 
also discouraged Eisenhower‟s confidence in a military solution.  State officials were openly 
skeptical over military competence at exercises of force. Rivalry between the armed services 
eroded Eisenhower‟s confidence even further.
232
   General Clay‟s December convoy proposal 
and the March visit by the JCS to Herter show that the Pentagon was favorably disposed toward 
armed conflict.  But the President saw war as an option of last resort.  He was inclined to pursue 
negotiation instead.
233
  Because his Secretary of State had similar instincts about Allied relations, 
the German question, negotiations with the Soviets and the hazards of accidental war, Dulles's 
diplomatic team became the instrument of choice to resolve the Berlin problem. 
 Dulles was no longer the rigid policy hawk with little command experience he 
had been when Eisenhower and Khrushchev had met in 1955.
234
  Nor did he attempt to put 
Europe under the US‟s nuclear thumb with Eisenhower‟s distracted approval.  Such criticisms 
might have characterized Dulles earlier in the decade.  Richard Goold-Adams says that, by 1959, 
“first and foremost, he was from start to finish determined to prevent the use of force at almost 
any cost.”
 235
   Thomas Schwartz has pointed out the US had other problems to consider and 
could not undertake risk casually.
236
  For example, in the midst of the crisis, on the first of 
January 1, 1959, suspected Soviet sympathizer Fidel Castro overthrew Cuba‟s U.S.-aligned 
government. 
237
  Budget constraints and potential hazards of regional wars demanded the 
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attention of both Washington and Moscow. Both countries analyzed militarization and limited 
war issues, to project force short of general war.  Khrushchev had to deal with resistance from 




Conclusion: Nuclear Diplomacy as the Only Expedient Option 
Throughout the first phase of the Berlin crisis, the United States‟ response was restrained, 
but tough and open to negotiation.  The U.S. was prepared – over the objections of the West 
Germans and French - to negotiate objectionable topics.
239
  Americans called the Russian hand 
by considering such unappealing measures as an “agency principle.”   This would allow East 
German document stamping and even plebiscites on reunification.  But the President and Dulles 
recognized that no unilateral reordering of the WWII jurisdiction arrangements could be 
tolerated.
240
  The essentially diplomatic nature of the 4-power occupation agreement for Berlin - 
an agreement between states - also prompted a diplomatic course.  American diplomacy was 
backed by a readiness to use force if and when the President deemed it appropriate.
241
  The 
Soviets could not be sure how the Americans would define the limits. 
The diplomatic course in Berlin may not have produced conclusive results but neither did 
it leave Germany destroyed yet again. The proxy mode of conflict -- diplomatic exchange instead 
of military action -  was a very risky but viable alternative to general war.   Diplomacy helped 
avert war over  Berlin, in part because the leaders involved had neither the inclination nor 
resources for a serious conflict.  But the danger of accidental war was growing, especially with 
tactical nuclear weapons as a front-line defense.  Paul H Nitze described dilemmas that would 
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face the entire next generation of US presidents and their advisors: “The process of action and 
reaction will test the resolution of both sides.  It is comparable to the process of peeling off the 
successive layers of two onions.  At the center of each onion is a kernel of self-knowledge that 
no stake, even the German stake, is worth a nuclear war.  Each side will try to peel…the other 
side‟s onion of resolution, while trying to protect its own.  This is a dangerous game.”
242
   The 
1958-59 Berlin crisis was the first round in the Cold War with real nuclear war possibilities, and 
it would not be the last.  
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 Khrushchev suspended his original May 28, 1959 deadline for a new Berlin settlement 
pending the outcome of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva, but he did not withdraw his 
demands.  The opening sessions produced no progress and when the ministers resumed 
negotiations, following Secretary of State Dulles funeral at the end of May, the deadlock 
continued.
243
  Talk of an East-West Heads of State summit increased in June.  Although the idea 
had been rejected the previous winter, Western leaders now received the idea more favorably. 
The Soviets sent clear signals to Washington that they believed direct talks between Eisenhower 
and Khrushchev were necessary to break the impasse.  Rather than an official bilateral summit, 
both sides began to explore the feasibility of an exchange of visits that would include unofficial 
talks between the US and Soviet leaders. 
244
   
These visits would not replace a Four-Power summit but it was becoming understood that 
the United States and the Soviets represented the real power.  Harold Macmillan was eager for a 
conference to regain rapidly eroding British stature.  Charles de Gaulle wanted to enhance 
French influence, but was wary of entering into a conference that might change the balance of 
power in Europe to their disadvantage.  Berlin resolution and disarmament progress would be the 
twin objectives of the East-West Heads of State summit.
245
  Ostensibly, disarmament would be 
the top priority, but preliminary discussions focused on Berlin.   
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Early discussions imagined a conference in the fall of 1959, but the schedule was pushed 
back so that the summit was eventually held in Paris in May 1960.  Although disarmament is 
often cited today as the main concern, there was little consensus on how to achieve it.  Berlin 
was an immediate concern.  Disarmament did not have the same compelling interest, despite the 
growing numbers of  nuclear weapons in Germany.  While Eisenhower and Macmillan hoped for 
a test-ban agreement from Paris, neither Khrushchev or de Gaulle would accept their terms.
246
  
An interim arrangement on Berlin might preserve the status quo for a couple of years. Despite 
Berlin‟s importance, neither West nor East would reconsider their positions enough to allow real 




 Western hopes for a productive summit focused on a possible Berlin moratorium to be 
followed by long-term measures that might lead to German reunification.  Berlin, not 
disarmament, was the one exclusive area of shared business that France, Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union had in common.  Berlin and disarmament were hardly exclusive 
subjects.  Regardless of the stated agenda, Berlin would have probably emerged as the main 
topic if the summit had proceeded as planned.   The final summit agenda released by the Western 
allies listed, in order: disarmament, Berlin and international cooperation.
 248
  French and West 
German resistance to any change on Berlin may have helped shift Allied interest towards 
disarmament, as a way to achieve something at the summit.   
 Although the Paris summit was an important event in its own time, it receives 
only passing references in much of the Cold War historiography. There is little consensus on the 
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goals of the conference nor the reasons for its collapse.  Disarmament and Berlin are recognized 
as prime concerns, but the linkage between these two issues remains unexplored.  The U-2 
incident and Khrushchev‟s theatrics overshadow the serious problems regarding Germany, 
among the Allies and between them and the Soviets.
249
   These problems helped convince 
American leaders to begin direct discussions with the Soviets. Although the summit collapsed, it 
still must be recognized as a pivotal event.   
 It was the last multi-lateral Heads-of-State meeting, in the tradition of Potsdam and 
Vienna, and it marked a decisive shift towards US-Soviet superpower diplomacy.
 250
  
Disarmament may have been the preferred purpose, but Berlin was the issue above all that 
brought the leaders to the table. As such, it should be recognized as a key step in the 1958-63 
Berlin crises.  Paris was also notable as a media event; the leaders went through with the summit 
mainly because they wanted to appeal to public opinion and they wanted to reassure the public 
that their concerns were understood.
251
  Paris was a key event in the careers of all the leaders 
involved, providing a good example of the importance of personal diplomacy in the détente 
process.   
 But the final importance of the Paris summit is that it was an exercise in nationalism as 
much as cosmopolitanism.  Conflicting national interests and priorities hindered Allied unity. 
The Soviet Union and East Germany also had differences. Common interests did not translate 
into common actions to resolve either the Berlin or disarmament questions. The events in Paris 
may not have great immediate effect on the nations involved, but were emblematic of how they 
were perceived in the global arena.   After the Paris summit, bilateral US-Soviet diplomacy 
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displaced  the multilateral approach to the Berlin problem.  Historians need to look at the 1960 
summit not as a thing apart, as in the historiographic examples following, but in context, to 
develop a more complete synthesis of the event's purpose. 
 
Historiography on the Paris Summit  
For example, Russian political historian and biographer Roy Medvedev treats the subject 
very briskly, identifying the purpose only as “discussion of problems arising from the meeting of 
great powers in Geneva in 1955.”  
252
 He concentrates on the U2 incident as mainly a problem 
for Soviet ground-to-air missile technology.   The Americans, “did not offer even formal 
apologies.”  Khrushchev‟s visit to New York three months later receives more attention from 
Medvedev, suggesting that the Soviets did not hold the event in high regard. 
Saki Dockrill puts the summit into a context of Eisenhower‟s attempts to de-escalate 
armament growth, if not to actually disarm without assurance of reciprocal actions from the 
Soviets.  She focuses on Eisenhower‟s attentions to disarmament in 1958-59, saying 
disarmament was the most important concern during the Camp David talks.
 253
  That is 
debatable; the memoranda show the most attention being paid to Berlin.  She notes that 
Eisenhower refused to negotiate under a Berlin deadline.  Although she does not see Berlin as 
the motive for a conference, both sides used the Berlin problem as leverage regarding 
disarmament. Dockrill says Khrushchev saw the summit mainly as a step towards an eventual 
test-ban treaty and pursued détente in reaction to  domestic foreign communist pressure. 
 
                                                 
252
 Roy Medvedev, Khrushchev, trans. Brian Pearce (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), p. 149-53.   
253
 Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 




Veteran Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis places the summit in the context of aerial 
surveillance, Open Skies and defense spending limits.  He does not deal with the summit 
specifically in the emergence of detente.  He sees the U-2 as having been worth the risk because 
it gave the President the intelligence needed to fight ruinous missile costs.  Gaddis leans towards 
disarmament as the proper context of the summit, but does not deal with the sharp difference in 
American and Soviet positions, nor the linkage with nuclear weapons in Germany and the Berlin 
problem. In Gaddis‟s accounts, based on Khrushchev‟s own version, the decision to abort the 
summit was made on the flight to Paris.
254
  Gaddis and Medvedev may be correct in minimizing 
the failed summit‟s importance, but may also not give due respect to the fact that it was 
attempted at all and that it marked the end of four-power summitry. 
Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, who have done considerable work with Soviet 
sources, say Khrushchev believed Eisenhower had a personal interest in peace and was inclined 
to detente.  Khrushchev hoped that the Eisenhower might be sensitive enough about the U-2 
incident to look past the hard-line advice of Secretary of State Herter and Vice President Nixon.  
He told the Supreme Soviet that disarmament and the German question were the key issues, but 
suggest that he was open to general discussions.  They say Khrushchev did want a successful 
summit.    Khrushchev held more flexible views on disarmament than on Berlin but was too 
concerned about US military strength to allow verification. This paper agrees with Naftali and 
Fursenko's important point that Khrushchev had considerable prestige at stake.  The U-2 may not 
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Vladimir Zubok‟s observations deserve special attention because of his unparalleled 
access to Soviet archives and his reliable objectivity.  He frames the summit as an exercise in 
public opinion, part of Khrushchev‟s global campaign for influence.
256
  On one hand he was 
eager to continue the statesmanship and peacemaking he believed he was conveying in Third 
World visits, the United Nations and other publicity opportunities.  On the other, he wanted to 
show up Mao Zedong after a very tense visit to Peking. Both public opinion and reaction to Mao 
themes are important parts of the summit story.  Zubok posits Berlin as a central Khrushchev 
concern, because he did not like the idea of a nuclear armed Germany which he thought he could 
use as leverage to gain German neutralization and disarmament concessions from the West. 
Michael Beschloss frames the summit as backdrop for the U-2 incident. The real story 
here is the aerial reconnaissance program, its risks and the reward of proof to thwart the missile 
lobbyists.  Beschloss sees the conference goals as a competing set of Western interests and 
anxieties.   The summit seen here is an isolated incident, not a direct consequence of the 1958 
Berlin initiative or the emergence of a practical detente. though they are all too aware the 
Khrushchev can easily tip their hands.  He treats Khrushchev‟s summit goals as being very broad 
and general.
257
  This may have been true at some levels, particularly in the realm of public 
relations objectives.  In terms of practical politics, though, Khrushchev consistently linked Berlin 
and the German treaty with disarmament as his reasons for needing a summit. 
Former State Department analyst Robert Bowie and diplomatic and military historian 
Richard Immerman provide further background on Eisenhower era security policy, which was 
not belligerent but required a strong deterrent.  Eisenhower was not opposed to nuclear deterrent 
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but was very wary of spending so much on inadequate systems that the nation might be 
unprepared for an unexpected threat.  In evaluating Eisenhower‟s legacy, the authors 
conspicuously do not emphasize movement towards détente.  They provide only marginal 
mention of the 1955 Vienna summit where Eisenhower hoped to make a convincing case for the 
Open Skies inspection program.  They do observe that Eisenhower was always committed to 
allied unity and held a special capability for leadership in this area.  They note that Eisenhower 
left office deeply disappointed at the lack of progress in disarmament, yet was determined to 
keep the nuclear emphasis in US defense forces, including tactical weapons such as were in 
Germany by 1960.
258
  It is difficult to imagine their version of Eisenhower approaching a Paris 
summit with any intent of rejecting American prerogatives of aerial reconnaissance.   
Political discourse analyst Ira Chernus offers another perspective on Eisenhower‟s public 
diplomacy, namely the pursuit of promising goals in the interest of reassuring the public. 
259
 
Nuclear weapons loomed ever more ominously in the public imagination.  Chernus emphasizes 
that the promotion of national security carried with it the implication of insecurity, requiring 
continuous buildups of force.  Thus the United States and Soviet Union  tried to pursue 
contradictory purposes in their public diplomacy.  Leaders would use provocative language even 
as they attempted to open negotiations where they did not intend to actually change their 
positions.  Berlin provided a dramatic image of the consequences of national insecurity.  Period 
media, such as the Luce magazines or Newsweek, show vivid examples of Berlin‟s symbolic 
value, as well as an implied danger of atomic war if the situation became too unstable. 
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Post-Geneva Calls for a Summit 
Khrushchev‟s 1958 ultimatum had threatened to destabilize not only Berlin and  
Germany, but East-West relations in general. John Foster Dulles had helped contain the post-
ultimatum confusion with his visits to Europe in December and February. Dulles died during the 
Geneva meeting, but he had already resigned as Secretary. Eisenhower had appointed former 
Christian Herter as head of the State Department in March.
260
   The president had confidence in 
Herter because of the latter‟s extensive record in public service as a state governor and a 
diplomat, but did not allow Herter the same authority that Dulles had exercised.  Herter relied 
extensively on the State Department staff that had worked well with Dulles, in particular  
Undersecretaries Livingston Merchant and Douglas Dillon.
261
  Ambassadors David Bruce in 
Bonn and Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow had provided indispensable contributions in the first 
phase of the Berlin crisis.    They would continue to do so, enabling Herter to proceed with 
Eisenhower‟s and Dulles‟ strategies to neutralize Khrushchev‟s provocations as much as  
possible.   Thompson's close ties with Khrushchev and sound perception of trends in the Soviet 
leadership made him invaluable as the Soviets concentrated increasingly on their bilateral 
relationship with the US. 
262
 
Khrushchev kept Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva.  Once the ministers 
reconvened, Gromyko wasted little time in hardening the Soviet position, just short of re-
imposing a deadline.  He countered Herter‟s complaints about using Berlin as a basis for 
propaganda and subversion by noting similar Western activities. 
263
  When the West complained 
that Gromyko only wanted to consider the occupation situation in West Berlin, Gromyko replied 
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that the West would not yield occupation rights and wanted also to interfere in East Berlin‟s 
affairs.   He suggested that the respective German ministers be invited to attend but Herter 
refused to allow East German participation.  By refusing to recognize the GDR, he was 
effectively rejecting the German peace treaty idea.  At that point, Gromyko re-introduced 
Khrushchev‟s „free city‟ proposal for Berlin.  The free city idea was problematic for the West 
because it  created a new German political entity, probably with Soviet peacekeepers, clearly 
without Soviet guarantees of access.   Gromyko said the Soviets were tired of continuing an 
occupational function and wished to turn access over to the local government, which was the 
GDR.
264
  He rejected the agency idea, which left the Soviet Union responsible through their 
GDR representatives.  The agency idea, which was only brought to the table after much 
reluctance, was one of the few Western concessions offered. 
265
  
Gromyko had taken the Soviet position on Berlin and Germany back to the November 
starting point without any acceptance of Western compromises such as a troop freeze or 
accepting East German agency stamping of documents.  He suggested “the Germans be allowed 
to decide this.  Let them try for one year to undertake these tasks.  The terms of reference would 
be … reunification by stages and … a German peace treaty.”
266
  He said the Soviet Union 
desired more sessions, but the reasons why were unclear.  A major reason may have been to lay 
the groundwork for a summit.   
Berlin‟s Mayor Willy Brandt expressed his serious anxiety over the conference's lack of 
progress on guaranteed access for West Berlin's civilians.  Eisenhower was concerned about the 
lack of progress.  As he told Macmillan, some progress might be found in the fact that East-West 
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negotiations were proceeding, though in a meandering fashion. The West needed to affirm its 
commitments to Berlin. He suggested the ministers might declare, “Since the Geneva Conference 
is partially a result of the crisis in Berlin, there must be an agreement confirming the continuing 
status of Berlin, pending the reunification of Germany.”
267
  'Ike' considered a summit possible 
only with Soviet agreement.  Further plenary sessions in Geneva produced no opening in the 
Soviet position.  Despite the toughness of the Russians, they did not seem intent on any forcible 
activities in the near future, though long- term interests were harder to gauge.
268
 
Herter visited privately with Gromyko on June 12.  They outlined their respective 
governments‟ positions, and Herter considered Gromyko‟s statements that no deadline was 
currently in effect as reason to continue the conference.  Then Gromyko brought up a summit 
conference, which he said the Americans had incorrectly linked to the Foreign Ministers 
Conference.  The Soviets considered a summit too important to be a made an “object of 
bargaining.”
269
  American linkage of a summit to concessions on Berlin appeared as an 
ultimatum to the Soviets, Gromyko informed Herter. The Secretary replied it might be thought 
the new one-year moratorium might be constituted a deadline.  He said Eisenhower had made 
plain that he could not reconcile going to a conference to restore tensions while the Soviets made 
threats over Berlin.  The candid and tense exchange ended with the Secretary saying the new few 
days would determine if progress were possible and Gromyko saying the US was to blame for 
unsatisfactory relations between their countries. 
A potential summit came up in the next plenary session of the Foreign Minster‟s 
Conference.  Gromyko told his counterparts that a summit, or series of summits, could be useful 
but  should not be made contingent on a Berlin deal.  Herter told Eisenhower that he expected 
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Gromyko to propose a summit conference within a week.  The President replied that, while still 
unwilling to proceed toward a summit under present conditions, he would write personally to 
Khrushchev to express his concerns that Foreign ministers were being “considered only as errand 
boys … some kind of (Soviet) concession on Berlin and German problem” would be essential” 
for a summit.
270
  Eisenhower reminded Khrushchev of the President‟s March 20 letter linking 
progress at the conference and any possibility of a heads of government meeting.  The Soviet 
Union had changed the topic of business in Geneva to summit meetings without solving the 
Berlin problem.  The US could not accept the call to a summit without resolution first.  He told 
Khrushchev that “final agreements on critical questions affecting world peace could probably be 
best concluded at a meeting of Heads of Government.”
271
 His Secretary of State was in Geneva 
negotiating in good faith and he hoped the Soviet Foreign minister was also negotiating seriously 
and with authority.  He hoped that they could yet make progress.  Their progress would be the 
best indicator that a sufficiently productive understanding was in place to proceed with a 
summit.
272
   
The next day, Gromyko requested a private audience with Herter, who said the Russian 
“made even more clear than on any previous occasion Soviet indication to get us out of 
Berlin.”
273
  Gromyko also brought up other topics including a nuclear-free zone in Europe, 
global disarmament and a non-aggression pact.  Herter found Gromyko friendly on this occasion, 
but thought he might be probing American positions on matters beyond the ministers‟ 
conference.    Harold Macmillan wrote Eisenhower that he hoped the conference could conclude 
with an agreement on a summit. He acknowledged the lack of progress but feared that, if the 
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West made a summit contingent on Berlin resolution, that Khrushchev might force a summit 
through some other action.  The West would do better to consider a summit where it still had the 
most leverage, Berlin notwithstanding.  Perhaps, a Heads of State meeting minus a large staff 
might actually be productive.  Eisenhower rejected that prospect, saying that Khrushchev‟s reply 
would give a good idea of Soviet attitudes.
274
   
In the meantime, the Foreign Ministers could recess with the option for a quick 
resumption if conditions warranted.  Although French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville was 
active in the discussions, the French Government did not offer new proposals of their own, nor 
did they take nearly as strong a position regarding the summit as the Americans.  Since Dulles‟ 
visit in February, they were congruent with the Americans but still had their own special 
concerns about German reunification.  De Gaulle was more interested achieving parity with the 
Americans, possibly at British expense, in a tripartite Western bloc.  He would later initiate his 
own bipolar dialogue with the Soviets, though, and end up chairing the Paris summit.  That was 
later. In the summer of 1959, though, the French president remained reserved in the extreme.
275
 
 Khrushchev replied to Eisenhower by restating the Soviet positions, declaring that the 
Soviet side had bargained in good faith, and laying the blame for the breakdown on the West.  
The Soviet leader sidestepped the summit question, but his tone was cordial and he said he hoped 
to continue a private direct correspondence with Khrushchev.
276
  Such correspondence had in 
fact been very formal and sporadic; this would represent a step towards engagement.  Such small 
steps were not immediately visible compared to the overall intransigence of Khrushchev‟s reply.  
The Western ministers were discouraged by the message and discounted the worth of continuing 
in conference. In the final June sessions, Gromyko repeated his intention to resolve the matter 
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along Soviets line at an indeterminate but definite date within a year or so.  When he called for a 
two-week recess, the other ministers agreed but declined to sign a joint communiqué. 
The conference resumed in mid-July but without any more progress. In the meantime, 
Averill Harriman, a former US Ambassador to Moscow and longtime back-channel intermediary 
for Kremlin contacts, reported to Eisenhower and Herter on his recent visit to the Soviet Union.  
Harriman toured the country and visited privately with Khrushchev, with whom he mainly 
discussed agriculture but also Soviet ambitions and military progress.
277
  They were joined by 
Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan whose tour of America in January had combined  tough 
sessions with the president and largely successful publicity opportunities with business and 
political leaders.   Harriman thought that Mikoyan might be emerging as a co-partner with 
Khrushchev.  The possibility that Khrushchev‟s authority might not be absolute was underscored 
by their chiding the Americans for placing too much emphasis on junior aide Dmitri Kurichenko 
as a successor. Mikoyan and Khrushchev told Harriman that Deputy Premier Frol Kozlov was in 
fact the most likely next Soviet leader.
278
  Kozlov, an economic specialist who had been made a 
full member of the Politburo in 1957,  was about to visit  America on a similar goodwill visit to 
Mikoyan‟s but would not bring the demands Mikoyan had brought in January.
279
  Harriman also 
came away with the impression that Khrushchev had doubts about his country‟s missile strength, 
despite his frequent boasts touting their destructive capacity.  On the subject of Berlin, however, 
Harriman felt Khrushchev was still convinced “he could end our rights in Berlin by signing a 
piece of paper, and we would be the ones to move our tanks and accept the onus of war.”
280
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Harriman thought a summit conference might be "a good idea" if a summit could be held to 
informal discussions that might touch on disarmament. 
Mikoyan‟s trip to the US in January had been the first in a series of high-level visits 
intended to relax tense relations between the two superpowers.  Vice-President Nixon would visit 
the Soviet Union a few weeks later; both deputy leaders would host an industrial exhibition and 
then travel around the host country.
281
  This exchange helped prepare the way for mutual visits 
by the US and Soviet heads of state, which were at first projected to include informal executive 
talks and goodwill tours, but stopping short of conclusive summit meetings. Such visits had not 
been part of the wartime or Geneva 1955 summit formulas but would become an essential 
feature of 1970s era détente.  Publicity tours were intended as a confidence-building, tension-
reducing counterpart to the executive discussions.  Though still unconvinced of the practicality 
or usefulness of mutual visits at the heads-of-state level, Eisenhower's advisors began exploring 
the possibility of  such visits in June 1959.  A back-channel exploratory offer to Khrushchev for 
an exchange was accepted unexpectedly.
282
  Eisenhower was furious because the precondition of 
Berlin progress had been bypassed.  Nevertheless, plans for the visit proceeded, especially after 
the Kozlov visit. 
Kozlov met with the President on July 1 and their discussions  touched on many of the 
same matters as Khrushchev's visit two months later.   Agriculture was a comfortable opening 
topic, with Kozlov investigating American corn production.  He visited the Iowa rancher 
Roswell Garst, who had already met with Khrushchev in Moscow. 
283
  Kozlov and the President 
talked about peaceful uses of atomic energy in icebreakers and heavy industry.  The Russia 
declared that their own natural resources were superior to those of potential client states like 
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Egypt and therefore the Soviets had no selfish designs in seeking closer ties in these Third world 
countries.
284
   
 Kozlov also met with Vice-President Nixon  for cordial but tougher talks, centering on  
trade problems.  Their discussions extended into other areas of contention between the two 
countries, including propaganda and nuclear deterrence. These discussions touched on  Berlin; 
Nixon suggested that the problem remained unresolved at present but the peaceful cooperation in 
agriculture represented a potential for improved general relations.   Nixon probed for assurances 
that he would be given comparable freedom of movement to what had been extended to Kozlov, 
but the tacit assurances offered by the Russians were not in fact realized.
285
  But in talks with 
Livingston merchant two days later, Kozlov reiterated Soviet demands for a new Berlin 
settlement remained, even without a formal deadline.
286
  
As important as Berlin was to US-Soviet relations, questions remained about the real 
strength of the Soviet nuclear deterrent.  Harriman had suggested that Khrushchev did not have 
full confidence in his ability to deliver nuclear bombs with missiles, so the extent of that strength 
was a necessary piece of intelligence for the West.
287
 On July 8, Eisenhower told Secretary 
Herter and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that he was very apprehensive about 
launching U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union to find their missile bases.  The 
President "expressed his concern over the possibility of getting involved in something costly and 
harmful." Herter said only one operation was planned and the "the intelligence objective 
outweighs the danger of getting trapped."
 288
  They agreed that "in case of protest, we would 
defend ourselves with an absolute disavowal and denial on the matter." Prophetically, 
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Eisenhower noted that Khrushchev could "put us in a terrible hole over Berlin." He could say 
Soviet interception of a U-2 flight "marks the end of serious negotiation." Eisenhower remarked 




Vice-President Nixon was due to visit Moscow two weeks later.   The Nixon-Khrushchev 
„kitchen debate‟ in Moscow was televised and became a celebrated piece of Cold War public 
theater, a kind of proxy conflict for the cameras and a strange public counterpoint to the Geneva 
talks.  In private, Nixon and the president‟s brother Milton Eisenhower had much more serious 
talks that focused on military strength and global political aims.  They did not discuss practical 
programs for disarmament nor the need for heads of state agreements to begin disarmament.  
Khrushchev‟s all-or-nothing approach was as well known to the Americans as Eisenhower‟s 
insistence on inspection during disarmament was to the Soviets.
290
  Neither position was 
attractive to the other side.  Khrushchev‟s vision of total simultaneous disarmament without 
inspection seemed utterly unrealistic to the Allies.
291
  The Soviet efforts to link disarmament 
with Berlin complicated efforts to develop a negotiating strategy.  The Americans concluded 
that, whatever plans might be made for a summit, Khrushchev would block progress in any other 
area till he gained Western acceptance for the „free city‟ and German peace treaty proposals.  
Ambassador Thompson thought that Nixon‟s visit had been successful in terms of public 
relations and that the Soviets had extended favorable hospitality to the Vice-President.
292
 By the 
time they returned to Washington, the Foreign Ministers conference had resumed and ended 
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without resolution.  Discussion of a summit assumed new urgency as Khrushchev‟s visit 
approached. 
 
Eisenhower Consults Allies in Europe 
In August 1959, Eisenhower and Herter visited West German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and his foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano.  They discussed possible interim 
agreements to forestall new Berlin threats, but differed about possible revision of the occupation 
arrangement.  They discussed disarmament briefly and only after first speaking of Berlin.  The 
president emphasized “mutual and effective inspection.”
293
   Eisenhower asked Adenauer if 
progress was necessary before a summit conference was in order; the Chancellor agreed.  The 
West Germans forwarded to the Americans their draft reply to a very tough July 17 note from the 
Soviets, warning the West Germans from accepting US Polaris missiles.  In their own public 
reply to the Soviet note, the US made no apologies for the missile deployment, observing that the 
Soviets “threaten the use of rockets in support of its policy towards Cuba.
294
  The Americans also 
visited Macmillan, who believed personally in head of state diplomacy, having made a solo visit 
to Khrushchev during the chilliest days of the crisis. Macmillan asked the President whether he 
now saw any ground to explore the idea of summit with Khrushchev during the latter‟s 
forthcoming visit to the United States.  Eisenhower had cautioned Macmillan already  that most 
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Khrushchev's and Eisenhower at Camp David; Conceiving a Summit 
 Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959, partly to reinforce his country's 
presence at the United Nations General Assembly sessions and partly as an experiment in 
goodwill to Americans.
296
  Khrushchev, a few weeks later as Eisenhower‟s guest at Camp David, 
Maryland, broached the topic of a summit.  Eisenhower had opened their talks with a statement 
on Berlin, affirming American commitment and a sincere desire to eventually move beyond the 
occupation arrangements.  He said Khrushchev‟s statements on Berlin had only increased 
American determination to defend its responsibilities.  The president said “if some [corrective] 
statement [from the Soviets] could be made on this question, we could make progress on others, 
up and down the line, such as disarmament.” 
297
 This is the first stated linkage of Berlin and 
disarmament in the summit dialogue, and it indicates that disarmament was a topic dependent on 
progress in Berlin discussions.
 298
   On September 29,White House Press Secretary James C. 
Hagerty briefed reporters the president and the Chairman had “concentrated almost entirely on 
the question of Berlin and Germany.  There was discussion of one other topic…disarmament, but 
the main concentration…has been on Berlin and Germany.”  But the last communiqué of this 
main day of meetings emphasized disarmament as the main topic, though no details were 
provided.  Eisenhower‟s visit to Russia was heralded, but there was no mention yet of  an East-
West summit.
299
   
 Though disarmament was scarcely mentioned in their first session,  Khrushchev soon 
widened the discussion to include disarmament: “Mr. K said that without a thorough exposition 
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of the US position on Germany and disarmament, it would be difficult for him to report to his 
government and say where the barometer pointed - to clear, changing or stormy.” 
300
 Eisenhower 
answered in two phases, stressing that there was no need for any tensions over Berlin.  
Americans were ready to seek solutions but patience was necessary.   Eisenhower said some 
progress on general disarmament was necessary to solve specific issues.   Khrushchev said 
disarmament offered more room to negotiate because the sides were not frozen into set positions.       
 Discussing the meeting later, Eisenhower reported that talks had centered on Berlin and 
unacceptable Soviet deadlines and demands.  A summit was impossible under such conditions, 
said the president, but “he had told Khrushchev that he would rather have a summit meeting for 
negotiations on the subject of disarmament if we were both ready to negotiate on this question.  
In this sense he had made Berlin a catalyst.”
301
 The final communiqué said that the leaders 
agreed that disarmament was the most important issue of the day, though Berlin, not 
disarmament, had dominated their conversations. The communiqué referred to these negotiations 
as a summit on disarmament.  The summit had been conceived and its parameters roughly 
described - two intersecting axial concerns of Berlin and disarmament.  International cooperation 
remained as the periphery of discussion. 
 Eisenhower told Adenauer he and Khrushchev had discussed a summit but reiterated 
American commitment to defend West Berlin‟s interests and Allied occupation rights. 
302
 
Eisenhower then wrote Macmillan and framed the summit idea as Khrushchev‟s.  Although, the 
President noted, “Mr. Khrushchev did not modify the Soviet positions regarding Berlin, German 
reunification, disarmament or other major international questions … there was sufficient 
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indication of a change of tone … I believe we would be assuming a heavy responsibility if we 
now refused to meet him at the Summit.”
303
  Eisenhower expressed skepticism about summit 
prospects; hastily conceived agreements entered into for appearances would solve nothing. But 
even if little of substance might be accomplished, the West might better win world support than 
if they declined such a meeting. 
304
   
 Before the State Department drafted a formal proposal for a summit, Secretary Herter, 
along with Undersecretaries Livingston Merchant and Foy Kohler, met with the President to 
discuss possible aims for such a conference.  Eisenhower immediately brought up Berlin, asking 
if there any possibility of reaching a Berlin agreement at a summit. “Our main aim,” Herter 
replied, “that would be to get Mr. Khrushchev to agree to a moratorium for a couple of years.”
305
 
The president then brought up the desirability of cutting US occupation force levels, citing costs.  
All present doubted whether Khrushchev would seriously consider the Western version of a 
moratorium.  A Western conference would be necessary to plan an agenda. 
 De Gaulle made his own reluctance for a summit known in an October 8, 1959, letter to 
Eisenhower.  The President  responded by suggesting disarmament as a possible topic, citing the 
ten-power East-West disarmament talks as basis for higher-level negotiation.
306
   In reply, De 
Gaulle repeated his doubts about any real progress, saying that of all issues, “only Berlin” 
warranted heads-of-state negotiations, “yet its solution appears more uncertain than ever.”  
DeGaulle mentioned Asian affairs as a topic of concern, but not disarmament. 
307
 The West 
Germans offered further doubts, citing the Soviets failure to extend any concessions on Berlin or 
Germany in spite of the compromises offered on July 28.  In a letter from von Brentano to 
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Herter, the Foreign Minister noted that, “in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union, we must 
assume that any change in Berlin‟s status will necessarily be a change for the worse [italics in 
original].”  Von Brentano scoffed at the value of a United Nations supervised solution.  Von 
Brentano noted reunification problems, but did mention that Soviet budget pressures might 
present an opportunity for disarmament progress.  However, the most recent Soviet offer 
appeared unsatisfactory, “it does not look like an act of good faith to speak of disarmament but 
…indicate that controls should only become effective once disarmament has been carried out.”
308
  
De Gaulle then sent a more optimistic letter to Eisenhower, outlining a possible agenda “general 
disarmament, Germany, assistance to underdeveloped countries, non-interference.”
309
  He said 
Khrushchev had just accepted a French offer to visit Paris.   
 Meeting with Eisenhower on October 21, Herter summarized the difficulties facing the 
Western heads as they prepared to meet.  Adenauer wanted to join in while de Gaulle wanted 
only a tripartite meeting.  Adenauer resisted the focus on Germany and Berlin and claimed that 
disarmament was his main concern.  Eisenhower observed that a summit might deal with issues 
far afield of Germany‟s particular interests.  Herter said the United States wanted a long-term 
solution for Berlin.  The British preferred a short-term situation to stabilize the situation, given 
upcoming British and German elections.  Herter moved on to disarmament, in the form of 
conventional force cutbacks in Europe.  Eisenhower replied that, though desirable, he would not 
advance this proposal until some basic agreement was reached on disarmament.
310
  Low-level 
East German provocations continued in Berlin and the refugee situation continued to erode, so 
Eisenhower may have had some concerns about thinning- out at that time.  Eisenhower finally 
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convinced de Gaulle that that a summit with the Soviets would be useful to work on disarmament 
and Berlin, but only after a Western summit later that fall.
311
   
 The West Germans were now signaling that disarmament should not be the only item 
discussed at such a Summit; it would also be necessary to deal with Berlin.
312
  Herter told West 
German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe that that the Soviets would probably open with their 
German proposals.  Herter said there were two options - a temporary and a permanent solution - 
and the West Germans did not favor an interim solution.   Herter brought up the possibility that 
the Soviets might simply direct the summit to whatever topics they wanted.  He said he did not 
know if summits were practical.  Various distractions complicated planning.  Adenauer was 
working up his own new German and Berlin proposals, centered on German self-determination 
through internationally supervised elections. A NATO ministerial meeting was scheduled for 
December and the United States planned to make its case for a reduced share of expenditures.  
De Gaulle‟s meddling in NATO business disturbed Herter, already impatient with the French 
president‟s aspirations for dominance on the continent.
313
  Macmillan and his Foreign Minister 
Selwyn Lloyd visited Adenauer and DeGaulle, finding them manageable but still troublesome.    
  Cautionary voices were heard as the Western meeting preparations concluded in mid-
December.  Livingston Merchant told Grewe that “primary stress on disarmament might be an 
effective tactic but…armaments were essentially the symptoms of political tensions not the 
reverse.”
314
  From Moscow, Ambassador Thompson wired Herter that he saw little chance for 
resolution of the German and Berlin problems unless some more imaginative new proposals 
were developed.   Thompson agreed with German Ambassador Kroll that Khrushchev was under 
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domestic political pressure from hardliners.   It might be in the West‟s interest to give 
Khrushchev some support to forestall a tougher new Soviet regime. Various distractions 
complicated planning for the Western heads meeting.
 315
  Subsequent reports indicated Adenauer 
was working up his own new German and Berlin proposals, centered on German self-
determination through internationally supervised elections. A NATO ministerial meeting was 
scheduled for December and the United States planned to make its case for a  reduced share of 
expenditures.   
 Policy Planning Staff head Gerard Smith told analyst Henry Owen, "in thinking about 
Berlin, we should keep in mind the primacy of the need for a US-USSR detente. Probably the 
first real test of the genuineness of the detente will be the Berlin negotiation." If Khrushchev  
would freeze his plans till the next German elections, in September 1961, that might allow " a 
serious disarmament discussion which I understand is the President's main motivation in trying 
quickly to get a Berlin solution." Smith thought a postponement strategy was better than 
unacceptable compromises just to get an agreement.
316
 That thinking would later underlie most 
of US's negotiating approaches in the more bilateral phase after the Berlin Wall's construction. 
Smith also suggested a post-freeze idea the Soviets would later propose in modified form but 
which the West would decline: putting the occupation regime under the UN's auspices.
317
 Owen 
would be one of the few carryovers at the State Department into the Kennedy administration and 
a very influential advisor throughout Kennedy's public and private attempts to foster detente.  He 
had a good understanding of the Soviet Union as well as the Allies and was involved in the 
Berlin crisis from the onset.  After 1961, the Allies would become less directly involved, but in 
1959 and 1960, they were all equal partners regarding Berlin.  
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Western Heads Meet to Plan Summit 
De Gaulle‟s meddling in NATO business disturbed Herter, already impatient with the 
French president‟s aspirations for dominance on the continent.
318
  Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd 
visited Adenauer and DeGaulle, finding them manageable but still troublesome.   NATO 
member Canada expressed support for the summit, but also some  impatience with its peripheral 
role.  Foy Kohler told them that the United States imagined, “almost an agenda- less meeting, “ 
with disarmament being “a tough question to place on the agenda…..the summit might be our 
kick-off place for this topic; but there would not be enough time…to get very far with it.”  
Kohler pleased the Canadians by asking their opinion and noted how difficult it would be to have 
summit disarmament talks so close to the ten-power talks.
319
  Kohler approved NATO discussion 
of the summit but could only offer limited hope of meaningful input.  The Italian NATO 
representatives also expressed similar sentiments of support mixed with frustration at their 
second-tier status. (Following the conference, the Canadians and Italians would explicitly blame 
de Gaulle for their diminished role).   
Berlin was reasonably quiet, though the occupying powers were exploring tricky 
questions of high altitude flights in the access corridor.  The flag problem had receded but 
political tensions ran high in anticipation of Mayor Brandt‟s upcoming run against Adenauer for 
the Chancellorship. 
320
 The working groups continued their work, helping the Western heads 
made their final preparations for their meeting in mid-December.  Undersecretary of State 
Douglas Dillon met with European leaders in mid-December and advised Eisenhower that trade 
rivalries were dividing the Allies.  Britain was afraid the European Economic Community, 'the 
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Common Market,' would evolve into a political entity, a course the Americans, French and West 
Germans desired. Europe also needed to provide more aid to less developed areas, said Dillon.  




French president De Gaulle chaired the meetings, also including President Eisenhower, 
Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer, which began in Paris on December 19. 
Their first session, with Heads alone and interpreters, dealt with arrangements for an East-West 
summit.  Eisenhower suggested they not plan too much on a fixed agenda because of 
Khrushchev's tendency to "go from one subject to another."  Eisenhower said "there should be 
some definite items on the program and the subjects of disarmament, the under-developed 
countries, non interference..and naturally Germany had been mentioned."  On disarmament, they 
thought, "there were no great possibilities of coming to grips with such a subject at a summit 
meeting but it could be discussed in general terms."
 322
  The British had proposals ready but 
without Allied support. They were in general agreement that "the juridical status and rights of the 
West in Berlin should not be brought into question." Plans needed to be made in case of a new 
blockade.  Khrushchev had to be told that if he "created difficulties then this means he does not 
want a detente."   The main topics, disarmament and Berlin were agreed on firmly but without 
much specificity.  On other areas, like trade reform, aid to the undeveloped and colonial self-
determination, the Allies exhibited cordial but obvious differences. 
323
 
 In their last meetings on December 21, the Western leaders agreed to send a formal 
invitation to the Soviets, without specifying an agenda. Eisenhower suggested disarmament and 
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related matters.  De Gaulle and Adenauer wanted to at least mention Germany and Berlin.  The 
Four agreed that the ten-power disarmament committee should try to have a common Western 
position ready to show Khrushchev.  There was no consensus on Berlin. Adenauer reacted 
sharply to Eisenhower‟s readiness to look beyond the July 28 proposal, but had no idea what to 
do if the Soviets wanted changes on Berlin.  De Gaulle said that Khrushchev would probably talk 
about whatever he wanted, no matter what the plan was.
324
   
 De Gaulle said disarmament was a big question, but some progress might be possible.  
Adenauer mentioned cost-savings which could be channeled to aid projects.  Macmillan cited 
UK disarmament interest.  All agreed that warheads and delivery systems  should be limited.    
“On Germany,” De Gaulle concluded, “the four had centered on Berlin…juridical status and 
Western rights should not be brought into question…governments should plan measures 
…[to]…prevent interference…developments in Germany depend on intentions of 
Khrushchev.”
325
  Citing the failure of the 1955 Geneva meeting, Eisenhower again spoke of his 
fear that Khrushchev could use Germany was a blunt tool to obstruct progress.   Macmillan 
brought up possible economic obstacles to this limited agenda.  Clearly,  substantial differences 
remained as to the summit„s purpose.
326
 
 In their final session, de Gaulle summarized their position.  They had agreed that the 
“Communist menace” was still great, but that Khrushchev‟s recent comments about peaceful 
coexistence had prompted  an invitation to a summit.  The Four “had discussed Germany and 
agreed that their position should be very reserved, especially re Berlin.”
327
  They must not give 
up their occupation rights and they must affirm their commitment to the well-being of the West 
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Berliners.   Expectations for a German solution were modest unless international tensions should 
relax.  Disarmament was mentioned, with little expectation of progress.  The Four made note 
again of Adenauer‟s suggestion of disarmament savings being diverted for aid to underdeveloped 
areas.  They discussed joint efforts with Khrushchev on Nile development and public health 
projects.    Macmillan opposed linking disarmament and aid projects without careful study.  They 
agreed to a summit date in May, then adjourned.  The West was now committed to a summit, but 
without a practical strategy towards agreements on either Berlin or disarmament. 
 Still intent on his tripartite vision, De Gaulle was able to get Macmillan and Eisenhower 
to meet with him after the main meetings were done.  De Gaulle said they needed to determine 
what attitude to take towards Khrushchev.  They could not let him browbeat them over Berlin 
and wartime injustices but should allow the Soviets to raise the topic.  Eisenhower cautioned 
against overplaying Berlin as a test of the Soviets' interest in detente. They would continue to use 
the 'Western Peace Plan' of July 28 as their basic program for Berlin.
328
 That program had been 
rejected by the Soviets in July.  Tentative talk of possible border concessions or long-range 
reunification understandings found little agreement.  The French admitted they were in no hurry 
for German unification; the British agreed.  Eisenhower said a permanently divided Germany 
destabilized Europe; that was also the West German position.
329
   
 That schism would grow deeper in coming weeks. Their tripartite discussion of 
disarmament  was very brief and inconclusive. Other areas of non-Berlin tripartite like the 
colonies and European military integration were even less productive.  The meeting indicated 
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that, whatever de Gaulle hoped for, Berlin was the only real piece of business that France, 




Slow Progress to a Summit Strategy  
 On New Year‟s Day, Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington to describe his talks with 
Khrushchev at a party the night before.  Khrushchev told him how much he liked Eisenhower 
and Herter too, though he did not look forward to the possibility of a Nixon presidency.  He 
wanted peace, lamenting the destructive potential of atomic weapons.  He spoke at length about 
Berlin, hinting that Adenauer might provoke him into signing a separate peace treaty.  He told 
Thompson the Soviets would not be throwing the Allies out of Berlin but simply turning over 
access responsibility to the GDR.  He refused to acknowledge that the Allied position would be 
restricted by a separate peace treaty.  Khrushchev compared the situation to the American 
arrangements with Japan.  Thompson disagreed and told him the American  commitment to 
uphold its position and responsibilities was unchanged. 
331
  
Khrushchev said he could not see why the West placed such importance on Berlin.   
Thompson asked the Soviet chief why he placed such emphasis on Berlin.  Khrushchev replied 
“because it was surrounded by East Germany.” Thompson followed up with a long letter to 
Herter, noting how both East and West would probe the other side‟s positions at the summit 
before advancing their positions.  He thought Khrushchev “seeks a détente of long duration and a 
real measure of disarmament if this can be had without jeopardizing the Communist empire in 
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  Thompson  warned that Western positions so far would appear as threats  
too dangerous and fruitless to proceed with.    
 Even before their New Year‟s Eve talk, Thompson was convinced of Khrushchev‟s intent 
to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany at the earliest opportunity.  Eisenhower's security 
analysts said, "The rhetoric of the Soviet treaty emphasizes the danger of German revanchism 
and portrays the new treaty as a great initiative for global peace that would finally resolve the 
last unresolved remainder of the Second World War.  The treaty addresses not only Europe and 
America but many developing nations by name.  It promises German unity but would sharply 
restrict self-defense and military alliance options; if the nations  addressed do not affirm the 
treaty in unison, they may recognize it unilaterally, which the Soviet Union makes it clear is its 
intention."
333
 East German pressure to solve their problems was mounting.  Soviet hardliners and 
Chinese rivals also wanted action.
334
  If the West could not accept Soviet terms, they needed to 
figure some way for him to save face.  Linkage to disarmament progress might be a good 
delaying tactic but it would not be long before Khrushchev felt compelled to make the separate 
treaty with the GDR.  Thomson saw few options: more flexible Western positions that still 
maintained their rights, a pan-German solution that might put peace treaty and Berlin actions on 
hold, or a breakthrough in disarmament, such as a US offer to thin its military presence in 
Germany if the  Soviets would do the same.  Thompson‟s conclusion was the British and West 
Germans should learn of the full range of the conversation, but the other NATO partners should 
be informed only that the Soviet position on Germany was essentially unchanged.
 335
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 Discussions in the following weeks did not indicate that Thompson‟s advice was 
understood.  Adenauer backed away from the July 28 proposals on Berlin. 
336
 This was the kind 
of provocative attitude Thompson warned against.  The preparation process was so broad that 
building a consensus for a more innovative strategy would be hard.  Smaller NATO partners like 
Italy and Canada were concerned the Big 4 would leave them out of decision-making.
337
  Gerard 
Smith, the State Department‟s Policy planning head,  cautioned against saber-rattling but warned 
the status quo must be maintained.
338
  Livingston Merchant had told Gerard Smith the US 
"should take a position which ruled out any change," but  Smith said that was unrealistic given 
the Soviets' large advantage in conventional forces. Besides, said Smith, "when the chips are 
down, none of the other three Western powers would stand firm with the United States."
339
  Both 
Smith and Thompson had reviewed the same set of options.  Thompson in Moscow may have 
had a better idea what might influence the Soviet leader.  Smith„s view reflected much of the 
thinking in Washington, which still favored tough positions and propaganda actions.  State 
Department leaders were beginning to realize that they had a narrow set of options, with limited, 
chances for success.
340
   
 In Moscow, Khrushchev told Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Gronchi that “if the West 
was trying to give disarmament precedence over German questions as trick to maintain status 
quo, he was not such a fool as to fall into a trap.”
341
  Thompson, along with West Germany‟s 
Ambassador Kroll, felt Khrushchev would still prefer negotiation, but might not be able to defer 
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unilateral action on Germany.  Both thought Khrushchev now saw an all-German commission as 
the best vehicle to delay action while still moving toward his goals for a new settlement without 
a Western military presence in Berlin or Germany.  They also agreed that Adenauer was intent 
on blocking any new Western concessions.  The Soviets and GDR were testing the waters by 
issuing new travel documents allowing continued access to and within Berlin, with a new layer 
of bureaucratic interference.  None of these alternatives were likely to be brought to the table by 
May, but he saw signs the Soviets were interested in accommodation.
342
  Relaxation of tensions 
might lead to more freedoms for the Soviet satellites including East Germany, thus quieting the 
Berlin issue.  
 This relaxation was fortunate for the West because Live Oak contingency planning had 
not proceeded very far since the Foreign Ministers Conference.  Live Oak was essentially 
tripartite (UK/US/France), representing the West Berlin signatory peace-keepers.  In February 
1960, they were reluctant to allow either further West German or United Nations participation, 
which might dilute their tripartite responsibility. The Western ambassadorial group was still  
working with basic position papers, not battle plans.  This reflected not only lack of coordination 
but caution on the part of their governments about over-mobilizing, which might tip 
Khrushchev's hand towards action.
343
 Their immediate task was to prepare status reports to be 
included in the four-power Western Working Group Reports for final review before the summit. 
Frictions were visible even at the tripartite level, with the French being especially sensitive to 
anything that hinted at compromises with the East Germans.  The Americans and British saw 
such compromises, such as which might flight notification or allowing GDR personnel to check 
documents, as pressure-relieving devices to avoid flash conflicts.  FRG Ambassador Grewe was 
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present  for March meetings and voiced strong concerns that the other Allies still might accept 
the peace treaty.
344
    
 Berlin was still the primary area of discussion, but its military aspects explained why 
disarmament was also on the table.  US Army General Lauris Norstad, assigned to NATO, 
reported to Eisenhower that control and inspection programs might be worked out for central 
Europe.  This could allow reduced force levels, thus easing tensions.  Adenauer might be 
placated a little by extending the control zones beyond German territory, but generally appeared 
to be more inflexible than ever.  The FRG‟s growing independence might, as US Ambassador 
Walter to Bonn Dowling told Herter: “create problems of grave danger.”
345
  Adenauer was so 
afraid of recognizing the GDR that he wanted to move quickly from Berlin to disarmament.  
Dowling told him the likely progression was still Berlin-reunification-disarmament.  
  On the eve of Adenauer‟s mid-March visit, Eisenhower affirmed that Berlin was still the 
“key.”  He hoped Adenauer would be more interested than the French in his ideas for in 
disarmament-inspection zones, which might even be palatble to the Soviets.
346
  He lamented 
loopholes had been left in the original agreements and the fact that he could not guarantee access 
or supply for West Berlin. Eisenhower still thought a UN solution for Berlin was possible, 
though this option was not well received.  Since Adenauer would be unreceptive to any revisions 
on Berlin, the only areas where concessions of interest to the Soviets might be developed were 
the West German-Polish border and limited East German access control duties.
347
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   Progress on even these concessions proved elusive, let alone on the really significant 
issues;  the Soviets wanted major revisions on Berlin and arms levels in central Europe.  The 
Chancellor did not object to Eisenhower‟s suggestion of continuous aerial inspection, apart from 
any disarmament pact.  This was essentially an update of his familiar “Open Skies” proposal. 
348
  
In further talks without the President, Von Brentano warned against waffling on civilian access 
to Berlin.  The July 28 proposals had explicitly refused to separate civilian from Allied military 
access rights to and within Berlin.  Adenauer repeated his insistence that any recognition of GDR 
authority - granting them access authority -  was still unacceptable.  Herter reminded him that 
East and West Germany had ongoing toll and tariff arrangements that implied mutual 
recognition.  Adenauer demurred and expressed his concern that no common Western position 
would be ready in time form the summit.  He now opposed the inspection zone proposals.  He 
again suggested a plebiscite in West Berlin, which he wanted to hold before the summit.
 349
 This 
was clearly impossible, causing both the Americans and the other West Germans to wonder if the 
Chancellor was still serious about the summit.  
 Eisenhower and Herter's meetings with Adenauer had not gone well, foreshadowing 
problems the Chancellor would present throughout the rest of the Berlin crisis.  Adenauer's 
insistence on a quick referendum for Berlin, demands that the FRG be more involved in 
contingency planning and resistance to the inspection zone proposals prevented the West 
Germans from more meaningful participation in summit preparation.
350
 Dulles, an old friend, had 
been able to manage Adenauer better than Herter.
 351
  The problem was not so much with the 
Americans as with the British and French, who were less eager to see West Germany as a senior 
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 Adenauer was determined to see the FRG gain a nuclear deterrent, even if 
they not control its use and did not welcome disarmament yet.  Even reunification may have 
been second to his nuclear aspirations.
353
 
 The Americans made their final preparations with the British and French.    Macmillan 
visited Eisenhower at Camp David at the end of March.   During discussion about a test ban 
treaty, Eisenhower brought up the Soviets‟ concerns about an armed, reunited Germany.  He had 
seen firsthand evidence of reunification spirit in West Germany, yet knew that current borders 
needed to be recognized.  Macmillan commented that “this might be an important consideration 
to the Soviets.  If anything could be gotten from such a statement, he thought it might be 
worthwhile.  Eisenhower agreed that "this was not a thing we should let the Soviets have 
cheaply.”
354
  He wondered whether a two year test ban moratorium might be traded for a two 
year moratorium on Berlin.  They noted Adenauer seemed intractable on any revision for Berlin 
or for GDR recognition.  Eisenhower said the Chancellor might opt for neutralization if too 
disgruntled.  Macmillan disagreed, saying the Germans liked being well armed.  He personally 
would be happy with a “free city” arrangement but said it was “unobtainable.”  Eisenhower 
feared an island city like West Berlin could not last indefinitely but “it would be serious blow to 
the entire western position if we show ourselves to be weak on Germany.”  He hoped Adenauer 
could be persuaded to accept an inspection zone plan that might get Soviet agreement.   
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 The next day Ambassador Houghton in Paris sent the first reports of Khrushchev‟s 
meeting with de Gaulle.  De Gaulle told Khrushchev his fears of an armed West Germany were 
unfounded.   He accepted the reality of two Germanys, but thought that West Germany‟s strength 
helped balance strategic power in Europe.
356
  Khrushchev disagreed and expressed his intent to 
sign a separate peace treaty.  De Gaulle replied that France would still not recognize the GDR.  
Khrushchev raised the German question again, concentrating on the peace treaty  and free city 
ideas.  De Gaulle and Khrushchev, said Couve de Murville “agreed they want a détente…the 
difference being that the French want a détente leaving the German  situation in status quo …the 
Russians want a détente based on a settlement of the German question… it appears fundamental 
positions of both sides remain unchanged.”
357
  He did not make any new offers or accept 
Western terms but he did encourage de Gaulle‟s independent ambitions.  Khrushchev probably 
understood now that de Gaulle did not share Eisenhower and Macmillan's flexibility .  De Gaulle 
wanted an armed West Germany next door, ready to take a first strike from the East.
358
   
 Although expectations were diminished for the summit, the participants were still 
prepared to go forward.  The ministers might actually succeed in finding some agreement among 
the various papers on the table.  These reports, the products of the working groups on 
disarmament, Berlin, and cooperation, were received in April 7, just a few days before the U-2 
incident.
359
  These reports summarized Western and Soviet positions, areas of agreement and 
difference, and expected Soviet negotiating strategy.  For instance, on disarmament, the Soviets 
were expected  “to maintain their public postures of champions of complete and general 
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disarmament, to get the west to agree to certain disarmament  principles, which would form the 
basis of a treaty…later represented as being equivalent to the Khrushchev  plan and consequently 
available to blackmail the West …make the Western delegations responsible for rejecting the 
concept of a general and comprehensive disarmament.”
360
  This assessment reflects low 
expectations.  US Ambassador to West Germany Walter Dowling reported from Bonn that the 
plebiscite was simply impossible at the present time when even the regularly scheduled election 
season was chaotic.   
 The Berlin working group released its report on April 9.  Like the disarmament paper, 
this was more a summary than a new plan.  The preferred schedule would consider disarmament 
first and then Berlin and Germany, followed by international cooperation.  The Western aim 
should be to eliminate Soviet threats without sacrificing freedom and cooperation in Europe.   
The West would counter the Soviets‟ peace treaty with the Western Peace Plan (essentially the 
July 28
th
 plan), calls for a freeze on Berlin  and then an all-German plebiscite proposal. 
361
 A 
„free Berlin‟ would be countered with an all-Berlin plebiscite plan.  They might then try seeking 
extra time, whether by signed agreement or by tacit understanding.  Like the disarmament paper, 
it was intended to guide what would at best be an incremental process. 
 The Western foreign ministers, including West German Foreign Minister von Brentano 
whose country would not take part in the summit, gathered in Washington, April 11 to 14, 1960, 
to coordinate their plans.  In a private session,  Herter and British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd  
reviewed reports that the Khrushchev-de Gaulle talk had included a possible trade-off linking  
interim freezes on nuclear testing and Berlin actions.  Lloyd thought de Gaulle might “have less 
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of a chip on his shoulder.”
362
  In Von Brentano-Herter talks, the Germans expressed their 
concern that the West need to show unity on Berlin and German issues.  Herter reassured him 
that the positions were coming together.  They also discussed a possible disarmament-Berlin 
trade-off,  agreeing it was difficult to forecast what the Soviets would do at the Summit. Von 
Brentano predicted that “Khrushchev would provoke at least one serious crisis” 
363
  Herter 
agreed but noted that the Soviet leader‟s usual technique – to start calmly, provoke, and then 
level off. Von Brentano worried the Soviets might try to introduce the GDR into discussions.  He 
also wanted to know if there was any chance a test limitation treaty might be signed at the 
summit.  Herter said a signed agreement was not imminent.    
Despite some US effort to emphasize disarmament, Berlin remained the most prominent 
concern of pre-Summit preparations. In the final planning sessions in Washington from April 12-
24, the Big Three ministers tried to set a summit agenda, after reviewing reports of the working-
groups on Germany, disarmament and international aid.  Herter “recalled that the Soviets had 
generally mentioned four topics…disarmament, Germany and Berlin, East-West relations.” 
364
  
He suggested that they proceed in that order, with nuclear testing first.  Lloyd countered with the 
idea of opening with East-West relations; that way, Khrushchev might be channeled towards 
expressing the idea of a detente in principle right up front.  De Murville said the French would 
not object to discussion of nuclear testing, but would absent themselves from those talks.  He 
also told Herter that de Gaulle was opposed to any German-Polish border revision. Herter was 
leery of the West‟s committing itself to détente and then being embarrassed if Khrushchev then 
proved intractable over German/Berlin issues.  Couve de Murville noted that détente would be 
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futile if the Soviets would not budge on German issues. Herter asked that they give the subject 
some thought and re-visit it later.
365
   
Clearly, serious doubts persisted about chances for a real détente in Paris.   De Murville 
downplayed the idea of a disarmament-Berlin interim freeze and said de Gaulle was not eager to 
go to Moscow.  The French minister indicated that the French had not significantly changed their 
positions since the December heads of state meeting.  The West Germans and French were still 
not fully reconciled with the working group‟s proposed tactics, such as popular referendums in 
both Germanys. Nor did they like the idea of an interim agreement that would eventually hand 
over Berlin access to the GDR. The French worried about creating a third category of non-
aligned German territory.  The Germans wanted to flatly state that normalization of Berlin 
should be a first step towards reunification.
366
   
Similarly, the working-group paper on disarmament revealed divergence in the Western 
position.  The Soviets were expected to insist on a commitment to general principles before 
discussing concrete measures like inspection, but had also tentatively agreed to seismic test 
research cooperation .
367
  The West had reached rough agreement on pilot programs of force 
reduction and inspection zones.  The British had ready a counter-statement on general principles.  
Such a counter-statement might help move the Soviets towards feasible near-term disarmament 
agreements.  But Herter thought that French insistence on tackling the problem of nuclear 
delivery systems  would probably result in the Soviets successfully hiding their missiles and 
warheads.  Trying to do too much too early might derail meaningful progress. 
368
  Nor was there 
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much enthusiasm for inviting the UN into the discussions.  Khrushchev, it was felt, could simply 
use the UN as a propaganda forum.  
The ministers approved a Western five-power plan calling for a ban on space weaponry, 
notification of missile launches, force ceilings of 2.5 million troops for the Soviets and 2.1 
million for the West, and stricter controls on production and distribution of fissile materials.  The 
plan emphasized force balance, effective control and inspection, phased force reduction without 
a strict timetable, and rejection of space weapons.
369
  Disarmament and non-proliferation also 
figured in the ministers‟ session on East-West relations.  Again, the Soviets were expected to 
open with an emphasis on general principles that might prove more restrictive to the West than 
the East.  Non-interference pledges could be  troublesome because the Soviets would try to 
exclude their Communist Party activities from restrictions on government action.  Trade and aid 
agreements might be possible but would have to be coordinated with existing bilateral 
arrangements, and would need approval by the U.S. Congress and other national assemblies.  
Enough disagreement remained between the Allies to delay issuing a press statement that might 
reveal those differences.
370
   
The inter-connectedness of disarmament, Germany and East-West relations can be seen 
in the military's reports to the summit planners.  The test-ban debate was still unproductive, as 
seen in the Geneva UN-panel discussions of January 1960 and the April Western Ministers 
meetings.
371
 The most important area where  arms, conventional and nuclear, needed to be 
reduced was Europe, not the heartland arsenals of the United States and Soviet Union at stake in 
the later detente.  Disarmament in 1958 meant force reductions in nuclear artillery, 
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fighter/bombers, short and medium range ballistic missiles in Germany, as well as troop levels. 
With both Germanys now nuclear-armed, any change in their political systems would affect 
military situations in the surrounding countries as well.
372
   
Though tensions in Berlin had relaxed somewhat in advance of the summit, the basic 
military standoff over Germany that disturbed Khrushchev also remained very serious to NATO 
Commandant General Lauris Nortsad.  Reviewing attempts to denuclearize central Europe, 
Nortsad said that the Rapacki plan would have left Western Europe vulnerable and recent Soviets 
proposals that lacked inspection options were impractical. Norstad argued that a robust and  
mobile, ground and air inspection system would be the only way to satisfy public concerns and 
guarantee safety.  Though it would not protect central Europe from weapons launched outside 
the control zones, it would greatly reduce chances and effects of armed conflict.
373
  Livingston 
Merchant told him the US would support this plan in Paris, though the Soviets had not indicated 
they were open yet to inspection measures. 
 The summit was now less than a month away. The State Department prepared a 
last position paper that listed three main “affirmative purposes” for the summit: first, “a small 
beginning toward practical controlled disarmament”; second, “deterring communist action 
towards Berlin and paving the way for an eventual acceptable solution,”, third, “An increase in 
the confidence and  cohesion of the Western alliance.”
374
  This paper, which did not discuss 
tactics, might be taken as a clear indication that disarmament progress was indeed the West‟s 
primary summit purpose.  But the discussions on Berlin had been the most extensive and 
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conflicted in all these late-April foreign minister sessions.
375
 Disarmament proposals were less 
likely to reveal Western differences and invite Soviet rejection.  Arms control also had the virtue 
of being an attractive cause in global public opinion. In Washington, Secretary of Defense Gates 
told Herter he opposed any force reduction in Berlin and West Germany.
376
 
The Soviets had been fairly quiet in the final pre-summit period, but Thompson brought 
former ambassador Bohlen along with him to visit Gromyko on April 24.  Gromyko expressed 
his "disappointment" that the Geneva test-ban panel had not made more progress.  He said he 
hoped disarmament discussions in Paris would be more specific and substantive. Gromyko 
discussed Berlin and Germany in more depth, but offered little hope that Khrushchev would 
relax his demands.  He said Allied occupation troops would have to leave West Berlin, but the 
Soviets would guarantee  the city's freedom. Bohlen observed that this meant the summit could 
produce no solution on Germany, but Gromyko finally hinted at a possible interim 
understanding. He did not discuss Khrushchev's visit to de Gaulle, which may have been a 
turning point in Khrushchev's expectations for the summit.
377
 
 De Gaulle visited Eisenhower at Camp David on April 24 to make final plans for the 
summit .  De Gaulle said, unrealistically, he hoped Berlin and Germany "could be left alone for 
the time being."  On disarmament, he "wondered how they might take that up with the Russians." 
Eisenhower said mutual inspections were essential to "sound" disarmament, but they should try 
to also propose zones outside of Germany.  De Gaulle said they should concentrate on pledges 
against missile and bomber delivery of nuclear weapons, with inspection targeted on those 
systems.  Eisenhower said that would involve an "Open Skies" arrangement which the Soviets 
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had pointedly refused.  Ground inspection, he said, was a better starting point.  De Gaulle 
acknowledged then that Germany would be discussed, but offered no new ideas. Eisenhower 
reiterated that there could be no Berlin discussions with any deadline attached and de Gaulle 
agreed.
378
  Later that day, Herter said that no matter what agenda was set, there was a strong 
chance the Soviets would "become difficult over Berlin."  De Gaulle said they should ask 
Khrushchev: "Have you come here to seek a detente" and if so, suggest disarmament as the 
important topic.  They must insist "all agreements were tied together."  He thought they might 
keep Khrushchev on track in small meetings.  They would end up holding larger sessions with 
staff. 379 The foreign ministers had their own differences with the executives they worked for.  
Herter commented in private, “the Heads want to be alone and all the Foreign Ministers were 
afraid of this.” 380 
 
The U-2 Incident & the Summit 
A week later, the United States released a statement on a missing aircraft, which was 
actually a U-2 reconnaissance plan. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Soviets had developed 
the S-25 surface-to-air missile capable of intercepting and destroying Captain Gary Powers 
reconnaissance flight over the ICBM facility Chelyabbinsk-40 near Kyshtym in Soviet Central 
Asia. They recovered the plane‟s ruins and captured the pilot.  Khrushchev viewed the incursion 
as a personal betrayal by Eisenhower.
 381
  He remained silent for the moment, waiting for the 
United States to attempt a cover-up.  The first American statement, dismissing the matter as 
routine, was carelessly drafted.  The Soviets soon revealed the whole story.  The over-flight and 
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cover-up embarrassed the Americans and gave the Soviets an escape route from an unpromising 
conference.   Foy Kohler told Grewe that Khrushchev “seems to be preparing his people for 
something less than success at the Summit.”  The Germans told Kohler they‟d heard hardliners in 
the Kremlin were forcing Khrushchev to act tough on the U-2.   If this was the case, then 
Khrushchev might have to take such a tough line on Berlin as to destroy the summit. But 
Khrushchev did not want to be seen as the summit‟s spoiler. 
382
 
The Western ministers had convened a final time, before the summit, at the NATO 
meetings in Istanbul from May 2-4 1960.  They adopted the America position paper in principle, 
with the understanding that all agreements would be linked.  The Germans, French, and British  
diverged from the Americans, however, on how to address the issues.  Would reunification be 
taken off the table, asked the Germans?  The French warned they could alienate Khrushchev with 
too aggressive a stance on Germany. The French emphasis on delivery systems bothered the 
others, who pointed out that the issue complicated disarmament. Should they just engage in 
discussion or seek agreements?   They noted that Soviet positions on Germany and disarmament 
were unchanged.
383
  For all their professed agreement, the Allies not have specific common 
objectives for the summit. 
In the National Security Council‟s final pre-summit session, less than a week before the 
Summit, Livingston Merchant summed up Western chances for progress.  Disarmament talks 
would have to be carefully nudged past Soviet insistence communiqués, without practical 
measures.  In the event of real negotiations, the French were likely to push prematurely for 
missile control but without specific plans yet.
384
   The USSR would table the standard German 
peace treaty and the West would counter with plebiscite and referendum options. Some chance 
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was seen of deferring the Berlin problem to a lower level panel for continuing study, which 
might serve as an interim solution.  Khrushchev might be agreeable to such a solution.  He could 
let the West have an interim Berlin truce without being seen as too flexible by Kremlin rivals.  
Eisenhower said he‟d just let Khrushchev have his public say on the incident and then come 
around for private talks.  He wanted to point out Soviet espionage in the US.  Eisenhower also 
wanted to know why the West Germans had picked this time offer the East a $1 billion line of 
credit.  The President remarked, “the Summit meeting would not be a Sunday School Picnic.”
385
 
  In a May 10 press conference in Moscow, Khrushchev signaled he was far from 
done with the U-2.  He indicated the invitation for Eisenhower‟s Moscow visit might be 
withdrawn.
386
  American intelligence analysts thought Khrushchev feared the West had a 
problem because of U2 publicity.  Therefore, his behavior “would lead to the conclusion that he 
now considers it better to avoid a summit confrontation under present conditions and that he is 
out to blame the United States for wrecking the summit.”
387
  The analysts speculated the Chinese 
might have threatened a break over the peaceful coexistence policy.  The next day, Llewellyn 
Thompson, cabling from Moscow, seconded these views of Khrushchev‟s position.  He 
attributed Khrushchev‟s sea change to the de Gaulle visit.   
Khrushchev saw that France was not disposed to negotiate away its presence in Berlin, 
one of the few remnants of French power.  Nor did any of the other Western parties seem likely 
to make the concessions he wanted.  He “may have believed that in view of the strong position 
he had taken, it (the summit) would end in humiliating defeat for him which could seriously 
jeopardize his situation as leader of the Communist bloc.”
388
  He urged the leaders to waste no 
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time starting concrete negotiations.  Thompson cautioned again that Khrushchev‟s words in 
public and in private “indicate that the cold war is on again.”
389
  At the NSC meeting on May 10,  
Eisenhower said he still hoped to let Khrushchev talk about the plane and settle the matter in 
private, by showing him evidence of Soviet espionage in America.
390
 
 Two days later , the Foreign Ministers were in Paris, the next day.  On May 15,  the 
Heads of Sate were scheduled to hold their first plenary, limited to them alone.  That morning, 
Khrushchev demanded an apology from Eisenhower and renunciation of the U-2 flights.  If not 
received promptly, he would withdraw the Soviet Union from the conference.
391
  Though the 
Western gave him a chance to change his mind, Khrushchev enjoyed playing the outraged 
statesman.  He did not return to the afternoon and next days. He shunned the conference but 
remained in Paris a day or so, giving sidewalk press conferences where he denounced the U-2 
flights and generally taunted the Allies.
392
  
 The Allied heads of state had little new to talk about as they met bilaterally recently and 
their ministers had been in close contact for weeks.  All the working group reports, briefing 
books and position papers were rendered obsolete as the Allies retreated to rethink their 
positions.  Squabbling broke out at  the ministerial sessions that continued after the walkout.   
British asked why they should consider war over Berlin when the West and East Germans had 
large ongoing trade arrangements.
393
 The French wanted to plan delivery-system-limitation talks 
when  Geneva ten-power talks reconvened in June, but the Americans were cautious.  The 
French had few delivery systems, but wanted to keep testing.
394
  The Western Heads-of-State put 
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on a show of unity, though Macmillan, and de Gaulle to a lesser extent, had tried hard to get 
Eisenhower to apologize to the Soviets. 
 The decision to boycott the summit may have been even before the plane ride 
Khrushchev publicly mentioned.  It was probably made before the plane left Moscow, says 
Vladimir Zubok.
395
  There is a fair chance the decision was made not long after his earlier visit to 
Paris.  Khrushchev biographer William Taubman says that Soviet generals were very displeased 
by Khrushchev‟s provocative exploitation of the incident.  As early as May 12
th
 some Praesidium 
members were already urging him to call off the summit; the final decision was made in 
consultation with Praesidium members at the airport.  These signals show that Khrushchev‟s 
authority was by no means complete, 
396
 Khrushchev himself said in his memoirs that he decided 
“present an ultimatum to the United States.”   He  and Gromyko radically revised their opening 
statement on the plane and then sent a copy to the party leadership for approval.    In the same 
section, Khrushchev says, "we had come to this summit to discuss this very question of 
Germany.”
397
  Sergei Khrushchev discounts reports friction in the Soviet leadership but admits 
some, especially in the military were “cool” to detente but “kept their opinions to themselves”; 
he notes that some of his father‟s personally selected candidates were elected to the Praesidium 
in early May, and future Premier Brezhnev replaced veteran Marshal Voroshilov, the last, though 
apparently reformed, member of the „anti-Party‟ Group.  Conspicuously, Sergei does not 
advance any purpose for the summit.  
398
 
Apart from the Berlin question, there was probably little that could realistically be 
accomplished at a multilateral summit. France was open to bilateral dialogue with the Soviet 
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Union, exclusive of the United States.  Berlin and German issues might be approached obliquely.  
The same could be true with the British, Macmillan was also agreeable to separate negotiation, 
but could not lead on the Berlin question.
399
 That left bilateral talks with the United States as the 
next logical step and that could wait till the next US President.  Though Khrushchev was 
pessimistic about Vice President Nixon‟s attitude to the United States, he had a low opinion of 
him and thought there was a good chance the next President might be more flexible.
400
    
Thus, the Soviets in Paris kept open the possibility of a postponed multi-lateral summit 
but never seriously followed up on that option.  This would be the last Heads of State meeting till  
the Berlin Wall came down. The reason that another attempt at a Big Four summit was never 
again scheduled during the crisis years  may have been that the Wall stabilized the situation.  
Khrushchev had quieted the East Germans and other critics, but, in so doing, could not continue 
to use Berlin as leverage against other issues.  After all, in 1959, he had used Berlin to get 
Western attention in hopes of a new German settlement or concessions.  He wanted a summit, if 
possible, to enhance Soviet prestige.  As Livingston Merchant told the US National Security 
Council, in a post-mortem review session some weeks after the Paris debacle, “the story really 
began in November 1958 with Khrushchev‟s speech on Berlin and the intent to make a separate 
peace treaty with East Germany ... [eventually] …it became an important part of Soviet thinking 
that there was unanimity among the Allies…as the Summit approached.”
401
  If that is the case, 
then Khrushchev probably left  de Gaulle convinced Eisenhower and Macmillan were inflexible 
on Berlin.  The point is not to blame de Gaulle for the summit‟s demise but to show that 
Summit‟s chances for success were low even before the U-2 crash.  That incident and 
Khrushchev‟s theatrics overshadowed the serious problems among the Allies and between them 
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and the Soviets.  A deputy ministers meeting on May 19 revealed little consensus about what to 
do next on Berlin.
402
  These problems helped convince American leaders to begin direct bipolar 
discussions with the Soviets. Although the summit was unsuccessful, it still must be recognized 
as a pivotal event.   
 
Conclusions 
 The Paris summit was the last Heads-of-State meeting, in the tradition of Potsdam 
and Vienna, and it marked a decisive shift towards US-Soviet superpower diplomacy. 
403
 
Disarmament may have been the desired purpose, but Berlin was the issue above all that brought 
the leaders to the table. As such, it should be recognized as a key step in the 1958-63 Berlin 
crises.  Paris was also notable as a media event; the leaders went through with the summit mainly 
because they wanted to appeal to public opinion reassure their respective publics that their 
concerns were understood.  Paris was a key event in the careers of all the leaders involved, 
providing a good example of the importance of personal diplomacy in the détente process.
404
   
Perhaps the early phases of the Berlin crisis receive less attention today because the 
events of the next few years neutralized the issue.  For modern historians, Berlin may seem a 
case of selfish interests by occupying powers who were reluctant to yield their residual 
importance as World War II victors.   But Allied and Soviet leaders did attempt diplomatic 
resolution at Paris. Although the U-2 espionage that wrecked the summit may seem a selfish 
interest today, Eisenhower and his advisors felt strong public pressure about Soviet missile 
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  They saw more public concern with dangers of an insufficient nuclear deterrent than 
the necessity for disarmament treaties.  Khrushchev‟s very public demands for a German peace 
treaty and expulsion of the West from Berlin made the public expect those issues would 
dominate summit discussions.  Disarmament might involve dangerous concessions.  The 
prospects for détente had seemed unpromising before Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United 
States.
406
  But the public approved the exchange of US-Soviets and high level unofficial talks, 
suggesting that despite the summit‟s failure, direct superpower diplomacy might be more viable 
than the familiar multi-polar dissension.  For the first time since the war, there appeared some 
chance that the US and Soviets would have to deal with each other again.
407
 
A major reason for the shift from a multilateral  East-West approach to engagement was 
the lack of consensus on aims and approaches, not only on Berlin but on nuclear deterrence.
408
  
This discord discouraged lesser allies in the Western camp, such as Italy and Canada, who were 
not pleased with British and French efforts to dominate the Paris proceedings.  They had made 
their complaints known before and during the Western heads and NATO meetings in December 
and through the spring preparations.  After the summit‟s failure, other countries like Turkey 
seconded these complaints, especially about de Gaulle.  They expressed  more confidence in 
American leadership and respect for other national interests.  These allies‟ skepticism reflected 
the real problems that faced the Western allies. Macmillan‟s eagerness for peace agreements 
worried the Italians who thought Britain too ready to disengage from Europe just to could prop 
up their colonial positions.  De Gaulle, Macmillan and Adenauer were confirmed in positions on 
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Berlin and disarmament that they had staked out in the first weeks, through the foreign minister 
conference, heads-of-state conference, Western heads and the summit.
409
   
De Gaulle was particularly troublesome, though Eisenhower approved of his leadership at 
the summit, if not during the preparations. De Gaulle tried to assume a chairman‟s role for a 
summit he initially opposed.  His private diplomacy with Khrushchev in March showed the 
Soviets that the French had no intention of changing their position on Berlin.  The Americans 
and British had not opposed the visit.  They were disappointed that the French leader had not 
used the opportunity to convince the Russians that progress was possible on Berlin.
410
  They 
showed little  readiness for any limit on nuclear testing or for comprehensive disarmament that 
would limit their own deterrent strength. Eisenhower expressed  satisfaction for de Gaulle‟s 
performance at the summit but did not think the  French president was ready to offer any 
breakthrough.
411




Coordination of efforts with the British was easier but still difficult.  The British were 
also distracted and relatively weak in the wake of their colonial retreats.  Macmillan was an old 
friend, intelligent and experienced but he was not a strong partner.  He faced strong political 
pressures, especially on disarmament, defense costs, and Britain‟s failure to win more 
participation in military research and development.  The Skybolt shared-development project 
was fraught with setbacks and eventually cancelled.
413
  De Gaulle was frustrating British 
attempts to gain access to the Common Market.  Eisenhower appreciated British loyalty and 
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support but had little confidence in Macmillan‟s eagerness to negotiate with the Soviets without 
preconditions.  Macmillan had urged Eisenhower to consider making some concession to 
Khrushchev so the conference could proceed.  Even after the summit had been suspended, the 
British were still eager to consider the Soviet offer to try another summit several months later.  




Eisenhower had less reason than ever to believe Khrushchev was interested in serious and 
wide-ranging negotiations, but he also had little confidence in his own allies.  If there were good 
reasons to seek détente with the Soviets, Eisenhower would proceed cautiously.
415
  He had 
agreed to a summit that, if not totally dedicated to Berlin, would probably not have been called if 
that issue had not been so contentious and difficult to resolve.  This last multi-lateral summit 
coincided with the first experiments in mutual US and Soviet visits.  Eisenhower was not 
interested in attempting further visits or summits, multilateral or bilateral.  Khrushchev later 
offered to reinstitute the Eisenhower Moscow visit, on the same preconditions demanded in 
Paris.  Eisenhower angrily ridiculed the offer but understood that his successors might attempt to 
revive the engagement that had emerged in 1959 and faltered in 1960. 
416
  He authorized 
continued disarmament and test ban negotiations under the oversight of Glenn Seaborg but those 
discussions made only incremental progress during the rest of his term.
417
  He also authorized 
more vigorous Live Oak contingency planning for a response to armed action against West 
Berlin.  Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose wrote that the President was very depressed in 
the wake of the conference and believed that there had been the chance of swapping an 
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unsupervised test ban for inspection teams within the Soviet Union.
418
  The diplomatic record 
does not indicate great chances that this would have been the case, especially after Khrushchev‟s 
Paris visit, unless the Berlin question was resolved first.  
 Despite Eisenhower's public position that he would not negotiate under a deadline, there 
was in fact a constant threat of duress related to Berlin from 1958 to1960.  To use a Western 
idiom, Paris was a „shotgun‟ summit.  Its failure was due to Western disunity as well as Soviet 
stubbornness and belligerence.  Despite its failure, it still represented a constructive approach 
instead of the retaliation that had been urged as recently as the 1958 Iraq and Chinese island 
crises.  Eisenhower„s consistent reluctance to use force, while keeping a credible deterrent, 
improved the climate for diplomacy.
419
  The difference was that, before Berlin, Eisenhower still 
thought the United Nations Security Council was a better venue for resolution than summits. 
420
 
Eisenhower also guessed correctly that Khrushchev would not wage war unless 
absolutely necessary.  Though reluctant to begin détente with the mercurial Khrushchev whom 
he did not trust, he did come to believe it was worth attempting.  
421
 Campbell Craig has argued 
that Eisenhower‟s restraint of contingency activity had helped contain the Berlin crisis in the 
spring of 1958.  The president offered a simple choice between  negotiation and general nuclear 
war, without allowing for the possibility of limited war.  If this is the case, it may represent the 
kind of brinksmanship which Dulles had been accused of, but which was to become a hallmark 
of the next phase of Berlin and the ensuing Cuba crisis. More likely, Eisenhower and Dulles had 
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already decided even before 1958, that diplomacy backed with maximum force did not mean that 
they would use that force in any but the last resort possible. 
422
    
 In getting to Paris, there had been nearly two years of ambassadorial talks, top-level 
Soviet and US visits by private and deputy leaders, such as Harriman, Humphrey, Nixon, 
Mikoyan and Kozlov.  More importantly there had been visits to the United States by Nikita 
Khrushchev, Premier and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.  He had 
been received by Eisenhower and there had been every expectation  that American president 
would return the visit.  Ambassadorial  connections between the Americans and Russians 
increased.  A network of contacts, official and back-channel alike, was creating an ongoing 
dialogue.  The conferences established templates for negotiating formats and tactics, as can be 
seen in the briefing books prepared for successive meetings in Geneva and  Paris.  Khrushchev 
tried to revive this momentum with his October 1960 visit to New York for UN sessions, but 
failed.  Despite new pressures on Berlin, he could not recreate the catalytic potential.  Without a 
focus, he ended up just banging his shoe at the United Nations.  He would have to wait for a new 
president to retry the Berlin gambit.
423
 
 When the Soviets proposed a new round of exchanges and meetings in early 1961, 
experienced diplomats and analysts, a network of contacts and templates of protocol provided 
Eisenhower‟s successor with many of the tools for engagement. Though engagement had seemed 
unlikely two years before, it now appeared necessary and inevitable.  Circumstance, more than a 
change in ideology or softening of positions, had brought about this realization.  
 The Soviet leader, like Macmillan, de Gaulle, Ulbricht and Adenauer, would still be in 
power when Eisenhower‟s successor John Kennedy assumed office in January 1961.   Kennedy‟s 
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attempts to keep continuity in some respects and depart from it in others meant that the next 
phase of détente built on the Eisenhower legacy only in part.  Berlin remained the catalyst, but 
the new Kennedy administration's strategies diverged from the formulas established by 
Eisenhower and Dulles.  Berlin‟s refugee problem in early 1961 renewed Khrushchev's urgency 
to quiet East Germany‟s Walter Ulbricht and created pressures for the Kennedy administration to 
resolve what had become an ongoing crisis over Berlin.
424
   
                                                 
424







Chapter 3: "Vienna & the Wall," January - August 1961 
 
Introduction 
Even after the collapse of the Paris summit in May 1960, the Soviet Union indicated its 
willingness to resume Four-Power negotiations over the status of Berlin and Germany.  
Disagreements among the Western allies and the firmness of the Soviet position ensured no 
further summits would be undertaken till after the impending presidential elections in the United 
States.
425
  The Soviet Union‟s Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, Britain‟s Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer  and France‟s President Charles de 
Gaulle waited to see whether president-elect John Kennedy would continue the personal 
diplomacy begun by President Dwight Eisenhower.  Berlin had been the main issue bringing 
these leaders together, although intransigence had rendered summit negotiations largely futile.  
Other compelling interests such as disarmament, nuclear testing and international cooperation 
offered little opportunity for immediate agreements. Berlin remained Khrushchev‟s primary 
concern. The Soviet leader used Berlin to control progress in other areas, divide the Western 
alliance, forestall challenges within the Communist bloc and deter nuclear arms for West 
Germany.  He thought Kennedy might be more accommodating on Berlin.
426
 
 If Kennedy wished to continue the diplomatic momentum begun with the 1959 Foreign 
Minister‟s Conference and the Paris summit, he would have to either bring together his Western 
partners and persuade them to adopt more unified, practical approaches, or set aside the  
multilateral approach exemplified by the wartime conferences  at Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam and the 
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1955 summit at Geneva.
427
  Instead, he might need to seek a more direct, bilateral rapprochement 
with Khrushchev.   Kennedy was inclined by personal temperament and external circumstances 
to the latter course.   
 Like Eisenhower, he was unhappy with the degree to which Berlin had taken 
precedence over other problems: the nuclear arms race, competition for influence in Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia, particularly Laos.  Both the outgoing and incoming presidents were impatient 
with the  limited cooperation offered by their erstwhile allies.  They understood that, however 
scant the actual prospects for progress through summit negotiations might be, domestic and 
global public opinion now favored the attempts at diplomacy.
428
 Negotiation would be a 
welcome relief from the tensions of containment and would assure the public that a more relaxed 
peace remained possible. Though the challenges and ambitions of the United States  were little 
different at the beginning of Kennedy‟s presidency,  it soon became clear that his approach 
would differ markedly from his predecessor.  
 
Contrasts Between Eisenhower and Kennedy  
Eisenhower had been a generally popular, confident, authoritative president, though with 
a reserved public presence and leadership style.   Eisenhower‟s experience in military 
administration had tempered his willingness to invest in new weapons systems and large force 
levels.  He was wary of using force as a crisis response, especially on Berlin.
429
  He relied on a 
tightly organized and co-coordinated hierarchical foreign policy establishment run by Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles.  Dulles' patience and pragmatism restored Allied unity in the first 
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phase of the Berlin crisis.
430
  Dulles successor, Christian Herter, had taken over just before the 
1959 Foreign Ministers Conference and generally continued Dulles‟s approach but less 
independently.  Herter retained most of the key staff , including Undersecretary Livingston 
Merchant and Policy Planning Staff head Gerald Smith, and such distinguished career 
ambassadors as Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow, Thomas Dowling in Germany and David 
Bruce in London.  The Eisenhower foreign policy establishment was considered by the incoming 
President as professional but conservative, able to maintain an often tense status quo with 
confidence, but perhaps unwilling to look past containment and convert crisis situations into 
opportunities.
431
   
Kennedy presented a strong contrast, with a strong personal charisma and personal 
confidence.  He was a decorated World War II veteran but most of his experience lay in 
congressional legislation.  As Kennedy scholars such as Lawrence Freedman and Mark J. White 
have noted, Kennedy‟s „New Frontier‟ signaled a combination of military reinforcement and 
initiatives for peaceful cooperation.
432
   Kennedy wanted to project an openness to new ideas and 
diversity of opinion among his advisors.  His foreign policy structure was more horizontal, with 
McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security affairs having as much or more 
influence than his Secretary of State Dean Rusk or the Secretary of Defense Robert Macnamara.   
Adlai Stevenson, passed over for the job at State, was named United Nations envoy, while 
Truman‟s Secretary of State Dean Acheson was brought in as a special consultant.
433
  Both of 
these appointments,  the former more open to unconditional negotiation and the latter more 
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insistent on linking negotiation to progress on outstanding disputes, were subordinate to the inner 
circle of Bundy, Rusk and McNamara.  Acheson's strong, hawkish opinions and confidence in 
his long experience often conflicted with the rest of Kennedy's security advisors.
434
  Rusk‟s 
deputies, Chester Bowles and George Ball also enjoyed the President‟s confidence to a  high 
degree.  Acheson‟s former head of Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, recruited by Kennedy for 
the Defense Department, also had a strong advisory role, particularly on nuclear issues. 
435
  
Though Rusk,  Acheson and Nitze had some experience in the official diplomatic 
structure, they, like the rest of the new security apparatus, had been external policy experts in 
academia, foundation and the Democratic party.   Rusk had experience in the Truman-era State 
Department but had been out of government since that time.  He was well-informed but cautious, 
inclined more to consider options than recommended specific courses of action.  He cautioned 
Kennedy against seeking an early summit with Khrushchev.  McNamara had been a Ford Motor 
Company executive, brought in more for managerial than foreign policy expertise.
436
  Retention 
of the senior ambassadorial corps helped provide continuity; Thompson was especially valuable 
as one of Khrushchev‟s preferred conduits and Bruce was adept at handling not only British, but 
other European partners.  In addition to these senior personnel, younger advisors such as Henry 
Kissinger often challenged established opinion-makers.
437
  The president‟s younger brother and 
new Attorney General, Robert Kennedy emerged as an important foreign policy influence, who 
                                                 
434
 Douglas Brinkley,  Dean Acheson, The Cold War Years, 1953-71 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992),     
p. 124.. 
435
 Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, p.37. 
436
 Beschloss, Crisis Years, p. 76 & 404 
437
 Kissinger had been an analyst with RAND and Harvard University, from which both Rusk and Bundy solicited 
his participation, with Rusk winning out for help in policy planning (PPS).  The PPS under Gerard Smith had played 
a significant advisory role in the Dulles-Herter State Department, but Smith left when Herter did. Kissinger proved 
even more willing than Smith had often been to criticize, without solicitation, what he considered realistic 
assumptions.  Kissinger‟s role during the 1961 Berlin crisis/summit period is also important because it was 
formative experience in his pursuit of détente ten years later.  He would have preferred working for the NSA, where 
he would later work under President Nixon. Rusk memo to Kennedy, February 8u, 1961, John F Kennedy Library, 





the Soviets sometimes used for back-channel communications with the White House.
438
  In 
addition to this already broad variety of advisors, Kennedy often sought external opinions and 
could be receptive to unsolicited opinions, to a degree not seen in the previous administration. 
 
Kennedy Assesses Berlin Situation & Meets with Allied Leaders 
 Eisenhower briefed Kennedy after the election and just before inauguration, 
identifying security issues and specific country problems but de-emphasizing Berlin.  Soon after 
the inauguration, Rusk summarized the history of the Berlin controversy, noting that refugee 
flight from East Germany was intensifying and Khrushchev was still intent on his Berlin „free 
city‟ and German „peace treaty‟ demands.
439
  No immediate Soviet action was anticipated.  On 
February 17, Kennedy assured West German Foreign Secretary Heinrich von Brentano that their 
interests and opinions would be respected and protected.  Kennedy explained that America was 
not going to bring up the Berlin issue for the time being and remained committed to the status 
quo.  When asked whether he thought the Soviets were preparing to renew their demands more 
vigorously, von Brentano said he did not anticipate new moves as long as Western commitment 
remained visibly firm.
440
    
At the same time, Kennedy was also considering new overtures for US-Soviet 
discussions.  Meetings with the French and West Germans had already touched on the possibility 
of a new Paris-style meeting, with unanimous feeling that such meetings remained premature.  
The reluctance to consider a new summit camouflaged lingering disagreements among the 
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   Exploration of bilateral talks reflected a still-embryonic trend, with precedents like 
Macmillan‟s solo visit to Moscow in February 1959, Khrushchev‟s talks with Eisenhower at 
Camp David in September of that year, and de Gaulle‟s reception of the Soviet leader in Paris 
several weeks before the abortive summit.  
In a February 23 meeting, February French ambassador Herve Alphand told Rusk his 
government had no problems with such talks but cautioned about the need for „Big Three 
(France, Britain and United States)‟ agreement.  Alphand emphasized Berlin‟s primacy among 
Western security interests and indicated the Soviets might be planning a new initiative in 
advance of German elections coming up in September.  He thought that Khrushchev‟s recent 
letter to Chancellor Konrad  Adenauer was a clear signal to the West Germans that Soviet 
demands remained on the table.  Like West German Ambassador to the U.S. Wilhelm Grewe, 
Alphand believed the Soviets would, if they acted, proceed in small but steady increments till 
their demands de facto if not de jure were enacted; from there, the West would  to have to 
recognize the new environment.  Rusk did not disagree.  He felt contingency planning must be 
advanced.
442
  The British, hopeful of strengthening their „special relationship‟ with US in hopes 
of offsetting a burgeoning Franco-German alliance, had already approached Kennedy on a 
variety of issues including joint weapons development and nuclear testing.
443
 
 Kennedy had begun by consulting the Allies, but soon realized the major 
differences in their relative positions, both in policy and capability.  Discussions  with 
Ambassador Thompson confirmed his belief that he should meet personally with the Soviets and 
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that it would be to his advantage to control the circumstances.
444
  Once a reasonable amount of 
common ground had been established and relations were acceptable, Rusk asked Thompson to 
approach Khrushchev about new bilateral discussions on issues like disarmament/testing, aid to 
the underdeveloped, and joint scientific programs.   Thompson was instructed to avoid broaching 
the subject of Berlin but to carefully observe and communicate any signals on that subject. 
445
  
Khrushchev listened to Thompson's message from Kennedy for better Soviet relations, 
but immediately noted Berlin had not been mentioned.  That, said Khrushchev, was the subject 
he most wanted to discuss.  He emphasized the issue of German unification, which he 
understood to be a goal held in common with the West.   The borders in place since the war 
“needed legal foundations” but that the “socialist camp does not want to expand towards the 
West.  Khrushchev then directed his focus toward Berlin, which he called “ a bone in the throat 
of Soviet-American relations…if Adenauer wants to fight …West Berlin would be a good place 
to begin.”
 446
  He shifted his tack again, asserting he wanted “better  relations with the US” and 
said that he merely wanted to “render it impossible for preparation for aggression and everyone 
understands what this would mean with nuclear weapons.”   
Thompson replied that the President was reviewing the situation and looking for 
clarification of the Soviet position about how the Berlin “free city‟ plan would work in actual 
practice.  Khrushchev answered that West Berlin might be able to keep the current arrangements  
- a step away from the original „free city‟ plan – but  was vague about  how this could be 
guaranteed.  Thompson pointed out that East German leader Walter Ulbricht “was very much 
interested in West Berlin.”  Khrushchev said Ulbricht would also sign the commitment to ensure 
West Berlin‟s status.  Thompson did not force the issue further but reiterated that the German 
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problem was under review.  Khrushchev identified Adenauer as the aggressor but said that if 
“Pres. Kennedy and they (Soviets) could sign a peace treaty, it would be a great step forward in 
American-Soviet relations” which at present resembled an armistice more than peace.  The peace 




Although Khrushchev had not been explicitly offered a new summit opportunity and had 
not extended one himself, he did say he wanted better relations with America.  Berlin was still 
his top priority and progress towards his peace treaty and „free city‟ plans were prerequisites for 
disarmament negotiations.  This talk of incremental implementation of the peace treaty was 
remarkably similar to the French and West German estimates of how Khrushchev might proceed 
unilaterally.  Khrushchev at this point was making his most forceful demands directly to the 




In Washington that same day, March 10, Ambassador Grewe was reviewing the recent 
Khrushchev letter to Adenauer which reiterated familiar demands with renewed harshness.  
Grewe asked the president about a shift in US military policy, which the Germans feared would 
de-emphasize nuclear deterrence even if it amplified conventional forces.  The President was 
noncommittal on this topic and on Grewe‟s suggestion that a new public statement of the 
Western  position would be helpful.
449
  Kennedy met with West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt a 
few days later; Brandt was running against Adenauer in the September elections and Kennedy 
did not want to play favorites.
450
  Kennedy asked Brandt about recognition of the Polish-East 
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German border at the Oder and Niesse rivers, which the West was inclined to grant as an easy 
concession.  Brandt felt that was an issue for a peace conference.  Brandt viewed reunification as 
a possibility but only over a very extended period. The president commented that he wanted to 
continue contingency planning, but thought that NATO commandant Lauris Norstad‟s force 
targets were “grandiose.”  He clearly did not want to begin his presidency with a new Berlin 
conflict. Kennedy did not have particularly warm relations with either Adenauer or Brandt and 
was keeping his distance as long as he could.
451
 
A cable from Thompson a few days later indicated the Khrushchev might not give him 
that option much longer.  The consensus among the Western missions in Moscow was that, 
without a new round of negotiations, Khrushchev would proceed with his plans before the 
German elections.  Thompson‟s guess was that the Soviet leader would conclude his peace treaty 
with the East Germans but would try to avoid a Berlin conflict by instructing them to continue to 
allow Western access to the city.  The decision would be heavily influenced by the overall state 
of relations with the West, which were not presently favorable.  Thompson thought Laos might 
be settled amicably but that Latin American and African competition would intensify.  Test ban 
and disarmament prospects were not encouraging, with minimal progress in UN-sponsored talks 
and new increases in US defense spending after the force reductions of the Eisenhower years.
452
   
Kennedy‟s personal support for Radio Free Europe and American refusal to grant licenses for 
machine tools further clouded prospects with the Soviets.   
 West German foreign minister Von Brentano believed new East-West talks might 
postpone the peace treaty, though he did not mention this when he was in Washington.
453
  West 
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German rejection of Khrushchev‟s demands remained adamant, but they were concerned that 
Kennedy's "flexible response" policy, deemphasizing nuclear use, would encourage  Soviet 
ambitions on Germany.
454
   
 Thompson thought “at such time as the President might meet Khrushchev, 
discussion German problem will be main point exercise so far as he is concerned and he will 
probably make his decision on German policy at that time or shortly after. …alternative would 
seem to be that President should be able to hold out prospect for negotiations which would at 
minimum enable  Khrushchev to save face somewhat and maintain his position.”  Thompson  
noted that while Khrushchev was probably better for US purposes than other Soviet leaders, he 
did not think  this possibility should determine US policy.
455
 These last comments indicate that 
some kind of US-Soviet meeting was likely, but neither side was yet making specific overtures.  
They also showed awareness that Khrushchev‟s authority was not absolute and that he had rivals. 
Thompson did not believe the West Germans could handle implementation of the peace treaty 
without US assistance.   
The Ambassador warned that Khrushchev might begin to take the incremental steps 
already forecasted. Specifically, he warned: “If we expect Soviets to leave Berlin problem as is, 
we must at least expect East Germans to seal off sector boundary in order to stop … refugee flow 
through Berlin.”
456
  This is the first prediction of the Wall on record from a senior US foreign 
policy officer.  Thompson was probably better acquainted with Khrushchev than any other  
American and was an astute observer of Soviet politics.   
It is remarkable that the possibility of a border closure had not received much attention in 
contingency planning or position papers already.  Even after this warning, US planners 
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concentrated on initiatives like negotiation or even forceful probes with force, instead of 
contingency planning for incremental Soviet actions toward Berlin.  Henry Kissinger, a new 
consultant drafted from strategic studies at Harvard University, urged the president personally to 
visit Berlin during a goodwill tour of Western European capitals projected for April, but this 
option was not carried out till thirty months later in a very different situation.
457
  
Kennedy needed to consult with the other Western heads of state before he could further 
consider direct US-Soviet negotiation.  A briefing that Dean Acheson provided for a meeting 
with the President and Harold Macmillan, as well as most of senior foreign policy leaders of the 
US and Britain, did not reflect immediate readiness to negotiate with the Soviets.
458
  Instead, 
Acheson wanted a demonstration of ground power to show the West was ready to defend Berlin 
though surface-to-air missiles now made an airlift unrealistic; blocked ground access was still 
considered Khrushchev‟s likely first move.  Acheson criticized the slack pace of conventional 
planning.  The president was reluctant to concede that an airlift was no longer an effective 
option, but Macmillan told him he had gotten the same opinion.  McNamara was pessimistic 
about a ground attack, and the leaders and their advisors returned to the idea that an airlift might 
be feasible after all. 
459
  
British Foreign Secretary Lord Douglass Home warned that “if Khrushchev says he 
wants a conference and that we wants to make a change, then we have no alternative to propose.”  
Home thought the West should try get Khrushchev to accept  a deal that would defer change in 
occupation for ten years.  Acheson rejected the suggestion that this “would get Khrushchev off 
the hook,” saying that should be of no concern since Khrushchev “was trying to divide the 
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allies.”  Rusk seconded Acheson by saying that Khrushchev should not be allowed to seem as 
though he could grant what was already guaranteed by the end-of-war agreements.  Home 
observed that “the right of conquest was wearing thin.”  Rusk ended the meeting by reaffirming 
the familiar declaration to stand up for their rights by agreement.  But first Home noted that he 
did not like “going to a conference knowing we had nothing to offer.” 
460
  
Home‟s observation confirmed the reality that rhetoric could not conceal: there was no 
reason to believe that Khrushchev would accept what was still the Western peace plan of July 
1959.  Unless the West was prepared to much more visibly acknowledge East Germany to defuse 
the German peace treaty issue and then accept their control of ground access, their occupation 
position in West Berlin would probably be challenged very soon, with unpredictable results.
461
  
Eisenhower, and Macmillan, too had been willing to consider these concessions in the spring of 
1960, but de Gaulle and Adenauer were reluctant to consider any form of German reunification 
that did not give them complete assurance of the outcome.  Even before the Paris summit it had 
become apparent that no breakthrough on Berlin was likely.
462
  Whether the West might have 
been able to use such a compromise to leverage progress on disarmament cannot be known, 
because such an offer was never approved in common.   
The comments of Acheson and Rusk indicate a retreat to initial, hard-line reactions of 
late 1958 when Khrushchev began his free city/peace treaty demands.  Home‟s comments at the 
Acheson meeting also indicate that another Paris-type of summit was not likely in the near 
future, even if a possible Soviet move might be more imminent now than at any time since the 
demands were first presented.
463
  In subsequent talks, the President and Macmillan tried to look 




 Acheson memo to Kennedy, April 3, 1961, JFK Library, Presidential Papers, NSF files, Box 81, folder 4/61. 
462
 Fursenko & Nafatli, Khrushchev's Cold War, p. 289. 
463




at more flexible approaches, including co-opting the „free city‟ with a Western counter version 
but indicated no movement to the deeper concessions probably necessary.
464
 
When Adenauer himself came to Washington a few days later, he mostly discussed  
contingency issues. Asked by the President what he thought the proper US response should be in 
the event of a peace treaty, the Chancellor indicated legal questions  would be raised that might 
deter  immediate action, but would be troublesome nevertheless.  He also worried that the West 
Germans might not be fully involved in any NATO  defensive action on Berlin. He queried 
Kennedy and Rusk about Allied access plans in the event of a peace treaty, but they had no ready 
answer.
 465
 In a follow up visit with West German Ambassador Grewe, Rusk warned of the 
Soviets blocking access through incremental means: "it would be difficult to find definite line 
which, if breached by the East, would elicit specific Western measures.  Here was the old 
Communist problem of ... salami tactics."
466
  Soon after, Khrushchev informed Hans Kroll, West 
German Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that he planned to sign a peace treaty with East 
Germany after the West German elections, then about four months away.
467
 
   The Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plans required at least two divisions to avoid 
reliance on nuclear weapons, which would require a significant mobilization effort.
468
  They 
wanted to enlist West German forces although their participation was still limited in NATO.  A 
quadripartite session of US, French, British and West German foreign ministers in Bonn 
“generally agreed that was no basis for Western initiative to open negotiations with the Soviets 
on Berlin.” They thought Khrushchev‟s “possible misperception … re Allied firmness of 
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intentions on Berlin … could be highly dangerous.” Von Brentano said the West Germans 
wanted to be more active in planning (Kennedy had told Adenauer that was his wish also).  Rusk 
said this would be helpful, especially in legal matters.
469
 
Multi-party negotiations did not look promising but Kennedy remained interested in 
meeting with Khrushchev.  The President had just suffered a major credibility challenge when 
the US failed to provide air cover for an ill-prepared CIA-sponsored guerilla incursion of Cuba at 
the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.
470
  Khrushchev, on other hand, could bask in the achievements of 
Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, who became the first human in space in early April.  Kennedy hoped 
that he could recover some of his questioned authority with a vigorous tour of Europe.
471
  He had 
already received most of the western heads in Washington, with the notable exception of  French 
President Charles de Gaulle.  A visit abroad would help Kennedy project the commitment and 
outreach he wanted his administration to stand for.  He hoped Khrushchev might respond to a 
day or so of intimate meetings where they might be able to explore issues besides Berlin.  The 
initial contact came from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who asked Thompson if the 
President did in fact want a personal meeting with Khrushchev.  Kennedy responded 
affirmatively that he hoped to adjust his tour schedule to meet in neutral Vienna in early June; he 
promised to set definite details shortly.
472
   
This contact was supplemented by backchannel communication through the president‟s 
brother Robert, who had already had informal but apparently privileged messages from the 
Soviets through their embassy aide and GRU operative Georgi Bolshakov.
473
  Robert Kennedy 
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outlined his brother‟s program: progress on the nuclear  test inspection issue which could lead to 
broader disarmament discussions.
474
  These contacts are notable not only as indicators of 
Kennedy‟s desire to move past Berlin and build a more stable and productive base for US-Soviet 
relations.  David Reynolds notes they also mark the emergence of Robert Kennedy as a major 
voice in Kennedy‟s inner foreign policy circle.  And, since the Bolshakov-Kennedy connection 
continued for another eighteen months, it is also an important precedent in secret backchannel 
diplomacy.  Backchannels would be a key element of the diplomatic campaigns of the later 
détente era.
475
  Khrushchev approached Thompson on May 23, two weeks before the summit, to 
make it clear that Berlin was still his main concern.  The tough message only made Kennedy 
more determined to announce his conventional arms build-up to send a message that the United 
States would be negotiating from a position of strength, not under intimidation. 
476
   
The meeting pioneered a bilateral US-Soviet summit approach, using a neutral country as 
backdrop.  Guenter Bischof has recently argued that the bilateral approach with the Soviets was 
continued through his week-long series of visits with other heads of state. 
477
  Kennedy planned 
to conduct an intensive round of bilateral summits as an alternative to the multilateral approach 
that had stalled even before Paris 1960.  Optimally, this would open the foreign relations 
deadlock between East and West which had existed since November 1958 and bridge the 
distance among the allies already apparent before the Berlin/peace treaty issue.  It also marked a 
new readiness to assume the superpower role that Eisenhower and Dulles had to moderated to 
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avoid unwelcome commitments.  Kennedy needed to balance firmness with outreach to make his 
strategy work.  In preparation for the talks, Kennedy was advised to avoid ideological 
discussions and the subject of Berlin if at all possible. 
478
 The president, by his later admission, 
still did not understand the extent of Khrushchev‟s single-mindedness and  determination 
regarding Berlin and Germany.  Experienced Soviet observers like Thompson, Undersecretary 
Charles Bohlen, Foy Kohler and George Kennan advised caution.
479
 
On May 24, Khrushchev himself sent a clear signal, through a private interview with 
Thompson at the American ice skating exhibition, that Berlin remained his top priority for the 
Vienna meetings.
480
  Khrushchev “revealed plainly that he was troubled by problem how to deal 
with the president on question Berlin.”  He could not make the same approaches in a get-
acquainted meeting in front of staff that he did  privately with the Ambassador.  Khrushchev 
reaffirmed his intention to sign separate peace treaties, pending the failure to sign a new Berlin 
agreement, just after the German elections.  He had told West German Ambassador Hans Kroll 
the same thing.  Khrushchev acknowledged the danger of war but insisted his moves would not 
lead to war.  Thompson replied that it was his official duty to make American commitment to 
Berlin clear to the Soviet leader.   Khrushchev answered by saying that “if he wanted war, we 
could bet it,” but, “only madmen wanted war and the Western leaders were not mad, although 
Hitler was.”  Khrushchev tempered this provocative line by trying to bring up the „free city‟ idea 
as a peaceful alternative.  Thompson pointed out, while Khrushchev “might not want Berlin, 
Ulbricht clearly did.”
481
  Khrushchev kept returning to the theme of finally normalizing relations 
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sixteen years after the war.  He said Western access would not be obstructed by a treaty, 
promising no blockade; the West could then deal with the East Germans.    
Khrushchev seemed interested when Thompson indicated the US might be flexible on 
East European frontier issues if that would help.  Khrushchev, very informally, mentioned 
possible troop reductions of as much as a third.  Thompson thought Khrushchev “seemed to be 
groping for some war out of [an] impasse.  Thompson carefully suggested that a freeze might 
still be the most productive near-term course, saying this might allow time for disarmament 
progress.  Khrushchev “said frankly that disarmament impossible as long as Berlin problem 
existed.”  Despite the tough line, continued sparring, and Khrushchev‟s refusal to discuss all-
Berlin alternative solutions, the Soviet leader did appear “most anxious” that the talks with 
Kennedy should “go well” but appeared "deadly serious” about signing the separate treaties.
482
  
 Thompson followed this report by noting that he had compared notes with Kroll and 
other Western Ambassadors in Moscow, all of whom believed Khrushchev would proceed with 
the peace treaty.  Thompson thought the Western position should put Khrushchev in the position 
of being the one “saying no” to peace.  Thompson saw some hope in trying to re-advance their 
Geneva peace plan (the "July 28" plan also used at Paris), but spread out over time and 
sweetened with assurances that East European borders were accepted by the West.
 483
 He hoped 
these offers could be accompanied by better access guarantees for the West.
 
He noted also that 
both the Americans and Soviets had tremendous prestige interests at stake: some formula must 
be found which would enable  both sides to save face…difficult but not impossible…President 
might most usefully explore with K. in private stating frankly what his purpose was.”  Thompson 








ended his assessment pessimistically, observing „some difference of opinion‟ among the 
Allies.
484
   
  Thompson believed the peace treaty would provide a wedge for “radical action from the 
Communist side.”  The lack of Western consensus encouraged bilateral US-Soviet diplomacy 
and discouraged the back-up consensus that the West had been able to rely on through the 
problems of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference and the Paris summit.
485
  A State 
Department paper from May 25 noted that Khrushchev might be emboldened  by successes with 
"Laos, Cuba, and Yuri Gagarin, " The analysts cautioned "Khrushchev is undoubtedly reluctant 




Michael Beschloss and David Reynolds have noted that Undersecretary Bohlen and Press 
Secretary Salinger  tried to downplay expectations for the summit in the final days. 
487
  Kennedy, 
still  recovering from a perceived lack of leadership surrounding the Bay of Pigs, faced  a much 
different negotiating situation than Eisenhower.  The former president had met Khrushchev in 
Geneva at the 1955 summit and held informal talks on his own home ground at Camp David.  In 
both those meetings, he was working with an experienced, centralized foreign policy team.  He 
knew the other Allied heads of state well.  By the time of the Paris summit, they had worked out 
and defended their positions for nearly two and a half years.  Kennedy, on the other hand, was 
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still getting to know his Western counterparts and had never met Khrushchev.    His own 
advisors were not in agreement, with Acheson urging a hard line and Averell Harriman calling 
for a new beginning to discussions.  
488
 
Just days before the President left for Europe, US  Ambassador to West Berlin, Allan 
Lightner urged that Kennedy should use the unilateral setting to make clear that the US regarded 
the Soviets as responsible for the problems of a divided Germany.  Kennedy needed to say “Sovs 
should keep hands off Berlin where US committed to stay…nothing further to discuss on Berlin 
itself …Vienna will be psychological testing ground.” Lightner thought Yuri Gagarin‟s space 
flight and Communist gains in Laos and the Congo had cushioned Khrushchev against hard-line 
rivals who might be more difficult to deal with.
 489
  Thompson noted Khrushchev had so 
committed himself to this issue that he would not want to risk losing face, through concessions, 
before the  Communist Party Congress met just after the West German elections.  In this 
situation, he might not accept the kind of rebuff suggested by Acheson and Lightner.    
Thompson had the most confidential relationship with Khrushchev of any US official; he 
saw strong determination on Berlin, as well as a hope for negotiations in Khrushchev.  This was 
a difficult situation for the US to approach: “we should not allow gradual erosion (of) our 
position by embarking on slippery path of tempting compromises.  President has difficult task of 
convincing K on one hand that we will fulfill our commitment…and on other that it is not our 
attention to saw off limb on which he has crawled.”
490
  Thompson advocated some kind of 
solution that would mutually save face and defer action so other problems could be studied.  The 
President needed to make clear to Khrushchev that American remained committed to both West 
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Berlin‟s freedom and productive relations with the Soviet Union; these positions did not need to 
be mutually exclusive.    
A final pre-summit talking points memorandum by the State Department suggested that 
Khrushchev might respond if Kennedy showed strong concern about the destabilizing effects of 
any unilateral Soviet move on Berlin.  By indicating that the US still viewed occupation 
withdrawals and GDR recognition as unacceptable, Kennedy could perhaps steer the discussion 
to disarmament instead.
491
  Although these latter suggestions sounded reasonable, they were 
unlikely to be persuasive.  Khrushchev‟s messages to Kroll and Thompson had made it plain that 
he would need strong reasons to change his demands. 
Part of Khrushchev‟s urgency in renewing his demands was increased pressure from both 
Walter Ulbricht in East Berlin and Mao Zedong in China.   This pressure might be reflected in 
the upcoming Party Congress.  The flow of refugees from the East through West Berlin had risen 
to nearly 18,000 in May 1961.
492
  From Khrushchev‟s view, Kennedy‟s May 25 speech calling 
for sharp increases in American defense spending may have also been a challenge that needed to 
be answered.  The tough warnings to Thompson may have been a response to Kennedy‟s 
proposed build-up.   The increases were a unilateral move in which Kennedy tried to recover 
from the Bay of Pigs indecision and make good on campaign promises for a strong defense.  
Though Khrushchev had considerable hopes that Kennedy was more interested in negotiation 
than Eisenhower, he was not impressed by his performance in the Cuban fiasco.
493
,   
William Taubman says that Khrushchev announced, to the Praesidium just days before 
the Vienna meeting, his intention to press the American President hard on Berlin.  Mikoyan 
                                                 
491
 State Dept. paper Berlin and Germany, May 25, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc.26. 
492
  Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A World Divided , 1961-1989 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006. ) p.66. 
493




cautioned against forcing Kennedy into hardening the American position.
494
  Khrushchev 
apparently dismissed such cautions, saying that he did not believe Kennedy had Eisenhower‟s 
political maturity. Sergei Khrushchev says that his father “never regarded Kennedy as a weak 
president.”
495
 Whatever the Soviet leader‟s estimate of Kennedy, he shortly was to demonstrate 
his intention to test Kennedy through the Berlin issue.  His treatment of Kennedy would be 
reminiscent of his attempts to intimidate Vice-President Nixon in the private meetings after the 
Moscow “kitchen debate.”  Unlike his tactics in the televised encounter, in the private talks, 
Nixon, aided by the presence of the President‟s brother Milton Eisenhower, had followed his 





Kennedy's Trip to Europe 
In the new bilateral mode of summitry, personal dynamics assumed much more 
significance than was the case in the large-staffed formats of the Foreign Minister‟s Conference 
or the Paris summit.  This was especially true because Kennedy was conducting a series of 
bilateral summits with a small staff.  While a large staff may have impeded spontaneous 
negotiations, it also provided some insulation in the case of serious disagreements, as well as a 
mechanism to keep negotiations going.  Kennedy had not yet met de Gaulle or Khrushchev.  The 
latter were already secure in their leadership and with much longer diplomatic experience, 
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particularly regarding Berlin.  Both also differed with Kennedy on a number of issues, notably 
the dangers of German rearmament.
497
 
In his first visit, with Charles de Gaulle, the French President urged Kennedy to take a 
non-confrontational approach. De Gaulle had his own interests in assisting Kennedy.  He wanted 
to improve US-French relations which had cooled over the Eisenhower years.  He did not want a 
US-led NATO to control European defense matters.
498
  Kennedy respected and admired de 
Gaulle and appeared interested in the latter‟s advice.  De Gaulle had managed to retain cordial 
relations with Khrushchev despite their disagreements over Berlin and Germany and the failed 
summit.  He established a warm personal accord with Kennedy, though the US and French 
positions diverged widely on issues from post-colonial problems in Africa and Asia to defense 
and economic integration in Europe.
499
   
In their talks on May 31, Kennedy noted that Berlin continued to be the most pressing 
issue in East-West matters and openly asked for de Gaulle‟s advice.  De Gaulle observed that, 
since the initial Soviet demands had been presented two and a half years earlier, that Khrushchev 
had established a pattern of setting and then postponing deadlines.  This suggested that the Soviet 
leader did not, in fact, want war, but that he was not yet prepared for a real détente, which would 
involve practical disarmament negotiations.  De Gaulle said that he had told Khrushchev as 
much.  Kennedy pressed de Gaulle for advice on how to show the Soviets that the West still 
remained firm on Berlin.  De Gaulle said it was necessary to make clear that it was the Soviets 
who were intent on disrupting a stable, if unsatisfying, situation.  Khrushchev must also be told 
that if the Soviets proceeded to sign a separate „peace treaty‟ that the West would not recognize 
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it any way, not even accepting East German document stamping.  De Gaulle repeated his belief 
that the Soviets did not want war; since a Berlin confrontation would probably devolve into 
general war, that a visible Western readiness not to be intimidated would deter Khrushchev. 
500
   
Notably absent from their discussion was any mention of resuming four-power talks.  De Gaulle 
indicated no displeasure with the independent talks.  He himself had held bilateral talks with 
Khrushchev – but said there could be no revision of Berlin agreements unless agreed upon and 
signed by all four occupying powers.
501
 
In their next session, de Gaulle reported that he had talked with Macmillan, whose 
position was “unclear … (and) … hesitant,” and the British would, of necessity, have to go along 
with the French and American positions. 
502
 This probably misrepresented the situation. 
Although the British had the weakest position, they were also determined not to be perceived as 
subordinate to the French.  Further, the British had consistently shown themselves to be, among 
the Allies, most inclined to a flexible Berlin strategy.  Although De Gaulle may have been less 
than realistic in assessing British readiness to negotiate and Soviet willingness to risk general 
war, Kennedy accepted his formulations.  Kennedy stated that he was not satisfied with 
contingency planning or the material state of Western defense capacity.  Although Kennedy 
spoke in broad terms, de Gaulle responded in terms of strengthening just the West Berlin 
occupation forces.  De Gaulle noted Soviet nuclear deterrence now made an airlift less feasible.   
He did think, however, that increased Soviet trade with the West made the Soviets more 
vulnerable to economic retaliation.  De Gaulle was sanguine: “Generally speaking, the West is 
not as weak as people think in regard to the Berlin question and Mr. Khrushchev must be made 
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 This view was much more optimistic than observers like Kroll and 
Thompson were suggesting. De Gaulle's priority in these talks was Laos and Africa, not Berlin.  
He wanted to reassure Kennedy about Berlin so that the America would be more receptive to 
French policies in the Third World.  Although de Gaulle may have underestimated Khrushchev‟s 
resolve, his advice on how to handle Khrushchev was sound.  
Khrushchev had little reason to believe that Kennedy was any more inclined to accept his 
terms than Eisenhower had been.  Through his long experience as an executive leader, 
Eisenhower had become adept at cautious, patient personal diplomacy, using his foreign policy 
team to insulate himself as needed.  Kennedy was impetuous and more confident in his own 
charisma than in his handler‟s advice.  British historian David Reynolds suggests that 
Khrushchev saw Kennedy as personally immature because of his penchant for womanizing.
504
  
American historian Robert Dallek‟s research confirms the reports of Michael Beschloss that 
Kennedy was being heavily medicated just prior to the Vienna stop; the president had strained 
his back during an unproductive summit with the Canadian prime minister a few weeks 
earlier.
505
 Beschloss speculates that Kennedy was less than ready for the tough encounter to 
come; Dallek does not believe Kennedy was functionally impaired for the summit.  Whether 
Kennedy was in full capacity or not, if Khrushchev‟s intelligence services made him aware of the 
president‟s pain and fatigue, this knowledge may have contributed to the aggressive 
confrontation he soon launched in their private sessions. 
In their first session on June 3, the two leaders were accompanied by staff.  Kennedy had 
Secretary Rusk, and perhaps more importantly, Thompson and Undersecretaries Foy Kohler and 
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Charles Bohlen; these State Department aides had been involved with the Berlin problem since 
its beginning and were more familiar with Khrushchev‟s tactics than Rusk.  After opening 
statements of peaceful intentions, Khrushchev became combative.
506
 He led with an ideological 
thrust, asserting the inevitable victory of a superior Communist system.  Kennedy, despite many 
briefings against accepting this line of discussion, chose to answer Khrushchev on the 
Chairman‟s own terms.
507
  This was a mistake.  Khrushchev was capable of speaking in 
abstractions at greater length than Kennedy had ever experienced in his political life.  Nixon had 
confronted Khrushchev with abstract moral arguments, but, briefly, in a media environment.  
That exercise in contentious public diplomacy stands in sharp contrast to the caution of Nixon‟s 
private talks held later the same day with Khrushchev.  Kennedy‟s attempts at cordiality 
collapsed in the face of Khrushchev‟s invective.  Practical discussion was delayed and the 
president failed to gain momentum.   
As the discussion turned to the German issue, Khrushchev evoked the Soviet Union‟s 
wartime sacrifices, including his and Gromyko‟s own loss of family, to frame his „peace treaty‟ 
proposal.  He asked how the Americans could oppose ending the last vestiges of the war.  The 
unspoken but present subtext here was the delay in opening a second front against Germany till 
1944.  Kennedy replied that “We are not in Berlin because of someone‟s sufferance but by 
contractual rights.  We fought our way there, although our casualties may not have been as high 
as the USSR‟s.”
508
  Kennedy noted his predecessors had upheld this principle of contractual 
rights and he intended to do the same.  Khrushchev was hardly moved by the statement, saying 
this meant “the US did not want a peace treaty.”  Kennedy tried to work his way out of this 
impasse by asking why it was necessary to change a stable, if “abnormal,” situation when there 
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were so many other pressing problems.  Khrushchev replied that the US still did not understand 
the Soviet goal of normalizing “the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world.”  He then 
proceeded to restate the Soviet Union‟s wartime losses and the claim that the peace treaty was 
the only just solution at the present time.  When Kennedy interrupted to ask “whether the peace 
treaty would block access to Berlin,” Khrushchev said it would.
509
   
 As recently as his talk with Thompson at the ice show, Khrushchev still claimed 
the peace treaty would leave Western access unimpeded.  His blunt dismissal of the President‟s 
question shows that Khrushchev felt little need to accommodate the president.  Mikoyan had 
cautioned Khrushchev about bullying the inexperienced Kennedy.
510
  Just as Kennedy failed to 
heed expert advice, so did Khrushchev‟s rashness lock him into a belligerent posture, at the cost 
of possible gains in other areas.  The tone of these initial discussions also shows that Berlin still 
outranked all other issues.   Khrushchev‟s toughness on Berlin reflected not only  personal belief 
that his strategy could solve many problems, but also the degree to which he had staked his 
personal prestige on this issue.   
The only concession Khrushchev was willing to offer was another six month deadline.
511
   
Overall, his position and language was nearly the same as it had been since 1958, now presented 
to a new President and Secretary of State.   The parties broke for a lunch, which turned out, not 
unexpectedly, to be an awkward affair.  Rusk tried to steer the conversation to agriculture, 
especially corn, one of  Khrushchev‟s favorite topics.  Khrushchev was not so easily deterred 
from taunting his guests, ridiculing Nixon‟s kitchen debate performance.
512
  Mrs. Kennedy found 
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him boorish.  Toasts were awkward and the afternoon sessions promised to be little better than 
the first.   When Kennedy suggested an outdoor walk, Khrushchev again brought up Berlin.
513
   
 Kennedy suggested their last session on June 4 be held with only translators; the 
Chairman agreed.  Despite Kennedy‟s attempts to win his counterpart over with self-deprecating 
humor and observations on common national interests, Khrushchev returned argumentatively to 
Berlin.
514
  Again, Kennedy tried to debate Khrushchev in ideological terms, a disastrous tactic.  
Kennedy attempted to introduce a more global perspective, “an evolution is taking place in many 
areas of the world and no one can predict which course it would take … it is most important that 
decisions should be carefully considered.” Khrushchev made it known that he had already made 
his decision by saying that if, after a peace treaty “the borders of the GDR – land, sea and air 
borders –were violated, they would be defended.”
515
  He painted the US as a potential aggressor 
intent on humiliating the USSR.  He was willing to offer six months delay to protect US prestige.  
To make further concessions would be a dereliction of his duty as Soviet head of state.   
Kennedy interrupted to say he was afraid he would have to tell Macmillan that the West 
had been given a new ultimatum instead of a breakthrough.  Kennedy‟s frank admission that his 
prestige was at stake elicited only token offers to retain some  Western troops, alongside Soviet 
troops, without any contractual basis.   Khrushchev did not further sweeten his offer or suggest 
further negotiation.  Instead, he ended on a tough note, “It is not the USSR that threatens with 
war, it is the US.”
516
  The President needed to tell Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer that “the 
decision is firm and irrevocable and the Soviet Union will sign it in December if the US refuses 
an interim agreement."  Kennedy understood well that another interim agreement in these 
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circumstances was unacceptable, since it would probably be accompanied by incremental steps 




Kennedy had found himself in an even more defensive position than in the morning 
sessions.  By the end of the day, the President was indeed fatigued, perhaps due to the back 
problems, perhaps the medication.
518
  Not only had he failed to reverse Khrushchev‟s course on 
Berlin, he had attempted to defuse Third World competition by acknowledging the superpowers 
were effectively stalemated in attempting to bring their military strength to bear through proxies.  
David Reynolds says that Khrushchev saw this as an unprecedented US admission of military 
parity, an admission which seriously displeased the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
519
  A tired 
and dejected President told his Press Secretary that Khrushchev “just beat hell out of me.”  The 
formal state dinner that followed did not improve the situation.  The Kennedys and Khrushchevs 
found scant rapport.  The attempted pleasantry of the evening was uncomfortably forced.   
Khrushchev later said Kennedy was “very gloomy … I sympathized with him … but there was  
nothing I could do to help him."
520
  Khrushchev acknowledged that he had “kept the pressure on, 
in order to place the president in a hopeless position and force him to recognize the necessity 
meeting us halfway; otherwise a military  conflict would be possible.”  He told Austrian  Foreign 
Minister Bruno Kreisky that the President was “pleasant” but “displays no understanding.”
521
 
Kennedy had attempted personal diplomacy to resolve a solution which had defied 
American and Allied diplomats and executives for two and a half years.  This was an ambitious 
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goal, and he underestimated Khrushev's fixation on Berlin.  Thompson said the outcome was 
predictable once the President strayed from his briefing advice.  Domestic and European public 
reaction to the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting was cool at best.  The comity seen at Secretary 
Dulles‟ funeral during the Foreign Ministers Conference and in some of the period leading up to 
the Paris summit now seemed even more distant than it had in the wake of the U-2 incident.
522
  
Multilateral diplomacy had been postponed indefinitely.  Khrushchev had not indicated any 
reason to convene the Heads of State again, for disarmament, resolution of Third World 
competition, international cooperation or any other cause.  The bilateral approach pioneered by 
Macmillan in February 1959 and Khrushchev in Paris in March 1960, had stalled.  Kennedy and 
Khrushchev had damaged the most important bilateral relationship in the world.  The fact that 
they had even attempted diplomatic resolution as a basis for a détente seemed unimportant in the 
face of their failure to negotiate prudently.
523
  However they still had the rest of the summer to 
try to salvage the Berlin situation before the German elections. 
Discouraging as this situation was, it was fortunate that Kennedy's next scheduled 
bilateral summit in this period was with the supportive British Prime Minister.  Harold 
Macmillan had championed head-of state-diplomacy for some time. He had also suffered 
through Khrushchev‟s belligerence in Moscow and in Paris.
524
 Macmillan observed that, as harsh 
as Khrushchev‟s personal language had been with Kennedy, the official aide memoire the 
Soviets handed the US at the Vienna was considerably milder.  Khrushchev had suggested that 
the treaty be handled through a „peace conference‟ instead of by simple unilateral diktat.  The 
President and the Prime Minister recognized that, however tough Khrushchev‟s language was, 
                                                 
522
 Beschloss, Crisis Years, p. 231-33. 
523
 Reynolds, Summits, p. 219-21. 
524
 Macmillan was inclined to be conciliatory because he wanted Kennedy‟s support for enhanced British 
participation in defense research and production, European economic integration, and a test ban.  Nigel Ashton, 




and however much observers were convinced of his determination, the Berlin deadline had been 
extended once again.  Khrushchev would be most unlikely to make any large move before the 
September German elections.   The immediate Western task was to draft, in concert, a reply to 
the Soviet note.  They also needed to upgrade West Berlin‟s capacity to withstand a blockade.
525
 
In Europe, Kennedy had touched base with the US's West Berlin occupation partners, but they 
were no nearer a common strategy on Berlin, let alone resolution,  than they had been a year 
earlier at Paris. 
 
Preparing for the Soviets to Sign Their German Peace Treaty 
Forceful defense of West Berlin occupation rights now had to be considered with greater 
intensity.
526
  Joint Chiefs of Staff memo  JCSM-287-61, providing the latest update on the state 
of contingency planning, outlined  a „checklist‟ of conditions, options and other considerations. 
The checklist approach was incremental and carefully targeted, to avoid escalation or negative 
effect on countries not directly involved.  It did not constitute a plan for a general war response 
and, in fact, shows the narrow limits Allied planners faced in considering forceful response.  
Non-military measures of „political, economic, or psychological nature‟ would first be applied, 
but “more severe military measures” amounting to reprisals “should be considered.”
527
   Both 
military and non-military measures should be flexible enough that they “may be turned on and 
off again in accordance with the situation.”  Reprisals might be required in the event of “Soviet 
or East German actions or omissions adversely affecting Allied rights of access to West 
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  Naval and air controls would be imposed quickly after notifying „friendly 
governments.‟ The checklist states that “Nuclear weapons will not be used, except upon direct 
order of the President, and no threat or implication of their use will be made.”  Clearance and 
guarantees of non-interference would have to be obtained from neighboring countries.   
A naval blockade would expand the area of possible confrontation outside of Berlin and 
the Germanys and “US effort applied to reprisals against Soviet merchant shipping and air 
activities could become disproportionate to the real effects obtainable.”  Adding forces in the 
area could adversely affect US ability to deter threats elsewhere.  Soviet probes in other sensitive 
areas worldwide could be expected in response.
529
  Public reaction would be more supportive of 
forceful Allied responses if the responses were made after the Soviet had already blockaded 
West Berlin.  The report concluded by emphasizing the need to curtail responses if the Soviets 
showed a willingness to negotiate.  This would require careful coordination among the Allies.   
Paul-Henry Spaak, head of NATO, summed up the major challenges facing NATO in 
achieving better integration at this time.  Spaak said “Nothing is more important in NATO than 
to enmesh West Germany into the Alliance in every possible way,” in part to ensure that a post-
Adenauer West Germany would remain committed to the Alliance.  Of secondary importance 
was the “problem of bringing General de Gaulle‟s France more into the Alliance.”
530
  Spaak also 
wanted to bring American nuclear capacity more fully into NATO, but US representatives 
informed him that was not a priority for the US at that time.  Although the Soviets still had a 
strong advantage in conventional forces in Europe, the JCS report had been very cautious about 
bringing any more explicit nuclear deterrence to bear than necessary.  NATO dissonance, and 
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increasing public concerns about nuclear fallout, discouraged continued reliance on theater 
nuclear response, though such deterrence still needed to be made evident to the Soviets.  Airlift 
scenarios involved considerably more difficulties than imagined two years before.
531
 Debate on 
the nature and degree of force would become increasingly important as President Kennedy 
commissioned new plans for US responses to Soviet moves on Berlin.
532
 
Although military planning had gained more immediacy in  the wake of the Vienna 
meeting, softer new Khrushchev speeches suggested further negotiation might still be possible. 
533
 The four-power Allied working group gathered in Washington in mid-June to draft a response 
to the June 4 Soviet aide-memoire.  In private talks, Undersecretary Foy Kohler told French 
Minister Jean Laloy that Khrushchev, despite his bluster, was taking a cautious approach on 
Berlin: “the President may have had more effect on Khrushchev than was thought at the time.”
534
 
Laloy agreed, though he doubted whether the UN might provide a productive diplomatic forum 
for resolution.  The working group‟s full session agreed the UN would only complicate the 
problem; the Allies should focus on contingency planning and a reply to the Soviets ' tough 
diplomatic note of June 4.
535
  British Undersecretary Sir Evelyn Shukburgh told Kohler that his 
government wanted to emphasize diplomatic correspondence and publicity efforts to delay the 
peace treaty. The UK remained skeptical about military measures on Berlin.
536
  
Bonn wanted to emphasize the legal problems of a unilateral change to a multi-party 
agreement.  They wanted to make their own reply in advance of the Allied joint communiqué, 
but Kohler wanted the US to make its response first, followed immediately by the German note.  
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The US would propose to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
Opening the Berlin issue up to juridical negotiation offered a new non-reprisal alternative to 
stalled diplomacy.  Kohler said this strategy might be accomplished through the UN and could 
produce favorable public reaction.
537
 British delegate Sir Evelyn Shukbrough was reluctant to 
spell out recourse to the Court mediation just yet. Further review of this idea brought forth 
doubts by the French that the UN Security Council would be able to bring the issue before the 
ICJ and that ICJ resolution would lead indirectly de jure recognition of  East Germany.  Kohler 
said that bringing the case to the ICJ would be done on grounds of threatened world peace rather 
than as a simple legal dispute.
538
  
 Speaking informally with West German attaché Martin Hillenbrand, US diplomatic 
counselor to the French Jean-Claude Winkler said he thought the new French objections might 
be a sign of displeasure at bilateral US-Soviet disarmament discussions. 
539
 Further talks between 
Laloy and Kohler centered around what they discerned as reduced threats of nuclear threats from 
Khrushchev re Berlin.  Laloy dismissed East German and Chinese pressure on Khrushchev, as 
well as the importance of Berlin to the Soviets but did acknowledge that Khrushchev might still 
need support against Kremlin hard-liners.
540
  While these Allied talks were cordial and some 
general accordance was found, serious differences remained on basic assumptions and attitudes, 
as well as on prescriptive action. 
Some of Kennedy‟s advisors outside the State Department were also looking at the 
possibility of non-military responses.  Eugene Rostow urged Chester Bowles, personally close to 
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the President, to suggest a new diplomatic and much-less defensive approach.  The US initiative  
should try to marshal global public opinion towards a spirit of détente and towards European 
progress.  Rostow felt that British integration into Europe was a development on a par with the 
Chinese revolution.  Rostow noted further the Soviet supplemental note on disarmament to the 
June 4 aide-memoire and suggested a fresh linkage of disarmament and Berlin.
541
   
He saw possibilities for such an approach in an emerging Russian shift to diplomacy.  
Soviet military confidence, based in great part on missile progress, was the foundation for a 
diplomatic campaign evidenced by the Mikoyan, Kozlov and Khrushchev visits to the United 
States.  This  campaign involved some risks that Soviet prestige would be damaged if the visits 
were unsuccessful and that their Chinese rivals might be displeased.  The campaign might 
currently be centered around Berlin and Germany but involved farther reaching goals for 
enhanced Soviet influence.  Secretary Dulles had erred, Rostow believed, by never sufficiently 




Rostow‟s comments on Dulles might have been a suggestion that the Kennedy 
administration could  develop a new paradigm in its diplomacy.  They overlook the fact that 
Dulles consistently invoked Potsdam as the contractual basis for insisting on continued Allied 
occupation rights.  Dulles had, moreover, marshaled Allied unity as Herter and Rusk had not.
543
  
Rostow saw the Berlin/German strategy as a wedge leading to greatly increased Soviet presence 
in Europe, accompanied by conspicuous nuclear strength.   British estrangement from European 
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economic integration hindered a common Western front.  The West needed a more vigorous and  
positive public relations effort to counter Soviet ambitions.
544
 
Senator Mike Mansfield, a frequent critic of what he saw as laxness in US Berlin policy, 
supported the firm but open tone being considered in response to Soviet note, and suggested that 
private talks might be arranged between Bohlen and a Soviet counterpart, perhaps at the United 
Nations.
545
  Unofficial advisor William Griffith wrote from Berlin, concerned that US 
compromises against reunification could rapidly alienate the West Germans.  Griffith also 
reported that the East German economy was disintegrating, that the Poles preferred a divided 
Germany, and that public opinion in Berlin was firmly in the Allied favor.  Contacts in 
Yugoslavia and Albania reported deteriorating Sino-Soviet ties and that their leaders, Marshall 
Tito and Enver Hoxha, were attempting to gain leverage with Khrushchev as a result.
546
   The US 
thus had to consider dissenting allied opinion, tentative Congressional support, and a diverse 
range of public opinion in Europe.   
Kennedy also had to deal with prominent vocal critics like Walter Lippmann who told 
CBS News  on June 15 that Berlin  was still the most important issue in the Cold War.  
Lippmann thought Khrushchev was bluffing, but that nuclear war was more likely to result over 
Berlin than any other issue.
547
  Lippmann and other vocal commentators only complicated the 
US Administration‟s hope of pursuing a diplomatic resolution of the Berlin issue.  On June 10, 
Bundy forwarded recent commentaries by Lippmann and Joseph Alsop to the President, noting 
that while Alsop remained as hawkish as ever on Berlin, Lippmann saw a true, sustainable 
neutralization of Berlin as the best hope for resolution.  Bundy also recommended the recent 
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Kissinger position paper to Kennedy, particularly in regard to its renewed emphasis on German 
unification.  Kennedy‟s personal leadership was going to be essential, said Bundy, because 
“Four-power parleys will almost surely produce uncertain postures.”
548
 
On June 19, Llewellyn Thompson provided Secretary Rusk with his own analysis.  He 
thought Khrushchev‟s objectives were stabilization and border recognition for  East Germany, 
neutralization of Berlin preceding East German assimilation, and erosion of  NATO coherence. 
Although Khrushchev had attempted to shield US prestige previously through sweeteners like 
the „free city‟ concept, he was so disappointed by Vienna and the Western reply that he was now 
willing to „discredit the United States or seriously damage our prestige.”  Thompson was 
convinced Khrushchev was not bluffing and without unacceptable concessions he would go 
through with the  treaty.  The imminent timeframe for action could  divided into four phases: the 
time remaining before West German elections, the time between elections and Soviet 
convocation of a peace conference, the time between a conference agreement and its expected 
date, and the time between that date and treaty implementation.
 549
  Although each of these 
phases  offered some continued room for a non-peace treaty resolution, the West must make its 
decisions well in advance of each deadline. Short term, pre-election options included an 
alternative to the „free city‟ plan, well-publicized proposals for a Berlin plebiscite, and 
resumption of nuclear testing, which the British might strongly resist.  He also suggested Soviet 
Marshal Vershinin be invited to review Western military readiness.   
 Thompson saw few new diplomatic options once a peace conference was called; if such 
a conference did not agree on a treaty, military readiness must be in their final stages.  He still 
thought that military measures should begin with an airlift, while ground forces were put into 
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position to probe the access corridor.  If these measures failed, we should then proceed with 
military action, including the use of tactical atomic weapons.”  The Soviets should be made to 
see that the West would not stop with economic and political sanctions.
550
  It is notable, in 
retrospect, that Thompson did not discuss possible responses to a border closure, even though he 
had been one of the first, in February 1961, to mention such a possibility. 
On June 16, Dean Acheson presented his preliminary report on Berlin to the 
interdepartmental group headed by Foy Kohler and including Kissinger, Henry Owen, 
Thompson, Martin Hillenbrand, and Paul Nitze.  The Acheson report, commissioned by the 
President but not binding, would become a basic, hotly contested reference point for discussions 
in the coming weeks.
551
  Acheson affirmed the continuing importance of Berlin “involving 
deeply the prestige of the United States and perhaps its very survival…(and) …did not believe a 
political solution was possible.” 
552
  Because Khrushchev, under pressure from the East Germans 
and rival Communist factions, perceived less risk of a Western nuclear response and was feeling 
certain other pressures, he was now willing to carry out his long-delayed threats over Berlin. “It 
was absolutely essential,” for the United States, “to increase the belief that we would use nuclear 
weapons to oppose Russian advances.”   The US needed to make such readiness highly visible in 
the post-Vienna military buildup in order to maximize deterrence.  Such demonstrations of 
readiness were, so far, missing in Berlin contingency preparations.  Conventional force 
enhancements and civil defense needed to be increased concurrently, and nuclear testing 
resumed.  “It would be important to bring our Allies along,” said Acheson, “but we should be 
prepared to go without them unless the Germans buckled…we should be prepared to go to the 
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Foy Kohler expressed his general agreement with Acheson, and opened the meeting to 
questions. Paul Nitze noted that General Nathan Twining said that it might not be advisable to 
cross the East German border with a large ground force.  Nitze added that the British were 
uneasy about such plans.  Acheson dismissed Allied "cold feet", saying: “We should … say 
“boo” and see how far they jump." Thompson cautioned against putting Khrushchev in a position 
where he could not back down from hard-line Western response. Thompson wanted incremental 
steps including air raid  shelters, a garrison airlift and delayed reaction to separate treaty.
554
  
Perceived Allied unity would deter Khrushchev more than saying “boo” publicly.  Kohler agreed 
with Thompson that it was important to leave Khrushchev with “a face-saving device.” Paul 
Nitze noted that it would “necessary to mobilize the entire US behind this program {of increased 
deterrence and civil defense}and that it would be very visible.”   Acheson reaffirmed his support 
for a garrison airlift, but noted “the situation would heat up very quickly,” especially if the 
Soviets shot down Allied aircraft.
 555
  Military contingency measures, not further attempts at 
multi-polar resolution, would constitute the next immediate steps on Berlin. 
Kohler headed both the US inter-departmental group and the Allied working group,  but 
the tone of their discussions was markedly different.  The US policy planners were more 
convinced that Khrushchev was serious this time and there would be no more postponed 
deadlines.  The US was becoming more willing to act independently of the Allies.  At the same 
time the Allies were more forthcoming with their reservations about American assumptions and 












  The Western reply to the Soviet June 4 note was still under review.  Kennedy 
complained drafts were just recycled boilerplate dating back to 1958, but J Kohler said anything 
new would have to get Allied approval.
557
  The British, French and German governments were 
working on their own military contingency reports while the US began deliberating its own, now 
much tougher, plans.  Allied cooperation had not improved since Vienna. 
On June 19, US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke sent a memo to  
Acheson and to the JCS cautioning that military planning also needed to take into account 
possible Soviet diversionary moves in Southeast Asia and suggested that Khrushchev might link 
Berlin concessions to US guarantees of non-interference in that region.  NATO commandant  
and US General) Lauris Norstad had met with Acheson and the JCS prior to Acheson‟s full 
report to the coordinating group.   Norstad‟s subsequent memo to the JCS reflected the now more 
visible commitment to  forceful response, but also cautioned that the West, and specifically the 
US,  must retain flexibility and freedom a action to avoid dangerous circumstantial escalation.
558
  
Not spelled out in the JCS memorandum, but still important to the US planners, was the need to 
keep popular support for a course that involved substantial risks of war over an issue, Berlin, that 
might not seem to be worth the danger.  British and French public opinion was much cooler 
towards war over Berlin.
559
 
Dean Acheson issued his full report on June 28. He framed his argument “an issue of 
resolution between the US and the USSR…which will go far to determine the confidence of 
Europe - indeed the world  -  in the United States.”  In this “conflict of wills”, said Acheson, “an 
attempt to solve the Berlin issue by negotiation is worse than a waste of time and energy…it is 
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dangerous.”  Negotiation was contingent on Kremlin attitudes, which could be turned to 
constructive purpose only by a demonstration of Western force.  Otherwise, negotiation could 
only lead to “a submission to Soviet demands.”
560
  Acheson‟s proposal outlined his idea of an 
effective demonstration of force, in military, economic and political terms.   
Successful negotiation, insisted Acheson, would be explicitly contingent on the extent 
and outcomes of demonstrated readiness to maintain Western positions in Berlin and Germany.  
He saw little merit in „interim freeze‟ variations, or an indefinite agreement, which define the 
peace treaty‟s consequences for Berlin; these options would be unacceptable to West Germany.  
He saw some value in Thompson‟s idea of an agreement, reached between East and West before 
the „peace conference,‟ which would leave the West in Berlin despite a peace treaty, but doubted 
this arrangement would gain Soviet approval. Accommodations like a pledge against nuclear 
arms in Berlin, disengagement from espionage and propaganda activities and recognition of the 
Oder-Niesse border between East Germany and Poland.  Acheson did not think Khrushchev, 
after staking prestige on demands for withdrawal, would accept continued occupation.
561
  
Acheson concluded his report by noting force carried its own risks, including refusal of the 
Allies to carry through with forceful measures, escalation to general (i.e. nuclear) war by 
“mischance, ” or Soviet determination to implement its new arrangements despite the 
demonstration of force. 
Kennedy had commissioned the Acheson report but he invited review and critique , 
which was quick in coming.  The State Department‟s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
observed that the proposed military buildup would be expensive but manageable for the US, 
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more so for the Allies and difficult for the Soviets.
562
  Kennedy‟s May 25 television 
announcement had already outlined major new military investments by the US.  The President 
would, within the next month, call for additional new military spending.  These major increases 
in defense costs marked a distinct shift from Eisenhower‟s restrained defense spending.  The 
same State Department research unit also presented a report noting considerable difficulties for 
an airlift.  Electronic counter measures, harassment and sabotage on the ground, and economic 
interference would make an airlift difficult, but possible.  West Berlin could be sustained on an 
austerity basis for up to a year, but eventually the Allies would have to resort to ground action.
563
 
State Department analyst Roger Hilsman doubted whether Khrushchev really sought the 
showdown of „will‟ that Acheson envisioned.
564
  All these reports suggest that Acheson‟s 
proposed use of force entailed serious collateral concerns, economically, logistically and 
politically; furthermore, a “showdown” might be basically unnecessary since Khrushchev‟s 
continued extension of the crisis suggested he really did not war.   
Not only did forceful response have its critics, but some advisors continued to hold out 
hope for renewed negotiation.  State Dept. legal counselor Richard Kearney suggested a new 
approach to negotiation that would de-emphasize reunification. The Kearney proposal essentially 
called for neutralization of Berlin with a guaranteed access corridor, but on terms more 
acceptable to the United States and hopefully for France and West Germany as well.   Kearney 
raised the possibility of another summit: “it would be possible to offer the Soviets at a summit 
meeting a variety of other Berlin solutions so as not to appear to be standing on a take-it or 
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  Presidential special advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. explicitly argued 
against  Acheson‟s assumptions and recommendations, especially the dismissal of further 




Eugene Rostow, Walt's brother and dean of the Yale Law School, continued to argue that 
the Soviets wanted negotiation much more than conflict.  He delivered lectures and circulated a 
paper arguing that the Soviets had embarked on a diplomatic campaign that was "one of the most 
strenuous and dramatic of the century."  He cited the Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Kozlov visits to 
the US as gambles that that showed intense Soviet interest in using diplomacy to avoid conflict 
with the West.  Rostow said the Berlin initiative was more than just an attempt at incremental 
expansion of their dominion or a public relations gambit.  Their real goal, thought Rostow, might 
be the limitation of nuclear arms.
 567
  The arms race was expensive, dangerous and destabilizing.  
Khrushchev's Berlin campaign could thus be an oblique strategy to begin serious disarmament 
negotiation.  Rostow suggested that the US be more understanding of legitimate Soviet fears 
about German militarization, notwithstanding the admitted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.  
Although Rostow denigrated Dulles's Berlin strategy, perceived linkages of Berlin and 
disarmament  were not, in fact, new but had been understood since the beginning of the crisis in 
late 1958.  The difficulty had been, and still remained, in getting the Soviets, to show enough 
flexibility on either Berlin or disarmament to advance towards new agreements. 
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Disarmament was becoming more timely in mid-summer 1961, because contingency 
scenarios for Berlin pointed towards use of nuclear weapons in the event of a forceful Western 
response to a Berlin blockade.  Limited nuclear use in Europe could readily escalate to total 
war.
568
  Carl Kaysen, an NSC deputy who became very influential from mid-1961 on, wrote a 
memo for Bundy outlining the risks and effects of nuclear attacks on the United States.  Kaysen 
recommended that more attention be paid to civil defense.  Henry Kissinger also wrote Bundy 
about general nuclear war.  He agreed with Acheson that Kennedy must decide if he was ready to 
risk nuclear war over Berlin.  That commitment, Kissinger said, was essential to all Western 
plans to ensure ground access; the problem was preparing a set of graduated nuclear options and 
understanding their risks.
569
 Bundy told Rusk and McNamara that the US prepare short-term 
disarmament options, including a "crash effort which might be proposed to the USSR at the 
height of a Berlin crisis, in order to defuse a dangerous situation." 
570
 
 Allied cohesion was still shaky, though drafts of reply to the Soviet June 4 note 
were finally being circulated.  Rusk advised the US envoy to NATO that “we cannot begin  
intergovernmental consultations until ... we ourselves are clear about how we see the problem 
and how we think the West should proceed.” Rusk acknowledged that news reports were 
suggesting the Allies felt ignored, but added that the allies were welcome to offer their own 
alternatives. Rusk wanted to send the Western replies, grouped as closely as possible, by July 14. 
In National Security Action Memorandum 58 dated July 30, the President commissioned yet 
another comprehensive Berlin report, including the state of contingency planning.  NSAM 58 set 
an October 15 deadline for airlift capability, a November 15 deadline for naval blockade 
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capability, and ongoing Strategic Air Command readiness  for an alert.
571
  On July 12, at the 
initial review session  for the resulting paper, the lingering divide between advocates for forceful 
demonstration and those favoring new negotiation became quickly evident. Acheson, backed by 
General Maxwell Taylor, said adequate military preparations would require not only sustained 
effort into 1962, but might also involve a congressionally approved state of national emergency.  
Bundy agreed “in general” with Acheson but was worried about collateral effects of declaring 
such an emergency.  Participants were cautioned to keep discussions in strict confidence. 
572
 
Meanwhile, US Ambassador to West Germany Thomas Dowling reported that the 
refugee exodus through Berlin was rapidly becoming uncontrollable for East German leader 
Walter Ulbricht.  Dowling warned that the US prestige would be badly damaged if it remained 
“on sidelines” in the event of refugee riots.  Khrushchev was under great pressure to resolve the 
problem and began to seriously consider Ulbricht‟s requests for an inter-zonal border closure to 
stabilize the Berlin situation.  The East German press demanded an end to the drain of human 
resources. 
573
 Western planners continued to ignore the possibility of such a stop-gap solution.   
At a July 13 National Security Council meeting, Secretary Rusk admitted that the West 
really did not know what Khrushchev‟s timetable for action might be. Rusk affirmed the 
Acheson view that “the US was not currently in a good position to negotiate.”  Khrushchev no 
longer appeared interested in providing cover for Western prestige and would be compelled to 
negotiate only if “appropriate steps were taken for our side.”  Rush wanted to begin 
implementing economic counter measures, but was still reticent about declaring a national 
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emergency.  Kennedy said he wanted to first see a very specific program.  Acheson “made clear 
his belief that the President should decide to support a full program of decisive action.” 
574
 
Vice President Lyndon Johnson agreed with Acheson, arguing for a speedy and 
substantial reinforcement of  ground forces.  Secretary of Defense and McNamara agreed with 
Rusk that measures short of requiring  a state of emergency should be implemented first.  
General Taylor wanted a declaration of emergency and mobilization up to the point of calling up 
reserve forces.  President Kennedy did not specifically endorse any of these plans, but, to 
McGeorge Bundy, appeared still committed to maintaining US presence in and access to 
Berlin.
575
  The next day Rusk, Macnamara, and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles met 
to address the calls for new preparedness reports, emphasizing military and economic 
preparation for a probable and imminent crisis.
576
   
In these highest circles of foreign policy-making, negotiation now seemed a distinctly 
unlikely alternative.  There  had been only incidental discussion of  further summits for 
resolution of the Berlin problem.  Nevertheless, negotiation did remain an outside possibility. 
Schlesinger continued to argue for negotiation, warning that the US should provide “an escape 
hatch for Khrushchev.”
577
 State Dept. planners issued a new paper on Soviet positions in the 
event that the US  were to actually participate in the „peace conference‟ that Khrushchev had 
referenced often as a vehicle for his peace treaty.  Problems included East German participation, 
which the Soviets had lobbied hard for in the 1959 Geneva Foreign Minister‟s Conference and 
which was anathema to Paris and Bonn.  Khrushchev might still try to assuage the West  by 
delaying reunification and allowing East and West Germany to remain in their  respective 
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military alliances for the time being.   The planners thought concessions might be offered to link 
Berlin/German resolution to a new round of disarmament talks: “the Soviets would probably 
hope to elicit  a conditional but positive response from the West, which they would cite as an 
endorsement for separate, unconditional negotiations on European security within a reconstituted 
disarmament forum.”
578
 The Soviets however would not advance such linkage before they had 
secured a satisfactory amount of their basic Berlin/German program.  
 Linkage continued between Khrushchev‟s Berlin proposals and Soviet disarmament, but 
the Soviets had hardened their positions against any German reunification based on a freely-
elected government. They certainly would want to retain the option of concluding their own 
arrangements with East Germany to end the existing occupation regime.   Since these demands 
had been consistently rejected by the West, Khrushchev's apparent intention to sign the peace 
treaty still constituted, an unacceptable outcome for the Western occupying powers in Berlin and 
for the Allies.  The West was unaware that the East Germans and Soviets were already 




Post-Vienna Standoff Deepens 
Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov sought out Bundy's NSC aide Walt Rostow on 
July 17 to exchange views.  The conversation quickly turned to Berlin.  Menshikov and Rostow 
both restated the familiar positions of both sides.  Menshikov wondered why the US could deal 
with other opposed governments, but not the East Germans which the US “evidently disliked.” 
580
Rostow replied that the East German government had been established in violation of the 
wartime agreements.  The US, he said, still considered this a serious problem.  Menshikov 
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replied the Soviets were very worried about a nuclear-armed West Germany.  Rostow said the 
US was also anxious about this development, a curious position since it was official US and 
NATO policy to  equip the West Germans with US-supplied tactical nuclear missiles.   Rostow 
said that nuclear armaments in Europe were a good reason to complete a test-ban agreement.  
They both expressed regrets over escalating problems in Africa.  Then Menshikov announced the 
Soviets would sign a treaty with East Germany in the latter part of November, preceded first by 
invitations to all parties involved in Berlin.  He wondered if the US would come to such a 
conference.  Rostow tried to avoid answering directly; the Soviet Ambassador then said he had 
gathered that the US would not attend such a conference.  Rostow did not deny such reports.
 581
   
Menshikov returned to basics of the Berlin conflict.  He asked “Why do you wish to be in 
Berlin as conquerors?”  Menshikov told Rostow he did not think the US public was really 
prepared to go to war over Berlin. 
582
 Rostow said Hitler had made similar assumptions about 
American resolve. They both agreed that the nuclear weapons had changed the  equations of 
national security.  They concluded by briefly discussing Laos without any particular animus, but 
also without any particular enthusiasm.  Rostow reported that Menshikov seemed willing to 
defuse the issue of Western access but did want to confirm US interest in recognizing East 
Germany, if not outright, then by degrees.  Rostow said this was the first time he had heard a 
Soviet official mention the peace conference with a firm late November date.  Menshikov did not 
appear to doubt US readiness to “fight over access, nor did he threaten the US.”
583
  
He appeared conciliatory to Rostow, who thought this softened tone reflected Soviet 
awareness that the US was making its crucial decisions on Berlin that same week.  If that was the 
case, it might confirm Acheson's conviction that US firmness might prompt new negotiations.  










Thompson reported harsh new Soviets statements about West Germany that struck a much more 
belligerent tone.
584
  'Peace conference‟ negotiations would, in no way, represent Soviet 
acceptance of the status quo as Acheson had so optimistically imagined.   
 On July 25, President Kennedy delivered a televised address on Berlin.  He said the US 
would not allow the Soviet Union to "drive us out of Berlin."  He announced mobilization 
measures including a call-up of reserve troops, civil defense actions, and a state of ground alert 
for combat and support aircraft.  Acheson had argued for a declaration of national emergency, 
but Kennedy wanted to provide some margin to encourage the Soviets to reconsider 
negotiation.
585
  Kennedy explicitly reminded the American people that the Berlin crisis carried 
dangers of thermonuclear war.   Those warnings did not deter an appreciative public response or 
Congressional approval of the announced measures.
586
 
Further refinements and arguments over  the Acheson plan continued over the next few 
weeks. Henry Kissinger lobbied hard for a new more positive and confident US diplomatic 
initiative, but defense planning overshadowed such ideas. On August 3, Bundy forwarded plans 
for possible  new US-UK-France-USSR foreign-minister and summit meetings to Kennedy.  The 
Allies were not enthusiastic over negotiations, but the deteriorating situation in Berlin and lack 
of contingency preparedness compelled them to reconsider their options.
587
  In Moscow, 
Khrushchev was angry over Kennedy's speech and authorized new Soviet statements calling for 
implementation of his peace treaty. 
588
  
The Western foreign ministers met again in Paris from August 4-9 to discuss Berlin. 
They could not agree on a timetable or common program for resuming negotiations, but did 
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agree the situation called for new high-level talks.   A near-term plebiscite, the heart of any all-
German self-determination proposal, did not seem feasible.
589
 The imagined timetable for 
conferences would be in October after the German elections.  The Soviets were about to take 
"game-changing" action well before the elections.  On August 10, when Rusk visited Adenauer 
in Bonn, the West still did not realize the Soviets were about to undertake their most significant 




The Berlin Wall is Constructed 
The conflict in Washington over pursuing  a forceful or negotiable US response to the 
June 4 Soviet demands was soon rendered moot by events in the Soviet Union an East Germany.  
The drain of 50 to 75,000 people from East Berlin and heavy financial support meant 
Khrushchev had to stabilize the situation.
591
  East Germany was key to the Warsaw Pact and 
Ulbricht was a prominent leader in the Communist bloc, with allies in the Soviet Union.  
Ulbricht also wanted to minimize the Western presence in East Berlin. He made a persuasive 
plea for assistance to Warsaw Pact leaders in East.  He had been demanding a border for months. 
and in early July, Khrushchev finally gave his approval.
592
  By August 10, Soviet Army 
engineers had delivered vast loads of materials and technicians and prepared to construct a 
barbed wire barrier, with concrete reinforcement.  Soviet and East German troops and tanks were 
brought closer to Berlin.  
Khrushchev was still most interested in his peace treaty but had decided a border closure 
was necessary first, if only to quiet Ulbricht.  Michael Beschloss has suggested that Robert 
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Kennedy may have suggested, through Bolshakov,  closure as a compromise to the Soviets. 
593
  
Hope Harrison says Khrushchev was angry over Kennedy's July 25 speech announcing an arms 
build-up.
594
 Sergei Khrushchev recalled that his father did not seem very enthusiastic about the 
Wall at first.  The reluctance seems likely. Khrushchev probably realized that the Wall would be 
viewed as harsh symbol of Communism.  A wall might not fit well with the 'free city' concept.  
Nor did Khrushchev know how the West would  react. Though he later became pleased with the 
Wall, it may have been because it calmed things down.  He still had not successfully negotiated 
with the Americans.
 595
  The Wall gave him time to figure how to achieve the peace treaty. 
On a Sunday morning, August 13, the East Germans, with Soviet assistance and 
approval, erected barriers closing East Berlin‟s access to the city‟s Western zones.   By 
afternoon, they had sealed off most access points.  There was little resistance on either side, 
though news got out quickly.  They reinforced the border crossings, notably at Friedrichstrasse 
and Steinsteucken. 
596
 The Wall was erected before there was any thought of mobilizing the 
occupation troops.  The East Germans had armor and troops within sight.  Escapee numbers went 
from thousands to hundreds to dozens to singles within a few days. Initial Western reaction was 
relaxed.   Neither Kennedy nor Macmillan interrupted their vacations for full-on crisis 
consultation.  The Berlin refugee crisis had been, at least temporarily, resolved.  
597
   
The cool reaction may have been prudent, but the US could not accept the Wall without 
some protest.  Quadripartite Western meetings in Paris failed to develop an effective response.
598
 
Willy Brandt, Mayor of Berlin, was furious that the troops had done nothing and West German 
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public opinion was turning against the Americans.  He sent a strong letter of protest to 
Kennedy.
599
 Adenauer was more understanding but still concerned about what might happen 
next. President Kennedy, under some pressure, sent Vice-President Lyndon Johnson to Berlin to 
reassure the West Berliners.  Kennedy bolstered Johnson‟s mission by sending along a US 
ground battalion, commanded by General Lucius Clay, who had overseen the 1948 airlift. 
Adenauer and Brandt were locked in a bitter election for the Chancellorship.  Johnson would 
have to placate both of them and deliver reprimands from Kennedy for their presumptuous 
demands on the US.
600
 
Johnson and Clay, with Ambassador Bohlen along as a "minder," went to Bonn on 
August 19, when they met with Adenauer.  They then flew to Tempelhof airport in West Berlin, 
though Adenauer had to take a separate plane to appease Brandt.  All received an overflowing 
and appreciative reception.  Johnson effectively navigated the Adenauer-Brandt rivalry, though 
he made clear  Kennedy's impatience with their refusal to acknowledge the hazards of  military 
action in the situation.  Johnson's Texas-politician street skills served him well in an enthusiastic 
motorcade tour where he stopped and walked among the crowds.  Bohlen prevented him from 
attempting to enter West Berlin.  Johnson's street tour presaged a later appearance by Kennedy in 
Berlin in June 1963, but Johnson did not have Kennedy's oratorical skill.  Clay remained with the 
battalion, which met only minor harassment as it travelled the access corridor.
601
   
 During his trip, Johnson made no attempt at negotiations with either East German 
or Soviet representatives.  The Johnson visit was only a stopgap measure, a sharply limited 
protest against the Wall.  Dean Rusk recalled in his memoirs: "we quickly decided that the wall 
                                                 
599
 Brandt letter to Kennedy, August 16, 1961, FRUS 1961- 1963, Vol. XIV, doc.117. 
600
 Memo re Kennedy-Rusk, Kohler, McNamara, Taylor, etc. meeting, August 17, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 
XIV, doc.118. 
601




was not an issue of war and peace between East and West; there was no way we would destroy 
the human race over it."  The Secretary was, however, less confident about new negotiations than 
the President.
602
  New talks would be further complicated by the Soviets' August 31 
announcement of  resumed atomic testing.
603
  The events of August 1961 concluded a very 
significant phase of the Berlin crisis and set the stage for a much different approach to 
negotiations beginning in September 1961.   
 
Conclusions 
Construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 concluded the first, multilateral phase of 
a diplomatic arc that began in November 1958 with Khrushchev‟s demands for a new Berlin and 
German arrangement.  In the first phase the Western partners in Berlin chose closer consultation 
with each other and with the Soviets to address Khrushchev's ultimatum. The Geneva 
conference, US-Soviet goodwill/trade visits of 1959, and the attempted Paris summit had raised 
hopes that a détente was in the making.
604
  Détente, i.e. a mutual effort to create and sustain an 
atmosphere of negotiation, relaxed tension and cooperation, would stand in sharp contrast to the 
diplomatic estrangement that had characterized the „containment‟ era.  The failure of the Paris 
summit showed how frail this fledgling detente was.  The disappointments of Vienna and the 
Wall reflected that detente had again been attempted and had apparently failed.
605
  New 
precedents for high level negotiation, however, had been established.   
The arc from late 1958 to late 1960 was an important learning exercise in the transition 
from containment to détente.  Berlin was the catalyst, though the hoped-for linkage with 
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disarmament did not produce recognizable gains.  The dangers associated with Berlin fostered 
awareness of the need for arms-control, but the Geneva disarmament talks made only slow and 
intermittent progress.  Disarmament would gradually be de-linked from Germany in the arc that 
began with Kennedy's election and the Vienna summit.  The Wall's construction may have 
stabilized the Berlin situation, but it also lessened the impetus for Berlin negotiation.  
Though the next year would seem to represent a definite slide back into vintage Cold War 
tensions, much progress had been made at times up the „slippery path.‟  These lessons would be 
helpful in the years to come, as US leaders, frustrated by Allied disagreements, decided it had to 
take the diplomatic initiative.  In the coming months, Kennedy continued the transition from 
multi-lateral to bilateral diplomacy.
606
  Though tedious and unproductive, these talks provided 
useful negotiating experience with the Soviets and precedents for the later, disarmament-centered 
detente.  But, in 1962, the strains on the US-Soviet relationship would disrupt diplomatic 
engagement.  Increasingly distant from their alliance partners, the test for both Khrushchev and 
Kennedy would be whether they would anchor superpower relations in confrontation or detente. 
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 The sudden construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 marked the end of the 
preliminary détente American and Soviet leaders had been exploring since 1959.  Renewed 
interest in diplomacy instead of force to resolve the lingering Berlin controversy had led to the 
1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference and then to the 1960 Paris and 1961 Vienna heads of 
states summits.  Just before the Wall's construction, Western leaders had been ready to accept a 
new East-West foreign minister's conference and possible summit.  Afterwards, they were less 
willing, although Khrushchev still seemed ready to sign his peace treaty very soon, possibly at a 
'peace conference."  To avert potential conflict and  recover American leadership on Berlin, 
Kennedy decided to try a confidential approach to the Soviets, with the Allies deciding any final 
agreement.
607
  He had to balance this private diplomacy with alliance disunity, as well as 
pressures from military and hard-line advisors for tough contingency planning  that might 
include limited nuclear warfare. 
 The fall of 1961 did not accomplish any new agreements among the Allies or with the 
Soviets, but included some of the most significant diplomatic sequences of the Berlin crisis.   
The American and Soviet foreign ministers, Dean Rusk and Andrei Gromyko, held bilateral 
diplomatic talks in September 1961.  Nikita Khrushchev and American President John Kennedy 
began an unprecedented private correspondence to renew negotiations. 
608
  US Ambassador 
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Llewellyn Thompson prepared to begin new discussions in Moscow that winter.  Western 
ministers and heads of state also met to try and develop a common strategy on Berlin and 
German issues. Britain's Harold Macmillan was most interested, as always in a summit, but 
France's Charles de Gaulle was adamantly opposed to new negotiations with the Soviets on 
Berlin.  One reason for the impasse was the lack of persuasive new proposals on Germany/Berlin 
or the related topic of disarmament.  The lack of Western consensus on Berlin became more 
pronounced than at any time since  Soviet demands of November 1958.  Soviet resumption of 
nuclear testing, and France's continued testing, discouraged disarmament progress, even while 
the need had become more obvious.  The Soviets did seem very interested in negotiating, despite 
the impasse, but the ongoing pursuit of negotiations helped leaders on all sides resist the use of 
force to resolve post-Wall conflicts in Berlin. 
 
Searching for a Post-Wall Strategy 
 In late August, Khrushchev had told American columnist Drew Pearson, “There will be 
no war.”
609
  Kennedy and his advisors could not be sure how long the post-Wall truce would last.  
The construction of the Wall on August 13, the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing on August 
31, and Khrushchev's evident intention to sign the peace treaty with East Germany signaled a 
sharp retreat from detente, but fell short of an open break with the West.  Vice-President 
Johnson‟s visit to West Germany and West Berlin on August 19, carefully managed by Kennedy, 
Ambassador Charles Bohlen, and national security aide Walt Rostow, aimed to reassure 
European allies and deflect domestic criticism in America.
610
  Kennedy hoped to display some 
toughness by assigning General Lucius Clay to accompany Johnson and  dispatching a combat 
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battalion through the East German access corridor.
611
  While successful as a morale-builder, the 
Johnson-Clay expedition did not attempt any new East-West discussion and instead highlighted 
the growing impasse over Berlin.  West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and West Berlin's  
mayor Willy Brandt were locked in a bitter election contest.  Both leaders had offended Kennedy 
with their ham-handed insistence on a more vigorous response.  Neither de Gaulle nor 
Macmillan was impressed by the American exercise, nor did they expect that Khrushchev would 
be either. 
612
 Scarcely had Johnson made his report to Kennedy, when Khrushchev announced 
that the USSR would resume nuclear testing.  The president was furious at the announcement, 
but was reluctant to respond in kind.  He delayed agreeing to the Joint Chief of Staff‟s calls for 
immediate US nuclear testing and further mobilization for a possible Berlin conflict.
613
   
Khrushchev further surprised Kennedy by requesting, via a private letter delivered by 
Cyrus Sulzberger, “some sort of informal contact with him to find a means of settling the crisis 
without damaging the prestige of the United States  - but on the basis of a German peace treaty 
and a free city of Berlin.”
614
 Thompson had just warned that the West would probably have to 
“accept de facto” the Wall and avoid the temptation to tie West Berlin and West Germany further 
together politically.
615
  Unwilling to accept Khrushchev‟s apparent ability to define the situation, 
Kennedy resolved to find a new approach to negotiations.  Two days after receiving 
Khrushchev‟s note, Kennedy and Rusk agreed they should call for a peace conference to 
consider parallel peace treaties for Germany.  The president did not want to use a new variant of 
the familiar “Western Peace Plan,” which dated back to the 1959 Foreign Ministers Conference, 
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as the basis for new discussions.
616
  Kennedy would not call for reunification through all-German 
free elections – an idea unacceptable to the Soviets, as well as the East and West German 
leadership.  Instead of specific political measures, Kennedy wanted to open with a statement of  
general goals before presenting  a “real reconstruction of our negotiating positions.”  He thought 
new British proposals were tied up in “impracticable machinery.” He designated a small group of 
advisors, including Bohlen, Kohler, Hillenbrand and Owen, to prepare new options that might 
lead to a resolution of the Berlin and German issues.
 617
  This group was to work in the strictest 
confidence, outside from the usual working group on Berlin and without input from Acheson and 
others committed to forceful responses.   
Berlin remained tense, with particular Soviet harassment at the chronically troublesome 
Steinstuecken and Freidrichstrasse checkpoints.  Kennedy wanted to convey American readiness 
to respond to further provocations.  In mid-September, Kennedy assigned General Lucius Clay to 
remain as a special military advisor.
618
  West Berliners found Clay's appointment  reassuring, but 
the General soon troubled Kennedy with unauthorized  probing of various boundary points.  
Adenauer defeated Brandt, but had to settle for a coalition government and the promise he would 
not serve a full term.  Walter Ulbricht, believing Khrushchev would soon implement his peace 
treaty, was ready to consolidate access control for all Berlin.
619
 
On September 14, Rusk advised British Foreign Minister Lord Home and French Foreign 
Minister Couve de Murville that he intended to sound out Gromyko, at the upcoming United 
Nations General Assembly sessions, about the prospects for new negotiations.  The French were 
cool to this idea, saying Soviet positions were still unchanged and new negotiations under the 
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circumstances were “not appropriate.”
620
   If the Americans and British wanted to explore the 
possibility, the French would not object.  Rusk noted ongoing British and French differences 
over what the Western position should be regarding Berlin and Germany, but thought his own 
recent talks with de Gaulle had lessened their overall differences.  De Murville noted the French 
press had already announced Rusk‟s intended overtures to Gromyko at the UN; public response 
was already critical.   Bohlen said it was necessary to keep talking with the Soviets because they 
had earlier “changed their positions” on important matters like the end of the 1948-49 Berlin 
Blockade and the Austrian peace treaty. 
621
  De Murville said the Soviets had a more immediate 
objective now: shutting down air access to starve out West Berlin.  France thought serious Rusk-
Gromyko talks could be useful, but as long as the Soviet Union remained committed to getting 
the West out of Berlin, there was no point in a conference held on Soviet terms.  
Rusk‟s meeting with Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov less than three hours later 
seemed to confirm French skepticism.  Menshikov said that if the Americans were prepared to 
negotiate in a “businesslike” manner, the Soviets would meet with them in the same spirit.   
However, the Ambassador said recent US language might also be read as threatening, a tone the 
Soviets were prepared to match.  Rusk said it was the Soviets and East Germans who were 
making obstructive threats to air access for West Berlin.  Menshikov dismissed Rusk‟s 
objections, saying the US did not have “the full facts.”
622
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The next day, Kennedy met with the Western foreign ministers and asked them what 
differences remained regarding negotiations.   De Murville noted that negotiations would entail 
concerns similar to those presented by coordinating individual national contingency planning 
(for a military response) with the multilateral Live Oak planning.  The problem was to “convince 
Khrushchev that he was facing a serious risk of war and he should not be allowed to have his 
own way.”  Only the United States “had the strength to speak convincingly to Khrushchev along 
these lines … a US private warning was extremely important…the preliminary to everything.”  
Kennedy also said "he wanted to stress the role of the Federal Republic in this question," a 
statement much appreciated by West German  Foreign Minister von Brentano.
623
 
 The Western ministers met again without Kennedy.  Lord Home said he didn‟t think 
Khrushchev would pay much attention to public warnings; instead a conference was needed, an 
idea that de Murville quickly dismissed.  He reiterated that the US would have to take the lead in 
opening up new negotiations, which could only proceed if Khrushchev was really prepared to 
negotiate constructively and flexibly. West German foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano, also 
present, but saying little, said that the West needed to be able to match Soviet initiatives like the 
„free city Berlin‟ plan with firm proposals, such as free elections for Berlin and Germany.  
Kennedy endorsed Von Brentano‟s statement; the US would “keep closely in step with the (West 
Germans) and that we not undertake courses of action or proposals which would turn them away 
from the Alliance.”  
624
 
This meeting illustrates serious internal problems which had complicated Western 
responses over Berlin since the November 1958 Soviet proposals: The Kennedy administration's 
attempts to reduce NATO control over nuclear use of nuclear angered European leaders, 
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  While all Western co-signatories of the Berlin occupation accords had 
equal political status, disparity in their relative practical strengths hindered a balanced alliance 
with the US.  Trade rivalries disturbed Allied unity.
626
  The French were telling Kennedy to take 
the lead, but not proceed far without consensus.  The British, weakest of the alliance and keenest 
on conference negotiation, had little weight to back their positions.  The French had little 
confidence in the British, but both encouraged and resisted US leadership.  The West Germans, 
still regarded with some skepticism by the French and British, would be most affected by matters 
in which they could not yet negotiate directly.
627
  
The United States felt it essential to preserve West German freedom from Eastern 
domination, yet understood that Berlin in itself did not have much essential value economically, 
militarily or for intelligence and propaganda purposes.  The European leadership of Macmillan, 
de Gaulle, and Adenauer had remained a stable constant, besides Khrushchev‟s unwavering 
attachment to his free city/peace treaty proposals.  That constant  provided a steady reference 
point for the US leadership.  Kennedy was sincere in wanting to find new approaches to this 
central problem for the Western alliance.
628
  The problems he faced, even after the Wall, were 
essentially the same as Eisenhower and Dulles had faced in December 1958.  De Gaulle and 
Adenauer wanted no revision of  the Berlin status quo and Macmillan was too willing to bargain.  
At the same time as the Western powers were trying to find consensus for a new 
approach to negotiations, a series of war-games designed by Professor Thomas Schelling were 
conducted to gauge the viability of forceful responses.  Schelling devised a set of scenarios 
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requiring decisions at crucial stages and evaluated the probable outcomes.
629
 NATO 
Commandant General Lauris Nortsad reported that the Soviets could field 100 divisions, twice 
the number estimated by the US Defense Department.  At a meeting with Kennedy, Rusk and 
McNamara Joint Chiefs of Staff representative General Curtis Lemay said the Army and the JCS 
chairman were split over sending more reinforcements.  Kennedy decided to call up one infantry 
and one armored division, but with little fanfare.
630
 He had good reason to be cautious.   
Reports from the Schelling exercise indicated that the US would find it “difficult to use 
its military power flexibly and effectively for tactical purposes.” One problem was “alliance drag 
... getting agreement among a number of allies on day to day measures.”  Another was predicting 
reliably what the other side might do in a given situation  Rolling force back once deployed also 
appeared difficult.  The problem of finding allied and domestic consensus in support of tactical 
operations was not easily solved.   The democratic nature of Western Europe's political systems 
made heads of state cautious about public reaction. Greater political flexibility in dealing with 
the East on GDR recognition or the Oder-Niesse border could mean trouble at the polls.   The US 
had to “take more initiative in relation to our allies and to assume a degree of independent 
leadership which corresponds more nearly with the degree of responsibility we bear for the final 
result.”
631
 National Security Council advisor Carl Kaysen concluded that it would be more useful 
if the exercise was repeated with high-ranking participants, such as General Maxwell Taylor, 
Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy. 
632
   Those individuals would 
actually shape decisions in a crisis. 
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Rusk and Gromyko Begin Talks 
At the beginning of the United Nations General Assembly sessions, Rusk approached  
Gromyko about private bilateral discussions on Berlin.  They began their discussions on 
September 21.
633
  McGeorge Bundy outlined for Kennedy what Rusk needed to consider.  The 
US needed to concentrate on the demands to end occupation rights, restrict access to West 
Berlin, and make unilateral political changes regarding East Germany‟s status.   The US wanted 
serious bilateral talks with the Soviets in a mutually acceptable setting.  The US would consider 
the idea of peace conference to normalize unresolved issues left over from World war Two.  The 
US would not use the Western Peace Plan as its starting proposal and did not think another  
Four-Power Foreign Minister‟s conference would be productive. 
634
 
The Rusk-Gromyko meetings proved “reasonably relaxed” but not very productive.  
Gromyko underscored the intransigent tone that the Soviets had presented at Vienna and in their 
June 4 aide-memoire.  Rusk said he was speaking for the US alone.  He said the Berlin crisis 
“was essentially a Soviet creation.” The peace treaty threatened “vital interests and fundamental 
commitments of the US.”  The US did not want an arms race but would meet such challenges.  
Although Rusk believed the Soviets did not want war either, Soviet unilateralism did threaten 
war.  In response, Gromyko narrowed in on the specific issue of the peace treaty, which the 
Soviets cast as a legitimate means of normalizing the post-war situation and as the best  means 
for German unification. Western forces would definitely have to withdraw but that did not mean 
Soviet forces would replace them; neutral or UN peacekeepers could be brought in to oversee 
Berlin.  Access to the city was, likewise, a residue of the wartime situation and had no role in 
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perpetuity.   Rusk replied that while the 1945 agreements were to designed as temporary 
mechanisms, “it was not intended that one side would unilaterally terminate them.” 
635
 The 
Soviets had already unilaterally turned over their responsibilities for East Berlin and removed its 
status from discussion.  The Soviets could begin, Rusk said, by inviting UN peacekeepers to 
replace East German and Soviet forces in East Berlin.  Western access rights were not Soviet 
property to be disposed of at will.  The meeting ended noncommittally, with no new ground 
being broken but no new obstacles to further discussion.   
British Foreign Secretary Lord Home held his own private meetings with Gromyko three 
days later.  Home asked Gromyko if the Soviets, before proceeding with their peace treaty, might 
arrange with the East Germans for guaranteed Western access.  Gromyko said that would best 
handled through Western recognition of East Germany (with the Oder-Niesse eastern border) and 
withdrawal of occupation forces from West Berlin.  Home asked if Khrushchev was prepared to 
make good on his offer to negotiate “any time, anywhere and at any level.” If that was the case, 
said Home, it would be useful to discuss other approaches than the free city/peace treaty 
package.  Gromyko “said with strong emphasis that this would be useless and a waste of time.”  
He repeated the Soviets had no interest in discussing “the whole of Germany or the whole of 
Berlin.”
636
  He repeated that the USSR had one main interest and that was the normalization of 
the wartime agreement.  The West was worried about access, he complained, while the East was 
“interested in respect for the rights of the DDR, boundaries, atomic weapons,  demilitarization of 
Western Germany, and the status of West Berlin.” The Oder-Niesse border, established at Soviet 
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insistence after World War II,  had granted German territory to Poland as a buffer zone for the 
USSR.  Khrushchev wanted full Western recognition of Warsaw Pact boundaries.
637
 
Berlin was, as Khrushchev had reminded Thompson, in the middle of East Germany.  
The Soviets thought West Berlin‟s current status was an unacceptable anomaly in that system 
and could be corrected only by a peace conference to formally accept the Soviet Berlin/German 
package.  Home said the Soviet Union must know the Western powers could not sign an 
agreement with East Germany. Could not Berlin be placed under some neutral administration 
like the United Nations?  Gromyko ignored this suggestion, saying again that a peace conference 
was the only acceptable approach.   If the West participated, they could help shape the 
arrangements (on general Soviet terms).   If the West boycotted the conference, the Soviets 
would have no obligation to consider their objections.   Home concluded the meeting by saying 
that would be a very dangerous course the Soviets.  The United Kingdom did not want war but 
“would not be threatened by threats.”
638
   
The British, as they had since 1958, had again demonstrated their persistent pursuit of 
negotiation.  Home‟s approach was nuanced and principled.  However, it was reactive and could 
never have the same focus and momentum as the single-minded Soviet approach. 
639
 Gromyko‟s 
replies also revealed a basic dynamic to the problem that the Britain, France and the United 
States still did not fully understand.  West Berlin destabilized East Germany and encouraged the 
strength of West Germany.  A nuclear West Germany would be a constant threat that reminded 
the Soviets of the worst dangers of wartime invasion.  Compared with these concerns, Western 
complaints about access rights, let alone occupation rights, seemed trivial.
640
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This Soviet attitude could be challenged at a number of levels . Both France and Britain 
had suffered terrible wartime incursions.  Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe violated wartime 
protocols and was overtly hostile to the West.  The Soviets possessed overwhelming combat-
ready superiority in conventional forces.  The Western powers could not solve the Soviet 
challenge by endlessly rebutting minor details.  Nor were the Soviets any more ready to pursue 
Western ideas; Gromyko refused to consider any all-German discussion.
641
  Soviet negotiating 
tactics over Berlin and Germany followed a negotiating pattern that was very familiar to Kennan, 
Thompson, Bohlen and other experienced Western diplomats.  The Soviets were adept at 
sticking to a particular agenda, to the exclusion of any other topics or approaches.  Yet, the same 
observers who best knew Soviet intransigence remained the most committed advocates for 
continued negotiation, however difficult that might prove. 
642
  
The difference between veterans like Bohlen and Kennan and less experienced advisors 
like Kissinger is that the novices believed the Soviets could be influenced by theoretical 
arguments, no matter how attractive and reasonable these ideas might seem in Washington.
643
  
The Rusk-Gromyko-Home talks and the fledgling „pen pal‟ correspondence did amount to 
constructive efforts to renew negotiations.   But the initial discussions continued to reflect the 




NSC consultant Carl Kaysen noted that achieving consensus was difficult for both 
internal and external reasons.  Internally, there was concern that any new position would be 
perceived  as weakness – a retreat from long-standing positions.  Externally, difficulties 
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remained in getting the French and Germans to support new negotiating proposals.  Kaysen 
thought that Khrushchev was softening his position regarding access, provided “we accept 
legitimacy of GDR.”  Kaysen thought both the internal and external obstacles might be 
overcome by a Kennedy speech recapping the Rusk-Gromyko talks and proposing a choice of 
negotiation approaches: broad, encompassing all of European security, or talks narrowly focused 
on Berlin and Germany.  The Soviets would be publicly challenged to engage in peaceful 
negotiation, an idea advanced by William Griffith, Henry Kissinger and others.  Even Kaysen 
admitted in this memo that he did not how the Soviets would react to such a proposal.
 645
   
The Soviets had, for a number of years, shown themselves to be willing to forego public 
approval in lieu of specific security aims.  Examples of this indifference to opinion included 
interference in Berlin in 1948 and 1953, suppression of Hungarian resistance in 1956, and, more 
recently, the Wall‟s construction and the decision to resume testing.  Speeches generally did not 
move Khrushchev. When they did, as in the Kennedy's May and July speeches announcing 
higher defense spending, they often had the opposite effect than intended.  Khrushchev resolved 
to delay his military cutbacks once Kennedy announced reserve call-ups of 250,000 troops.
646
 
Military planning indicated the West could  not readily present a credible deterrent to a 
blockade.
647
  A week after  the US/UK/USSR foreign minister sessions, General Maxwell Taylor 
reported to the President about  some likely, and serious, difficulties projected in the event of a 
forceful response.  The President was about to meet with NATO‟s General Norstad who had just 
made a pessimistic report to the JCS.  Norstad had concluded that “the Allies cannot unilaterally 
control any conflict with the USSR and thus may not be able to enforce a gradual controlled 
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development of the battle … the US must be prepared for explosive escalation to general war.”  
Norstad distrusted the concept of “progressive escalation” because it might encourage the 
Soviets “to think that they can become involved without the risk of incurring nuclear war at 
once.”
648
  Norstad did not think six extra divisions (not yet even approved) would provide more 
operational flexibility.  He warned that the Allies would become very apprehensive if planning 
directions indicated the US might concede territory “for time to negotiate and to avoid spreading 
the war to the United States.”   
Norstad said six divisions might be able to reopen access and secure a corridor for a 
week, but the Soviets would be able to repel such action.  The Soviets were readily capable of a 
strong counterattack; the question would be whether they were politically disposed to undertake 
such a risk. Taylor noted Norstad had said the cause for nuclear use would be “to insure the 
success of major military operations,”  instead of the standard phrase, “to avoid defeat.”  No use 
of West German troops was anticipated.  Taylor‟s cautious advisory about the memo would have 
indicated to the president that serious doubts about forceful response persisted even within the 
highest levels of the military.
649
 At least, the September Rusk-Gromyko talks indicated the 




Beginning of Khrushchev-Kennedy 'Pen Pal' Correspondence 
Gromyko-Rusk talks resumed on September 29, followed immediately by a long letter 
from Khrushchev to Kennedy.  Notable in the ministers' sessions was a broader, more muted 
Soviet approach that almost concealed the standard free city/peace treaty demands. This same 
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 Cable from Rusk to US Europe embassies re Gromyko meeting, September 22, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 




tone was evident in Khrushchev's letter.   Even before the Rusk meeting, the Soviet Chairman 
had delivered an oral message for Kennedy through the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press 
secretary, Mikhail Kharmalov, to the President's spokesman, Pierre Salinger. That message noted 
the hazardous Berlin situation and suggested they hold another meeting soon.  Kennedy had 
Salinger deliver a reply, also unwritten, to Kharmalov, indicating his interest.
651
  Kennedy hoped 
the message indicated Khrushchev was not yet ready to sign the peace treaty.  That exchange 




In his first letter dated September 29, 1962, Khrushchev mentioned the late summer 
weather he was enjoying on vacation.  He then turned to afterthoughts on Vienna and what he 
saw as conflicting signals from Kennedy in the weeks since.  Khrushchev said he was convinced  
that, like himself, Kennedy did not want war. A draft 'statement of principles' on disarmament, 
then under consideration for submission to the UN General Assembly, was a good, if tentative, 
first step.  He restated his desire for "prompt implementation of general and complete 
disarmament," with no mention of the contentious issue of  inspections.  But, said Khrushchev, 
the current "strengthening of armaments ... in connection with the German question" discouraged 
prospects for disarmament.  He tied the situation to "problems we inherited from the last war" 
which could, he said, be best resolved by the peace treaty proposal.   Khrushchev then brought 
up, for the first time, a Kennedy visit to the USSR, a possibility "I am hoping for."  He said that 
such a visit, a clear sign of detente, would be contingent on a peace treaty. 
653
  
To sweeten this offer, the first such incentive offered since 1959, he also suggested that 
there could be parallel peace treaties, one for the Soviets to sign with the (East) German 
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Democratic Republic and one for the US, France and Britain  to sign with the (West) Federal 
Republic of Germany.  These treaties would include language which could be used for 
unification "if the Germans so desire," but would have to recognize the current borders between 
the GDR and the FRG.  The peace treaty would supersede the Potsdam agreement and  Berlin, 
situated within the GDR, would be transformed into a "free city."  The Soviet Union would 
provide guarantees of Berlin's "free city" status but would allow a small transitional presence of 
Western troops in Berlin.  This was still basically the 1958 proposal, with token innovations of 




Khrushchev also brought up the possibility of UN or neutral peace-keepers for Berlin but 
emphasized  that "the occupation regime in West Berlin must be eliminated."  He dismissed  the 
occupation arrangements as a destabilizing residue of the war, but invited the United States to 
present its own versions of his formula.   He suggested the Rusk-Gromyko talks could serve as 
the start of broader discussion on the German question: "it could be arranged for you and I to 
appoint appropriate representatives for private meetings and talks."  Such talks could prepare the 
ground for a conference to conclude a peace treaty.  He mentioned the recent discussions that 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia George Kennan was having with Soviet delegates in Belgrade.  
Though Khrushchev thought these diplomats were wasting too much time "sniffing each other 
out, " he respected Kennan and authorized the Soviet ambassador to hold substantive 
discussions.  Khrushchev suggested that Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
might be a suitable representative for high-level talks to arrange a peace conference.
655
   








Khrushchev noted that non-aligned leaders had recently written to him and to Kennedy, 
calling for another summit meeting, and that they had both replied positively to that suggestion.  
Khrushchev now said to Kennedy, "I believe a meeting between us could be useful."  This was 
the first direct reference, by either head of state to the other,  to a new summit since Vienna.  
Such a meeting would require careful and confidential preparation but could be held "any place."  
It's purpose would be to conclude a German peace treaty, for which all nations would be grateful.  
Khrushchev again disavowed war and said their political difference should not obstruct the quest 
for peace.  He invoked a surprising analogy of both "clean and unclean" animals going together 
into Noah's Ark to seek sanctuary.   So too did the superpowers need to put aside their 
differences and resolve this issue, not only for themselves but for all nations.  He linked 
"disarmament and the German question" one last time, saying he would need to make a progress 
report to the upcoming 22nd Party Congress.
656
  His tone was noticeably less confrontational, his 
desire for high-level negotiations unmistakable.  
The final round of Rusk-Gromyko talks in New York on October 2 showed that serious 
difficulties still remained, but the Soviets wanted a diplomatic solution.
657
  Rusk noted the 
Soviets had not clarified what effects the peace treaty would have on access rights to West 
Berlin.  Gromyko replied that the treaty would make West Berlin a 'free city' without occupation 
rights.  Diplomatic relations with the GDR could be optional but de jure recognition would be 
necessary.  Parallel treaties could satisfy Western prestige but Western non-participation would 
leave the Soviets and East Germans free to determine access.  Gromyko surprised Rusk by 
suggesting their talks be expanded to consider broader questions of European security.  Rusk 
said the US might be interested in broader discussions but not by giving up rights that had 








already been established by legal treaties.
 658
  Gromyko brushed this objection aside, complaining 
that the US only wanted to perpetuate an outdated wartime understanding.  Rusk said the US was 
more interested in preventing another world war than re-addressing well established agreements.  
The US could not make specific proposals affecting European security without the input and 
approval of other nations involved.  The US and the USSR might not be overtly involved, 
militarily, in Europe, but they could not disengage quickly without creating a "vacuum."
659
   
Rusk stressed that the US was very interested in disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation and wanted to review current Soviet proposals to the UN about these topics.   
Gromyko said his government needed to consult with Ulbricht and consider GDR interests.   He 
spelled out the essential goals the USSR and GDR held in common: recognition of current 
German borders, recognition of GDR sovereignty over its territory, halting the spread of nuclear 
weapons in West Germany, and transformation of West Berlin into a free city, with East Berlin 
remaining the capital of the GDR.  These demands could not be made contingent on broader 
discussions of European security.  Further, said Gromyko, "existence of two separate German 
states must be accepted as ... fact. Unity of Germany only possible through arrangements 
between the two German governments."
660
  Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, who have 
had extensive access to Soviet records, say that Khrushchev was very pleased with this first 
Rusk-Gromyko meeting and did what he could with socialist allies to ensure the talks would not 
be disturbed with new frictions.
661
 
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy reported to the President that the Soviets 
seemed "more willing to settle the access question" but were not offering any significant 
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concessions themselves.  Bundy warned "unless something more is put into the record before 
these conversations close, I think we are on a dangerous slope of appeasement.  He added that 
this would be the likely view of "the Germans, the French and the Republicans."  Gromyko 
needed to be told, before returning to Moscow, that further clarification of Western access  was 
still necessary, not conditional on GDR approval; one internationalized route to West Berlin 
should be established.  Bundy thought Rusk had done an excellent job and the talks had on the 
whole been constructive.
662
   
Walt Rostow prepared for Bundy a counter-proposal for a '1961 protocol' which would  
supersede the Potsdam agreements but keep Western occupation forces in West Berlin.  Because 
the USSR was unwilling to recognize the legality of the Potsdam agreement, the US would not 
proceed with a peace treaty or recognition of the GDR. This proposal would offer  recognition of 
the Oder-Niesse boundary for the GDR, proscribe ownership or control of nuclear weapons for 
both the FRG and GDR, encourage contacts and agreements between the FRG and GDR without 
demanding they recognize each other diplomatically, and use such contacts as a gauge to guide 
US policy in the region.  Rostow's proposal also called for moving the UN Economic 
Development office from New York to West Berlin and planning a new Four-Power Foreign 
Minister meeting.
663
 Keeping the West Germans from owning nuclear arms was less a 
concession to the Soviets than a reflection of the Kennedy administration's desire to control 
NATO nuclear forces. 
664
 
If the Soviets were not prepared to offered substantial concessions, neither were the 
Americans.  Rostow's proposal would have the US and FRG accept GDR document stamping on 
                                                 
662
 Bundy memo to Kennedy, October 2nd, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc. 165. 
663
 Memo from Rostow to Bundy, JFK Library, National Security Files (Berlin and Germany series), Box 83, folder 
10/1-10/4/61. 
664




the principle that they would be agents of the Soviets, recognize the Oder-Niesse border wanted 
by the GDR and Soviets, and withdraw nuclear weapons from Germany if the Soviets would do 
the same.  Although neither the US or USSR were prepared to offer more than incremental 
flexibility, they were at least, as Kennan and Thompson had urged, still negotiating.
665
   
The talks were still very tentative, while the tensions on the ground in Berlin were 
rising.
666
  Serious potential for escalation remained.  While contingency planning for Berlin 
action was based on a credible nuclear deterrent, considerable differences had emerged among 
State, Defense, JCS and NATO.  These disagreements were reflected in Bundy's brief for 
Kennedy at an October 4 meeting with General Norstad.  NATO and Defense Dept. planners 
agreed on an immediate buildup of conventional forces in Europe, and wanted both planning and 
forceful action carried out by NATO, instead of the West Berlin occupying powers.  Norstad was 
much more willing than Defense Secretary Robert McNamara or the JCS's  General Maxwell 
Taylor to employ nuclear weapons.  Bundy wanted the President to remind Norstad who was 
Commander in Chief. 
667
  The meeting proved generally satisfactory but also made evident the 
ongoing problem of developing pre-agreed response plans with the other allies.  Norstad took 
care to point out he did not, in fact, think that escalation could be smoothly managed in a 
crisis.
668
  Reaching NATO agreement was difficult, yet necessary because the Western powers 
were at odds about negotiation tactics or even the desirability of continued negotiations.   
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When Rusk briefed the Ambassadorial working Group partners (UK/France/FRG) the 
same day, he did not bring up contingency planning.  The FRG's Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe 
considered the Rusk-Gromyko talks useful but thought they should be discontinued precisely 
because they were on the verge of including broader European security issues.  France's 
Ambassador Alphand said that the Soviet definition of a 'free city' would be one with no political 
connection with West Germany, a condition that would be unacceptable in either Bonn or West 
Berlin.  He thought that too much optimism in the press over the Rusk-Gromyko talks would 
only make the Soviets less likely to offer real concessions.
669
 
President Kennedy feared the Soviets might take advantage of American desire for 
negotiation.  He invited Gromyko to the White House on October 6th, 1961.  They had met 
during World War II, when Kennedy was a reporter, and again at Vienna.  Gromyko now told 
him  that, when they first met, "I formed the opinion you were no ordinary newspaperman."
670
 
Kennedy informed the Soviet Foreign Minister that the US would be consulting its allies and 
preparing questions, particularly regarding access guarantees and other present treaty rights.  
This might provide a basis for further talks Ambassador Thompson would conduct in Moscow. 
  Gromyko had a number of things to say himself.  Reading from a prepared statement, 
the Soviet diplomat repeated the normalization of wartime situations rationale, outlined the peace 
treaty as presented to Rusk, and criticized the US for having unilaterally made peace with Japan 
in 1945.  Gromyko said there was no set timetable for the peace treaty, but that it was inevitable.   
US abstinence would result in not being to participate in setting the new treaty's terms.  He said 
the Soviet Union was guaranteeing access and offering concessions to honor Western prestige.  
Kennedy was willing to consider broader security issues, including nuclear non-proliferation, 
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troop reductions and removal of foreign bases, "for the cause of an international detente."  He 
proposed demilitarizing both Germanys.  While the current US/USSR bilateral talks were 
"extremely useful," the Soviets were also willing to consider a new Four-Power conference to 
conclude a peace treaty and discuss European security.
671
    
Kennedy observed that the Soviets were demanding that the US give up longstanding 
rights the Soviets themselves had agreed to.  The token sweeteners now being offered were only 
superficial;  the Soviets were giving up nothing.  For the US, said Kennedy, this "would not be a 
compromise but a retreat."  Gromyko said it appeared that the US and its Allies were more 
concerned with its occupation rights inside East Germany than in stabilizing European security 
and recognizing the realities of post-war Europe.   There was no need to doubt Soviet guarantees 
on access or West Berlin's political freedom. The offers of token peacekeeping presence were an 
honorable concession to Western prestige, said Gromyko.
672
  At the end of the general meeting  
which included Rusk, Menshikov and Kohler, Gromyko requested a few minutes alone with 
Kennedy, though apparently each simply summed up their major themes.  Kennedy rejected in 
particular the new Soviet proposal to include their troops in the peacekeeping contingent.
673
   
Though the Gromyko talks in America in September and October 1961 were much 
preferable to the kind of forceful confrontation Dean Acheson had proposed just weeks before, 
they showed that diplomacy was not an easy alternative.  The official positions presented in the 
Rusk-Gromyko talks varied little from their governments' longstanding positions, though some 
wavering was visible.  In  an advisory memo to Rusk, Ambassador Charles Bohlen suggested 
that Khrushchev had realized he had "made a major misjudgment" with his early summer "shock 
treatment" approach for a new German/Berlin settlement.  Bohlen thought the Wall and the 
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resumption of testing had been reactive decisions to Kennedy's July 25 defense buildup speech, 
and the dispatch of Vice-President Johnson and the reinforcement battalion to Berlin mid-July.  
Since early September, Khrushchev had been looking for ways to pull back from the brink of 
war.  Changing tactics from confrontation to negotiation "is a classic Bolshevik method."  The 
Soviets were prepared to soften original demands but not offer real concessions. 
674
   
Bohlen carefully articulated the outstanding questions on guarantees for West Berlin 
access and political freedom, stressing that Gromyko needed to be pressed hard on these issues.  
In a sign as to how flexible some in the US diplomatic establishment were becoming on Berlin, 
Bohlen also pointed out that he had not discussed preservation of occupation rights: "in the 
conversations with Gromyko, there was no reference to our intention of preserving this statute 
and the Soviets appear to be quite adamant on this point."
675
  In fact, Rusk had indicated that the 
West intended to keep troops in West Berlin and Kennedy would affirm this commitment to his 
own talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister.  That an American advisor of  the  rank and expertise 
in Soviet relations as Bohlen would officially, if confidentially, discuss compromises on  the 
occupation indicated some of the Eisenhower/Dulles-era pragmatism on Berlin still survived.
676
 
Bohlen's observation of cracks in the Soviet leadership was bolstered by a report from 
NSC consultant Henry Kissinger on conversations that included American peace activist Erich 
Fromm and Soviet playwright, Central Committee member and Khrushchev confidant Alexander 
Korneichuk.   Korneichuk and Soviet journalist Ilya Khrenburg "indicated that there is increasing 
opposition to Mr. Khrushchev in the Soviet Union because his peace policy with the West 
appears to be a failure."
677
 Supposedly, Kennedy had drawn back from concessions thought to 
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have been offered by Eisenhower.  Khrushchev was facing opposition from both public opinion 
and high-ranking military leaders.  Negotiations were needed "very soon" or else the US might 
have to deal with a tougher Soviet leadership.  Similar warnings had come from diplomats like 
Thompson and West German Ambassador Kroll, but now they were coming from well-placed 
Soviet source  Kissinger discounted these warnings, though without saying why, but found them 
significant enough to pass along.  Even if these sources were planted by Khrushchev's 
administration, though, the fact that he felt the need to go to such measures showed that he now 




Allied and Defense Criticism of Negotiations 
The US and USSR may have felt that, by default, they had to turn to bilateral dialogue to 
resolve the problems of Germany and Berlin, but the other Berlin signatories were becoming 
concerned about decisions that might be made without them.
679
  Rusk's cautions to Gromyko 
about the limits of their bilateral authority were reflected in worried notes from the French and 
German ambassadors in Washington.
680
  
On October 7, US Ambassador to France John Gavin reported more serious difficulties 
with de Gaulle, who "has been using almost every public opportunity to restate opposition to 
negotiations with Soviets on Berlin/Germany unless these were preceded by detente, condition 
regarded here as most unlikely."  De Gaulle felt the US was unduly concerned about imminent 
danger of war and this fear was prompting a rush to negotiate. Gavin noted that de Gaulle wanted 
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to concentrate on the withdrawal of French forces from Algeria.  At present, said Gavin, "French, 
including de Gaulle, have now indicated they might not participate in negotiations even if they 
are arranged."  The French were concerned over how a deal might affect the FRG.  De Gaulle 
"firmly" supported the FRG, though he was "cool to ...[FRG] ... efforts to embrace West Berlin 
... (and)...lukewarm on German reunification." 
681
 Nor were they sympathetic to FRG efforts to 
regain territories lost to the East.    
The French adamantly opposed recognition of East Germany.  Their difference of 
opinion with Eisenhower and Macmillan on this issue had stymied efforts to present more 
flexible proposals in preparation for the Paris summit.   The French were "nervous" over possible 
discussions on European security because they feared such talks would diminish the West's 
strength in Central Europe.  Gavin tried to convince de Gaulle that a real danger existed for war 
over Berlin and that US-USSR talks would not prejudice French interests.
682
  Gavin and de 
Gaulle favored a new Western Foreign Ministers meeting, and even a Western Heads of State 
meeting.  De Gaulle was more interested in restoring French influence with the US than planning 
new negotiations with the Soviets.
683
 
 The twin currents of Berlin-related negotiation and military preparedness still 
created turbulence when they met.  Military and hard line factions felt acceptance of a divided 
Europe might invite Soviet expansion.
684
  The JCS were worried about Allied readiness and 
willingness to meet forceful Eastern action on Berlin. Their "Preferred Sequence of Military 
Actions in a Berlin Conflict" memo to Bundy started with non-military measures like economic 
sanctions in the event of a blockade and proceeded though a series of conventional-force ground 
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actions to restore access.  The JCS and NATO wanted a faster military response than the State 
Dept. favored.  If non-military efforts failed, they recommended either "selective nuclear attacks 
for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons" or "limited tactical 
employment of nuclear weapons."  However, "the Allies only partially control the timing and 
scale of nuclear weapons use, " with Soviet "unrestrained pre-emptive attack" or in-kind nuclear 
response being very possible.
685
 
The NSC meeting of October 10, where Rusk reported optimistically on the talks with 
Gromyko, reflected disagreements about nuclear response.  The President and most of advisors, 
especially McNamara, favored greater emphasis on conventional forces, which lessened danger 
of nuclear escalation and increased likelihood of effectively using these forces.  Paul Nitze 
strongly disagreed, feeling this policy would encourage the Soviets to consider a nuclear first-
strike.  The US should reserve a first-strike option for itself.  McNamara said first-use provided 
no assurance of victory.  Though Rusk reminded the group of the "very grave responsibility" 
involved in first-use of nuclear weapons, the issue was not flatly resolved.  General Norstad 




 The French did not want to negotiate further; the Americans were not sure 
whether they needed to be more concerned with negotiation or military preparations.  The 
British, keen on negotiations but militarily weak, said little for the moment.
687
 British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Home told Bundy that de Gaulle's objections would preclude a Western Foreign 
Minister's meeting on Berlin, but Kennedy should keep trying to get Adenauer's support for 
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negotiations at some level.  Home thought Gromyko was generally "pitching his demands very 




The West Germans voiced their objections more loudly.  Adenauer wrote Kennedy on 
October 4  to compliment the President's UN address but complain about US willingness to 
accommodate the Soviets.  Ambassador Grewe passed these complaints (particularly regarding 
GDR recognition) to Rusk, who said recognition was not on the table but acknowledgement of 
the GDR's existence  could facilitate an interim understanding.
689
  Dean Acheson, who was 
tougher on the Berlin issue than most of the Kennedy administration    Acheson cautioned 
against trying to incorporate West Berlin politically into the FRG or suggesting military strategy 
to the US.  Instead the FRG needed to develop its own negotiating position and marshal the 
economic, political and military resources to make it credible.
690
   
Kennedy, in his reply to Adenauer, tried to placate the Germans about overly generous 
concessions to the Soviets.  Kennedy assured the recently re-elected Chancellor that the US had 
no intention of withdrawing from Berlin; he also told him that "it is not realistically in our power 
to prevent indefinitely the signing of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the 
East German regime."  Referring to such an event as an "inevitability," Kennedy asked Adenauer 
whether it was better to simply boycott the process and have no input, or to consider negotiations 
that might mitigate a treaty's effects.
691
   
 Kennedy said he thought Thompson should continue discussions with Gromyko 
or Khrushchev in Moscow, and that these discussions might lead to a new East-West foreign 
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ministers meeting.  Kennedy also assured Adenauer that current UN disarmament discussions, on 
both conventional and nuclear forces, would not diminish the FRG's security.  Ambassador 
Dowling later reported that Chancellor had been assured by Kennedy's letter.  The French 
remained troublesome, refusing assent for a week-long Ambassadorial working group meeting 
proposed for London, starting October 19.  They said that a meeting intended to work out new 




Further Bilateral US-Soviet Negotiation on Berlin 
 French resistance to negotiation may not have been constructive, but it was not 
unrealistic either.  De Gaulle would be later proved correct in predicting there would be no war 
over Berlin, though he had not fully acknowledged the possibility of dangerous conflicts like the 
standoff that soon developed over the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint.
693
  Although not realized yet 
in Washington, the talks with Gromyko had largely been a byproduct of circumstance, i.e. his 
being in the United States for the UN General Assembly sessions.  The Soviets presented the 
latest version of their German/Berlin proposals, through Khrushchev's letter and the discussions 
with their Foreign Minister.  Once this was accomplished, the West needed to respond, which it 
was slow in doing.  Khrushchev wanted to act while the inexperienced Kennedy was still off 
balance from Vienna and the Wall.  The tentative warming of early fall 1961 would represent the 
closest East-West engagement for many months to come.
694
  
Kennedy still held out considerable hope for renewed talks when he wrote Khrushchev 
on October 16.  His letter paralleled the Soviet premier's in several respects, commenting on the 
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vacation weather in Hyannis Point, the disappointments of Vienna and the hope for discussion 
unclouded by ideological debate.  The President said he liked Khrushchev's Noah's Ark analogy 
(Both leaders refrained from speculating on which was the 'clean' or 'unclean' side.)
695
  He agreed 
that neither side wanted war.  But, where Khrushchev used this line of thought to introduce his 
theme of finally ending the state of war, Kennedy said the worse danger was thwarting German 
desires for re-unification.  That frustration, said the President, encouraged the 'militarists and 
revanchists' Khrushchev and Gromyko warned against.  Walter Ulbricht's provocations were not 
helping the situation either.
696
 As much as the US and USSR might want a unified, demilitarized 
Germany, conditions were not yet conducive for that, nor would a peace treaty solve the 
problems.  Kennedy emphasized that the current stewardship of Berlin was maintaining a stable 
situation there.  Stationing Soviet troops there could not improve the situation.
697
 
The president told the Chairman that negotiations could help prepare the way for a 
demilitarized, unified situation, but would have to be prepared carefully.  Kennedy would be 
talking with the Western allies, while the Premier would be meeting with the Party Congress.  
They needed to avoid "any statement, incident, or another provocation in Berlin which would 
make negotiation impossible."  Ambassador Thompson, in Washington but about to return to 
Moscow, could continue the private discussions.  Kennedy said "as for another meeting between 
the two of us, I agree completely that ...we had better postpone a decision on that until a 
preliminary understanding can be reached  ... on positive decisions which might appropriately be 
formalized."
698
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Kennedy linked a visit to the Soviet Union to " a reasonable settlement on Berlin.  "If the 
international atmosphere improves, I would take great pleasure in such a visit," said Kennedy 
recalling that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1939 and wanted to see "the great changes that 
had occurred since then."  Like Khrushchev, he reserved mention of disarmament till his closing 
remarks; "I do not intend to relegate the  achievement of complete and general disarmament to a 
place of secondary importance. " He thought their joint statement of principles submitted to the 
UN was, at least, a start toward an important and rewarding goal.  Kennedy briefly touched on 
competition for influence in the Laos situation, and even suggested that settlement there would 
improve the atmosphere for Berlin negotiations.
699
  Kennedy's letter was briefer and more 
general than Khrushchev's.  It was not so much a formal diplomatic reply as an 
acknowledgement that he had been granted some to reconsider the Berlin/Germany situation.  






Berlin Harassment and Allied Estrangement 
 The US would soon be involved in the kind of military provocations Kennedy had 
pleaded against in his letter.  In early October, Ulbricht began to limit free movement for 
diplomatic personnel in East Berlin.
701
  They also were closing check-points, at one point 
isolating the oft-contended Steinstecken neighborhood.   On October 18, Secretary Rusk advised 
Ambassador Lightner in West Berlin that the White House approved a plan to use two or three 
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tanks to clear any new check-point obstructions.
702
  The same day, Clay wrote Kennedy to 
complain that his options to respond to provocations were overly restricted.  Clay was frustrated 
because "I find little evidence in West Germany of the will to fight and I doubt if the West 
German people are as determined as we are to defend Berlin."  He warned against increased 
nationalism that "could lead West Germany into breaking with the West."
703
  Clay affirmed his 
respect and loyalty to the president, but he was clearly uneasy about his position in Berlin.  At 
the same time, Adenauer was lobbying for a Kennedy visit to Bonn, though this was not a 
serious possibility. 
The Chancellor was now being more cooperative, offering to try and persuade de Gaulle 
to do likewise.  Allied cohesion was still far from what it was needed for productive 
negotiation.
704
   Even the US diplomatic corps was having its doubts about Allied policy. 
Ambassador Bruce wrote from London that  it seemed the West had forgotten its 1954 
commitments to work for German reunification and never recognize the East German regime.  In 
light of the current diplomatic stalemate and perceived lack of will, Bruce thought the best 
course might be to take Khrushchev up on the proposal to internationalize Berlin under UN 
auspices. But, said Bruce, "meanwhile, I would consider it essential that we take, and make 
credible decision to engage if necessary in nuclear war  rather than lose West Berlin, and 
consequently, West Germany."
705
  In contrast, NSC advisor Henry Owen, part of the inner circle 
advising Kennedy's private approach to the Soviets, prepared for Bundy an all-Berlin plan 
without occupation.  The purpose, he said, was to consider a West Berlin without occupation.  
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Owen thought that the value of parallel peace treaties was that they would necessitate revising 
the occupation  statutes.
706
 
Contingency planning was hotly contested that same day at an NSC meeting, where 
Defense Undersecretary Gilpatric disputed Norstad's acceptance of the new emphasis on 
conventional forces. McNamara rejected that assertion, whereupon the President asked Dean 
Acheson for his opinion, and "from that point on, the meeting was dominated by Mr. Acheson's 
arguments."  Acheson said Norstad had received unclear instructions that needed to focus on 
Kennedy's preference on non-military action, and air action in the event of conflict.  In broader 
terms, Acheson argued that "the United States has been spending too much time seeking 
theoretical arguments with our allies ... the momentum of American decision and action is what 
will make the difference ... the United States should begin moving divisions in November."
707
 
When the President asked why, Acheson said a visible deterrent would provide useful 
political and diplomatic leverage to influence Khrushchev productively.  Kennedy was worried 
by the "gold drain" required for such a buildup, though Gilpatric and McNamara said this could 
be managed with allied cooperation.  Kennedy asked Foy Kohler about current allied relations. 
Kohler replied that the Germans were being more helpful now but "he could make no such 
optimistic judgment on the French."  Acheson said that, instead of asking the partners to 
negotiate, "we need to tell them."
708
  He approved of current US negotiating ideas and these 
needed to be presented to the allies as the firm US position.  He said Adenauer would be the key.  
Kennedy proceeded to write Norstad to confirm the official US policy of graduated, conventional 
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response in a Berlin conflict.  This policy would, the President said, have the most deterrent 




Kennedy now faced a very enigmatic situation over Berlin.  The Wall's construction had 
eased tensions for a few weeks, but the East Germans were hardening the border closure and 
eliminating checkpoints. 
710
  On October 23, Lightner was stopped by East German 'vopos', 
despite the clear diplomatic markings on his vehicle; he called in a US military escort and 
successfully entered East Berlin.  A Soviet political aide arrived, apologized (though protesting 
the military escort), and cleared him for transit.  Though  access was later tested without 
incident, Lightner observed nearby tank movements in East Berlin.
711
  US Generals Clay and 
Norstad were at odds, with each other and with Washington, over how to respond to these 
provocations and  how to proceed with military preparations for a potential Berlin conflict that 
could lead to general war.  The October 23 dispute was the beginning of more serious 
confrontation in the days to come. 
The diplomatic momentum of early October had stalled, for the most part because of 
French and West German disagreements but also because of the deepening realization that the 
Soviets were offering very little in return for Western withdrawal from Berlin.   The British 
supported the America initiative but worried the other Allies could derail negotiations.
712
  On the 
day Lightner was stopped in East Berlin, Ambassador Gavin called on de Gaulle who showed 
him a letter he had just written to Kennedy.  Gavin said he thought it important to continue the 
ambassadorial talks but de Gaulle made it clear such talks should not be construed as providing 
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guidance for Thompson's discussions in Moscow.  He rejected Kennedy's idea of a Western 
ministers meeting in November.  Gavin asked what would happen if they abandoned negotiations 
and the Soviets resorted to force?  De Gaulle replied that negotiating under threat of force was 
the worst option possible.
713
  On the other hand, if the Soviets were not going to use force, there 
was no need either to negotiate.  De Gaulle did not think the Soviets wanted war and the US was 
in too much hurry to negotiate.  He thought negotiations detrimental to the US, to Adenauer and 
the Germans and to the Western alliance.  
Meanwhile, Ambassador Grewe was telling Kennedy that the FRG had never opposed 
negotiations and would help get the French on board.  But Grewe also made clear that the West 
Germans were not happy with the new contingency plans deemphasizing nuclear use, in 
particular a first-strike option.
714
  Nor were they happy with US advice to explore unification 
through talks with the East Germans, rather than on the principle of free all-German elections.  
The new policy seemed more likely to reinforce than remove political divisions.  Said Grewe, 
"the Germans regarded the confrontation of Soviet and American forces as a desirable situation 
rather an as a bad one."
715
  Kennedy said that negotiations were a much better alternative and the 
rest of NATO supported this view.   Before Thompson proceeded very far in his Moscow talks, 
Kennedy thought it would be helpful for Adenauer to visit Washington again for talks. 
 
Armored Confrontation at "Checkpoint Charlie"  
 On October 24, Clay wired the President that East German provocations were becoming 
so severe as to preclude further negotiation until the Soviets reined in Ulbricht. He would cease 
further attempts to enter East Berlin with an armed escort but would make an unarmed probe 
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again that day.  He and Lightner urged the president to immediately call Ambassador Menshikov 
in to make a vigorous protest.
716
  Unhappy with Clay and Lightner's tactics, Kohler immediately 
wired back that they were over-reacting.   Kohler said most of what he received in reply was 
"doubletalk," but Lightner acknowledged over-reaction and accepted the rebuke, blaming "higher 
authority."
717
  He was told that negotiations depended on more important factors and to stress 
Washington's displeasure to Clay.    
Although Lightner was considerably more hawkish on Berlin than most of his State 
Department colleagues, he was a loyal and experienced team player.  General Clay, however, 
was about to demonstrate that he was considerably more independent.  With his approval, 
unarmed probes of entry access continued and met with official harassment and denial of access.  
On October 25, Norstad told the JCS's General Lyman Lemnitzer , "a foundation has certainly 
been established  for a showdown."
718
  Despite Kohler's opposition, Ambassador Dowling, in 
Bonn, favored continued armed probes; Lightner reported that the West Berlin public also 
supported the probes, as did Bundy aide Colonel Lawrence Legere.
719
 
After another probe was stopped the next day, US personnel observed , while East 
German officials refused to summon Soviet political aides, Russian vehicles were circling the 
scene. Norstad wanted Washington to have Thompson protest Soviet refusal to intervene.  On 
October 27, in Washington, Paul Nitze told Bundy that the JCS thought probes should continue, 
regardless of "Thompson's demarche in Moscow," but that McNamara disagreed.  Kohler, also a 
member of Kennedy's private negotiating group, wanted all probes stopped immediately.  
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Ambassador Dowling in Bonn thought they should be continued.  Lightner reported strong 
public support in West Berlin for the probes.  On October 30, Bundy told Kennedy that he had 
denied Lightner and Clay's request for reciprocal measures against Soviet visitors to West Berlin. 
Kennedy decided to limit Soviets to one point of access to West Berlin.
720
   
   The same day British Foreign Office aide Lord Hood was telling  Foy Kohler the 
British were still reluctant to commit to economic counter-measures in the event of total 
blockage to the city.  Nonetheless, the British were ready to demand reciprocity on showing 
entry credentials, though the French were still reluctant to take this step.   They noted that the 
Soviets would take careful note of these deliberations.
721
  Aides to Undersecretary of State 
George Ball cast doubt on economic counter measures as an effective deterrent to Soviet actions.  
Measures would be difficult to coordinate, would have little short-term effect and might appear 
as weak-willed, thus emboldening Khrushchev.
722
  Thompson had been instructed to make a 
strong protest personally to Gromyko about the Friedrichstrasse harassment and stress that 
negotiations could not take place under duress. Positive reaction from Gromyko would defer 
further probes till the matter was straightened out.
723
  
On October 28, after another refusal of entry at this crossing, near the Brandenburg gate, 
dubbed Checkpoint Charlie,  Clay ordered three US tanks brought within a quarter mile of the 
crossing.  The Soviets responded, and the tanks moved forward in turn till they were visibly 
facing each other across the border crossing.  More tanks, twenty on each side, were brought up 
to the checkpoint.
724
  This standoff continued overnight, but, apparently, messages conducted 
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through the Robert Kennedy/Georgi Bolshakov backchannel produced an agreement for each 
side to back off to a distance of two miles.  Kennedy wrote Clay to congratulate him on his 
nerve. Clay answered that it was the nerves in Washington he was more concerned about.
725
   
The incident brought home the seriousness of using force.  Both American and Soviet 
forces around the world were brought to full readiness.  Ulbricht was furious about Moscow's 
caution in the standoff and Khrushchev was angry that he had been baited into displaying more 
force than he wished.
726
  Despite Kennedy's congratulatory message, the incident also marked 
the end of Kennedy's confidence in the general.  After masterminding the 1948 airlift and 
accompanying the Vice-President in August, Clay felt a strong personal commitment to Berlin., 
but his superiors worried about both his objectivity and his judgment.  Rusk ordered a halt to 
armed probes into East Berlin. "to provide a cooling off period."
727
 
Kennedy, determined not abandon negotiations, applied pressure on de Gaulle.  In an 
October 30 letter, the President reminded de Gaulle that the US was providing most of the 
personnel and material support for NATO.  Kennedy proposed the Western heads meet in 
December.  However, said Kennedy, if prospects appeared dim for progress, it would be better 
not to meet at all.  He emphasized to de Gaulle how necessary it was for the West to work 
together.  De Gaulle sat stone-faced through Ambassador Gavin's presentation, offering only a 
perfunctory offer to consider the information.  If de Gaulle accepted, this would be the first 
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The situation in Berlin was not improving.  On November 2, Lightner advised Rusk that 
he saw little point in either submitting to the current East German identification checks for Allied 
diplomatic/military personnel or admitting similar Soviet personnel to the Western sectors.  To 
do otherwise would admit to de facto recognition of East Germany.
729
  Rusk replied that 
Kennedy agreed the West should not submit to identification checks but should take no further 
action.   The Wall had demonstrated East German control of their sector, whether or not this was 
politically recognized by the West.  Rather than wasting time contesting small issues, like 
identification checks, the West needed to deal with "other slices of salami which the Soviets will 
try to take to establish the wall as a state-frontier of the GDR."
730
  The West needed to remain 
focused  on negotiation and military preparedness. 
 
Allies Attempt New Negotiations 
Kohler reported that the allied ambassadorial group was unable to agree on any cohesive 
response to the Friedrichstrasse problem.  They thought "the probable next attempt to slice the 
salami" would have the GDR requiring identification from previously-exempt  military.  Kohler 
noted that West Germans, asked to explore intermediary relations with the GDR, were very 
reluctant to consider "making practical arrangements with someone from the other side.  Kohler 
also said "Ambassador Thompson has expressed doubts concerning the wisdom of continuing 
the Moscow probe of the Soviet position on the Berlin and German questions." 
731
  With the 
Western ambassadorial group unable to make much progress and Thompson skeptical about his 
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private mission, Kennedy would need agreement among the Western heads to prepare a 
constructive new approach to the Soviets, as well as viable contingency planning.
732
  
In a meeting with Kennedy, Norstad made clear he understood his responsibilities as a 
US General took precedence over NATO loyalties.  However, he also had, as SACEUR, to 
operate in the contentious context of the North Atlantic Council.  McNamara now understood the 
difficulty.  When asked by Kennedy what they should do if access were stopped, Norstad said he 
would respond with small probes and suggested appealing to the UN.  When Kennedy scoffed at 
the UN's efficacy, the General suggested that the President might consider inviting Khrushchev 
"to meet him in Berlin on a specific day."
733
  Kennedy seemed interested in this idea; he also told 
Norstad that he appreciated the General had not taken advantage of the opportunity to receive 
more divisions in Europe.  On the whole, this meeting bode well for cohesion in military 
planning and response.  Norstad's suggestion for an unplanned one-on-one meet with 




Kennedy's next step would be to steer Adenauer towards realistic negotiation.   The 
British wanted to push harder now new talks with the Soviets, without waiting for Adenauer and 
de Gaulle, or to see how Friedreichstrasse settled out, which could take a while.
735
  The Soviets 
had again lifted their deadline but might not take kindly to much delay in negotiation.  The 
Soviets were, in fact, in no hurry to resolve the checkpoint problem.   At a Kremlin reception on 
November 8, Gromyko told Thompson they did not intend to reply to Rusk's request for 
intercession since the situation had quieted somewhat.  Thompson said the quiet was only due to 
                                                 
732
 Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, p.106. 
733









Western attempts at a cooling-off period.  Gromyko said the problem had come up solely 
because of Western armed provocation.  Thompson said the reverse was true and the West would 
not accept the provocations much longer.
736
  Lightner was lobbying from Berlin for a more 
vigorous response to show that "even though we cannot effectively resist salami tactics in East 
Berlin, we will resist them wherever our interests are concerned."
737
  To do otherwise would risk 
West Berliners' confidence in the Allied protectors.  Lightner acknowledged that confrontation 
could harden Berlin's east-west division but felt the current position was doing that anyway. 
 
Khrushchev Turns Tougher 
Khrushchev chose this time to reply at some length to Kennedy.  The Premier had had a 
difficult few weeks himself.  The 22nd Party Congress in Moscow, drawing delegates not only 
from all over the USSR, but also the Peoples Republic of China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Cuba, 
was  much more trouble than expected.  Former protégés like Frol Kozlov, who had visited the 
US in 1959 as a counterpart to Vice-President Nixon's visit to Moscow, now openly criticized 
Khrushchev for both domestic and foreign policy shortcomings.
738
  Khrushchev was also 




President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara authorized Defense 
Undersecretary Roswell Gilpatric to publicly expose the gross exaggerations of  Khrushchev's 
claims about Soviet missile strength.  U-2 over-flights had been made superfluous by the new 
Corona reconnaissance satellite which sent back photos revealing that the Soviets had at best ten 
                                                 
736
 Cable from Thompson to Rusk, November 8, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc. 207. 
737
 Cable from Lightner to Rusk, November 8, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc. 208. 
738
 Beschlopss, The Crisis Years, p. 355;  Slusser "The Berlin Crisis of 1961," p. 431-440. 
739




to twenty-five ICBMs, without hardened silos or easy-launch capability; this was barely enough 
for a first strike, let alone retaliation.  Intelligence gained from Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovsky 
also indicted Soviet missile strength was much weaker than imagined.  In a speech to the 
Business Council in Hot Springs, Virginia on October 21, 1961, Gilpatric revealed this 
information to embarrass Khrushchev, sharpening the jibe by alluding to Soviet worries about 
Red Chinese competition.
740
  The speech was also intended to lessen the imposing technological 
shadow created by the Soviets' recent detonation of an unprecedented fifty megaton 
thermonuclear bomb.
741
  This 'Tsar Bomba,' as it was called, was too big for most Soviet missiles 
or bombers to carry, but it was another first, like the Gagarin spaceflight, that caught the US by 
surprise.  Gilpatric's exposure of Soviet weakness was only one problem for Khrushchev, 
though, who now faced pressure from domestic and East bloc critics.   
Bad harvests, environmental blunders and administrative corruption had resulted in food 
shortages, embarrassing the Premier who prided himself on being an agricultural specialist.  
Failure to more vigorously assist 'national liberation struggles' more vigorously brought jeers at 
the Party Congress from the Chinese, who walked out when Khrushchev began speaking of 
'peaceful coexistence."  Hard-line delegates from Soviet Union's own Communist Party criticized 
the failure to win concessions over Berlin and Germany.
742
  Khrushchev's further efforts at de-
Stalinization were approved only after considerable debate.  Although Khrushchev managed to 
get an overall vote of confidence, clearly domestic opposition was growing stronger.  Thus, 
Khrushchev knew he had to renew his Berlin campaign with toughness, as well as tact.
743
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 In the new letter to Kennedy, the Premier attacked Allied strengthening of West 
Germany as a violation of Potsdam.  He ridiculed de Gaulle for posing as the FRG's protector, 
when actually it was the Germans who were controlling de Gaulle's moves.  The peace treaty, 
said Khrushchev, was the one mechanism that could resolve dissension and competition in 
Europe.  It was not his intent to impose a socialist system on Germany nor could the West try to 
impose capitalism upon the East.  He had hoped that the practical measures outlined in his last 
letter and the discussions with Gromyko would have been answered in Kennedy's reply letter or 
in Thompson's presentation, but that had not happened.
744
  
The Soviet Union, he said, did not want troublesome West Berlin for itself, but all the 
West seemed to care for was its occupation status there.  Why not take the easy, peaceful course 
of  turning Berlin into a free city and recognizing East Germany, since the Allies already had de 
facto dealings with the GDR?  Did the West want to keep Berlin as a base for subversion, 
espionage and propaganda?  These, he said, were the important questions, not guaranteed access, 
which the West need not doubt.
745
  He said he also wished to discuss other matters, but they 
would have to wait.  Though cordial, the letter was noticeably tougher, with more boilerplate 
language than the previous letter.  Michael Beschloss has written that Khrushchev viewed the 
Gilpatric speech as a deliberate humiliation authorized by the President.  The cold tone of his 
November 7 letter reflected this bitterness.
746
 
West German Ambassador Kroll visited Khrushchev on November 11, and informally 
suggested a Berlin plan that basically kept the status quo, except for the Wall, on the basis of a 
new four-power agreement.  Khrushchev sounded receptive but Kroll's superiors in Bonn 
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  Thompson was briefed by Kroll but was still more concerned by 
Gromyko's refusal to intervene in the Berlin checkpoint problem.  Acceptance of the situation 
seemed unlikely to improve the situation, said Thompson.
748
  He did not want to proceed with 
more serious negotiations till Kennedy spoke with Adenauer.  Clay told Washington that if force 
proved necessary, the United States might have to proceed unilaterally.  Collateral problems  
would ensure a pyrrhic victory at best.  The Allies were so unprepared to negotiate they would 
certainly lose ground.  Ground force would be futile unless backed by an visible readiness to use 
nuclear force.
749
  This attitude may have, in fact been realistic, but it was also a retreat back to 
the fearful confusion of June and July.  As for Norstad's idea of an impromptu summit, Rusk 
offered indecisive approval, saying that  "we have always had in mind ... a meeting at the highest 
level with the Soviet Union."
750
  Rusk noted pros and cons of bilateral vs. four-power Berlin 
summitry, but deferred actually making any recommendation. 
 
Bringing the West Germans on Board 
On the eve of Adenauer's US visit, Bundy and Kissinger told the President they did not 
think the Germans actually wanted negotiations.  However, thought the National Security 
Advisor and his influential new aide, failure by the allies to pursue negotiations   would result in 
the Soviets implementing their peace  treaty which would probably find general public favor 
outside of Europe, more "salami tactics" to limit access to West Berlin, deepened allied division, 
and "possible war -conventional or nuclear."  Adenauer and de Gaulle's support remained 
essential, no matter how difficult it was to obtain.  Kennedy was being told again his own  "firm" 
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personal leadership would bring the Chancellor around.  This rhetoric was becoming familiar  
but less optimistic with each refrain.
751
   
Kennedy's meeting with Adenauer on November 20 proved anticlimactic.  The 
Chancellor opened with a long, if disingenuous, exposition on the Kroll's recent 'private 
diplomacy, saying that Khrushchev had engineered the incident and arranged for details to be 
leaked to the press. Adenauer said that Kroll had not been fully briefed, but still had been 
retired.
752
  Adenauer agreed with most of Kennedy's talking points, without displaying much 
commitment to  negotiation.
753
  He was open to a Western Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in 
December and  he approved of the Thompson demarche.  Unlike many observers, Adenauer 
thought Khrushchev had "emerged from the 22nd Party Congress at the height of his power."  
 This 'success' had fueled the Chairman's vanity and bravado, but he really did not want 
war: "one must neither show fear to Khrushchev or be impolite to him."   Kennedy said he 
agreed with de Gaulle that an unprepared or divided Western approach would be worse than no 
negotiations at all, but the West was now in a strong enough position to proceed.  Their nuclear 
advantage might be much less in a couple of years.  Delay would endanger West Berlin and 
Europe.  France might isolate itself from the rest of the West.  Adenauer said the general still had 
bitter feelings about his treatment by Roosevelt and Churchill during the wartime negotiations. 
The Chancellor would write de Gaulle immediately and urge his participation.  Before the 
meeting ended, Adenauer  said he had to emphasize that, in the event of a conflict, the West 
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would be stronger militarily only "only if nuclear weapons were used from the very beginning - 
otherwise the West would not succeed."
754
  
Though Adenauer gave a warm appearance of cooperation, he had avoided any specific 
discussion of the really difficult sticking points like recognition of and cooperation with East 
Germany or the Oder-Niesse as a border.
755
  Without serious consideration of how they  could 
now get the Soviet Union to relax its core demands for GDR recognition and Western 
withdrawal from Berlin,  they had agreed on negotiation only in theory.  Kennedy did not press 
the Chancellor on specifics beyond the need to negotiate and getting de Gaulle to participate. 
756
 
Complicating things further, the West Germans had a new foreign Minister, Gerhard 
Schroeder, who met with Rusk on November 21 to do more practical bargaining.  Rusk said they 
could try to get the Soviets to agree to the West Germans' preference for an all-Berlin plebiscite  
and removal of the wall, but there was no reason to expect any success in that direction.  
Schroeder acknowledged this and said their best chance lay in stressing the legal foundation for 
occupation rights.   The Soviets had already accepted that the West was there by treaty-ratified 
"right of conquest" and should be held to the legally recognize status quo.  This would have the 
most positive resonance with the public.
757
   
Rusk agreed with this strategy, but said integrating West Berlin into the FRG would 
compromise the legal argument for maintaining the status quo.  Schroeder accepted this 
objection and said the FRG would not press the issue.  Rusk promised the US would "strive very 
hard to protect the full freedom of action to West Berlin to maintain ties with the Federal 
Republic."  The FRG and West Berlin had already established some political links which might 
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have to be amended in a new affirmation with the Soviets on occupation rights.  West German 
requests for specific guarantees on civilian rights might not be easily bundled into the occupation 
agreements.   Undersecretary Kohler said these difficulties were more semantic than substantive.  
The allies would be seeking to ensure free access to the city for civilians as well as military.
758
 
More serious questions arose to how the FRG and GDR might recognize and deal with 
one another.  Schroeder said he did not see how West and East Germany could deal with one 
another on access problems without recognition.  Rusk said the US had told the Soviets would 
not deal with the GDR on access questions, but Schroeder replied the GDR would prefer dealing 
with the Allies rather than West Germany.  The Allies could bring more leverage to bear on 
access questions.
759
  FRG State Undersecretary Carstens (in rank and influence, similar to 
Kohler) noted a number of problematic situations.   He also observed that the GDR would not 
make trouble without Soviet approval; this point was debatable since the checkpoint  
provocations had been instigated more by Ulbricht than by Khrushchev.  Carstens disagreed with 
Rusk's suggestion that the UN might constructively assist in access problems.  Rusk kept his 




Adenauer and Kennedy spoke again shortly afterwards.  Rusk opened the meeting with a 
review of his discussion with Schroeder saying "as usual, when the ministers do the talking, the 
experts must tidy up matters afterwards."  Apparently, the problem of West Germany 
considering Berlin as one of its 'lands' (equivalent to a state or province) was more serious than 
first realized.  Rusk said he recognized the sensitivity of this issue and wanted to allow the West 
Germans to make their position clear; Schroeder declined to add anything.  Rusk outlined the 










strategy of framing access questions as a matter of uncontestable occupation rights and potential 
problems in dealing with the GDR.  Rusk said "the problem before us was what might happen 
after he Soviet Union enters into a separate peace treaty with the GDR." 
761
  The West Germans 
might suddenly have to deal with the GDR on a day-to-day basis, wherein it would behoove 
them to have some practical framework with the East.  This process could be started by now 
preparing detailed legal briefs on the current access arrangements.   
Business-like and optimistic, Kennedy said this had to be worked out in detail and that 
progress was already being made in this regard.   When the subject turned to the UN assistance, 
Schroeder again became cool, saying that could lead to GDR recognition.
762
  Further discussion 
of UN administration or peacekeepers in West Berlin brought even more objections from 
Schroeder.  Adenauer, who had been silent so far, said that some UN involvement could have a 
positive psychological value for West Berlin, but UN soldiers would inspire no confidence. 
Kennedy invited him to speak further. Adenauer said "the constitutional status of Berlin ... (is) ...  
most important of all."  He was a legal scholar who had helped draft the FRG's Basic Law 
system and had helped reconcile legal differences with the allied occupation. he was concerned 
also about the "80 or so" FRG offices in West Berlin." 
763
 FRG political connections with West 
Berlin were highly valued by the city's populace: "he wanted to hear no further talk about the 
removal of coats of arms."  Practical administrative matters might be shifted to UN auspices. 
764
 
The President, in turn, moved to build on Adenauer's cooperative tone, saying "we should 
start negotiating on the basis of a position of a position..which would insist on the complete 
freedom of Berlin to maintain its relations with West Germany."  There was a catch though;  
                                                 
761
 Memo re Kennedy-Adenauer meeting, Washington, November 21, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc 216. 
762
 Beschloss, Crisis Years, p. 340-41. 
763






Kroll had told Khrushchev that FRG/West Berlin ties were not negotiable.  Now, said Kennedy, 
there might be need for "some limitations on the freedom of Berlin." 
765
 Schroeder said this 
might be acceptable with sufficient guarantees.  Kennedy and Adenauer withdrew for private 
discussions.  Rusk then told Schroeder there would be no recognition of the GDR or the Oder-
Niesse boundary, both concessions that Eisenhower and Macmillan had tried to advance in 1959 
and 1960 and both under active US discussion in the early summer and mid-autumn of 1961.  By 
taking these options off the table, the West could not offer the Soviets any more attractive terms 
than in their July 1959 Western Peace Plan.  The Soviets had consistently rejected that package 
but Rusk did not acknowledge this reality.  The price for West German support in November 
1961 would probably be rejection by the Soviets.
766
    
The Rusk-Schroeder conversation then devolved even further away from pragmatic 
compromises that might attract the Soviets.  Rusk intoned the 'we won't buy the same horse 
twice' line to Schroeder, which Gromyko had pointedly ignored every time it was used.  FRG 
defense minister Strauss showed a map showing Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe; all agreed 
that the West should not be pushed back any further.  The German Foreign Minister  brought up 
non-starting ideas like all-German plebiscites for unification as though it were a serious 
negotiating position.
767
  It was as though they understood real negotiation with the Soviets was 
not going to happen and they might as well indulge their fantasies about an ideal settlement. 
The foreign ministers may have departed from practical approaches, but in the same 
minutes, Kennedy and Adenauer were speaking seriously.  The Chancellor said agreements 
needed to be as flexible as possible, but if they could guarantee "the freedom, the US need not 
fear any difficulties from the German side."  At that very moment, Rusk was accepting very 
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difficult demands from Schroeder.  Kennedy asked Adenauer what he thought of Walter 
Lippmann's statement that German acceptance of  neutral reunification would  result in 
irreversible assimilation into the East's orbit.  Adenauer dismissed any such possibility.   
Kennedy pressed Adenauer on West German renunciation of acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction.  Adenauer replied this would be no problem, as long as they could be assured of 
immediate communication with Washington in a crisis.
768
  The conversation ended amicably, but 
without any clear expressions from either leader on what the next step might be, either with 
among the Allies or with the Soviets. 
In a summary session with the ministers to draft a joint communiqué, the failure to make 
any substantive progress became apparent.  Disarmament and boundary questions thought 
already settled proved particularly awkward.  Kennedy and Rusk's attempts to make the West 
Germans more flexible were dismissed with flat statements that the Soviet and East German 
assurances were not to be trusted.   Glad to have at least some restoration of allied solidarity, the 
US accepted these objections along with Adenauer's assurance that he would work on de 
Gaulle.
769
  Kennedy told UK Prime Minster Macmillan that the meetings had been successful 
and had prepared the way for a  Western Ministers meeting before Christmas and possibly  an 
East-West foreign ministers meeting shortly after the new year.   Kennedy also told Macmillan 
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Negotiations Stall in December 
The West Germans had been more cooperative than expected but had still hads not 
agreed to the kind of practical concessions needed.
771
 The failure to produce a workable program 
in Washington may have been just as well, because attitudes in Moscow were hardening against 
negotiation. Noting the tougher tone of the Premier's November 7 letter, Thompson told the 
President a few days later that Khrushchev "may have been misled by the Gromyko talks and the 
fact that some of his statements were not specifically rebutted."  Said Thompson, "Khrushchev 
may have been over-encouraged by the splits within the Western ranks," specifically British  
willingness to recognize the GDR and some West German readiness to "sacrifice West 
Berlin."
772
   
Having had time to reflect, Khrushchev was growing cautious.  Opposition within Soviet 
Union and the Communist bloc, agricultural failures,  and East German economic weakness 
further discouraged his confidence in negotiation at this time.  Thompson speculated that the 
Premier may also have also become worried about hawks in the West ready to renew 
containment policies.  Thompson suggested sharing the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence 
with the British so they would have a more realistic idea of the situation.  Kennedy, said the 
Ambassador should tell Khrushchev  that "there is little hope for a broad agreement at this time 
but ...we should make every effort to prevent war."
773
 
Reports from the allies were no more optimistic.  Macmillan held disappointing talks 
with de Gaulle.  Falling ill on his return to Bonn, the elderly Chancellor's attempts to talk with 
the General were  delayed until mid-December .  In a note of apology, Adenauer sounded more 
interested in Western commitment to resist aggression than to pursue negotiation. In addition, the 
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letter from the Chancellor was apparently much softer on negotiations than hoped.
774
  Whatever  
momentum hoped for from the Kennedy-Adenauer meetings dissipated quickly.  Minor but 
chronic  harassment persisted at Berlin checkpoints and the access corridor.   
Impatient with allied refusal to develop a unified position, the President decided he 
needed to write Khrushchev and  salvage a deteriorating situation.  Kennedy had recently been 
interviewed again by Khrushchev's son-in-law, journalist Aleksei Adzhubei.
775
  He told 
Khrushchev now that interviews were where people made ideological arguments; this 
correspondence should be more practical and constructive.   Kennedy said they needed to 
abandon gimmicky language about 'free cities.'
776
  Kennedy said the fact of the matter was  West 
Berlin wanted Western troops and not Soviet troops to protect their  freedoms.  Western access 
rights preceded the establishment of East Germany; the Soviet Union had a legal obligation  to 
uphold those rights.  The US and its allies were open to clarifying those rights but not to Soviet 
unilateral action to abrogate them.   Khrushchev should not be misled by reports of dissent in the 
Western ranks. The West was preparing constructive negotiating proposals and the Soviets 
should so the same so that "we and you will be able to sit down in ... to reach a solution mutually 
satisfactory to all."  The president concluded "what best serves peace, not merely prestige, must 
be our yardstick."
777
  Having replied to Khrushchev, with a toughness matching the Chairman's, 
the American President now had to hope the Western Ministers could salvage enough common 
ground to back up his message. 
The Western Foreign Ministers met in Paris on December 10-12;  the Heads of State 
meeting anticipated in October did not occur.  Britain's  Lord Home told the Ministers they 
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needed to find some agreement before the NATO meetings a few days away.  Neither the French 
nor West Germans were eager  to discuss the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks that had just occurred.  
French minister Couve de Murville cast the Soviets' Berlin proposals as part of their larger, long-
term design to dominate Western Europe.  The French had hoped the Paris 1960 summit would 
provide a forum to discuss European security problems with Soviets; they were ready for another 
opportunity but thought it would be difficult.
778
 
 They thought Berlin was only "a means to an end" for the USSR, which was offering 
nothing of value to the West.   Since the Soviets did not really want war, no matter how much 
they blustered, there was no need for negotiations.   Not only were negotiations unnecessary, said 
de Murville, they would seriously weaken Germany and, in turn, all of Western Europe.   Lord 
Home answered that it was still possible to negotiate on specifics with the Soviet Union.
779
  He 
cited concurrent talks on Laos, nuclear testing and disarmament, though these examples were in 
fact only marginal discussions.  Home made an articulate argument in principle for negotiations, 
but did not move the French in the slightest. 
De Murville contrasted the pre-Paris period when "an atmosphere of detente as 
generated" with the current environment of border closings and high-yield thermonuclear tests.   
He asked what the West expected to gain when Khrushchev was making such threats?  
Schroeder entered the argument on the side on negotiation, saying it was an imperfect but 
necessary tool to avoid catastrophe and offer hope for the city's residents.   De Murville said the 
very nature of the occupation statutes was in question.  Home said there were ways to protect 
those statutes.  Unlike the French, he thought the stakes were too high not to attempt negotiation.  
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If the West could not even "come away from these meetings with greater unity, then the Soviets 
would indeed erode our position and the unity of the alliance is unlikely to be repaired." 
780
 
Negotiations with the Soviets did not require unacceptable concessions, said the 
Secretary. citing the 1949 Jessup-Malik agreement ending the airlift situation.  Rusk said that 
Gromyko understood in September that the issue of GDR recognition was not on the table and 
that the deadline for the treaty had been lifted.
781
  De Murville agreed on some points with Rusk, 
but said that since the French did not believe the Soviets would go to war over Berlin, that there 
was no need to negotiate over Berlin at the present time.  Schroeder said the greatest danger that 
could come out of negotiations was neutralization.  Rusk saw a danger of splitting the US away 
from Europe.  Home emphasized that they needed to get better organized before they met with 
NATO in two days.  In final sessions on December 12, the four countries could barely agree on a 
communiqué suggesting an East-West foreign ministers meeting.
782
 
Kennedy called de Gaulle the same day to get the General to accept their final resolution: 
"Diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union should be undertaken on the basis of the agreed 
positions of the Western powers in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to 
undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Ministers level with the Soviet government."
783
  De 
Gaulle rejected even this cautious language.  He was not in favor of negotiations at this time. 
Kennedy said they would try to find acceptable language, but the conference was already 
breaking up.  The Soviets were becoming very non-conciliatory;  public speeches indicated little 
hope for negotiations, especially if the West was determined to return to its least flexible 
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 The Ministers were also unable to present to the NATO council  a common position on economic counter-
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positions. At the National Press Club in Washington; Soviet Ambassador Menshikov had made a 
very tough presentation  that rolled the Soviet position back to November 1958.
784
  On December 
9, Khrushchev had made a similar speech to the world Federation of Trade Unions. 
Khrushchev wrote a private letter again to Kennedy on December 13, thanking the 
president for his publicly conciliatory interview with Adzhubei but admonishing him for the 
private toughness  of his December 2 letter.  Taking special aim at the occupation arrangements, 
Khrushchev complained that the US wanted the Soviets "to play traffic cops on the roads to West 
Berlin and (to make) your temporary occupation status become permanent."  He ridiculed the 
idea of a permanent occupation regime in West Berlin, saying that a German peace treaty was 
long overdue,.  A special protocol making Berlin a free city would answer any other questions 
the West might have about the city's status.  Khrushchev warned again against arming West 
Germany.  Not only was the West refusing to end the last vestiges of World War II, they were 
potentially sowing the seeds for its resurgence.  Khrushchev did not set a new deadline but 
neither did he make any specific suggestions on further negotiation.
785
    
The Allies seemed to have lost all progress on Berlin made since December 1958.  They 
had been in disarray then, but Eisenhower's  Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been able 
to  maneuver his fellow foreign ministers into some agreement.  Rusk had also gone to Europe 
but with more meager results.  Adenauer was trying to escape blame for his failure to make de 
Gaulle more agreeable to negotiation.
786
  French indifference to his attempted intercession 
visibly diminished Adenauer's influence and the idea of French-German solidarity they used to 
keep Britain at a disadvantage in Europe.  De Gaulle had gotten his way in obstructing 
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negotiations, but at serious cost to his relations with NATO, European allies and the United 
Sates.  The British, keenest of all on negotiations in 1961, had not been very influential in Paris 
or in Washington.  Macmillan and Ambassador Ormsby-Gore had good relations with Kennedy 
but without substantial results.
787
  United States leadership had increased disproportionally that 
its relations with smaller allies were becoming very uncomfortable.  The Soviets had the same 
problem with allies like East Germany.  Both Kennedy and Khrushchev faced significant 
domestic criticism over their Berlin policies.  As these leaders prepared for a bilateral 
negotiations in1962, they also had to consider the growing danger of nuclear escalation and the 
slow progress of  disarmament talks.
788
  Ambassador Menshikov made clear, in a speech to 
Washington's National Press Club, that Khrushchev was still intent on signing his peace treaty, 





  1961 marked the pivotal phase of the shift from multilateral East-West diplomacy on 
Berlin to bilateral engagement.  Kennedy's unfamiliarity with the other leaders, disagreement 
with the Allies defense and trade issues, failure to notify them of the Bay of Pigs mission, and 
bilateral meetings at the start of the summer all helped erode the Eisenhower -era relationship.  
Perceiving uncertainty on Kennedy's part, Khrushchev pressed harder with his Berlin/German  
demands. Western disunity prevented Kennedy from framing a coherent response.  Neither force 
nor negotiations promised successful outcomes.  The Wall eased the pressure for either rushed 
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negotiations or a quick military buildup, but did not solve the problem of Khrushchev's peace 
treaty plans or his disagreements with East Germany.
790
  
 That situation prompted the United States and Soviet Unions to begin private 
negotiations in the fall of 1961.  Khrushchev faced his own alliance problems, but the West's 
were more serious regarding Berlin.  Disarmament prospects remained minimal, especially since 
NATO planning relied heavily on nuclear deterrence.
791
  Although Berlin resolution did not seem 
likely, Western leaders did consider  possible East-West foreign minister or heads-of-state 
meetings.  The personal objections of de Gaulle and Adenauer prevented the West from finding a 
common platform or purpose.  There would be no new summit.  The United States, secured the 
agreement of the Allies for further US-Soviet talks.  
  From this point forward, the US and USSR would conduct the most important 
talks on Berlin.
792
  The West Germans grew more influential, the French more independent, and 
the British more insulated, but still had a determining say on Berlin.  So did Walter Ulbricht. 
Frustration with unrealistic and uncompromising allies led the superpowers to conduct Head-of-
State correspondence, highest level ambassadorial talks, and foreign minister meetings on Berlin.  
Disarmament linkage was used by both sides to gain leverage.  In the process of the next , 
intensive but formulaic rounds of talk, the participants - Thompson and Dobrynin, Rusk and 
Gromyko, Kennedy and Khrushchev, et al - got to know the other more closely than American 
and Soviet leaders had since the war.  As unproductive, prolonged and contentious as these 
meetings were, it is significant that they proceeded in spite of military tension and armed 
confrontations in Berlin.   
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 The question going into 1962 was whether force might replace negotiation.
793
  The 
importance of nuclear weapons, including ICBMs and long-range bombers, in Allied and Soviet 
military strategy meant that force would be a more dangerous option than ever.  This would 
become even clearer in the next year, as Khrushchev developed a plan to put nuclear missiles in 
Cuba.  That, he thought, would show the United States how it felt to have missiles on its 
doorstep.  But by introducing a new nuclear threat to the US, Khrushchev would diminish 
Berlin's leverage value for negotiations. 
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Chapter 5: "Vital Interests," January - August 1962  
 
Introduction 
 The failure of the Western powers in late 1961 to agree on a practical negotiating  
strategy ended the last major multilateral attempt to dissuade the Soviet Union from signing a 
separate peace treaty with East Germany and abrogating Allied occupation rights in West Berlin.  
In 1962, the United States and Soviet Union continued bilateral discussions they had begun in 
September 1961.
794
  Their basic positions remained the same but their negotiating goals shifted 
to more pragmatic ends.  The Soviets focused now on putting the occupation under a UN flag 
and linking a Berlin settlement to a European non-aggression pact.  The United States, speaking 
for the West, wanted an interim agreement and an international access authority.  Minimal 
progress on a negotiated settlement, and problems in Southeast Asia and Cuba eroded the 
importance of Berlin, so that the Berlin Crisis diminished in importance by late summer 1962, 
though the issue still held grave potential.
795
 
 Even with the bilateral approach, Western cohesion remained shaky and US-Soviet 
relations uncertain.  Concerned over the dangers and consequences of forceful response plans 
that involved nuclear weapons use, President John Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan strongly advocated negotiations and  tried to develop new options that might placate 
the Soviets.
796
  French president Charles de Gaulle, convinced that Khrushchev was not prepared 
to force the Allies from Berlin, discouraged negotiations, despite the increasing Soviet-approved 
pressure on West Berlin.  West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer could not be persuaded to 
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approve even modest concessions to East Germany, but other elements in his government 
recognized the need for an inter-German detente.
797
  The British approved of the US 's 
diplomacy but chafed at their own diminished influence. Because France was also a signatory to 
the occupation agreements and West Germany's approval of any revision of the current situation 
was also necessary, the US could not agree to alterations in the Berlin status quo without 
undermining the Western alliance.
798
 
 The bilateral US and Soviet dialogue in 1962 further emphasized a trend away from the 
multilateralism that characterized the first two years of the Berlin Crisis.  Begun soon after the 
Wall's construction in August1961 and resuming in 1962, these confidential negotiations 
consisted of back-channel contacts between Soviet agent Georgi Bolshakov and Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy, private correspondence between Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Nikita 
Khrushchev, more personal discussions in Washington and Moscow through their respective 
ambassadors, Llewellyn Thompson and Anatoly Dobrynin, and extended talks between US 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko.
799
   
 The Soviets did not sign their peace treaty with East Germany or blockade West Berlin 
during these negotiations, but checkpoint and access corridor harassment increased steadily 
through the next several months.  Contingency plans included nuclear weapons use to contest a 
West Berlin blockade.
800
  The resulting debates revealed the importance and hazards of nuclear 
deterrence more explicitly than at any time since the Korean War.
801
  The resumption of Soviet 
testing just days after the Wall, the US revelation in October 1961 that Soviet missile strength 
was but a fraction of Khrushchev's claims, and the US's own resumption of testing in March 
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1962 underscored concerns about the nuclear arms race.
802
  However, German and Berlin issues 
remained the most troublesome obstacle in their relations, with disarmament progress still 
dependent on their progress.   
 Eighteen-nation (East-West plus observers) disarmament talks, centering on a nuclear test 
ban, began in Geneva in the spring of 1962.
803
 Just as Gromyko's attendance at the United 
Nations sessions in October 1961 had allowed him to meet several times with Rusk, the Geneva 
talks provided diplomatic cover for extended discussions on Berlin between the two foreign 
ministers in April 1962.  In the absence of a summit, these meetings were the most significant 
East-West discussions on Berlin since the ministers' October talks and the discussions with 
Adenauer in November 1961. Those talks were not productive however and even represented a 
hardening of positions.
804
  The ambassadorial and Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence 
dialogues  lapsed as a result and harassment increased.  An ongoing impasse over Berlin, 
minimal progress at the disarmament conference, US resumption of testing and increased 
competition in the Third World signaled a retreat from detente.  The severity of this 
estrangement is defined by Khrushchev's decision in May 1962 to station Soviet ballistic missiles 




Ambassador Thompson's Discussions in Moscow 
 When US Ambassador Thompson began discussions with Gromyko in January, he 
understood that resolution was unlikely in the near future.  Rusk instructed him to first probe for 
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a productive basis for negotiation.
806
  Gromyko said that, although the most recent deadline had 
been extended for the time being, "it would be wrong to draw conclusion they are prepared to 
leave West Berlin situation unchanged."   As for Western proposal to hold all-Berlin plebiscites 
to replace the Potsdam accords, "this question cannot be discussed."  Gromyko  made clear that 
since "East Berlin is completely integrated into the German Democratic Republic (GDR), West 
Berlin is the problem precisely because it social system is different."
 807
  Thompson replied that 
the West still insisted on guaranteed access to West Berlin as a separate issue from recognizing 
GDR sovereignty.   
 Without actually stating that the West had little confidence in GDR responsibility for 
access, Thompson said the US was prepared to discuss an international access authority, one of 
the few new proposals in the 1962 dialogue.  Rejection of an all-Berlin approach, a main element 
of the new US approach, "would greatly restrict possibility for discussion."  "An agreement on 
access, even in absence of agreement on other matters," was essential, "if serious collision were 
to be avoided."
808
  He also reiterated the Soviet "free-city" was still not acceptable.  Despite this 
unpromising start, Gromyko welcomed further discussion.  
 Reviewing the meeting, Thompson noted that Gromyko indicated no hurry to re-impose 
the deadline and did not malign the West Germans.  Gromyko's reticence to discuss access may 
have reflected Soviet uncertainty about the Western position.  Thompson thought that if  the 
Soviets were aware that the West wanted more clearly defined links between West Germany and 
West Berlin, "discussions would be over."  Thompson asked Rusk for permission to suggest a 
"Confederation of West and East Berlin," with both sides determining their own system but 
sharing some municipal administration.   Because East German leader Walter Ulbricht had 
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already proposed an all-German confederation, advancing a parallel idea might be seen as 
acknowledgement  of Soviet prestige. This proposal might restore some unity and stability to the 
city, provide them with occupation rights in West Berlin, and even provide an excuse to remove 
the Wall.  Said Thompson, "in any case I need something positive to say ... on status West Berlin 
at next session."
809
  Rusk , talking to British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore, saw some slight 
signs of promise, especially regarding the international access authority.  Rusk also noted "The 
French ... are showing a great deal more interest in these talks than they are supposed to."
810
 
 Rusk replied to Thompson that  the Soviet interest in further talks was encouraging, but 
the Soviets needed to be told that any unilateral peace treaty moves on their part would be 
unacceptable - Western occupation rights could not be in question.  He should ask Gromyko to 
define how West Berlin was a threat to European peace and tell him that guaranteed access did 
not represent any infringement upon or interference with East German sovereignty.
811
  
Thompson could note that the West had not moved to make West Berlin the capitol of the 
Federal Republic, while the Soviets  had "first begun rearmament of Germany by rearming East 
Germans over Western protests."  Regarding Gromyko's reference to "broader questions" in the 
first session, Thompson should say that  the access question needed to be settled first.
812
  Specific 
details of the international access authority proposal would not be presented yet. The Soviets 
would first have to demonstrate they wanted to use the talks for more than just reiteration of their 
familiar positions. 
 So far, the latter was all the Soviets were showing Thompson.  Gromyko opened their 
next discussion by reiterating the Soviets' standard free city proposal.  Although they still 
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intended to proceed with the peace treaty, this could be preceded by an agreement on West 
Berlin. Gromyko "stressed that questions of formalization of existing German borders, respect 
for sovereignty GDR, prohibition nuclear arms for both German states, non-aggression treaty 
between NATO and Warsaw Pact must be considered simultaneously."  An international access 
authority would unacceptably infringe on GDR sovereignty.  Thompson responded that the peace 
treaty and free city proposals were unacceptable and Western occupation rights were not 
negotiable.  He then told Gromyko that "it would seem we have come full circle and in some 
respects have taken a step backwards."
813
  Gromyko responded that GDR sovereignty must be 
respected,  ruling out an international access authority and an all-Berlin plebiscite.  Access could 
only be discussed alongside the other Berlin issues.  If the West believed they could improve and 
perpetuate their occupation rights, "all talk will be in vain."    Thompson regretted the Soviets 
would allow the GDR to determine whether a new access agreement was acceptable; this made 
negotiations  futile because the West would be "buying the same horse twice."
814
  
 In evaluating the conversation, Thompson first reaction was pessimistic; he speculated 
that Gromyko's tough line may have been meant to delay the talks, possibly to bring in the 
Germans or to force a summit, or even scuttle discussions in favor of a separate  treaty.  British 
Ambassador Frank Roberts thought the Soviets were gauging the West, hoping to find out if 
Macmillan-Adenauer talks just a few days before had influenced the Americans.  Thompson 
noted that "Gromyko asked no questions about international authority idea even for purpose of 
being in better position to knock it down."
 815
  Thompson did not know what to recommend as a 
next step.  The Soviets had "tabled free city proposal even though told already it was 
unacceptable."  He felt the US, perceived as having "made a good faith effort to resume 
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negotiations," should encourage a Macmillan visit.  British softness on GDR recognition might 
persuade the Soviets to discuss access as a specific issue.
816
 An Adenauer visit to Moscow might 
move the Soviets to offer something new.  Adenauer did not like Khrushchev and wanted to talk 
with Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, whose senior authority did not extend to foreign 
policy.
817
  Thompson  thought a "meeting between President and Khrushchev in present 
circumstances seems to me out of the question."
818
 Thompson wanted to hold one more talk with 
Gromyko and then return to Washington, to buy time while Kennedy and Rusk decided what to 
do next.  
 After reading Thompson's reports, Kennedy suggested the Ambassador should be 
allowed to open the talks to positions not pre-agreed by the British and Germans.  Kennedy 
thought Thompson should be asked his ideas but that maybe another channel should replace him.  
Assuming Thompson would probably hold one more talk with meager results, the President 
wondered if they should try more formal talks.  The private channel proposals had to be vetted in 
London and Bonn first though the Americans had to actually conduct discussions.
819
  
 On January 17, 1961, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told the President 
"Berlin was the greatest issue of all ... talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise 
to keep on talking."   Kennedy told the NSC the next day that "the Soviets could be expected to 
proceed with a separate peace treaty and there might be a direct case of nerves in the Spring." He 
stressed the military responsibilities involved and the need to review closely their contingency 
plans.  He said they must "think hard about the ways and means of making decisions that might 
lead to nuclear war.  If there were to be any such war, we must know what it is for, and know 
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what other steps we can take before such war comes."
820
  The next Thompson-Gromyko meeting 
would have to make whatever gains could be salvaged from this round and estimate Soviet 
intentions on Berlin.    
 Rusk told Thompson to tell the Soviets they had not presented negotiable proposals. The 
Ambassador should  ask "what will happen when they sign separate peace treaty."
821
  He should 
signal that the West did not regard that as a desirable or an inevitable outcome.  Soviet flexibility 
could lead to progress.  The West would document their desire to negotiate by formally 
presenting the all-Berlin plebiscite and international access authority proposals to match the 
Soviet free city and GDR-favoring Protocol of Guarantees (for access).  He should avoid  "any 
implication that we considered talks had reached complete impasse and that only thing left was 
to proceed to improvisation for crisis situation after peace treaty."  If a peace treaty signing did 
appear imminent, the Soviets should be made to understand that could cause a "highly dangerous 
confrontation."
 822
   The all-Berlin and international access authority proposals should be tabled, 
but immediate discussion was not necessary.  He should ask for a further meeting, linking 
Gromyko's stated interest in "broader questions" with progress on Berlin.  
 In the meantime Kennedy met with a high-ranking Soviet press delegation, which 
included Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei, editor of Izvestia, and Georgi Bolshakov, 
nominally the editor of the pictorial magazine USSR, but also an intelligence aide at the Soviet 
Embassy and back-channel Soviet conduit via Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Khrushchev's 
daughter Rada also attended the lunch meeting.
823
  Bolshakov and Robert Kennedy had become 
good friends.  The President had granted Adzubei an interview in November and thought  him a 
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useful conduit to Khrushchev.  The President told his guests than since a final solution to Berlin 
and German problems might be "quite impossible" at present, an accommodation should be 
found to "prevent tensions from mounting."
 824
  Such arrangements need not be immediate.   
 Kennedy pointed to Laos and the Congo as situations where arrangements had been 
made.  Adzhubei asked if the president believed a final solution for Berlin could be found.  
Kennedy said this was not possible based on present positions, but the dangers of conflict 
impelled them to find some temporary compromise.  He noted that both Gromyko and 
Thompson had made proposals unacceptable to the other side, and was concerned both sides had 
become "more and more formal and more and more incompatible .... failure to reach an 
accommodation could be fraught with serious consequences."  He asked Adzhubei if the Soviets 
would proceed unilaterally with their peace treaty or to seek a compromise.  Adzhubei replied 
that an all-German solution would be best.  He hoped Kennedy would continue contacts with 
Khrushchev to that end.  He thought that the US might be taking advantage of the Soviet Union's 
"loyalty and desire for an agreement," but "the worst peace is better than a good war."
825
   
 Assistant Secretary of State Foy Kohler told Rusk that the Soviets seemed less urgent 
regarding the peace treaty.  He said  "while these did not reflect any serious split in the Soviet 
leadership, they might conceivably  make it more advisable for the leadership to reduce ... the 
high visibility of the Berlin crisis in a manner not damaging to Soviet prestige."  Kohler thought 
the Soviets were trying to use the West Germans to achieve their Berlin goals.  Other Berlin 
items of business included restoration of East-West commandant access, reassuring NATO on 
US troop levels and Inter-zonal trade. 
826
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 When talks in Moscow resumed on February 1, Gromyko accepted the statement of 
principles and access authority proposals, but informed Thompson he should not think "our 
attitude is in any degree favorable to the documents or what you have said today."
 827
  The access 
authority could only be considered in context of the whole Berlin situation.  Gromyko said US 
avoidance of the occupation issue did not reflect  the "current facts."  The US wanted to 
perpetuate a wartime situation, he said, against the interests of peace and progress. Thompson 
then emphasized impartiality in the access authority, citing the precedent of international air 
service agreements which included the Soviet Union and East Germany.  The US had its 
proposals to reduce dangerous friction and improve specific West Berlin problems, but the free 
city idea was not unacceptable.  He asked what would happen to the occupation  troops: "we did 
not believe it would be in the interest of peace if you did not understand what would happen if 
anyone tried to throw them out.  The same applies to their access to and from Berlin." 
828
 
  Gromyko replied that US proposals were unrealistic; the peace treaty was the 
"best solution" because it represented "facts of life in existing situation."  He said the Soviets did 
not want West Berlin and rejected a plebiscite, saying troops had not been invited in by the 
German people.  Thompson said West Berliners wanted the Allied troops to remain and a 
plebiscite would prove that.  Gromyko said this was an international situation involving greater 
interests than just the West Berliners.  Thompson said the wishes of West Berliners should be 
considered too.  Both expressed regret that no progress had been made, but Thompson rejected 
the charge that the US proposals were meant to prevent agreement.
829
   
 The Ambassador  reported to Rusk that he would wait for Gromyko to call the next 
meeting, but wanted guidance on how to respond.  He noted that Khrushchev was not then in 
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Moscow and Soviet intentions might not be clear till the Chairman returned.   Thompson worried 
that the Soviets might have decided that the West had hardened its position under pressure from 
Adenauer and de Gaulle.  He had briefed the other Western ambassadors who did not think the 
Soviets would accept the international authority without "major concessions."
830
  West German 
Ambassador Kroll, often considered too friendly with the Soviets, thought the Soviets were more 
interested in the peace treaty than in West Berlin, but Thompson doubted that Bonn was ready to 
accept any arrangement that would permanently divide Germany.  Ambassador David Ormsby-
Gore complained to Rusk the Soviets were trying to divide the Americans and British. 
831
 
 Kohler summed up the situation for Rusk prior to a White House meeting on February 9.  
Kohler addressed the idea that the recent Soviet intransigence signaled they might be trying to 
bury the issue.  The impasse presented a confusing situation for military planning, but did 
maintain the status quo in Berlin.  On the whole, said Kohler, continued delay was a more 
desirable outcome than a sudden unilateral move.  If they signed a peace treaty but compromised 
on access and allowed continued occupation, that could be acceptable.
832
  Kohler did not address 
probable French or German reaction, but noted that current French insistence on a detente before 
proceeding with formal negotiations precluded their renewed participation in exploratory talks. 
   Thompson could not predict whether the French would actually block any revised 
agreement but expected they would be consulted again soon.   A summit, multilateral or US-
Soviet, was unlikely at present, but Rusk might be able to accept Gromyko's invitation to visit 
Moscow.   More probably, Rusk would hold private sessions with Gromyko while both were in 
Geneva for the upcoming disarmament  conference.   The arrival of a new and more capable 
                                                 
830
 Thompson to Rusk, February 2, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XIV, doc. 280. 
831
 Memo ere Rusk-Ormsby-Gore meeting, Washington, February 5, 1962, JFK, NSF, Box 84, folder 2/62. 
832





Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, in Washington would provide a better conduit than 
Menshikov, and comparable to Thompson's stature in Moscow.
833
  British Ambassador Frank 
Roberts was not expected to produce any better results than Thompson had, but there was still 
some chance that Prime Minister Macmillan might again attempt personal intervention, as he had 
periodically since March 1959.
834
  There was an outside chance for West German-Soviet talks, 
which the US would not oppose.  The best immediate hope would be continued Thompson-
Gromyko talks, followed by Rusk-Gromyko talks in Geneva, and cultivation of Dobrynin as a 
conduit.   
 Gromyko opened the next meeting with a long declaration  that devolved into familiar 
arguments.  Thompson said the US wanted to reduce tensions and increase areas of agreement, 
but there had been no change in the US position and no agreement could be approved without 
consulting the Allies.  The US did not want West Berlin as a "military springboard" and saw no 
reason to allow Soviet troops there.  Gromyko replied that if the US wanted to reduce tension, 
they should not object to a peace treaty.  He said Western troops were dangerous and their 
presence was not obligated by the Potsdam Agreement, "which you have broken."
835
   
 The meeting was noticeably more formal than previous sessions.  Thompson reported 
that Gromyko's declaration had evidently been prepared for publication, and the US should 
produce a corresponding statement. Thompson noted that the Soviets had paid more attention to 
the Oder-Neisse border (which also affected Poland) than to the internal borders.  He thought  
the US might sweeten the plebiscite proposal by offering temporary replacement of Western 
troops with UN troops, but did not think the West Berliners would like the idea. He saw little 
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grounds for continuing the talks on the current basis, though "Gromyko certainly gave 
impression Soviets not yet ready for break and in any event would put onus for break on us."
836
 
Thompson was ready to hand over the talks to the foreign ministers in Geneva, but State 
Department analysts noted that Gromyko "made no attempt to end the talks."
837
  
  Thompson also received a letter from US Ambassador to Yugoslavia George Kennan, 
who was a veteran of the first US missions to Moscow and author of the 1946 'Long Telegram' 
warning of Soviet intentions in Europe.   Kennan now warned against assuming the Soviets were 
bluffing and urged negotiation on grounds more acceptable to the Soviets, lest they use the 
impasse to provoke a more dangerous situation.   Too much attention to Berlin's symbolic value, 
while ignoring more pressing realities, could lead to closer ties between Moscow and Belgrade, 
extending Soviet influence to the Eastern Mediterranean.
838
  Kennan's letter produced friendly 
but heated criticism from other US diplomats in Europe, who found his willingness to 
compromise with the Soviets unrealistic.  In the face of growing Soviet interference with Berlin 
corridor air traffic, such accommodation seemed dangerous.    
 NATO Commandant Lauris Norstad told Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Melvin 
Lemnitzer that their plans needed to be updated to allow fighter escorts of transport and civilian 
air traffic in the access corridor.
839
  Checkpoint and train travel incidents also continued, drawing 
concern from General Lucius Clay.  US leaders needed to determine if  Berlin harassment had 
any relation to the diplomatic standoff in Moscow. Walter Ulbricht had also gone to Moscow to 
pressure Khrushchev to sign the peace treaty soon.
840
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 Walt Rostow, head of State's Policy Planning Staff, summed the Berlin situation up for 
Rusk after meeting with policy aides and CIA representatives on February 9.  These analysts 
thought the Soviets were still undecided on whether to back off re Berlin, sign the peace treaty, 
pursue negotiations realistically or use the issue as leverage for wider discussions  The 
Gromyko-Thompson talks would probably decide the issue, but Soviet presentations had been so 
opaque, the analysts could not guess which choice the Soviets would pursue.  They 
recommended the US try to maintain the status quo in lieu of seeking a negotiated settlement,. 
Negotiations should continue, however, with "more forthcoming" positions (these were not 
spelled out).  They could also try again to offer discussions in other areas like disarmament to 
provide diplomatic cover for the Soviets.
841
 This prescription repeated what US analysts had 
been suggesting for three years.   
 Khrushchev kept coming back with the peace treaty/free city demands as his central 
issue.  The Sino-Soviet crisis had gotten worse than in 1959, raising hopes that the Soviets might 
seek to reduce tensions.  Khrushchev felt he should seem tougher with the West.
842
  Khrushchev 
also was very concerned with gaining Soviet influence in Cuba, which he regarded as a crucial 
link to the Communist bloc and the emerging post-colonial Third World.
843
  Gains elsewhere 
might compensate for indecision on Berlin and even bolster his hand there. 
  Rusk met with British and French delegations on February 13 to try and figure out 
"what  what the Soviets were really up to in Berlin." French Ambassador Herve Alphand saw 
Soviet ambiguity, with air harassment and a tough negotiating  stance balanced by good will 
gestures like the Adzhubei visit and an invitation to have Robert Kennedy visit Moscow.  British 
Ambassador Ormsby-Gore thought the Soviets realized "they could not obtain their kind of 
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German settlement at this time." They had to balance realistic expectations against domestic and 
Bloc pressures, and wanted some kind of resolution before extending the dialogue to other 
issues. Rusk observed that they also had "to stabilize Eastern Europe" while dealing with 
domestic problems like agriculture and "setbacks to with regard ... to under-developed 
countries." They had to deal with the West's knowledge that their missile strength had been 
greatly over-estimated and increased US defense spending.  Rusk guessed that they were 
"probably" not going to sign a separate treaty, but "the possibility could not be ruled out."
844
  
 Alphand wondered if the Soviets would perceive Western uncertainty.   He also asked 
what Rusk thought about direct bilateral West German-Soviet talks.  Rusk thought these might 
be profitable, but Alphand worried these might compromise West Germany's role in NATO.  
Rusk wondered why the West Germans were so reticent to deal with their weaker East German 
counterparts.  Ormsby-Gore thought Soviet participation in the upcoming Geneva disarmament 
talks a positive sign, even if they were only in it for the propaganda value.   Rusk discounted the 
Soviet interest in the talks because the Chairman had not shown any real interest in a summit  for 
disarmament, despite his calls for head-of-state participation; Ormsby-Gore seconded that 
opinion.
845
  Overall, this meeting indicated a mix of wary uncertainty and cautious optimism that 
a major Soviet move  was imminent regarding  Berlin and Germany.  It also showed that the 
focus of trans-Atlantic concern was about to shift towards the more positive topic of 
disarmament. However, Alphand's discussion with Foy Kohler two days later about Berlin air 
harassment, reflected the fact the Soviets were far from done with Berlin.
846
 
 Kennedy delayed answering Khrushchev's December 13 letter while waiting to see what 
the Thompson-Gromyko talks might produce.   On January 15, he  told the Chairman that the 
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formality of those talks was a disappointing reversion to the earlier phases of the Berlin crisis.    
While the current situation might not be satisfactory, "It is not the Western powers who are 
seeking a change in the status of Berlin," he said.  The Western side had no intention of using 
force to change the situation, but the Soviets must recognize  that they cannot unilaterally make  
changes "which would result in damage to the rights, obligations and interests of the Allied 
Powers and the people of West Berlin."   Both sides needed a solution which would "avoid any 
shift favorable to one side and detrimental to the other and ensure a greater degree of stability 
and tranquility in the entire German situation ...if we can take those two principles as a starting 
point, we might ...see light at the end of the tunnel."
847
   
 Kennedy alluded to the difficult struggle to limit nuclear testing, saying it was essential to 
the success of the Geneva disarmament talks not to increase tensions.  He noted that Thompson 
had protested Berlin air harassment and warned that such provocations would prevent any 
serious progress at the Geneva conference.  He warned Khrushchev that Soviet pressure would 
only induce France to build up their military forces and seek independent nuclear capacities.  
Restraint and negotiation would be more productive.  Thompson and Gromyko needed to discuss 
"concrete matters, "such as the international access authority.  He noted that Adzhubei had said 
such an instrument might be acceptable with GDR participation, but did not mention Gromyko's 
emphatic  rejection of even that concession.  Kennedy closed by reaffirming his hopes that 
private diplomacy, though  a "departure" from usual practice, could bring about the peaceful 
outcome he knew they both desired.
848
   
 At the same time Khrushchev was at his Black Sea dacha in Pitsunda, where he was 
conducting a review of Soviet missile progress, both for space exploration and delivery of 
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nuclear weapons.  A new heavy booster, the UR-500 was approved, capable of carrying both 
space vehicles and the recently-tested thirty megaton thermonuclear device.  Most importantly, 
new ICBM designs were commissioned  to replace the first-generation R-16, which was so slow 
to set up it would never  survive a first strike and to keep parity with the American Minuteman 
and Polaris missiles.
 849
  Though development problems continued, the new ICBMs would soon 
give the Soviet Union a practical rapid response long range nuclear capability, which it still did 
not have in 1962.  
 Ambassador Dowling and NSC advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger met with Chancellor 
Adenauer in Bonn on February 17 to brief him on US nuclear capabilities,  reassuring him about 
the ability to withstand and deliver retaliatory strikes.
850
  Kissinger told him both the US and 
USSR would share potential impact.  The US saw some possibility of a NATO nuclear force, 
such as the proposed MLF (Multi-Lateral Force), but at present the most efficient approach for 
the West was extending the US's protective nuclear umbrella through closer integration of the 
NATO countries.  Adenauer noted that Norstad's request for more medium range missiles 
(MRBM) had been delayed, but  Kissinger said that was for technical reasons and the US was 
not opposed to the MLF.
851
  Neither mentioned that political rivalries had so far stymied progress 
on the MLF idea.
852
   
 They also discussed contrary opinions within quadripartite military planning.  Adenauer 
objected to having to clear all planning, including economic and naval counter-measures, 
through NATO.  US estimates of 26 available Soviet conventional battalions was about a third of 
what really faced them.  That imbalance could lead to disaster.   Kissinger said that US forces 
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were modernized and could be deployed with adequate strength to compel the Soviets to 
negotiations; this would also provide a strategic hedge in the event of nuclear conflict.   
Adenauer said that changed the situation but still preferred naval blockade to ground action in 
the event of conflict.  Kissinger said that, at the risk of being undiplomatic, the Chancellor's 
attitude "might indicate the Federal Republic was unprepared to fight for Berlin if ground action 
or nuclear war might result."
853
  Adenauer reacted sharply to this suggestion, saying that since 
"consequences of nuclear war were incalculable ... every other measure should be tried before 
resorting to a nuclear war."
854
  If a blockade proved unsuccessful, he said, the FRG would 
support conventional ground action and whatever might follow.  Adenauer expressed 
appreciation for US efforts to defend its friends, saying historic opportunities for cooperation 
were now possible.  Kissinger affirmed that US leaders held the same view.  The meeting ended 
with the Chancellor expressing profuse appreciation for US dedication to the Atlantic 
Community.  
 FRG Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe told Kennedy and Rusk how much the Chancellor has 
appreciated the briefing.  Kennedy said he was glad the meeting went well but complained that 
the Chancellor needed constant reassurance.
855
  The President wanted to make clear that a naval 
blockade would do little; more serious conventional force plans were necessary.  With sufficient 
commitment from NATO partners, a conventional deterrent could be viable and less risky than 
front-line nuclear defense.  Grewe also assured the President that Adenauer was supportive of the 
ambassadorial working group, despite his sometimes disparaging remarks.   Kennedy 
acknowledged that progress had been minimal and prospects uncertain.  Rusk asked what "the 
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German view was on next steps to be taken." Grewe said that despite the standoff, the current 
talks in Moscow should continue but not be "expanded."
856
 
 Kennedy said the Soviets had made clear that even if Western troops remained - 
temporarily - that Soviet troops would have to be included with them.  Grewe said he was "not so 
sure" the Soviets would proceed with a treaty that might lead to a war which Khrushchev did not 
want. Kennedy agreed with Grewe that the US military buildup had so far stalled Khrushchev's 
hand, but said "a difficult spring and summer" still awaited.  He asked if there was much public 
interest in the FRG for their own bilateral dialogue with the Soviets.  Grewe said no and they 
wished to continue to treat West Berlin as a quadripartite (US/FRG/UK/France) concern.  He 
also said he hoped that these powers  should have a "common reassessment" of the situation 
before the Geneva talks commenced.
857
 
 Thompson cabled the next day to say he had encountered Gromyko at a Nepalese 
reception in Moscow and the Foreign Minister had initiated the subject of Berlin.  Both took 
standard positions but Gromyko made a point of saying that if access agreement was reached and 
accepted by GDR, "such agreement would be carried out."  Thompson replied that the West was 
still unprepared to accept the division of Germany and pointed out that Ulbricht had reneged on 
agreements for use of Tempelhof Airport.  Gromyko repeated that the GDR would carry out 
agreements and "if were not prepared to respect GDR sovereignty, then outlook was very 
gloomy.  The Foreign Minister made no effort to set a time limit for the talks or indicate 
imminent Soviet actions if resolution not found soon: "on the contrary, his concern appeared to 
be how we could keep talks going in view of current impasse."
858
  This conversation indicates 
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that, however skeptical some in the West may have been about the wisdom or utility of their 
talks,  Khrushchev and Gromyko valued them highly.   
 Adenauer, however, was not content with their progress and, unless the Soviets retreated 
from their "maximum positions",  was ready to suspend them and call a Western foreign 
Ministers conference.  He told Ambassador Dowling he did not want to proceed with FRG-
USSR bilateral talks.
859
  Adenauer said  Kennedy was "being unfair" in saying the US had 
already fully briefed him before the Kissinger meeting and complaining that Adenauer was not 
realistic. He showed Dowling a report from FRG Ambassador Kroll that suggested Thompson 
favored a "more flexible attitude." Dowling refuted reports that Thompson "advocated 
concessions beyond those agreed by four Western allies in concert."  Adenauer accepted this and 
acknowledged that Kroll himself was thought to be more favorable to GDR recognition.   
Dowling thought Kennedy's frank comments to Grewe had made the Chancellor realize how far 
he had tested US patience; he also noted Adenauer's "frailty."
 860
  As capable a leader as 
Adenauer had been for East Germany, he was proving a very difficult partner over Berlin. 
 Rusk told Thompson to arrange another meeting with Gromyko to "put further comments 
on record and link discussions with possible talks at Geneva."  The Ambassador should tell 
Gromyko he would be accompanying Rusk at the conference and could brief the Secretary on the 
substance of their discussions so far, if Gromyko wanted to hold higher level talks.  Thompson 
should state the recent Berlin air harassments "threatened to create highly dangerous situation." 
He should reiterate Kennedy's comments to Adzhubei that both sides should seek temporary 
accommodation, pending  final  resolution, and emphasize US serious intent.   He should explain 
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that US focus on access resulted from a belief that access disputes could lead to conflict.
861
  Rusk 
also told Thompson that, although the French had allowed the talks to go on without their direct 
participation, any agreement reached would still have to meet their approval.  That would also be 
a problem if the Western Foreign Ministers met, as they would in Geneva.  Ulbricht had just 
visited Moscow and the Soviets' Central Committee would also be meeting on March 5.  Rusk 
doubted that Khrushchev would be making any immediate move in these circumstances.   But he 
was telling General Clay in Berlin that it was still imperative to preserve Allied unity in West 
Berlin, however difficult that might be.
862
   
 On March 6, Thompson held his final session with Gromyko.  He told the Foreign 
Minister that air traffic harassment did not help "when we are discussing possibility of new 
arrangements" regarding access. Gromyko said their fighter activity was a justifiable response to 
Western provocations in GDR airspace .  He also said the US warnings about aggravating 
tensions only underscored the need for a peace treaty.
 863
  Their free city proposal would not 
favor either side, he said, and claimed the US was only interested in supporting their own 
positions.  He did not want to further discuss the all-Berlin plebiscite proposal.  Thompson 
pointed out that the Soviets had just unilaterally changed arrangements in place since the end of 
the war and those arrangements had been designed to ensure free access to Berlin.  Thompson 
"reiterated our conviction that resolution problems ... is impossible without satisfactory 
agreement on access."  He understood that Gromyko wanted to have a broader discussion with 
Rusk in Geneva; this would only be possible with a "strong and clear settlement on access and 
preservation rights in West Berlin."   He also said Kennedy "is determined to leave no method of 
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discussion untried in seeking a sensible accommodation of rights and interests (of) both sides."
864
  
Thompson complained of the vague generality in Gromyko's  remarks about respect for GDR 
sovereignty and his use of that issue as a blocking device to backtrack on agreed points. 
 Thompson moved on to Soviet insistence that Western occupation rights must be 
terminated; this was most "serious and discouraging."  If the Soviets considered this their bottom 
line, "any agreement between us would be impossible."  Thompson said the Western troops were 
going to stay till "the German question is finally resolved."  Gromyko did not directly respond to 
Thompson's declaration, but said that the Soviets had researched the air traffic issue and were 
sure they were legally justified.  He concluded by saying that "respect for GDR sovereignty" was 
"not only a phrase, it was an important condition."  Any agreement on access must be "in accord 
with GDR sovereignty."
865
   Thompson thought Gromyko seemed preoccupied and so did not 
press for further  discussion.  He did not anticipate another meeting before Geneva.  Their 





Preparations for Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting 
 Both sides had an obvious and sincere interest for negotiations,  for various reasons.  As 
they prepared for Geneva, their respective governments had to determine how to defend and 
advance their vital interests.  Some in the West, like Ambassador Dowling, were now less 
inclined to deal with the GDR on access, especially in light of the air harassment, lest they "make 
sustaining West Berlin's viability  extremely difficult."
867
  In Berlin, Assistant  Chief of the US  
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Mission Alan Lightner belatedly answered George Kennan's letter urging more Western 
flexibility: "Short of abandoning Berlin and ultimately all of Germany, what have we not done 
that we still could do to further peace with honor on the continent of Europe?"  Lightner said 
Kennan's suggestion that the US need to offer Ulbricht something to create a more situation in 
Central Europe smacked of Neville Chamberlain's "peace with honor."  Appeasement, said 
Lightner, was even more dangerous in a thermonuclear age.
868
 
 Kennedy's March 2 announcement that the US would resume nuclear testing underscored 
concern about the dangers of thermonuclear  war.
869
  Though not discussed in the last Gromyko-
Thompson talk, this decision would affect the proceedings in Geneva.  The decision was a 
reminder  that American strategic doctrine continued to require nuclear deterrence  to balance 
Soviet advantages in conventional forces.  If cuts as large as 30-50% were agreed on, the JCS 
was concerned that large and expensive increases in  conventional forces would be necessary to 
maintain strategic balance.
870
  A  major reason for the  resumption of testing lay in the need to 
keep the nuclear deterrent viable, especially since the Soviets had also resumed tests.  The 
Soviets had walked out on the previous round of UN-sponsored disarmament testing in 1960.  
 The new round of talks, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) added 
eight neutral nations to the five apiece from NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
871
  Nascent nuclear 
power France elected not to attend, objecting to the inclusion of non-nuclear -armed nations.   
The British had tried to forestall the American decision and would press for more stringent limits 
than the Americans preferred.  Khrushchev hoped that the neutrals would support his calls for 
sweeping disarmament without inspections.  When the conference began on March, Gromyko 
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immediately introduced the same all-or-nothing disarmament proposal the Soviets had 
championed since 1959.  US and UK representatives offered concessions designed to make a 
comprehensive test-ban possible, but the Soviets rejected this offer in their informal sessions. 
The majority of the conference then designated the US/UK/USSR as a subcommittee to draft a 
test ban treaty.  If France had chosen to attend, they might have been included; that would have  
constituted a session of Berlin signatories.
872
   
 Even without France, the subcommittee soon found itself mired in the same kind of 
deadlock that had stymied the Berlin negotiations.  Although the West had reduced the number 
of inspections they wanted, the Soviets still rejected inspections as camouflage for  espionage.  
The US delayed the start of its new test series but on March 2, Kennedy said the US would 
resume testing in April if the Soviets would not agree to a test ban first.
873
  The subcommittee 
discussions between the "Big Three" (US/UK/USSR) stuck closely to the test-ban  topic; but also 
discussed Berlin Soviet air traffic interference in Berlin.  When Rusk jokingly asked if Gromyko 
was going to call the Soviet Commandant in Berlin and ask him to change their flight plans, 





Rusk-Gromyko Sessions on Berlin at Geneva 
 Rusk and Gromyko began bilateral sessions in Geneva on March 12 in an uncertain 
climate for both sides.
875
  Kennedy instructed the Secretary to develop a modus vivendi on 
Berlin, i.e., a protocol to accommodate their respective interests pending final resolution.  
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Kennedy provided him with a draft proposal for a modus vivendi agreement; it included 
statements of general principles, nuclear non-proliferation, non-aggression, and an international 
access authority.
876
   
 Khrushchev had just sent a new, noticeably tougher letter to Kennedy, repeatedly stating 
Soviet intent to sign a separate treaty with the GDR.  Khrushchev now offered to allow an access 
authority but only temporarily, under GDR supervision and with the understanding that a free 
city arrangement without occupation forces and in context of his separate treaty.  He 
acknowledged that the Berlin impasse had stalled disarmament progress.  Khrushchev also noted 
that Kennedy had referred to a possible summit and agreed this could be useful if an 
accommodation is reached on a number of questions" before it took place.  He said that 
sometimes "efforts by ministers are not enough and ...heads of state and government have to join 
the effort.
877
  Khrushchev was holding out hope for a summit, but on condition of acceptance of 
the Soviet demands. 
 Kennedy amended his instructions to Rusk to take Khrushchev's counter-offer as a sign 
of interest despite its strict conditions; above all Rusk was to seek an accommodation agreement 
regardless of the air harassment.
878
  Rusk, Thompson, Kohler and Bohlen met with Lord Home 
on the eve of the new round of Berlin talks.  They had some cautious grounds for optimism: the 
West Germans seemed supportive; Khrushchev had moved slightly on the access authority, did 
not set a new deadline and was distracted by the Sino-Soviet schism; and the Soviets had just 
granted the East Germans a large loan that might placate them.  They agreed to attempt an access 
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agreement, clearly spelling out reasonable air access rights, without seeking approval from 
French and German partners till a draft was ready.
879
  
 Gromyko met Rusk at a luncheon at the Soviet embassy on March 12 and brought up the 
Berlin topic.  Rusk framed the US approach in terms of common interests and respective 
problems.  He said that the conference attested to the hazards nuclear weapons brought to the 
pursuit of peace, noting the difficult progress of disarmament efforts.  Common interests 
included mutual desire for resolution of Berlin tension, limiting the 'diffusion' of nuclear 
weapons, and establishing non-aggression policies.  Although Rusk had just expressed 
frustration that Soviets had been inconsistent about "existing facts," Gromyko renewed that 
approach.  The Foreign Minister took the same line as he had with Thompson in Moscow.  Facts 
in Germany had changed since the Potsdam agreements; the GDR was a reality and its 
sovereignty must be respected; Western occupation was inconsistent with that sovereignty.  The 
USSR felt that Berlin problems could only be solved through the peace treaty and the free city 
proposal would preserve the existing social order in Berlin without coercion.
880
  
  Gromyko said the idea of general principles was something new, but these would have to 
respect both sides' interests.   Rusk replied that the occupation was a well-established fact that 
could not be ignored.  The US was concerned that a peace treaty would negatively affect US 
interests.
881
 This cordial beginning was disturbed by reports that Soviet planes had again dropped 
radar jamming chaff over Allied flights in Berlin air corridor.  Rusk and Lord Home agreed they 
needed to protest to Gromyko, but not walk out on the conference. 
882
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 The jamming incident did not, however, disturb the next session. Rusk opened by citing 
respect for "vital interest."  This expression would become a signature theme of the US approach 
throughout the next several months.   Rusk said the US had no intention of disturbing GDR 
sovereignty in its territory, but the GDR had no legal rights to interfere with West Berlin access.   
He again cited the 1955 Zorin-Bolz protocols as documentation.
883
  Gromyko said that since the 
access corridor was within GDR territory, they had the right to approve access arrangements, in 
accordance with international law.  He did not accept Rusk's contention that Western rights or 
West Berlin's preferred  social order would be diminished by the peace treaty/free city proposals.   
 Rusk said they were following completely different approaches.  It was "one thing to 
propose a solution and say that it was good for the other side; it was another thing to recognize 
that each side had vital interests and to see how the problem could be resolved in accordance  
...with those interests."  He observed that both the US and USSR subscribed to various transit 
arrangements  where the ground governments claimed no control over traffic crossing their 
territories.  Gromyko said Rusk should understand that the Soviet proposals would be "in the 
interest of all concerned."  He dismissed Rusk's precedents: "there were many things in the past 
which no longer existed."  Gromyko concluded that he "liked" Rusk's statement that the "US and 
USSR had been allies against Germany and that Germany should not make them enemies."
884
   
 Soviet air harassment against civilian and military flights was increasing.
885
  Rusk said he 
could not manage the problem from Geneva.  In Berlin, Clay clashed with Norstad over the 
latter's plan to reschedule civilian flights; Clay wanted to keep to schedule and provide fighter 
escorts.  US advisors there were already discussing possible suspension of the talks with 
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Gromyko.  For the moment, they elected to send a sharp warning to the Soviets. 
886
  Thompson 
was advising Rusk not to offer acceptance of GDR personnel at checkpoints or else the Soviets 
would assume Western weakness and proceed with their separate treaty.   Kohler brought up the 
air interference problem with his Soviet counterpart Vladimir Semenov, who said the Soviet 
actions were legal.  Semenov told Kohler that the "real reason" the Soviets wanted to change the 
Berlin situation was to eliminate the use of West Berlin for intelligence and propaganda 
operations and reduce their "organic links" with the FRG.  He stressed concern about German 
militarism. When Kohler brought up making West Berlin the FRG capital, matching the GDR's 
action, Semenov replied, "You just try that."
887
  Kohler thought the talk a positive indication the 
Soviets wanted a mutually acceptable solution.  
 In Geneva, Rusk continued to have short talks with Gromyko, hoping his opposite 
number would receive instructions that might open up their discussions. Their next formal 
sessions were longer because Rusk and Gromyko wanted more substantial discussions before 
they had to return home.
888
  Rusk bluntly complained that the Soviet efforts were designed  "to 
undermine and destroy the freedom of West Berlin."  Neither side really wanted a crisis to 
develop, but they had been unsuccessful in negotiation.  Now they had to figure out how to 
manage their disagreement: "the problem was to find a method  not involving the interests of the 
West or requiring a formal withdrawal of Soviet proposals." Gromyko responded with recitations 
of his standard arguments about GDR sovereignty; Rusk responded in kind, invoking the "vital 
interests" rhetoric.  Rusk concluded by repeating "many problems would fall in place if the 
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central questions could be resolved."
889
   These questions seemed no closer to answers than they 
had been in the talks with Thompson, the previous October's sessions in Moscow, at the Vienna 
and Paris summits, or even at the 1959 Foreign Ministers Conference. 
 Meanwhile, the Berlin situation was getting worse, with incidents of East German vopos 
wounding a British soldier and shooting at a US military vehicle.
890
  Because Rusk was about to 
leave Geneva, there was no more suggestion of breaking off those talks.  Rusk wrote Kennedy 
that, Gromyko was not belligerent or threatening and wanted to continue talks.  However, "there 
seems to be no movement in the Soviet position toward Western vital interests ... there is no 
doubt Gromyko understands conditions under which they could sign a separate peace treaty ... 
without precipitating crisis."
891
  He saw no signs of an agreement but could not predict whether a 
crisis was imminent.  He would have to see how Gromyko reacted to the modus vivendi idea in 
their final talk.  The Soviets might be interested in continuing talks to keep open the possibility 
of a summit, which Rusk had mentioned as a possibility in delivering the modus vivendi paper.  
In Berlin, Alan Lightner protested bitterly to Washington that continued acceptance of the 
harassment could lead to war.
892
 
 In their final Geneva session, the two foreign ministers compared their working papers.  
Rusk said the contrast illustrated the difference between their negotiating strategies. He said the 
their access proposal was obviously designed to diminish US vital interests, while the US 
statement of principles was not so much a technical paper as way to move their dialogue 
forward.
893
  Gromyko said that his proposals were "aimed at a detente."  The Soviets desired 
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good relations with the US, he said, their German/Berlin proposals were intended to reduce 
tensions and they had no intent to seize Berlin.  All they wanted to do was finally end World War 
II.  He went through the US paper point-by-point, refuting each carefully crafted nuance with 
standard rhetoric.  As usual, the simplicity and consistency of the Soviet perspective produced an 
opaque cover that was hard for Rusk to penetrate.  Gromyko concluded by reaffirming 
Khrushchev's statements that Central Europe was the only area in which the US and USSR were 
in "direct collision."
894
  .   
 Rusk repudiated some of Gromyko's points but said he wanted to focus on specific points 
that experts in Washington would have to study first.  In their remaining time, he wanted to focus 
on trying to first resolve small, fixable specific problems.  They should at least affirm mutual 
commitment to pursue negotiated  agreement before either took unilateral action.   They briefly 
discussed their agreed goal of limiting nuclear "diffusion," and restated their basic positions: the 
peace treaty vs. continued occupation  pending German self-determination.  They concluded they 
would consider new bilateral contacts  and study the other's proposals further.   Both agreed they 
did not want "negotiations for the sake of negotiations."
895
  Gromyko invited Rusk to Moscow, 
noting that he himself had gone to Washington.  This was a benign end to a difficult meeting and 
a disappointing round of talks.
896
 It would also mark the end of East-West foreign-minister level 
direct talks on Berlin.  There would be no Rusk visit to Moscow, nor any further heads of state 
summits to resolve the German problem. 
 
 
                                                 
894









US and Soviets Evaluate their Options 
 Rusk told the President "the Soviets had not changed their proposals in any significant 
way since the Vienna summit."  Gromyko had not been threatening nor ready to end 
negotiations,  but "opportunities to clarify completely their real intentions, specifically to 
discover whether they are determined to move to a crisis."  Gromyko had not explicitly rejected 
the modus vivendi approach but remained insistent on their original objectives.  US insistence on 
its own 'vital interests' represented "a formidable obstacle and they are reluctant to challenge us 
frontally."
897
  In his report to the NSC, Rusk said he saw some Soviet flexibility on access; the 
trick would be getting them to separate that issue from their main demands.
898
  Rusk still did not 
recognize that the Soviets were not going to de-link the access issue.  They wanted negotiations 
to secure Western acceptance of their demands without use of force.  
 While Gromyko did not indicate to Rusk that the Soviets were about to implement their 
peace treaty, the West Berliners were beginning to lose confidence in American commitment.  
Rusk advised Clay that he did not anticipate imminent Soviet moves on Berlin.
899
  Clay replied a 
week later that that he saw a significant change in Soviet attitudes since the talks: "I am inclined 
to believe that it marks the full end of the Wall crisis and that we have won this round."
900
  This 
relaxation provided an opportunity to bring Clay back from Berlin.  Announcements and 
correspondence praised Clay's tenure, but the White House may have been relieved to have the 
independent and outspoken general out of the picture lest he disturb negotiations.
901
 
 Such relief was soon clouded by vehement objections from Chancellor Adenauer, who 
objected to the recently proposed  GDR participation in the access authority.  In a Bonn meeting 
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with Nitze, he said the West German public was disappointed at Clay's departure. Adenauer 
wanted a pause in the US-Soviet negotiations so the FRG could further study current proposals 
and prepare a response.  He may have sensed that Washington was impatient with FRG rigidity, 
which he acknowledged may have worsened prospects for negotiations.  Nitze assured the 
Chancellor his views would be considered and the West would not proceed without FRG 
agreement.
902
   
 In Washington, Grewe complained that the post-Geneva draft of the access authority 
proposal would change legal foundations of West Berlin, including the occupation rights, and 
would be a big step towards acceptance of a permanently divided Germany.
903
  Foy Kohler told 
him the British accepted the paper and that it would provide a road map for the next round of 
talks with Dobrynin.  The document reflected ongoing  remained commitment to the status quo; 
the Soviet papers presented at Geneva had been rejected as inconsistent with that commitment.  
In further meetings, Grewe expressed increasing frustration that the US was not taking FRG 
objections more seriously or responding in a timely manner.
 904
  Adenauer sent Kennedy a very 
short, terse note complaining of American unilateralism and urging him to suspend negotiation, 
pending consultation "with the three great powers."
905
  Kennedy and Rusk had their own 
complaints about FRG press leaks of the secret working papers.  Dobrynin was just about to 
arrive in Washington and the leaks could compromise chances for continued discussion.  That 




   
                                                 
902
 Memo re Adenauer-Nitze meeting, Bonn,  April 13, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XV, doc.34. 
903
 Text attached to Klein memo to Bundy, April 25, 1962, JFK, NSF Box 84, 4/62. 
904
 Memo re Grewe-Kohler meetings Washington, April 13 & 14, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XV, docs. 34 & 35. 
905
 Adenauer-Kennedy letter, April 14, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XV, doc. 37.  
906





Rusk-Dobrynin meet in Washington; Americans Resume Nuclear Testing 
 At their first meeting on April 14, Rusk outlined some of the negotiating problems for 
Dobrynin.  The Soviets had insisted on "drawing a line under World War II" and introduced their 
peace treaty/free city proposals to normalize what they considered outdated arrangements.  The 
US had responded with all-German/all-Berlin proposals as an alternative.  The Soviets had said 
the situation needed to be changed to recognize the "existing facts" in Germany.  When the US 
responded that occupation was also a fact, the Soviets would say the facts should be changed.  
The US wanted to "deal with the existence of underlying disagreement in such a way as not to 
move toward a dangerous crisis."
 907
   Regarding their respective working papers on access, the 
US objected that the Soviet version  was tied to Western withdrawal from Berlin; could 
Dobrynin clarify this?  Rusk said the Western proposals would not "interfere with activities in 
East Germany."  Dobrynin  said the "present position" of his government linked access 
agreements to the troop withdrawals.  He asked about broadening the discussion and Rusk told 
him that was possible if they could reach a better understanding on the Berlin/German 
problem.
908
  Dobrynin clearly had no instructions to depart from Gromyko's approach in the 
Geneva talks, nor did he signal the Soviets "were ready to move the matter to a crisis."  In his 
memoirs, Dobrynin says he thought Kennedy was willing to recognize a divided Germany and 
withdraw US troops but was afraid that would be perceived as weakness.
909
  
 Other problems were clouding relations between the superpowers.  These problems did 
not directly involve their alliance partners in the same way the German issue did.
910
 Bilateral 
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superpower rivalry was evidenced by Third World competition and the contest for nuclear 
supremacy.  One immediate Third World concern was Laos, where Pathet Lao rebels were 
making strong gains.  Both the US and Soviets had generally respected their recent agreements to 
avoid escalation, but Chinese intervention  was encouraging the rebels.  In response, the US had 
sent troops to Thailand.  The Communist North Vietnamese were also intervening in the Laos 
conflict and making aggressive incursions in South Vietnam.
911
  In Cuba, the Americans had 
renewed efforts to destabilize the Castro regime through the Central Intelligence Agency's 
Operation Mongoose.  The Soviets were offering increasing military and political support to the 
Castro regime, which had not only instituted  communist programs in Cuba but was providing 
weapons and guerilla training to leftist revolutionaries in Venezuela and Nicaragua.
912
   
 On April 25, the United States resumed atmospheric testing of hydrogen bombs.
913
 The 
Joint Chiefs of staff and hawkish members of Congress had lobbied hard for the decision, but the 
president's inner circle had divided opinions. The US had notified the Soviets of this decision, 
noting the lack of progress in the Geneva disarmament talks. The Soviets protested, without 
acknowledging that they had had been the first to break the moratorium.
 914
  Domestic and 
international press reaction to the new US tests was generally negative, renewing the calls for a 
comprehensive test ban treaty. 
 
Allied Dissension 
 The US needed to consult with the Allies before it started another round of bilateral talks 
with the Soviets.  On April 28, Macmillan met with Kennedy in Washington.  Macmillan was 
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most interested in reviving prospects for UK production of the Skybolt missile, which had been 
scaled back.
915
  They agreed that the recent relaxation in Berlin, whatever the cause might be, 
provided hope for better progress in the Dobrynin talks.  Rusk noted, however, that initial 
meetings offered little evidence that the Soviets were prepared to yield on their key issues.  Since 
the Soviets still indicated they would sign a separate treaty, the danger still lay in how they 
would treat the Western occupation after a treaty. Macmillan told Kennedy he had no plans to 
visit Adenauer himself, but would see de Gaulle in June.
 916
    
 They agreed that the West Germans now doubted whether the Allies were still interested 
in defending West Berlin and keeping the road open for unification.  Macmillan said he wanted 
an agreement or, failing that, a modus vivendi.  Macmillan offered a different sort of problems 
than those presented by the Germans or French.  The British were much more cooperative and 
encouraged negotiations, perhaps overly so.  They could not however, negotiate from strength 
and were treated accordingly, both within the alliance and by the Soviets.  Macmillan would 
occasionally upset  the Allied approach with solo diplomatic overtures.
917
 
 On the other hand, the West Germans could sometimes act constructively and in 
recognition of their responsibilities as an emerging mature partner.  But they chronically reverted 
to political immaturity, bemoaning their station in Europe and begging protection without regard 
to the hazards and costs their protectors faced. 
918
   The inconsistencies in their official positions, 
including the Berlin issue, were partially due to their own domestic divisions.  Former FRG 
foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano's visit to Kennedy on April 30 reflected those divisions.  
Von Brentano acknowledged his own disagreement with the Chancellor and his successor 
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Schroeder.  He stressed that he was not speaking officially for his  government but expressed 
regret at the recent leaks.  Kennedy said he was getting the feeling that the West German press 
"was waging a war against the United States," despite the US's expensive investments in their 
security and military and political risk taking.
 919
   Why were the French upheld as friends when 
they would only deploy a few divisions on their behalf?   He said the US would be glad to let 
someone else take over the prolonged fruitless negotiations.  Von Brentano said that he 
personally, and the German people generally, did appreciate US sacrifices.    
 They turned to the current US/UK working paper, which Adenauer had objected to.
920
 
Kennedy acknowledged that the German authorities, and the French too, were not happy with US 
policies to limit the diffusion of nuclear arms in Europe.  He said the non-aggression pact 
elements could be adjusted to satisfy the West Germans.  Von Brentano said he had no problem 
on those issues, but GDR recognition was "not a prestige factor but a political question of over-
riding importance."  GDR participation in an international access authority or joint commissions 
would grant East Germany a political legitimacy unacceptable to the West Germans.  Worse, he 
said, it could lead to all-German political union that would take West Germany out of the 
Western alliance, "which would be disastrous." 
921
  Kennedy asked what it was in the current 
proposals that would suggest serious consequences?   He pointed to recent public criticism of US 
policy by von Brentano and noted that he FRG had not fulfilled its defense commitments.   He 
told the West German: "if the United States and the Federal Republic cannot reach an agreement, 
it would not be possible for the talks to go on with the USSR."
922
  The FRG was being told the 
US would not indefinitely shoulder the burdens of negotiating a solution to their problems.   
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 Rusk tried to patch up the rift in talks during the May 4-6 NATO meeting in Athens.  He 
told Schroeder there had been no questions of "broader questions" that the FRG might be 
apprehensive about.  Nor would there be any German settlement without FRG "concurrence."  
He thought the French were waiting these rounds out because they did not want to make any deal 
that the Germans might later hold against them.  Rusk asked why the FRG was so apprehensive 
about dealing with the much weaker GDR.  They should anticipate a post-Ulbricht East Germany 
being more reasonable.  Rusk brought up East-West cooperation on trade commission's but 
Schroeder downplayed the options.  Were the French were ready to rejoin negotiations on 
Berlin?  The Germans said the NATO sessions would provide the answer. They wanted Grewe 
restored to confidence, after his press indiscretions, with full participation in the ambassadorial 
working group on Berlin.
923
  
 Bundy met with von Brentano, who continued to object to the access authority.  Bundy 
said the West Germans must be misunderstanding the position papers.  The US would not 
compromise its vital interests, which included continued occupation and no political recognition 
of the GDR.
924
 Schroeder, along his advisor Dr. Carstens and the still-influential von Brentano, 
were mostly appreciative but the real test would be Ambassador Dowling's meetings with 
Adenauer in Bonn. 
 Kennedy's press secretary Pierre Salinger visited Moscow at this same time, and met with 
Khrushchev.  Khrushchev received him warmly and indicated his wish for better relations, 
including interest in another summit.  But he also informed Salinger that he was committed to his 
peace treaty and free city plans.  There could be no place for an ongoing occupation regime in an 
open Berlin , nor was there any need for an international access authority.   Khrushchev was 
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basically friendly though.  Salinger got the impression Khrushchev did not believe the US would 
go to war over Berlin.
925
 
 Adenauer, not Khrushchev, had become the immediate problem for the Americans. Rusk 
told Dowling that Adenauer's pride was wounded on several counts and he might be reasonable 
after some assurances.  He said Kennedy was still wondering why the Germans were so 
sympathetic to the French who risked so little for them.  That question showed how Washington 
leaders still did not understand an important idea: emerging bonds in Western Europe could be 
stronger than their postwar attachment to the United States.  Kennedy thought the French should 
appreciate that the US was assuming much of their burden not only in Europe, but in Southeast 
Asia.  Dowling should make clear that the US would not appreciate the FRG's joining with 
France to block British entry into the Common Market. 
926
 Fortunately for Dowling, Adenauer 
was contrite: "with his underlying attitude being one of injured innocence characteristic of child 
with hand caught in cookie jar."
927
  Adenauer went to some lengths to emphasize his good 
personal relations with the President and the Secretary.   He affirmed his support for continued 
Berlin negotiations with the Soviets.  When he said he only wished the French would join them, 
Dowling observed that Adenauer might be in the best position to do that.  Adenauer said he 
would be visiting Paris in July and would do his best to bring de Gaulle around.  
 After cautioning Adenauer to be careful with the press, Dowling cabled Rusk that things 
had gone well, but he remained concerned.  Adenauer seemed to have fallen out with Schroeder 
and Carstens.  A fragmented West German leadership would not make a reassuring partner in 
negotiations with perceptive Soviets.   The impressionable Chancellor's visit to the persuasive de 
Gaulle in Paris offered "prospects for further damage. "  "Further inoculation ...in Washington"  
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might be a good idea, setting the stage for yet another hopefully decisive Adenauer-Kennedy 
meeting.
928
  Kennedy helped by sending the Chancellor a warm note, downplaying Rusk's 
disappointing talk with Schroeder and assuring him that he would find current proposals would  
protect FRG interests.   The president told Adenauer  that, while a real settlement might not be 
possible they might be able to get "this three and half year old crisis cooled off."  
929
 What he did 





Khrushchev Decides to Put Missiles in Cuba  
 Meanwhile in May, Khrushchev was making a decision that would change the 
superpower relationship in ways the US could not imagine.  Increasingly concerned over US-
sponsored nuclear encirclement, from West Germany to Turkey, he wondered how he could 
project a missile force within striking distance of the United States.  He considered  Cuba a good  
partner for this venture, which could also enhance his leadership within the Communist Bloc. 
931
  
He would present to Castro a plan to station several dozen medium and intermediate range 
ballistic missile sites, along with troops, materiel and advisors.  Partly this could be proposed as 
an effort on Cuba's behalf, partly as Soviet duty to the communist cause.  Not all his Presidium 
colleagues approved of such an adventure.  Mikoyan, in particular, voiced objections. 
932
  His 
ambassador in Cuba, Aleksei Aleyeev doubted at first whether Castro would accept.  
 Surprisingly, Castro readily assented, on condition the Soviets first provide him with 
surface to air missile batteries.   While the West was trying to develop strategy for the round of 
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negotiations with Dobrynin in the summer of 1962, the Soviets were taking steps that would 
render most of the West's  basic assumptions and options irrelevant.
933
 
 In Washington, Bundy's NSC aides Martin Hillenbrand and Henry Owen were working 
on a new position paper,"Next Steps in Berlin" to supplement the "Draft Principles" paper Rusk 
had presented to Gromyko in Geneva.
934
  The trouble was that the Soviets had not agreed to 
"Draft Principles, " which had been offered in hopes of moving the negotiations off their dead 
center insistence on troop withdrawals and GDR recognition.  Henry Owen advocated accepting 
GDR border personnel, but it was decided to reserve even this small concession unless Dobrynin 
offered Soviet concessions.  At this point, the Americans were running out of options for new 
negotiating tactics.  Changes in nomenclature, such as "police forces" instead of "occupation 
forces," would not move the Soviets, nor would another change of venue or negotiators. Part of 
the problem was clearing new offers with Allies, but the biggest obstacle was still  Soviet 
insistence on their core issues.  The bilateral dialogue was becoming "negotiation for the sake of 
negotiation." 
935
  While this was preferable to conflict, it was time-consuming and futile.   
 
Rusk-Dobrynin Discussions Begin 
 The Rusk-Dobrynin talks began in earnest on Memorial Day 1962.  Rusk summarized 
their recent negotiating history, noting the Soviets had balked at even temporary "modus vivendi" 
understandings" to keep stability short of full resolution.  Rusk reiterated that "there was no 
inherent contradiction between free access and the authority of the East Germans."  He wondered 
why the East had undertaken  more harassment recently:  "a crisis over Berlin would have the 
gravest implications for disarmament."  US suggestions for all-Berlin joint commissions, he said, 
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had been offered to foster a more cooperative atmosphere.  Dobrynin responded that the US 
principles paper said "nothing new" and then said he was expecting a reply to the Soviets' 




 Dobrynin backtracked to the Soviet theme of finally ending a wartime situation.  He 
alluded to Allied disagreements and said the Soviets were not demanding de jure recognition of 
the GDR, only de facto measures.  Technical commissions, he said, should be a matter for the 
Germans to decide.  He acknowledged the connection between Berlin and disarmament and said 
he welcomed concrete proposals.  Rusk dismissed Dobrynin's assertion that the West was in 
Berlin to fight the Soviets and said the technical commissions had been suggested to relieve 
tensions, thus benefitting both East and West.  GDR sovereignty over Berlin was not the Soviets' 
to grant unilaterally.  Dobrynin said the peace treaty would do just that.  Rusk answered "not 
without our consent. "  Dobrynin said "this is where we differ."
937
   
 Tensions in Berlin were beginning to increase again, as they had during the earlier rounds 
of 1962 negotiations.
938
  In early June, US contingency planners revamped their plans to deal 
with convoy harassment, with more discretion allowed for forceful response.   These new 
directives  reflected a more unilateral tone in US planning, even though the plans would be 
submitted to the Allies for their concurrence.
939
  On June 7, the Soviets sent letters of protest to 
the Allies, decrying what they called provocations; the Allies said shots fired into the Eastern 
sector were only answering fire initiated against refugees trying to escape to West Berlin.  In 
Rusk's next session with Dobrynin, the Soviets repeatedly stressed the danger of having 
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occupation troops in Berlin.  Dobrynin again suggested that UN troops replace the current 
regime, but Rusk rebuffed the idea, saying "a lot of experience in mutual confidence was 
required."
940
   
 While both the US and USSR had reduced their forces in the latter 1950s, they had been 
steadily rebuilding during the prolonged crisis over Berlin.  But, the US would still not allow 
West German control of nuclear weapons there, a caution which gave the Soviets some 
comfort.
941
 McNamara told Kennedy that the arms buildup, along with domestic and Bloc 
pressures, had tempered Khrushchev's early expectations that the West would acquiesce to his 
Berlin demands.   Khrushchev, he said, may have anticipated greater advances in Soviet and 
Bloc strength than had been realized.  As a result, the Soviets were not expected to sign a 
separate treaty soon.  McNamara thought they would continue " the same rigidity in negotiations 
without ... any serious attempt to break them off."  He expected "a new round of Berlin 




 Rusk travelled to Europe in late June to consult with Allied leaders.  He met first with the 
French, who he found "much more relaxed on Berlin." He told de Gaulle that the latter's 
pessimistic view on negotiations had proved correct.  De Gaulle said the talks had not caused the 
alliance problems he had feared.  Foreign minister Couve de Murville said the French still could 
not "approve or participate."
943
  Rusk then visited Bonn, which the West Germans had been 
hoping for as a sign of respect. He told Adenauer and Schroeder that he was impressed by West 
Berlin morale.  Schroeder said that East German unrest was due to a continuing exodus problem 
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which the Wall had not completely stopped.   The East German populace, he said, was opposed 
to credits from Bonn because that might strengthen the GDR regime; the US would be closely 
consulted on the matter.  Rusk said the morale risks were probably worth putting the GDR in 
position more amenable to negotiations. Schroder asked if recent GDR brutality at the Wall 
should be brought before the UN.  Rusk observed that referring the problem to the UN might 
strengthen Khrushchev's proposal for UN peace-keepers in Berlin.
944
   
 Rusk reported home that the visit had gone well and Adenauer was generally agreeable.  
He noted some hints of Franco-German unease and had tried to put in a good word for British 
entry into the Common Market, for which he found considerable support in Bonn.  However, the 
visit "removed any doubt that I might have had as to the inevitable growth of German pressure 
for nuclear weapons unless there are multilateral arrangements in NATO or ... significant steps 
toward disarmament."  Schroeder lobbied hard to remove non-diffusion language from the 
current position paper.  Rusk deferred action on that suggestion, pending resumption of Geneva 
disarmament talks in July.
945
  He noted that newer and more flexible voices were apparent, 
suggesting that the Adenauer-von Brentano leadership was waning.  There were also signs that 
Ulbricht might also be replaced.  In Washington, Kennedy's disarmament advisor John McCloy 
was hinting to Dobrynin that Ulbricht's removal would improve the situation in Berlin.
946
  Both 
Adenauer and Ulbricht were troublesome partners and bitterly opposed to cooperation between 
the two Germanys.  
 Personality continued to exert a strong influence on the Berlin situation. Second-tier 
leaders like Adenauer and Ulbricht could derail the calculations of the major heads of state. 
President Kennedy believed in personal diplomacy.  He gained confidence in foreign affairs but 
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was often frustrated by intermediaries.
947
  Kennedy had by this time narrowed his circle of 
security advisors, distancing himself from divisive  personalities, right and left, like Acheson and 
Bowles.  Robert Kennedy's influence grew however and did not always blend well with more 
experienced advisors.
 948
  The President's other Cabinet members like Rusk, McNamara, and 
Bundy were more reserved and studious.  Ambassadors Thompson, Dowling and Kohler had 
been involved in the Berlin crisis since its inception and their well-controlled diplomatic 
performance was a great help to the US.
949
 
 Macmillan was less trouble than he had been with Eisenhower, with whom he had 
presumed great influence.  As British prestige and power waned, he was more supplicating with 
Kennedy, hoping to renew their countries' "special relationship."  Lord Home had proved  a 
satisfactory replacement for Harold Caccia and the new Ambassador, David Ormsby-Gore was 
an intimate of the Kennedy family.
950
  De Gaulle interfered less than he had in the earlier phases 
of the Berlin Crisis.  Now convinced Khrushchev was bluffing, de Gaulle worried more about 
Algeria and development of the French bomb.  His foreign minister Couve de Murville and 
Ambassador to the US Alphand enjoyed the general, but not complete, confidence of 
Washington. 
951
 The French were now less close than the West Germans to Washington.  
Schroeder was more businesslike than von Brentano had gotten, but was not always on the same 
page as Adenauer; Grewe was still not fully restored to confidence.
952
  Willy Brandt was also 
proving more inconsistent and independent than he had been previously, at least in US 
perception. 
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 The most important - difficult - personality was still Nikita Khrushchev.  Khrushchev  
vacillated between impulsive direct communications and calculated impersonal  statements.  His 
July 12 letter to Kennedy used the more formal plural voice.
953
  He noted recent Berlin tension, 
which he blamed on opponents of peace, and complained about US refusal to negotiate 
constructively.  He said the peace treaty could no longer be postponed; to forestall a crisis, he 
was offering a proposal that would "take into account the wishes of the United Sates on the 
question of the presence of its troops in West Berlin so far as those wishes are compatible with 
the task of completing a general settlement."   US troops could remain in West Berlin as part of a 
UN peacekeeping force while the peace treaty was being implemented.   Warsaw pact members 
would also be part of this UN "police military formation," to be phased out over four years.  
Then, Berlin would become an independent and neutral "open city."  Khrushchev cited the recent 
US-Soviet agreement on Laos, as an example of phased withdrawal they could build on.  Both 
sides had maintained reasonably good faith on Laos, though they reneged somewhat after 
Chinese intervention changed the situation.  Khrushchev dangled the prospect of a US-Soviet 
summit to sign a final resolution of the Berlin situation, based on the peace treaty.
954
  Dobrynin 
had hand delivered the note, but it was not presented as an official communication.  Rusk 
decided not to answer without careful consideration, nor share it with the Allies yet.  Other signs 
were suggesting that the peace treaty might indeed be on the horizon again.
955
 
 Dobrynin presented a formal and more detailed version of the same proposal to Rusk 
soon after.  Except for the new concession to Western prestige, it was the same as their original 
demands. 
956
 Rusk answered indirectly, saying Kennedy had come "into office as one of the few 
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young men in high position ... among the great powers. He was looking ahead for decades 
...taking a broad historical view."  Kennedy felt they faced a choice between  paths of "hostility 
and catastrophe, and that of improved understanding leading to more normal relationship." 
 Kennedy wanted to take the latter path.  Dobrynin said the Soviet Union also wanted 
peace, specifically eliminating the danger posed by troops in West Berlin.  Rusk asked why the 
Soviets chose just West Berlin, which put the Allies on a "slippery slope."
957
 Dobrynin objected 
to the phrase as inappropriate.  Rusk said if it was not the case, the Soviets would not be 
pursuing this course.  He said Dobrynin drew an unwarranted distinction between Soviet troops 
in East Germany and Allied troops in West Berlin.  Dobrynin demurred, saying Soviet troops 
could be thinned after the peace treaty.  They briefly discussed all-Berlin joint commissions, 
which Dobrynin again called a matter for the Germans to decide for themselves.  Rusk told 
Dobrynin he would be expecting more reciprocity when he met Gromyko in Geneva.   Dobrynin 
simply brought up the familiar demand for the end of occupation.  Rusk had his answer.
958
 
 Kennedy met with the Ambassador on July 17, telling him that he would soon be replying 
to Khrushchev.  The current Soviet proposal was inconsistent with the "vital interests" of the 
United States, which included its presence in West Berlin.  Dobrynin asked if he was concerned 
over American or German interests?  " A vital US interest, " replied the President, cautioning 
him not to doubt Western unity.  Dobrynin argued that Western troops posed a danger and 
should be removed.  Kennedy told him that withdrawal would be a "disaster" for the West, but 
continued occupation would not be so for the Soviets.   He said the crisis had already sparked a 
US defense buildup and demands in Europe for nuclear weapons; confrontation could produce 
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"results which  the Soviet Government would not like."
959
  Dobrynin said the Chairman would be 
disappointed by the US response. 
 Kennedy's July 17 letter to Khrushchev, while far from his last, began the close of the 
Berlin-related "pen pal" correspondence.  From its inception in the fall of 1961, both had hoped 
personal letters between heads of state could enhance the work of their foreign ministers and 
foster a personal bond lead to a productive summit.
960
  The letters did not have as much effect as 
actual meetings  but were generally friendly exchanges.  The intimate tone of the earlier letters 
had gotten tough, devolving into the "we" of Khrushchev's last note.  Kennedy's reply was 
equally formal.  He complained the Soviet offer was incompatible with US "vital interests." 
There could be no question of Western withdrawal but the way should be open for all-Berlin self 
determination.  He agreed Laos was a good starting point.  He also thought Berlin and 
disarmament issues did have some bearing on each other.  Berlin relaxation could only help 
disarmament talks.  They could start with small, concrete steps.  He hoped Gromyko would be 
prepared to do that in Geneva.
961
 
 The personal correspondence and foreign minister/ambassadorial meetings had not 
brought about an acceptable Berlin resolution.  On July 19, Kennedy learned that military 
contingency plans were still not operational.   Allied consultation had been minimal, plans poorly 
designed and not distributed, and mobilization not yet authorized.
962
  Kennedy was still not 
familiar with the master plan, which had grown out of Live Oak, now dubbed "Poodle Blanket,".   
The plan broke a potential crisis into four likely stages: access interference, outright blockade, 
conventional ground action, and nuclear military action.  Bundy explained that they were in 
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Phase I, harassment.  To respond during Phase II, a blockade situation, they would need to begin 
a military buildup now and it would take about two months.  Bundy said Soviet continuance of 
negotiations meant they need not rush into Phase II readiness.
963
  
  Thompson reported from Moscow that he too doubted Khrushchev would move before 
late fall.  Thompson considered a "play for summit conference or bilateral meeting with 
President Kennedy likely."  He thought the emphasis on the known-to-be-unacceptable issue of 
troop withdrawal was just for show. Said Thompson, Khrushchev now thought "successful 
negotiation impossible and is building up his position for signature of treaty."  He said 
Khrushchev may have moved some towards a test ban treaty, to preserve recent gains before the 
Americans could advance again.
964
   
 As well as he knew Khrushchev, even Thompson did not know, nor did Ambassador 
Dobrynin, that the Soviets were already preparing launching sites in  Cuba.  They would ship 
missiles with nuclear warheads beginning in just a few weeks.
965
  Because the Cubans demanded 
the surface-to-air missiles be installed first, the site-building and shipments were delayed by 
several weeks.  The harassment in Berlin and toughness in negotiations may indeed have been 




Rusk-Gromyko July meetings in Geneva 
 Rusk's meetings with Gromyko in Geneva from July 23-25 broke no new ground and 
provided no clear indication of Soviet intentions on Berlin nor the consequences of a peace 
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treaty.  Gromyko's negotiating line was tougher but cordial. 
967
  Rusk thought that Gromyko was 
"more moderate" when not speaking from prepared statements.  Gromyko seemed upset when at 
one point he thought Rusk had suggested suspending the talks.  Rusk made oblique references to 
what Kennedy and Khrushchev might say to each other face to face, but Gromyko did not "raise 
or pursue summit."  Rusk noted that when he told Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki it would be 
helpful "for those who have influence in Moscow to council moderation," Rapacki replied "you 
may be sure this is being done." Rusk thought the Western Ministers showed good unity, though 
they all agreed contingency plans needed urgent review.
968
   
 In his final session with Gromyko, Rusk expressed his frustration at endlessly repeating 
the same arguments.  He asked what could they "profitably say to each other at this point."   He 
said circumstances did not warrant a summit "there was danger two leaders reaching same point 
we are now ... would not be satisfactory to either side."  Gromyko said the problem was still 
Western insistence on the occupation of West Berlin.   His government had "suspended"  air 
harassment but received no thanks.  As for Rusk's pessimistic outlook for a summit, he said that 
was the Secretary's view but the Soviets would never accept perpetual occupation.  Rusk said the 
US had never used the term "perpetual." 
969
   
 The US, Rusk said, would uphold their responsibilities per their legal agreements.  He 
could not imagine the Soviets would simply turn over their responsibilities to Walter Ulbricht. 
"Prudence required not to translate Berlin problem into sole determining issue in US-USSR 
relations, " he said.  Progress was possible on other issues, but without "reciprocity" on Berlin, 
"it was indeed major issue between US-USSR."  Gromyko returned to standard Soviet arguments 
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about dangers of West German revanchism and the West Berlin regime's incompatibility with 
GDR sovereignty.  He would not commit to talks between their Deputy Foreign Ministers, 
whether quadripartite or bilateral.  Rusk had thought Gromyko too was signaling that 
negotiations  had run their course for time being, since the US would not yield its occupation.
970
 
 At this same time, Llewellyn Thompson was returning to Washington after nearly five 
years in Moscow.  He would retain the rank of Ambassador but would mainly advise Rusk and 
Kennedy on Soviet matters.  In his final meeting with Khrushchev, the Soviet chief said he 
should ask Kennedy "whether it would be better for him if Berlin question brought to a head 
before or after our Congressional elections. He did not want to make things more difficult for 
Kennedy and in fact wanted to help him."
971
  But Khrushchev also said he was disappointed at 
early reports from Gromyko in Geneva: "it was already clear our dialogue was coming to an 
end."  The Soviets  had to stand by their East German allies and that meant signing a separate 
treaty.  Thompson asked what he would do if Soviet troops were in a similar position. 
Khrushchev responded as expected: "sign the treaty and withdraw, " but Thompson thought the 
remark had "some effect."  The meeting was cordial, but Thompson thought Khrushchev 
"realized he had to move ahead and was deeply troubled."    
 Khrushchev repeatedly emphasized "this was the one problem standing in way of good 
relations ... I believe he is sincere in this."
972
  Thompson told Rusk he did not think Khrushchev 
would push the situation to the brink of war.  The West should quietly but visibly continue 
contingency planning and avoid provocative statements or actions.  Since Khrushchev was 
"likely" to bring his case to the UN, the US should try to line up neutral support to prevent 
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unacceptable compromises being forced on the West.  Thompson noted some Soviet movement, 
but also objections, to disarmament.
973
  He did not make references to next steps in negotiation. 
 While Thompson was correct in observing that the peace treaty was not imminent, he did 
not realize that the Soviets were beginning a new campaign of harassment.  The Western powers 
did conduct a post-Geneva review of their contingency planning.  Planning now emphasized 
diplomatic rather than military reaction, in hopes of minimizing the importance of a treaty.  A 
major problem in planning a military response was the peace treaty would probably be 
implemented in small incremental steps, which would difficult to respond to with appropriate 
force.  As long as the Soviets or East Germans did not take serious unilateral steps, the effects of 
the treaty might be easily managed.
974
   Rusk told Kennedy that the Western powers were now 
prepared to accept East German personnel substituting for Soviets in implementing existing 
ground access procedures.  Rusk papered over significant disagreements remaining between the 
Allies.  The Europeans still wanted early use of nuclear weapons if military operations became 
necessary, but balked at building up their conventional forces. 
 McNamara told Kennedy the Allies lacked "understanding [of] the effects of these 
[nuclear] weapons."  Kennedy asked why the Germans still lagged in their build-up and why 
Adenauer had not been more helpful with the French.  He asked if he could tell the Allies would 
agree to the early use of tactical nuclear weapons if they would build up to the 30-division level 
that was expected would hold off their opponents for several weeks.  Henry Kissinger had 
recently written that even 30 divisions might not be enough to support a tactical nuclear strategy. 
McNamara observed that early use would require getting all the heads of government to agree; 
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that would "require time and some conventional defensive efforts."
975
  As for a US buildup, 
McNamara wanted to wait for Congress's upcoming summer recess to lobby for support.  Not 
even the US was ready for major military action in Europe.   
 By early August 1962 neither diplomatic or military options for the Berlin problem 
appeared as viable solutions to the Berlin problem.  Continued French and West German 
objections limited flexibility and kept the US on its bilateral track.
976
  Neither the Thompson 
meetings, the "Pen-Pal" correspondence, or the Rusk-Dobrynin and Rusk-Gromyko meetings 
had broken new ground.  Nor did the 1962 Soviet focus on UN-flag occupation and the US focus 
on an interim modus vivendi solve the deadlock.  As Senator Mike Mansfield told Kennedy, lack 
of diplomatic progress and renewed Soviet-GDR harassments in Berlin effectively stalled the 
negotiating track.
977
  By early September, intelligence information about Soviet missile 
installations in Cuba shifted attention away from Berlin towards new problems.   
 
Conclusions 
 In the first half of 1962, the United States continued take the lead in negotiations with the 
Soviet Union on Berlin.  This bilateral diplomacy was conducted through back channel 
approaches, ambassadorial talks, and foreign minister meetings conducted during Geneva 
disarmament talks. The shift to bilateralism was reinforced by continued poor relations with its 
Allied partners and Soviet interest in negotiating with the strongest Western power, the US, 
which controlled their nuclear deterrent.  The Berlin Wall had partially stabilized the German 
situation, but harassments and Khrushchev's public demands for a peace treaty, well into early 
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summer 1962, created tensions only the United States made serious efforts to resolve.  The US 
became even more estranged from the other Allies, who were inflexible diplomatically and ill-
prepared militarily to resolve the Berlin problem.
978
  Britain receded in importance, France 
became more isolated from NATO and West Germany's role continued to be more important, a 
trend that had begun in the fall of 1961.  Differing positions on disarmament and atomic testing 
further divided the Allies and made US talks with the Soviets more vital.
979
   
 The Soviet Union had sharply different positions on disarmament as well, but its 
comparable nuclear strength made its arms-control dialogue with the United States effectively 
bilateral.  Costs and dangers of nuclear weapons, as well as public pressure, renewed interest in 
reconvening ENDC talks in Geneva in the spring of 1962.  The Geneva  talks, though 
multilateral, allowed new bilateral  dialogue.  Like the fall 1961 United Nations sessions, they 
provided an opportunity for discussions centering on Berlin.
980
  Both the US and USSR 
continued to link disarmament progress with Berlin.  Eastern harassments worsened at the same 
time, hindering progress on Berlin and disarmament.  Like Ambassador Thompson's discussions 
in Moscow in January and February, Rusk's Geneva talks with Gromyko in the spring and 
summer were formal and repetitious.  Negotiations became a delaying tactic for both sides, but  
disarmament, particularly a test ban, was finally emerging from the shadow of Berlin.
981
 
 By mid-1962, Berlin had lost its immediacy as an issue.  Talks had gone on too long, 
alliance partners were dissatisfied and domestic debates confused the issue till it became an 
indefinite threat.  Kennedy and Khrushchev, both frustrated and ready to find some way out to 
salvage prestige, were unready to attempt another summit or continue the "Pen Pal" 
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correspondence.  Real negotiation on Berlin effectively ended with the Rusk-Gromyko talks in 
July 1962, though Rusk and Kennedy continued to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin in the early 
fall to no effect.  Gromyko met with Rusk again in Washington in October, but neither side 
attempted new proposals on Berlin.  The Western ministers consulted with little more accord. 
 Despite late summer violence in Berlin, elimination of the Soviet commandant  and likely 
a peace treaty signing, the German issue had taken on the character of permanent siege not a 
gathering storm.
982
  The failure of negotiations indicated Berlin's lessening importance.  The 
discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba in early fall showed Berlin was being replaced by other 
concerns.  None of these developments signaled a renewal of the proto-detente seen in 1959 
through early 1961.  Nor did they restore Allied unity.  Berlin was a catalytic issue that brought 
the US, Allies, and Soviets, closer than they had been in years.  In 1962, Berlin divided the 
Allies again.  Despite their diplomatic attempts in 1962, Berlin ultimately divided the US and 
USSR.  After loss of faith caused by the Cuban missile crisis of late 1962,  Berlin negotiations 
would continue only as a ritual to appease Khrushchev. 
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Chapter Six: "A Slippery Slope," September 1962 - November 1963 
 
Introduction 
 Although new confrontations in Berlin followed the collapse of bilateral negotiations in 
the summer of 1962, Western leaders believed Khrushchev would not sign his separate peace 
treaty before the US elections in November.  Actions like eliminating the office of Soviet 
Commandant in Berlin were seen as incremental steps towards turning over their Berlin 
responsibilities to the German Democratic Republic and allowing the GDR to control access to 
West Berlin.
983
  Allied relations had frayed over the course of bilateral negotiation and there was 
little consensus on how to proceed.  As the West tried to improve its readiness for a conflict to 
maintain Berlin access, attention was diverted to unexpected developments in Cuba, now a 
Soviet ally.   
  Intelligence sources  had indicated in late July 1962 that Soviet surface to air missiles 
were being installed in Cuba. In September, analysts saw signs that medium-range ballistic 
missile sites  were also under construction.  By October 16, these rumors were confirmed and 
President Kennedy convened an 'Executive Committee' of advisors consider their options.
 984
   
Unlike the Berlin situation, the Cuban development placed the United States in immediate 
nuclear vulnerability.  The resulting confrontation brought the two superpowers closer  to general 
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war than even the tensest periods of the Berlin crisis so far.  Because the US now had little 
confidence in either Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko or Ambassador Dobrynin, negotiations 
were conducted largely through Robert Kennedy's Soviet backchannel Georgi Bolshakov.
985
  
During deliberations, President Kennedy and advisers gave serious consideration to how the 
missile crisis might affect the Berlin situation and vice versa.
986
  An exchange of notes between 
Khrushchev and Kennedy produced a settlement that humiliated the Soviet Chairman but did not 
provide the American president with a clear victory.  
 French refusal the next month to admit the British to the Common Market, an uneasy 
Kennedy-Macmillan summit in Nassau, and renewed difficulties with the West Germans made it 
unlikely by January 1963 that the Western allies could regroup to take advantage of 
Khrushchev's setback.
987
  Despite the damage done to Soviet prestige and credibility, 
Khrushchev continued to press his demands for Western withdrawal from Berlin and the peace 
treaty.
988
  Serious negotiations did not resume and the standoff contributed to a general decline in 
US-Soviet relations.  President Kennedy visited Berlin in May  1963.  This visit, with his famous 
"Ich bin ein Berliner" speech reaffirmed American commitment, but like Johnson's visit in 
August  1961, also served as tacit acknowledgement of a divided Germany.  Khrushchev visited 
East Berlin on June 28, to a much more reserved reception.
989
 
 The nuclear dangers of the Cuban missile crisis and resulting damage to public relations 
encouraged the superpowers to redouble their efforts for a test ban treaty, which was signed in 
July 1963.  By February, the Soviets de-linked Berlin and disarmament issues in hopes of 
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reviving negotiations on this issues, as well as recovering lost prestige.
990
  The Limited Test Ban 
treaty did not produce a summit and fell short of the comprehensive disarmament action hoped 
for by alliance partners and neutral nations.  America's increasing involvement in Vietnam and 
Soviet conflicts with the People's Republic of China distracted the superpowers. Khrushchev's 
continued insistence on his Berlin demands further discouraged the resumption of negotiations.  
Both sides increased their nuclear arsenals.
991
 With the assassination of President Kennedy in 
November 1963 and the sacking of Khrushchev in October 1964, US-Soviet negotiations fell 
into a decline that would last for the next five years. 
 
Dobrynin Signals Stalemate; New Berlin Harassments 
 Berlin negotiations had already stalled by late summer 1962, just as Berlin harassments 
became more serious.  Rusk told Lord Hood and Georg Lillienfeld, the British and West German 
ministers to the United States, that "exploratory talks and probes had about run their course."
992
  
On August 13, Dobrynin had told Rusk that the Soviets could not agree to a Deputy Foreign 
Ministers Conference "since it would give the appearance of negotiations which in fact would 
have no real chance of success." Such a conference, he said, "would actually delay settlement."  
Dobrynin noted Rusk had told Gromyko in Geneva that he could not imagine what they would 
discuss.   Rusk objected, saying that the US "general principles" paper, first submitted in March, 
provided a basis for discussion.  He said Western support for the Deputy Ministers conference 
was not a delaying tactic but a positive step.  Rusk said the four occupation commandants should 
meet to work out problems, particularly incidents at the Wall.   
993
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 With the Soviet rejection of a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference, the door was out 
closed to further substantive negotiation for the foreseeable future.  France and Germany were 
not prepared to hold another East-West Foreign Ministers Conference or attempt a summit.
994
  In 
August, Foy Kohler replaced  Thompson in Moscow.  Robert Kennedy and Averill Harriman 
objected to Kohler's appointment, saying Kohler was unimaginative and dull.  Rusk and his State 
Department colleagues valued Kohler highly, as had Dulles.  He had spent time in the Soviet 
Union, as well as working closely with the Allied working groups, and been involved in the 
Berlin crisis from the beginning.
995
  Kohler had the Soviets' respect and had been involved in 
many high level discussions on Berlin over the previous three and half years.  He did not and 
never would have Khrushchev's confidence to the same high degree as his predecessor.
996
  
Dobrynin would continue to meet in Washington with Kennedy and Rusk over the coming 
weeks, but their exchanges became cooler and more formal, as Berlin harassments increased.   
 Khrushchev authorized the increasing Berlin harassments to turn up the pressure on the 
West.
997
  Gromyko had told his translator in Geneva not to say that the  Soviets had "stopped" air 
interference but only "suspended" it.   That air harassment had been a dangerous aggravation, but 
did not produce the sharp public alarm as did increasing brutality at the Wall.  On August 13, the 
East Germans shot a young refugee, Peter Fechter, at Checkpoint Charlie (Friedrichstrasse 
Crossing).  He was left to die in view of the West Berliners, who responded with mobs throwing 
rocks at the busses carrying guards for the Soviet War memorial.  Kennedy was angry at the 
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shooting and indecisive Western reaction, and at the stoning as well.
998
  The West strongly 
protested but were met by indifferent responses from the Soviet Commandant.    
 West Berlin public sentiment was turning against the Allies because of their moderate 
response to the shooting.  The Soviets bristled at their war memorial guards being  escorted by 
Western troops, but angry crowds were heckling all of them.
999
  Norstad told McNamara that 
events had gone beyond "the limits of the local military and political situation in Berlin" and 
"constituted an offense against humanity.  He wanted to be able to offer medical assistance, even 
if it required force to intervene, but without the Soviets taking such action as a "challenge."
1000
  
In Bonn, Adenauer told Ambassador Dowling that the Allies needed to show they were prepared 
to intervene: "Do it soon ... and let the people of West Berlin know."
1001
 
  Tensions rose even more when the Soviets unexpectedly "liquidated" their office of 
occupation commander in East Berlin on August 22.  Allied observers saw this as a critical first 
step in turning over their responsibilities for Berlin to the East Germans.  The immediate effects 
might be minimal but would set the stage for reducing the authority of the Allied Commandants 
in West Berlin and erode the basis for its occupation troops.
1002
  Kennedy's military advisors saw 
trouble in parsing the level of acceptable provocations.  General Taylor's assistant Lawrence 
Legere said the "vital interest" logic could lead to acceptance of 'non-vital' Checkpoint Charlie's 
closing because counter-actions like denying Soviet access to the war memorial could lead to 
closure of the 'vital' access corridor.  Légere said the West "should not back down one inch."  He 
added, with emphasis: "Above all, General Clay is so eternally right when he says that if we 
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stand up to them like men they will back down, not bomb New York and Washington." 
1003
  The 
President's Cabinet advisors were more temperate, but recognized that the Soviets were taking 
provocations to an new level.  Dobrynin did not seem very alarmed.  Bundy told Kennedy's 
counselor Ted Sorenson to tell the Ambassador that the Soviets should not "confuse our 
calmness and good manners with any weakening of our determination whatsoever."
1004
   
 In truth, the West, primarily due to US leadership, had consistently downplayed 
confrontations since the February 1959 convoy detention at Marienborn.  Even Western reaction 
to the Wall had been muted.  The sole significant exception had been Clay's tank standoff at 
Checkpoint Charlie almost a year earlier.  In those periods, negotiation was still considered a 
viable alternative.  With negotiations  in limbo, a new uncertainty accompanied incident 
response.
1005
  In a meeting with his Berlin working group on August 28, Kennedy tried to work 
out some measures which might make the Soviets relent without pushing them to tougher 
actions.  Recommended measures included not just limited access to the war memorial and  
restricted transit, but denial of any access by Soviet soldiers to West Berlin.
1006
  They would 
need to review these measures with the other Allied powers, a difficult and not-secure process. 
The President decided this would not be a good time to send General Clay back to Berlin, 
especially after Clay told Rusk that he and other US officers opposed thinning their  troop 
presence.  Kennedy's advisors were correct in noting that the Soviets very much wanted 
continued access to West Berlin.
1007
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 Allied unity on response plans was far from ideal but still encouraging to Washington. 
The Germans were now proving cooperative and the French not too much trouble.  Western 
planners decided to adopt their own incremental strategy to limit Soviet access piecemeal, to 
stymie a broader response.  Also encouraging was Khrushchev's statement in Russia to visiting 
Secretary of the Interior Morris Udall that there would be no peace treaty before the US 
election.
1008
  That news provided breathing room for the contingency planners.  It also served to 
camouflage Khrushchev's operations in Cuba.  That operation was now just days away from 
being discovered.  Khrushchev would pay a heavy price for his Berlin brinksmanship.  Not only 
had he conducted negotiations in bad faith, he had authorized inhumane tactics in Berlin and 
brought tensions in central Europe to dangerous levels.
1009
  Now that the negotiation had been 
suspended, the US would be very cautious about renewing them. 
 
The Missile Crisis 
 The bilateral US-Soviet negotiations over Berlin in the first part of 1962 helped define an 
emerging superpower relationship accentuated by an imbalance of strength with weak and often 
disagreeing partners.  The Allies' confused reaction to new Berlin harassment in August-
September 1962 and Walter Ulbricht's continued demands on Khrushchev for stronger support 
created new pressure to salvage what was left of the bilateral dialogue.
1010
  The Soviets had 
hinted they would that they would turn to the UN for support of their new idea to allow Western 
troops to remain temporarily in Berlin  under a UN flag and alongside East Bloc troops. 
1011
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 Though the UN General Assembly did not consider this potentially troublesome proposal, 
their sessions did bring Gromyko  to New York.  Khrushchev indicated to Ambassador Kohler in 
Moscow  that he too might travel to New York after the US elections to talk to Kennedy about a 
test ban agreement.  He said he did want to consult about Berlin, but complained that Kennedy 
had lately been provocative. For the first time since the planning of the Paris summit, 
Khrushchev was - apparently - giving disarmament issues  parity with the Berlin question, but 
still linking progress on the latter with the former. Khrushchev declined to discuss Berlin, or the 
missiles in Cuba, pending Gromyko's talks with Kennedy  in Washington.
1012
   
 Gromyko was very cordial to the President. conveying personal greetings from 
Khrushchev, noticeably absent from a strident late September  letter.
1013
  The Soviet minister 
assured Kennedy there would be no peace treaty before the elections, but the Berlin problem 
needed to be resolved according to Soviet terms: "in those circumstances, disarmament would 
also be easier to solve."  Gromyko offered a summit, but was adamant that Western troops must 
leave Berlin.  Kennedy said he would be happy to meet with Khrushchev if he came over for the 
UNGA sessions but, "it would be a mistake to describe such a meeting as dealing with a peace 
treaty and West Berlin, since others were involved in these matters and more formal discussions 
would be required." 
1014
  Kennedy worried later that he should have brought up the missiles and 
made plain that there could be no summit in the present situation.  Rusk and Thompson told the 
President he had been prudent.
1015
  Anatoly Dobrynin has recalled that Gromyko thought "it 
could well have been his most difficult conversation of all with nine American presidents."
1016
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    Gromyko's own meeting with Rusk was equally inconclusive; the Soviets offered an 
international arbitration authority for access and air, the Americans asked only for respect of 
existing arrangements.  At one point, when Gromyko was again talking of how the occupation 
agreements were obsolete, Rusk said they needed to "take the peels off the banana and to look at 
the heart of the matter. The Soviet Union was a great power and so was the United States." 
1017
  
Rusk, usually very careful to speak in multilateral Western Alliance terms, was acknowledging 
that the superpowers might not be able to decide the Berlin question themselves but bore the 
greatest responsibility for its resolution.   He again invoked mutual recognition and respect for 
"vital interests."   But each made bitter historical references and mainly repeated their stock 
arguments, with only token mention of the access mechanisms or other concrete business. 
Though Rusk and Gromyko skirted around Cuba, White House planners were already 
considering possible implications - and options - for the Berlin situation.
1018
 
 By October 22, international press disclosure of the Cuban missiles had usurped Berlin's 
centrality in the public eye.  The Cuban situation complicated the problems of  Allied military 
planning for Berlin, and vice versa.   Paul Nitze told the Western Ambassadorial Group, "one of 
the reasons for the use of 'quarantine' and not 'blockade' is to avoid the connection Khrushchev is 
trying to make between Berlin and Cuba." 
1019
 Nitze also thought  Khrushchev remained as 
determined as ever to proceed with his separate treaty.  He said that planners had anticipated 
possible trouble in other regions and Berlin planning needn't be rethought. Berlin had  about six 
months of reserves to withstand a possible blockade; it would take the US about six weeks to 
mobilize and transport reinforcements.  Nitze's estimate would have been over-optimistic since 
the extent of the hazards and possible response increased over the following days. 
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 The missile sites had been identified with the help of Soviet mole Igor Penkovsky who 
had been providing Washington with essential intelligence about Soviet missile systems for over 
a year.  His information had been used for Roswell Gilpatric's October 1962 expose of slow 
Soviet missile production.  U2 over-flight photography revealed images similar to Penkovsky's 
pictures of MRBM and IRBM launching sites in Russia. 
1020
 It was also learned that missile-
laden Soviet ships en route to Cuba.  Some missiles were probably operational. Kennedy chose 
not to respond immediately with an attack on Cuba., but instead ordered a naval blockade which 
deflected most of the Soviet vessels.
1021
  Cuban SAM's took out a U2 and increased pressure for 
various levels of invasion and airstrikes.
1022
  
 Kennedy chose a core group of advisors, the Executive Committee, or ExComm,  mainly 
from the NSC, to deal with the Cuban crisis..  The group included Vice President Johnson, 
Secretaries Rusk, Dillon and McNamara, JCS Chair General Maxwell Taylor, Ambassadors 
Thompson, Bohlen and Stevenson, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and his aide 
Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson who had been distanced by the White House for his hard-line attitudes 
on Berlin, and others.
1023
  As a sign of his increasing foreign policy influence, Robert Kennedy 
was also included.    This group advised on military responses, which ranged simple blockade to 
nuclear strikes.  As tentative offers appeared from Moscow, they also advised on settlement 
terms.
1024
   
 Khrushchev had thought up his Cuban plan in response to his perceived humiliation over 
the fact that his Berlin demands were not accepted, but he also had in mind NATO missiles in 
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  These missiles were first-generation Jupiters, already outdated.  The West could give 
them up and lose little strategically, but open acceptance of such an offer would have nearly 
broken US-Turkish relations.  Removal of those missiles would also ease Khrushchev's general 
fears of encirclement and provided a consolation offering to his Central Committee colleagues.  
Bohlen and Thompson noted the Cuba-Turkey missile linkage, but thought Khrushchev's main 
Cuban objective was leverage on Berlin.
1026
 
 The President faced a basic choice: negotiation or forcible response.  The first option, 
including possible Berlin linkages, received only brief consideration.   Diplomatic relations 
would not be suspended but would be minimal. When confronted with the photographs, 
Ambassador Dobrynin, who had not been informed of the operation, was embarrassed but 
insisted they must be forgeries.
1027
  He communicated his government's instructions on Cuba as 
faithfully as he did on Berlin.  Because Dobrynin had not officially been in the loop on the 
operation, Washington now had some doubt as to his authority.
1028
  When Kennedy announced 
the discovery of the missiles and the quarantine in a television address on October 22, 
Khrushchev realized that the element of surprise was lost.  He would not be able to use 
successfully installed missiles as a bargaining chip in the private sessions with Kennedy he had 
hoped to hold before years' end.  But he did not respond to Kennedy's quarantine announcement 
with a Berlin blockade or any other military action.
1029
   
 Because the US now little confidence in official diplomatic channels. Khrushchev began 
to open backchannels, first by KGB operative and Embassy aide Aleksandr Feklisov through US 
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 The Soviet floated a simple offer of a missile withdrawal for a US non-
invasion pledge.  When the US took its time in responding and proceeded with the naval 
blockade, Soviet embassy aide and agent Georgi Bolshakov approached Robert Kennedy with 
private messages from Khrushchev for the President.  ExComm was divided between factions 
favoring reliance on the quarantine to block further missile shipments as opposed to those 
wanting immediate invasion and airstrikes.
1031
 The Bolshakov backchannel was used for further 
exploratory offers and demands, with Dobrynin as the official channel for messages.  Soviet 
ships, all but one, turned back at the quarantine by October 25, but missile sites already on the 
island were becoming operational.  In Cuba, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara advocated launching 
the missiles, either ignorant or averse to the consequences. At the Kremlin, Khrushchev was 
already admitting defeat and figuring how best to cut his losses.
1032
 
 On October 26, , the Soviets offered, through the Feklisov-Scali channel, a withdrawal 
and non-invasion deal.  The next morning Khrushchev upped his bid, publicly announcing by 
radio an offer to that demanded withdrawal of the US missiles in Turkey.
1033
  Kennedy decided 
that the out-of-date Jupiters were not worth the risk of nuclear war and agreed to Khrushchev's 
amended terms, on condition the Turkish-missile  proviso be kept secret and delayed for a few 
months.  Khrushchev eagerly accepted on October  28.  While Robert Kennedy and others close 
to the president were very pleased with the outcome, the Joint Chiefs of State were not happy.  
They felt Kennedy had settled far too easily and set a dangerous precedent.
1034
 
 When the settlement  was reached on the 28th, Bundy advisor David Klein thought 
Khrushchev might be ready to come to terms on Berlin, but only if the US made the initiative..  
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Ruling out a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting as unwise, and talks with Gromyko who was now 
"discredited," Klein suggested Thompson/Dobrynin talks.
1035
 The Soviets quickly indicated they 
were not ready to compromise their Berlin demands.  Khrushchev  wrote Kennedy on October 
30, saying the USSR was withdrawing its  missiles and the Il-28 bombers, though he said the 
latter posed no threat and the quarantine should be lifted immediately.  He said now was the time 
to make the world more peaceful.  The German peace treaty was the place to start, followed by 
dissolution of their military alliances, adoption of a non-aggression pact in Europe and 
admittance of China to the United Nations.
1036
  On November 6, Kennedy replied that the 
Soviets had to complete their withdrawal of  all offensive weapons system before the US and 
USSR  could move on to other matters. The President made no mention of future meetings 
between them or any other negotiations. 
1037
 Berlin had finally been de-prioritized in US-Soviet 
relations. 
 
Attempts to Restart Berlin Negotiations After Cuban Crisis 
 Nevertheless, the US was considering how they could use the situation to meaningfully 
restart Berlin negotiations and restore Allied unity.  Dean Acheson had visited de Gaulle  during 
the crisis to show him photographs of the missile sites; this consultation was greatly appreciated 
and helped to repair relations with the French.
1038
  In Washington, new options were advanced 
for Berlin talks.  These included NATO-Warsaw Pact mutual strategic arms reduction, GDR 
jurisdiction over East Germany in exchange for FRG political union with the FRG, concessions 
to the Peoples Republic of China, and mutual pledges not to provide military support for the 
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   These ideas would require getting Allied and domestic political support, which 
would be difficult.  De Gaulle complained to Macmillan, though, that, Acheson's visit 
notwithstanding, France and Britain had been inadequately consulted.  De Gaulle suggested that 
now was the time for the tripartism he had advocated since 1958.
1040
  Washington's disregard for 
its European partners did not bode well for Berlin negotiations.  At the least, they should try to 
nail down a modus vivendi agreement to ensure stability for the foreseeable future.  Thompson 
remained skeptical of trying to restart negotiations, saying they could just stir up trouble.
1041
   
 If talks were mandated, the West might offer some minor concessions  such as modifying 
the legal status of the occupation troops and making the GDR signatories to new access 
arrangements, mutual elimination of  propaganda and espionage operations, and no attempts to 
incorporate West Berlin into the FRG. These could be matched by Soviet acceptance of the 
Western troops and secure access arrangements.
1042
 Another option was a lease proposal for 
Berlin access, similar to an arrangement the Soviets had in Finland.  The lease would be 
combined with troop withdrawals, to be replaced by a "police-force" of their own choosing.  
Thompson suggested a package of de facto recognition of the GDR, pledges against FRG 
incorporation, a UN presence, elimination of espionage and propaganda apparatus, anti-nuclear 
pledges, East Berlin access rights and other sweeteners were considered.  Soviet concessions 
might include accepting continued Western troops, no Soviet presence in West Berlin, no 
espionage/propaganda/nuclear weapons in East Berlin.  Khrushchev could then sign his peace 
treaty if he wanted, without effect on West Berlin.
1043
  Bundy was also considering all-Berlin/all-
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German plebiscite ideas, disarmament linkage, bilateral cooperation agreements between the US 
and Soviets, and short and long range interim plans.  The problem remained though of securing 
Allied agreement, as well as Soviet approval.
1044
 
  In early November, Rusk thought there was still a chance Khrushchev would still 
come to the UN session and try to meet with Kennedy before he proceeded with the peace treaty.  
Khrushchev again advanced his idea, through British Ambassador Frank Roberts on October 12, 
of allowing some Western troops to stay under a UN flag. Lord Hood told Rusk the British had 
no intention of "being drawn in to bilateral discussions with the Soviets on Berlin."  They were 
however, hopeful that negotiations might re-open.
1045
  Kennedy had closely consulted Britain 
and France, contrary to de Gaulle's complaints.  Macmillan hoped to capitalize on that 
rapprochement, especially since he wanted Kennedy's support in other areas like the EEC and 




 In Washington, Khrushchev's UN proposal was seen by the State Department as an 
indication that he wanted to resume Berlin negotiations and shift toward detente.
1047
  Soviet 
Embassy Counselor Georgi Kornienko told Martin Hillenbrand, director of Kennedy's Berlin 
task force, that a Kennedy-Khrushchev summit should be arranged.
1048
 Adenauer visited 
Washington in mid-November and told the President that Khrushchev would take new talks as a 
sign of weakness.  The Chancellor noted the Alliance had problems, namely de Gaulle's serious 
political distractions.  Kennedy said another problem was the FRG's failure to make agreed upon 
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purchases from the US; the dollar drain to Germany could not be ignored. He agreed, though, 
that the French and West Germans would be consulted before talks resumed.
 1049
 
  Khrushchev elected not to travel to the US, perhaps sensing he should not press Kennedy 
too hard when there were still Soviet Il-28 bombers and troops in Cuba.  Kennedy was angry that 
Khrushchev was waffling on their removal. Instead, the more diplomatic Mikoyan visited 
Washington in mid-November.
1050
  As in January 1959, the Soviets may have hoped Mikoyan, 
level-headed and diplomatic and with high authority, might be able to build trust where 
Khrushchev could not.  Meeting with Rusk, along with Thompson and Dobrynin, Mikoyan 
started with the timely, if disingenuous, topic of nuclear non-proliferation, but soon brought up 
Germany.  The USSR's position was unchanged - there must be a peace treaty soon and the 
occupation troops had to leave.  They could remain for a short period as part of a UN force, but 
Berlin must become a free city as Khrushchev had demanded in November 1958.  Though 
Mikoyan "disclaimed any intention of conducting  negotiation, the US should understand "the 
seriousness of this issue for the USSR."
1051
   
 In Moscow, Kohler told Semenov that he was encouraged by Soviet acknowledgement 
that the Cuban crisis had implications for Berlin. Semenov said Mikoyan and Khrushchev had 
brought up disarmament.  However, he said, although the Cuban crisis had been solved, FRG 
provocations stymied a Berlin solution.  Kohler did not rise to this bait and emphasized 
American interest in practical measures for a peaceful situation in Berlin.  Their exchange 
quickly reverted to boilerplate language.   Kohler noted that Khrushchev had spoken to British 
Ambassador Frank Roberts, but no arrangements were made for further talks.
1052
 The Americans  
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however, no longer seriously believed in any more Berlin negotiation than necessary to ward off 
the peace treaty.   
 Acting JCS Chairman General Curtis LeMay told McNamara that military leaders now 
favored the West turning over its responsibilities for Berlin to the FRG, just as the Soviets had 
done with the GDR.  With access guarantees, Berlin would then become a German problem.  He 
thought FRG and West Berlin were inclined to this solution.   This arrangement would probably 
not have been acceptable to the Soviets.  LeMay was correct in noting that that Germanys might 
have to work out their problems themselves.
1053
  Khrushchev wrote Kennedy on December 11 in 
a friendlier tone, but still blaming Adenauer for the Berlin impasse.
1054
   
 French and West German resistance to a negotiated Berlin settlement was as much a 
problem as Soviet intractability. The Germans wanted a nuclear capability Kennedy would not 
grant. 
1055
Although the British were more cooperative, and always interested in negotiation, they 
had difficult relations with the French.  Kennedy and Macmillan had hoped to find common 
ground on Berlin at their bilateral summit in Nassau in December, but were distracted by 
Gaulle's early December decision against British entry into the Common Market with West 
German assent.
1056
 The British thought some UN involvement would be "useful in any plan for 
settlement."
1057
  Macmillan was also disappointed by US reluctance to proceed in joint 
development of nuclear delivery systems.  The promised Skybolt surface to ground missile 
system had been scaled back and then cancelled. US offers of a partial Polaris submarine missile 
system helped Kennedy  patch up the rift but British confidence in America suffered.
 1058
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 The French were already displeased at the Americans for refusing to share missile 
delivery systems.  They now had their own bomb and wanted an independent  nuclear  deterrent; 
NATO and the proposed multilateral force seemed too dominated by the Americans.
1059
  On the 
other hand, NATO partners like the Belgians and Italians did not welcome de Gaulle's dream of a 
trilateral US-British-French alliance determining Western Europe security. The West Germans 
were able to exert leverage with both the French and British hoping to get their cooperation.  
Bonn decided Paris made a better partner, and signed a Franco-German Treaty of Friendship on 
January 21, 1963.  The treaty did not interfere with NATO  obligations, but was seen in 




The US in a Bilateral Environment  
 With the refusal to admit Britain to the EEC, the signing of the Franco-German Treaty, 
and the US cancellation, of the Skybolt Treaty, Allied relations were too poor to sustain new 
Berlin negotiations. The Soviets were still expecting discussions geared towards an interim troop 
presence under UN auspices, leading to a "free city," but they expressed little urgency.
1061
  On 
January 26, 1963, Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler that the Soviet Union wanted to reopen 
talks.  He also wanted to protest an American embargo on  large-diameter steel pipe sales to the 
USSR.
1062
  The FRG was cool to the new Soviet offer, as were the French.  Kennedy told Rusk, 
Thompson and Dowling that without Allied support, the US might have to tell the Soviets "we 
could not carry on with the talks." Rusk said the US should proceed anyway "if only to keep the 
Berlin situation under control.  Thompson agreed, because otherwise the Soviets could increase 
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pressure Berlin and force the US  into discussions.  Kennedy decided to delay response pending 
consultation with the West Germans.
 1063
    
 With only a months left in office and too frail to fight, Adenauer did not object to new 
talks since the Soviets had made the overture.  The FRG's emerging new leadership was very 
cautious about Berlin negotiation, especially given their new entente with the French.  Kennedy 
still urged their participation, and tried to assure them that the United States would not undertake 
new talks without some expectation of improvement.
1064
  The United States did pursue those 
talks with the Soviets in spring and summer 1963, but alone and without improving the Berlin 
situation. Their disarmament dialogue, however, revived, with good progress toward a test ban, 
with Khrushchev finally willing, in January 1963,  to accept two detection stations in both the 
US and USSR. 
1065
  
 That concession sparked new hopes for a test-ban, further encouraged by a Soviet 
invitation for US disarmament chief Glenn Seaborg to visit the Soviet Union in May 1962 and 
meet Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev.  Brezhnev said Seaborg should tell Kennedy that 
Khrushchev really did want peaceful cooperation.  Seaborg and Kennedy thought Khrushchev 
was sending a positive message on disarmament.
1066
 Brezhnev had been a Khrushchev protégé 
but was already plotting a coup.   He had an interest in arms-control and disapproved of wasting 
time on Berlin.  He was still counted publically as Khrushchev's ally, and his messages were 
construed to indicate Khrushchev wanted negotiations that might not be contingent on his Berlin 
demands. 
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New Bilateral Talks with the Soviets 
 Kohler began new meetings with Gromyko in Moscow in February. Rusk advised him to 
avoid any discussion of Berlin.  If Gromyko insisted, Kohler should look for any sign of 
relaxation on troop withdrawals as a sign of serious Soviet intent to find an agreement. 
1067
 
Thompson remained cautious, speculating that Khrushchev might still be hoping for "a major 
UN responsibility."  Khrushchev also still had to deal with pressure from Walter Ulbricht and 
wanted to keep the Allies at odds with each other.  Since the US was indicating no more 
flexibility on his basic demands, and Khrushchev was not interested in an interim modus vivendi, 
further talks could provide diplomatic cover to insulate a treaty signing from military 
confrontation.  Thompson suggested the US should avoid serious discussion of the 'UN flag' 
proposal.  Instead, Gromyko should be asked again what was the real danger in having Western 
troops in West Berlin.
1068
   
 Rusk and Dobrynin began new talks in Washington on March 26, 1963.  Dobrynin noted 
that the East and West had been discussing a "peace settlement" and "normalizing" West Berlin: 
"the parties succeeded in reaching definite results on well known questions."  Western troops 
were still unacceptable but could remain a short while longer under the UN flag.  Rusk asked 
why UN troops shouldn't be in East Berlin too?   He said "to think of Berlin as a NATO base is 
not realistic on either military or political grounds."  He emphasized the basic Four-Power 
responsibility for Berlin as a stabilizing factor.  Dobrynin said that arrangement was obsolete: 
"West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin exist as separate states."   The Soviet Union, he 
said, was not opposed to German reunification, but first Western troops had to leave Berlin and 
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the separate treaty signed,  West Berlin would exist as a "separate state," with no political ties to 
the FRG.  The UN would oversee the transition.
1069
 
 How long would that take, asked Rusk, noting the Soviets had suggested four years; there 
was also the question of a UN flag for East Berlin.  Dobrynin  said the Americans were well 
aware the USSR considered East Berlin to be East German territory.  Rusk said the West had as 
much responsibility for East Berlin  as the Soviets had for West Berlin.  They should start their 
negotiations with a systematic review of their positions.
1070
  By not presenting a new proposal, 
on access or any other subject, the Secretary was indicating to the Soviets that the US would 
offer no new substantive concessions.  On the Soviet side, the UN idea dated back at least to the 
previous summer. 
 Rusk told de Gaulle that a Berlin solution was only possible through concessions 
unacceptable to the West.  The West should maintain its "present military and diplomatic 
positions."
1071
  He did not think the Soviets were in much of a hurry.  In his talks with Dobrynin 
on March 26  and April 12, Rusk chided the Ambassador for misleading Soviet statements 
indicating agreements had been reached already.   He complained the Soviets had offered 
nothing new or acceptable. They also briefly discussed nuclear nonproliferation. The talks in 
Washington with Dobrynin had already reverted back to the pro forma rituals of 1962. 
1072
  They 
would remain so for several more months, with almost no change in their positions or arguments. 
 Khrushchev was still determined to wrest Berlin from Western occupation, but he had 
other problems in the summer of 1963.  Continued agricultural failures produced food shortages 
and left dust-bowls.  New increases in military spending, to make up the 'missile gap' revealed by 
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Gilpatric, sapped resources for consumer goods production.  Castro was still unhappy with 
Soviet terms in the missile crisis and was flirting with the Red Chinese. 
1073
 Mao was openly 
attacking the policy of 'peaceful coexistence' and not cooperating in Southeast Asia.  Military 
skirmishes had broken out on the long Siberian frontier with China.   Hard-line opposing 
factions, at first led by onetime lieutenant, Frol Kozlov and then by Leonid Brezhnev, criticized 
his moves in the Central Committee.  Mikoyan remained Khrushchev's ally, but had argued 
against both the Cuban and Berlin operations from the start.
1074
 
 Khrushchev asked the advice of former American Ambassador, Averill Harriman, then 
visiting in Moscow.  Khrushchev downplayed the importance of a peace treaty; all the Soviets 
wanted was the "normalization" of Berlin. Harriman told the Chairman he should leave Berlin 
alone then and "come to an agreement on a test ban."   He should also get the Chinese on board; 
Khrushchev said Harriman should talk to them himself.  Harriman said he'd tried already but 
Mikoyan blocked it.  Khrushchev replied: "Mikoyan was not the foreign minister of China and 
could not get Harriman into China," a veiled reference perhaps to Moscow's growing 
estrangement from Peking.
1075
  Khrushchev would take Harriman's advice on the test ban, but 
was not prepared yet to give up on his German program.  He told Harriman: "I will give you my 
word that I will find a basis for a test ban agreeable to both sides provided you agree to work out 
the basis for a German settlement which would recognize the two Germanies as they now exist" 
Harriman said he "would not buy a pig in a poke."
1076
  The two issues had to be discussed 
separately.  Khrushchev joked that Harriman was "an old diplomat who knew how to talk 
without saying anything." 
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 The new US and Soviet ambassadors, Kohler and Dobrynin, carried out rote recitals on 
Berlin.  In a Rusk meeting with Dobrynin, Berlin had been mentioned only in passing, with most 
discussion about testing and disarmament issues. Rusk said the Soviets had asked for new talks 
but were not "pressing" hard for progress. They had proposed a  NATO-Warsaw Pact non-
aggression pact (NAP), which Rusk said he hoped would not turn out to be another Briand-
Kellogg pact. the Allies would later regret.  Dobrynin seemed more interested in the NAP than in 
Berlin this time, perhaps hoping for an agreement on something they could present to the world 
as good faith diplomacy.
1077
      
 At a NATO meeting in Ottawa in May, Rusk discussed Berlin with Lord Home, 
Schroeder, and de Murville.  Rusk noted Khrushchev's troubles at home, among the Warsaw 
Pact, and with the Chinese.  Lord Home said Gromyko seemed very interested in a NAP.  De 
Murville said a NAP could lead to GDR recognition. Schroeder it was obviously very important 
to the Soviets since they had introduced it at Geneva, "Khrushchev thinks he invented the NAP 
in Geneva in 1955".  Rusk noted liberalization among the Warsaw Pact satellites might make the 
NAP more worth the West's attention now. Rusk told Home that Dobrynin had indicated 
acceptance of an NAP might facilitate a Berlin settlement, except the Soviets did not seem very 
interested in discussing Berlin. De Murville said "it is certainly not in the Western interest to stop 
a move toward a detente if there is a possibility for one."  They all agreed developments in 
Moscow needed to be closely watched.
1078
  Hardliner Frol Kozlov's demotion in April 1963 
reduced pressure on Khrushchev for toughness on Berlin.
1079
 
 One promising development in the Kremlin was the growing momentum for a test ban.  
In addition to conveying a message through Seaborg's meeting with Brezhnev, Khrushchev 
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received a message from Kennedy through American journalist Norman Cousins in April 1962. 
According to Glenn Seaborg, Khrushchev overplayed Soviet insistence on only two inspections, 
but sent a clear signal that he was willing to make further concessions.  Khrushchev was now 
prepared to seriously consider further Western proposals for a treaty.  Harold Macmillan 
suggested to Kennedy they try a summit on arms control.  Though that was unlikely, they did 
send a joint letter  to Khrushchev, urging him to accept an emissary like Harriman to negotiate a 
test-ban treaty.  Khrushchev replied disagreeably at the end of May, but said he was prepared to 
accept a representative for talks that summer.
 1080
   
 Kennedy issued a public call for better relations, including nuclear arms control, with the 
Russians in a June 9 speech at American University.  The speech was designed to encourage 
Khrushchev's cooperation at a time when the Chinese were pressuring him for a tougher stance 
against the United States.  Khrushchev appreciated Kennedy's speech and, on June 20, approved 
a 'hot line' direct telephone/teletype link with the United States for better crisis communications.  
Khrushchev would be less enthusiastic about Kennedy's remarks a week later in Berlin.
1081
   
 
 
Kennedy in Berlin 
 Kennedy decided to visit Europe again in early June to repair Allied relations through 
personal diplomacy.  He wanted to go to West Berlin as a public show of US support.
1082
  CIA 
reports from June 7 and June 14 indicated that the West Berlin morale was good. The Soviets 
were still attempting to "establish a foothold" in the westernmost sectors.  They had less official 
presence in East Berlin, having turned over many occupation duties to the GDR.   The Soviets 
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wanted fewer restrictions on their transit to the Soviet War memorial in West Berlin, as well as 
more non-military contacts.  They hoped to promote an image of an "independent" West Berlin, 
that could still lead to a free city arrangement.
1083
  State Department analysts thought the Soviets 
and East Germans were preparing to formally incorporate East Berlin into the GDR.  That 
incremental move would not have "dramatic" effect, but could hinder access and undermine 
West German confidence in the Allies.
1084
 
 In Moscow Deputy Foreign Minister Zorn told Kohler that Kennedy 's plan to visit West 
Berlin was a provocation by Adenauer and would not help Berlin discussions.   The Chancellor's 
official FRG presence in West Berlin was unacceptable.  When Kohler met again with Zorn, the 
Ambassador said that Soviet distinctions between the GDR and FRG were not founded in fact or 
law.  The Soviets did not press their objections further.
1085
  In fact, Kennedy's visit  was not an 
official state visit to either West Berlin or West Germany.  It was a goodwill visit, intended to 
show solidarity.   Economic Minister Erhard would shortly succeed Adenauer and would also 
have to be cultivated.  The US would not use the visit to pressure the German leaders, but take 
clear positions on the MLF, trade issues, including British entry into the Common Market, and 
balance of payments.  Kennedy could expect to hear much about reunification hopes.
1086
 
 Kennedy and Rusk arrived in Bonn on June 21, 1963.  The president met with the 
Chancellor alone, while the two foreign minister met.  Schroeder told Rusk he was concerned 
that the US seemed only interested in access now and had forgotten reunification - the 
Americans should think of Berlin in a reunification context.   They should discourage any level 
of GDR recognition or agreements which would freeze the status quo in Europe, which Rusk was 
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thought an allusion to the NAP.
1087
  Adenauer and Kennedy's talk was more personal.  The 
Chancellor knew he had only a few more months in office, but wanted to be at the forefront as 
long as possible.  Kennedy tried to emphasize continuity and good faith between the US and 
FRG.  The US remained committed to protect West Germany, but needed cooperation too.  The 
bloom was already fading from the Franco-German entente, keeping FRG leaders mindful of the 
importance of good relations with the US.
1088
 
 Kennedy and Adenauer travelled to Berlin the next day, where they were met by  Mayor 
Willy Brandt.  Rusk met with Brandt to discuss checkpoint problems.
1089
  The Austrians wanted 
to open new air service, which Rusk approved of.  The Secretary quizzed Brandt about West 
Berliners visiting the Eastern sectors, which Brandt thought was fine. He wanted greater tourist 
access and freedom for his citizens to enjoy the whole of the city, as best they could, thus 
"punching holes in the wall."  Rusk said he had no problem with this at all, but they had to 
recognize they still faced the possibility of East Germany being able to control all Berlin access, 
which even Brandt could not accept.
1090
  Brandt  was more inclined to East-West cooperation 
than he had been in 1959, but still more conservative in this regard than he would be a few years 
later when, as Chancellor, he would advance his Ostpolitik policy.  For the present, Brandt and 
Adenauer cooperated during Kennedy's visit, in solidarity against East Germany and the Wall. 
 The next day, Kennedy, Adenauer and Brandt arrived at Tempelhof Airport together.  All 
appeared on the same reviewing stand and enjoyed  thunderous reception by large crowds, which 
overflowed sidewalks along the President's motorcade.
1091
  Kennedy stopped briefly at 
Friedrichstrasse Crossing, site of Clay's tank confrontation.  His famous "Ich bin ein Berliner" 
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speech, declaring that the West Berliners had become worldwide symbols of freedom, was 
rapturously received.  For Kennedy, that rapture was a little disturbing and he worried about the 
potentials of  German reunification.
1092
  Alliance mending and public relations purposes had 
been served well, but, in a way, East German sovereignty had been acknowledged.  Kennedy 
expressed abstract commitment, not new practical steps to remove the Wall, diplomatic or 
otherwise.  The Wall would stay.   
 Despite the success of the Kennedy visit, political problems remained with both Brandt 
and Adenauer.  Brandt was "not enthusiastic" about the MLF.
1093
  Adenauer, along with other 
FRG leaders, had strong reservations about the Limited Test Ban Treaty which now seemed a 
probability.  He complained to the visiting McNamara that the US was too willing to 
compromise with the Soviets and "the State Department had not been what it was under John 
Foster Dulles."  Indeed, it was not.  Rusk never exerted the kind of unifying foreign policy 
command and responsibility as Dulles.  Bundy was a far more influential National Security  
Advisor, at Rusk's expense, than Eisenhower ever had, nor would a Robert Kennedy ever have 
played the same kind of role.   But Rusk, not Dulles, was now Secretary and would proceed with 




The Test Ban Treaty 
 The groundwork for serious test-ban negotiations had been established with the Seaborg 
and Cousins visits to Moscow in the spring.  Harriman was chosen as the US representative, with 
Carl Kaysen providing assistance.  The UK would also participate in the talks.  Harriman was 
uneasy about the conjunction of test-ban talks, set to start on July 15,  with Khrushchev's 
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discussions with the Chinese several days later.  Khrushchev had complained to Macmillan about 
Kennedy's tough language in Berlin.  The Chairman still might try to make a test-ban contingent 
on a non-aggression pact (NAP) for Central Europe.
1095
  
 The Limited Test Ban Treaty fell short of the comprehensive ban initially sought.  It 
produced intense political criticism in the United Sates and faced arduous Congressional 
approval.  Even when its passage seemed imminent in late July, Khrushchev told Harriman, 
again in Moscow to finalize the Test Ban Treaty, that a German peace treaty was still necessary, 
along with a NAP.  Harriman helped ensure the test-ban agreement, because he had the Soviets' 
confidence.  A final sticking issue was US insistence on a withdrawal option, tied specifically to 
perceived breaches in treaty observance.
1096
  The test-ban agreement bound signatories to 
suspend nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space, but not underground. The 
signatories also agreed not to assist or participate in tests by other nations.  General disarmament 
was not discussed in depth in the treaty negotiations, because Western and Soviet positions were 
still as far apart as they had been in 1960 and 1961, when there had been some hope for 
disarmament progress at the heads of state summit meetings.  Gromyko's presence, instead of the 
more intractable Zorin, was taken as a sign of serious Soviet intent, as was Khrushchev's own 
participation in opening and closing sessions..
1097
 
 The July 16 meeting with Harriman, with Kohler, Kaysen and Gromyko also in 
attendance, was relaxed and friendly, but Khrushchev did bring up his German issues and the 
NAP.
1098
  Khrushchev suggested the "possibility of US pressure prompting Germans seeking a 
Rapallo-type arrangement with USSR." The original Rapallo pact between Germany and the 
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Soviet Union in 1924 had been controversial since the USSR was then in diplomatic isolation 
and Germany was not supposed to enter into new alliances without approval from the British, 
French and Americans.  He said a new arrangement would benefit East and West and deflect 
future German conflicts with the United States.  Harriman said the US had no objections to better 
intra-German and east-West relations, but "so long as Soviets sat on East Germany, they could 
not expect friendship from West Germany."  Harriman said there might be some connection 
between a NAP and progress on Germany but Khrushchev insisted these were separate interests.  
Khrushchev intimated that there were several areas, "corns" that could be stepped on, where the 
Soviets could apply pressure on the West to encourage a peace treaty.  Harriman replied that "as 
long as Khrushchev said it with a smile, he was not taking it seriously."
1099
 
 Harriman told Kennedy a few days later that  an NAP might actually loosen Warsaw Pact 
ties.  Thompson remained skeptical of a NAP but Harriman "pointed out consequences of a 
detente in permitting a further loosening of ties between the satellites and the Soviet Union."  
Kennedy observed "Berlin was not now in trouble and ... did not seem likely to be in the near 
future" but an NAP's possibility might have some bearing on improvements in Berlin.
1100
  He did 
not want to hear pessimism about NAP.  The immediate problem was securing Adenauer's 
support for the treaty.  Kennedy wrote the Chancellor that the treaty would not "create any 
danger of increased recognition or international status for the East German regime."
1101
 
 Despite Khrushchev's relatively benign tone with Harriman and Kennedy's optimistic  
assessment, the Soviets were still bringing up the German peace treaty in the final negotiations 
for the Limited Test Ban Treaty.  Although the Treaty was the most significant measure yet to 
control the nuclear arms race,  the East-West heads of state would not convene a summit for the 
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signing.  Lord Home and Rusk met with Gromyko on August 6 because the latter wanted to 
discuss Germany and West Berlin.  Western troops, said Gromyko, endangered peace: "What 
kind of freedom existed in West Berlin guarded by foreign bayonets?"   He said the all-German 
plebiscite proposals "reeked of mothballs."
1102
    
 Complaining of the slow pace of negotiations, Gromyko said "No matter how capable 
Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Dobrynin were, this could go on for 10-25 or even 100 years."  
Alluding to the improved seismic monitoring which had convinced the West to lower their 
demands for in-country inspections, he added, "there was no known instrument that could detect 
progress in these discussions."  Rusk said the West Berlin garrisons were necessary to ensure 
access and "almost a waste of time to go on if this were not accepted."  He said the troops posed 
no threat to the "several Soviet divisions in East  Germany."
1103
  He acknowledged that talks had 
become repetitious but "far-reaching fundamental problems involved." Although the Western 
Principles Paper had tried to present a basis for a comprehensive solution, he said, the East was 
still not showing reciprocity.  Gromyko said "the Soviets did not fear the word reciprocity," but 
he insisted on "liquidation remnants of World War II." Gromyko also said the GDR needed tolls 
and tariffs for Autobahn, rail, air and communications traffic through their territory.   Rusk asked 
why it was that the Soviets supported self-determination everywhere but in Central Europe.
1104
 
 When Khrushchev met the foreign ministers at his dacha in Pitsunda on August 9, he said 
they must  now turn to the German problem which was the most difficult, but also the easiest 
facing them because it could be fixed with his peace treaty.   He said Eisenhower had been 
inclined in this direction but wanted to slow down West German competition by making them 
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buy arms, an honest attitude for a soldier.  Even de Gaulle, he said, acknowledged the division of 
Germany - Adenauer was the only holdout since the British, Americans and NATO's Spaak were 
coming around to accepting political recognition of a divided Germany.  Rusk replied that, 
though the Chairman might not like hearing this, it was not up to the Soviet Union or Western 
allies to decide whether the Germans should accept political division.   At the same time, neither 
the US or USSR wanted a nuclear Germany.  "Sweeping disarmament" might not be feasible at 
the present time, but small steps could improve  safety and security.
1105
  
 Khrushchev was not to be easily swayed from the German topic.  The US, he said, had 
intervened against self-determination in Pakistan, Guatemala and South Vietnam.  But he did not 
persist and offered no last minute objections to the Test Ban Treaty.  Sergei Khrushchev says his 
father was very pleased with the Treaty, saying the USSR would retain an ample nuclear  
deterrent.
1106
  Vlaimir Zubok says Kennedy had Harriman ask Khrushchev about possible 
preemptive strikes on Chinese nuclear weapon facilities, but this approach was rebuffed.  





Leaving It Up to the Germans 
 Adenauer tried to backpedal on  the Test Ban Treaty at the last minute but had to 
acquiesce.  He complained to Rusk that the withdrawal of 600 troops from Berlin was a gesture 
to Khrushchev that would only be interpreted as weakness.
1108
   Rusk was more worried about 
Gromyko and Khrushchev's references to "stepping on Western corns," which might indicate a 
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fresh round of harassment in Berlin.  He thought the East might focus next on blocking access 
instead of withdrawal of the Western occupation troops.
1109
  The West Germans had prepared 
their own peace plan, emphasizing reunification, which they shared with their NATO partners 
for consultation.  Though the French seemed to favor the idea, Thompson thought the Soviets 
might take the proposal as a provocation.
1110
    
 Rusk told Schroeder that the plan could destabilize the Western negotiating position and 
encourage Soviets mischief, particularly if they thought it might deflect Chinese charges of  
being weak with the West.  He said Schroeder should first advance the West German ideas in a 
general audience speech instead of formal proposal to the USSR.
1111
  When Schroeder met with 
Kennedy in Washington on September 24, the latter emphasized the need for consultation.  
Schroeder agreed they needed to expedited the MLF, though he doubted British and French 
enthusiasm for the joint European-American nuclear force.  He also said that while Berlin 
tensions had not led to reunification of Germany, they did keep attention on the subject.
1112
 
 Extensive bilateral negotiations had encouraged the Soviets to put the United States in the 
position of speaking for all the Allies.  The United States was hindered because it could not 
always reply directly without first consulting its partners, whereas the Soviets did not have to get 
Warsaw Pact approval.  In early October, Gromyko returned to Washington, again raising the 
Germany issue, but without  acrimony.  Rusk asked whether a NAP would include references to 
West Berlin, but was told that would "swamp" the NAP which could "provide a peaceful 
settlement [of] all issues without exception." 
1113
  West German Economic Minster Erhard 
thought the time had come to use economic leverage, noting the Soviet and East Germans needed 
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more trade with the West.  Rusk thought Erhard's understanding of Soviet political logic was a 
little naive, but economic leverage need not be discouraged.  They agreed not to try the idea out 
on de Gaulle yet.
1114
   
 The US not only had to deal with three other contrary sets of opinion (UK/FRG/France) 
in marshalling consensus, it had to deal with communication between those partners that could 
run contrary to US thinking. French Foreign Minister De Murville told Rusk that the danger of 
German reunification lay in its possible disengagement from the West.  Rusk mentioned that the 
US was still not committed to recognition of the Oder-Niesse border, which the French favored 
but would also affect Poland.  He also observed that Soviet relaxation over Eastern Europe 
would encourage reunification.  De Murville said "a detente would work in the long run would to 
the advantage of the West ... the problem was what would happen in the short run." 
1115
  
 He had told Schroeder that the best one could expect from current negotiations was that 
they might not change the status quo, but changes like the NAP could freeze the status quo with 
no hope for improvement.  Unlike Rusk and Schroeder, he said, the French did not think East-
West relaxation was an automatic good, nor did he think the Sino-Soviet split presented 
problems for the West.  He did not want to see the West Germans confronted by a choice 
between siding with the US or France.  Conspicuously missing from the French minister's 
arguments was any mention of their other partner in Berlin, the UK.  Also not discussed, was 
French refusal to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
1116
 
 When Kennedy met with Gromyko in Washington on October 10, the same day the Test 
Ban Treaty went into effect, the Soviet minister said the German problem still needed to be 
resolved.  He said the Americans no longer seemed interested but the Soviets still considered 
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their peace treaty an important matter.  Kennedy did not directly answer Gromyko and instead 
noted that relations had improved between their two countries, as evidenced by the Test Ban 
Treaty and a pact to sell wheat to the Soviet Union.  Rusk said the US wanted clarification on the 
time frame of the Soviets UN flag Berlin-troop proposal.  Gromyko said he still wondered if he 




 The next day, Soviet armed forces detained a large convoy from proceeding on the 
autobahn, after already holding back a smaller detachment. Rusk told Kennedy and his Berlin 
task force that both Dobrynin and Gromyko "acted like a man upset" when informed of the 
incident.
1118
  Their surprise may have reflected the erosion of Khrushchev's political authority in 
the Soviet Union; though noted in this meeting, the extent of that conflict was still not realized in 
Washington.  Whether a rogue field commander's action or an attempt by Khrushchev to silence 
hard-line domestic and Chinese criticism, Rusk said the incident could signal a "major crisis" 
with the Soviets.  Immediate allied consultation and preliminary mobilization  were in order, but 
the convoys should attempt no actions in the meantime.  This policy, which some more hawkish 
advisors like Nitze protested, was in line with convoy harassments going back to the February 
1959 Marienborn harassment.  The Kremlin would be allowed time to regain control over the 
situation.  Thompson and Rusk agreed the incident was not directed from the top and may have 
been staged by dissenting factions to embarrass Gromyko in his negotiations.
1119
 
 The convoy incident and conflicting Soviet attitudes thereto showed that, despite 
Kennedy's optimistic observations to Gromyko, the test ban treaty had so far not fostered a spirit 
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of detente.  Kohler reported from Moscow that Zorin would provide no details, saying only that 
the Americans must not have followed procedure.
1120
  Zorin, as deputy minister, had only limited 
authority and always took a hard line in negotiations. Thompson asked Dobrynin's help to tell 
Zorin a meeting between the US and Soviet field commanders needed to be arranged at once.  
The more cooperative Dobrynin said it was "incomprehensible" that the convoy had been 
stopped.
1121
  Though the convoy was released the next day, Zorin continued his tough line with 
Kohler, placing all the blame on the Americans.  Gromyko was more conciliatory with Rusk, 
evidently hoping to do productive business while in the US for the UNGA sessions.
1122
  The 
incident may have shown him that he needed to make gains for his country while present 
circumstances allowed.  Gromyko was a business-like Soviet foreign minister, but he was also a 
member of the Central Committee.  He was aware of Brezhnev's developing campaign against 
Khrushchev, and while not an early member, would join the plotters by the following summer. 
 The Americans did not know that a regime change loomed in the Soviet Union but they  
were pleased to welcome one in Bonn.  Erhard, not Strauss, was named Chancellor to succeed 
the ailing Adenauer.
1123
  Erhard, an academic economist, did not possess Adenauer's long 
experience and broad perspective, but he was more flexible and forward-thinking.  Rusk's 
congratulatory visit was appreciated and augured well for greater US-FRG cooperation. Rusk 
doubted Khrushchev was behind the convoy incident, but said he did not see good prospects for 
near-term renewal of negotiations.   The Secretary "made clear that there was at the present time 
no detente ...only a hunting license for detente."  The NAP was "dead because the Soviets would 
not come clean on Berlin."   Similarly, there could be no agreement on nuclear non-
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dissemination because the Soviets objected to the MLF.  Rusk said "there is no possibility of 
moving rapidly to a detente ... there is danger of people thinking there is a detente which does 
not exist."
1124
  Though Rusk did not express to his misgivings about the recent FRG proposal to 
offer  economic incentives to relax tensions with the Soviets, Washington was still concerned.  
George Ball recommended to Kennedy that Erhard be gently but firmly reminded that serious 
overtures that might affect West Berlin needed to be cleared with all the Allied partners.
1125
  
 As had been the case the previous fall, Berlin negotiations had lapsed without any 
progress and harassment ensued in the wake.  On November 4, another convoy was stopped on 
the Autobahn and this time it appeared Khrushchev had approved.
1126
  Dobrynin disclaimed any 
knowledge and suggested the troops were looking to make trouble. He raised the issue of 
whether West Berlin was covered by the Test Ban Treaty. Rusk made plain his displeased 
"astonishment at [the] Soviet action."
1127
  In Moscow, Deputy Premier Kosygin and Gromyko 
blamed Pentagon provocateurs and insisted the US respect access procedure.
1128
 
 New Berlin harassments disturbed a budding detente signaled by the Test Ban Treaty 
While a detente could be reached only through many small steps, it might took fewer  steps in 
the other direction to return to the distant estrangement of the 1950s.   However, diplomatic 
contacts between the US and USSR had now become so frequent, that even when tensions 
worsened, the US and Soviet ambassadors and foreign ministers remained in regular contact.
1129
 
This was especially true when Gromyko was in the United States for the annual UNGA sessions.  
Regular communication provided some assurance that crises could be controlled; both sides 
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realized the importance of this after the Cuban affair.  Kennedy and his advisors considered 
whether they should match Soviet harassment without resorting to more forceful actions.  Such 
matching harassment could entail blocking access to the Soviet War memorial and even include 
delays of Soviet transit through the Panama Canal.  Rusk, McNamara and Kennedy decided to 




End of Kennedy and Khrushchev Period 
 Washington had good reason to be cautious and cool. The difference in November 1963, 
and previous autumns, was that Khrushchev's authority was now in question, while the West 
Germans were actively interested in pursuing their own negotiating track.
1131
  The British and 
French had marginalized themselves. The British had not had not developed enough leverage to 
back up their desire to negotiate.  The French were still distracted by Algeria and dreams of 
nuclear independence and political leadership in Europe.  Also, the Americans were increasingly 
occupied by a deteriorating situation in Vietnam.  The Kennedy administration had supported 
Ngo Van Diem, who, though eager for Western support, had alienated both the military and the 
largely Buddhist populace.  In mid-November, the Kennedy had to consider helping to bring 
about regime change lest the insurgent Viet Cong exploit the instability.
1132
   The Test Ban 
Treaty had faced difficult passage in the US Senate.  Kennedy's acceptance of the Wall and 
moderate terms for ending the Cuban missile crisis also created political pressure for a tougher 
foreign policy.  Examples of US domestic discontent could be seen in negative newspaper 
advertisements and demonstrations in  advance of the President's  visit to Texas in late 
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November to shore up Southern political support.  When Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas in 
on November 22, 1963, the momentum for any kind of Berlin resolution died with him.
1133
 
 Khrushchev realized he could not easily resume negotiations. further, he had little 
backing from his colleagues to continue pressing a fruitless cause.
1134
  He continued to insist on 
his peace treaty, without urgency, till he was quietly removed from office in August 1964, the 
first Soviet leader ever to be painlessly demoted.
1135
  Most in the Kremlin thought, with Berlin 
stabilized by a Wall that was continually being strengthened, that it was better to let the 
Americans overextend themselves in Vietnam.  President Johnson would be observed until new 
overtures might be made.  Contacts with the West Germans would be quietly pursued, the 
Chinese loudly denounced and missile production accelerated.
1136
  Since there was no crisis to 
avert or feasible advantage to be gained, there was no need to resume close diplomatic 
engagement.  Johnson had neither the inclination or temperament to resume negotiation.  Neither 
he or the new Soviet leaders were willing to inflame a fairly non-threatening issue like Berlin 
into a cause for serious face to face negotiation.  Except for a few small moments such as the 
Johnson-Kosygin mini-summit in Glassboro , New Jersey in 1967, detente was postponed and 




Conclusions   
 Negotiations on Berlin never regained momentum after the deadlock  of  the July 1962 
Rusk-Gromyko meetings in Geneva.  The Peter Fechter killing and abolition of Soviet 
commandant in East Berlin did not bring the quarrelsome Allies together enough to develop a 
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common position.  The placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, partly a reaction to the Berlin 
standoff, displaced the German problem as the main issue between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  Talks continued at the ambassadorial level, mainly as a repetitious formality. 
 Although the Cuban Missile Crisis worsened already tense relations between the US and 
USSR and did not improve Allied relations, it also helped delink Berlin and disarmament.  
France and West Germany's exclusion of Britain ensured there would be no joint Allied 
participation in Berlin talks.  West Germany had become such a pivotal element, and with post-
Adenauer leadership, that it was already considering  bilateral approaches with the Soviet Union.  
Although Kennedy had disappointed Macmillan at Bermuda, British input in Test Ban 
deliberations restored some influence.  In general relations with both Allies and Soviets, the US 
continued its trend towards general bilateralism.  However, Khrushchev, the architect and chief  
protagonist  of the Berlin crisis, the main constant in US-Soviet relations for nearly a decade, 
was losing influence.
1138
  Kennedy's term was cut short and the bilateral relationship could not 
proceed until new leadership was established in the Soviet Union and in the United States.  
 Kennedy's visit to West Berlin was an exercise in American-West German bilateralism 
that signaled the real end of a Western multilateral front on Berlin.  This weakened Berlin as a 
leverage issue Khrushchev could use.
1139
  Test Ban treaty negotiations were proof that he had 
already decided to accept disarmament measures without concessions on Germany, though he 
did try to bargain while he could.  These talks were the highest level successful negotiations on 
arms control yet between the US and USSR, but they still did not bring on detente. 
 The Test Ban did not bring Kennedy and Khrushchev together in another summit or 
initiate goodwill visits to the other's country.  Nor did Sino-Soviet rivalry, Cuba or Vietnam. 
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Disarmament never developed the power Berlin had as a catalytic issue in US-Soviet relations.   
Berlin's anomalous situation  still had a symbolic importance for East  and West.  The possibility 
of a solution  promised progress and peace.
1140
  No other issue, not even disarmament, engaged 
the US and Soviet Union as it had from 1958 to 1962.  After Berlin as an issue was neutralized 
by the Wall and Cuba, the US-Soviet relationship became less intense but much closer than 
before Khrushchev began his Berlin campaign.
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 Western leaders often used  the expression "slippery slope" during the negotiations to 
resolve the Berlin crisis.  The words suggest potential more than active danger.  Despite the 
implicit threats of Khrushchev's demands and the explicit Western declaration to forcibly defend 
'vital interests,' neither side really wanted a battle  over Berlin, much less a general war  that 
could involve nuclear weapons.
1141
  Khrushchev's deadline tactic indicated that really wanted 
was negotiations, possibly for disarmament, more than forceful confrontation.
1142
  Perceiving this 
distinction, Western leaders over-ruled advocates of force and chose to pursue a diplomatic 
resolution.  Although flashpoints like the U-2 incident, the troubled Vienna and Paris summits, 
construction of the Berlin Wall, the tank standoff at Checkpoint Charlie and Kennedy's visit to 
Berlin remain the focus of public and academic attention, the unprecedented level of sustained 
US-Soviet negotiation may be the most significant aspect of  the Berlin crisis.   
 Though it often seemed that the superpowers - and their allies - were merely traversing a 
hazardous slope in vain, their patient if slippery steps prevented war and provided a template for 
future negotiations.
1143
  As a result of the Berlin discussions, US leaders gained familiarity with 
Khrushchev and Soviet  thinking, which helped them respond to the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
enable passage of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.  As serious as those events were, they did not 
produce heads of state summits.
1144
  Only Berlin led to comprehensive negotiations between the 
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US and Soviet Union.  Berlin negotiations were a transformative factor in their bilateral relations 
in this period and rekindled  the hopes for cooperation seen in  the days of the Teheran and Yalta 
conferences but thought lost after the postwar division of Europe, the 1948 Berlin airlift, a 
lackluster Vienna 1955 summit and the 1956 Hungarian intervention.  US-Soviet relations may 
have lapsed after the Berlin crisis but the 1958-1963 negotiations had renewed relations and 
established diplomatic templates that would help enable a more robust detente in the 1970s.
1145
 
 The 1958-63  dialogue marked a profound shift away from  diplomatic  estrangement and 
containment doctrine.  Leaders who, even two or three years earlier, would have scarcely 
imagined long running ministerial and executive discussions with the other side pursued those 
discussions as one of their nation's highest priorities.  They hoped to keep dangers, both military 
and political, as potential but avertable threats through discussions by backchannel, foreign 
minister level, and heads of state discussions.
1146
  Such discussions were not a familiar part of the 
political landscape in 1958.  East-West relations were in limbo and Allied and East Bloc 
relations were strained.  Berlin negotiations did not quite produce a detente that eased tensions 
and enabled them to cut back on military spending, but did preserve the German status quo 
without serious conflict or political destabilization.
1147
 Those dangers remained - militarily, in 
the emphasis in contingency planning on possible nuclear use, and politically, in the stresses on 
both NATO and Warsaw Pact unity and prestige.
1148
  The 'slippery slope' referred not only to the 
hazards of using force, but also unacceptable concessions that might result from negotiations.   
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   Why did Berlin, and not disarmament, Third World competition or improved trade, 
become the focus of diplomatic engagement?  The answer may lie in the fact that the Berlin 
crisis was, in many ways, an invented situation.  Negotiation on Berlin became a proxy conflict 
in which neither side was likely to take irrevocable action, but did see some chance at realizing 
long-held security goals through small steps.
1149
  By contrast, their positions in other areas of 
contention, like disarmament, the Third World or aid to underdeveloped countries ,were simply 
too far apart.  These 'great powers' were afraid of  being  compromised by agreeing to principles 
and arrangements with unforeseen consequences.   Berlin issues, particularly the refugee exodus,  
were serious enough to warrant close attention and concern, but not immediately threatening.
1150
 
Negotiations took on an indefinite, repetitious character like siege tactics. 
 Resolution of German and Berlin problems may have been improbable but did not seem 
impossible.  These problems were linked to disarmament, the most likely other candidate for 
negotiations, because both Germanys hosted nuclear weapons by 1959.  By linking disarmament 
to progress on German/Berlin resolution, East and West alike hoped to advance stalled low-level 
discussions on the former topic, which was a real concern and attractive to public opinion.
1151
 
Negotiations would hopefully stabilize the Berlin situation, which could slide into the chaos of 
war and political surrender. 
 Nikita Khrushchev's sustained demands for a separate German 'peace treaty' and making 
Berlin a 'free city' thus made a tense but stable situation into the major area of contention 
between the Soviet Union and the United States from late November 1958 to November 1962.  
To a great extent, Berlin was an exaggerated concern.  From the time of the 1953 East Berlin 
riots to Khrushchev's 1958 declarations, Berlin had not been not a critical concern to the US or 
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the Soviets, who remained diplomatically estranged for the most part.  The 1955 four-power 
Vienna summit dealt little with Berlin or even the alliance face-off created by the establishment 
of the Warsaw Pact to match NATO.
1152
  The only substantial concerns that had developed by 
1958 were the refugee exodus from East Germany and introduction of nuclear arms in Germany.    
 These were serious but manageable problems. The strain on human resources through 
West Berlin was destabilizing to the GDR, until stopped midway through the crisis by the simple 
expedient of the Wall.  Kennedy and Rusk believed the Wall stabilized the Berlin issue. 
1153
 
NATO and Warsaw Pact stationing of tactical nuclear weapons reflected military cost cutting 
pressures, since nuclear weapons were cheaper than maintaining large forward-based 
conventional forces.  Nuclear deployment was too basic to both East West and East strategic 
doctrine to be easily changed through negotiation.  Eisenhower thought  Berlin held little 
strategic value for the US, but its defense was a symbolic commitment that could not be 
compromised without serious losses to its prestige or the confidence of its NATO partners.
1154
  
Berlin and the status of Germany were also vital interests for West Germany, France and Britain, 
which would face the direct results of conflict  but could not match the superpowers' resources.   
 The United States faced difficulties throughout the Berlin crisis in dealing with the Allies, 
delaying negotiations and enhancing a trend towards direct talks with the Soviet Union.  US 
desire to control nuclear weapons in Europe, and European reluctance to accept the American 
concept of a multilateral force, increased its distance from the Allies.
1155
  The US had to make 
the strongest commitment of personnel and hardware, but it could not make arrangements on 
Berlin and Germany without the approval of its Potsdam Treaty occupation co-signatories.  The 
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USSR had more freedom to make terms without client approval, but did face alliance pressures, 
both within the Warsaw Pact  and from its Communist Bloc rival, the Peoples Republic of China.  
East German leader Walter Ulbricht's demands to solve the exodus problem and Chinese 
Chairman Mao Zedong's demands for a more militant stand with the West created pressure for 
Khrushchev to take a tougher stand on Berlin, but he did not want war.  Mao and Ulbricht's 
criticisms plagued Khrushchev throughout the Berlin Crisis.
1156
   Problems with alliance partners' 
varying positions and the cumbersome process of reaching consensus appeared even before the 
first major negotiating phase, the May-July 1959 Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva.  
Though the principle difficulty at Geneva was the refusal of either side to make significant 
concessions, the imbalance of superpowers and lesser partners also hindered resolution.
1157
  
 The stalemate of summer 1959 fostered calls for a heads-of-state  meeting to resolve the 
differences.  However, neither East or West Germany, the states that would be most affected by a 
change in the status quo, were Potsdam signatories. West Germany's NATO allies, the United 
States, France, and Great Britain were also signatories but of greatly unequal stature.  
Khrushchev realized this and pursued his Berlin/German objectives in great part to create 
sustained  dissension in the West and quiet hard-line Communist rivals.
1158
 
 Promoting Allied discord was only one of Khrushchev's motives - he really wanted 
bilateral high-level talks with the United States.  Khrushchev authority William Taubman has 
cited high-level discussions with the United States as one of the Chairman's primary goals.  He 
wanted better relations with the United Sates mainly to reduce the cost of the arms race, allowing 
for more Soviet consumer production.
 1159
  Whether or not he thought the West would ever agree 
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to his idea for complete and immediate, but uninspected, disarmament cannot really be known 
but he certainly seemed to hope so.  He also wanted better trade arrangements and credits from 
the West, as well as cultural and technical exchanges that would benefit his country.  He knew 
that Eisenhower, as an experienced military leader, would be a tough but practical negotiator.   
 Though Khrushchev-Eisenhower  relations never could be really called warm, they were 
sufficiently friendly to allow for the 1959 deputy minister level exchange of visits and for his 
own visit to the United States.  If Eisenhower had been able to return the visit, as planned, such 
reciprocity would have been taken as a clear sign of detente.
1160
  Though both leaders stressed 
disarmament as a top concern, Berlin dominated their direct conversations, which had been 
minimal up to that point.  Berlin also became the chief topic of their ministers discussions from 
late1958 to late 1960. 
 Ministerial discussions were particularly important in the early phases of the Berlin crisis 
because Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had a stronger influence on his 
nation's foreign policy than either the Allied counterparts, Britain's Harold Caccia, West 
Germany's Heinrich von Brentano or  France's Couve de Murville.  Frederick Marks argues that 
Dulles was even less inclined than Eisenhower to use force over Berlin.
1161
  The Soviet Union's 
Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, did not set policy but he acted on his executive's instructions 
more consistently and faithfully than any of his counterparts, providing a strong coherence to 
Soviet negotiating practice.  When Dulles was replaced by Christian Herter, who took more of 
caretaker role, US direction on Berlin became noticeably less forceful.
1162
  This contributed to 
Allied disarray in planning the Paris summit conference in late 1959 and early 1960.   
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 Eisenhower's increasingly lame-duck status and Herter's softness enabled other 
determined executives to attempt more divergent courses.  France's president Charles de Gaulle 
took advantage of the diluted US foreign policy leadership and pursued a more independent path 
that he hoped would lead to France's principle leadership in European security.
1163
  De Gaulle 
had come to power only weeks before the Berlin crisis began, but had already advanced his plan 
to supersede NATO leadership with a triumvirate of the US-France-Great Britain deciding global 
security matters.  He wanted French leadership in Europe but would respect British and 
American interests in their respective regions of interest.   De Gaulle was skeptical of negotiation 
with the Soviet Union in 1959 and would remain so throughout the crisis.
1164
  He did not believe 
Khrushchev would go to war and was afraid of being led into unnecessary concessions that could 
hinder French influence.  
 Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was much more inclined to negotiations, 
having travelled to Moscow alone in early 1958.  The US was not pleased with that visit nor the 
implication, not very well founded, that the visit had enabled the Foreign Ministers Conference 
which averted war.  Macmillan also lobbied heavily for a summit conference to do what the 
foreign ministers proved unable to do in Geneva in 1959.  Macmillan wanted to restore British 
influence but also to avoid a war his country could not afford.
1165
  He was the first to 
prominently use the 'slippery slope' expression.  When he used it, he was probably most worried 
about nuclear conflict, not political destabilization.   
 Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also used the Eisenhower 'twilight' to take a 
more independent course.  The chancellor was inflexible about recognition of East Germany and 
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maintaining the occupation regime, but unwilling to make the military commitment the other 
Western leaders thought necessary.  Insecure with the European Allied leaders and unable to 
gain as much influence as he hoped for Eisenhower and Kennedy, Adenauer's vacillations 
became chronic obstacle to developing a coordinated Western response.
1166
  Berlin brought out 
these leaders' least cooperative tendencies and encouraged US and Soviet leaders to concentrate 
on bilateral discussions. 
 The election of John Kennedy to succeed Eisenhower also fed the bilateral trend.  
Kennedy believed in the power of personal persuasion, much as Franklin Roosevelt had.  Like 
Roosevelt, Kennedy thought a strong personal appeal to a Soviet leader could overcome a 
general malaise and mistrust in their relations.  Like Roosevelt with Stalin in World War II, this 
conviction was not borne out in Kennedy's dealings with Khrushchev over Berlin.  Likewise, 
Kennedy's hopes that Western relations could be improved by better individual relations proved 
largely unfounded.   Much of the modern literature on Kennedy, from authors like Lawrence 
Freedman, Michael Beschloss, Robert Dallek and Mark White, emphasizes ideas like a new 
frontier extending to international relations.
1167
  That perspective does not always take into 
account the pragmatic concerns of his more experienced European counterparts.  They saw an 
inexperienced idealist who could be manipulated more easily than they could the seasoned 
veteran Eisenhower.  Khrushchev saw Kennedy in much the same way.
1168
  The Bay of Pigs 
disaster only encouraged that perception.   
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 Kennedy saw a global environment ripe for detente, to ease worsening conditions in 
Berlin, nuclear tensions and Third World strife.
1169
  When Kennedy travelled to Europe a few 
months into his presidency, he sought a series of mini-summits, bilateral meetings with 
Macmillan and de Gaulle, as well as with Khrushchev.  It is hard to imagine Eisenhower 
attempting such an independent approach with Berlin very evidently on the table and still 
requiring a common Western position.
1170
 The Berlin situation was serious enough that 
contingency planners emphasized real probabilities of nuclear use, probably the most articulated 
plans for nuclear use since Korea.  Contingency planning ran parallel to negotiation all through 
the Berlin crisis.  Military leaders like General Nathan Twining and hardliners like Dean 
Acheson vied with peace advocates like Arthur Schlesinger and Adlai Stevenson for their 
president's attention.  Eisenhower, always concerned about giving momentum to contingency 
plans, preferred low-key diplomacy.  The less experienced Kennedy, guided by the indecisive 
Rusk, also preferred diplomacy but was afraid of showing military weakness.
1171
 
 De Gaulle and Adenauer were less interested than Macmillan in negotiation.  They 
wanted US declarations of US nuclear readiness, and sought leverage over Kennedy's refusal to 
provide them with nuclear weapons.
1172
  Khrushchev had already had the same nuclear-sharing 
problem with the Chinese.
1173
  Much has been made of the new Kennedy doctrine of flexible 
readiness, as though this new policy was an abandonment of nuclear strategy in favor of 
conventional response.  In fact, flexible response involved considerations of tactical nuclear 
weapons, short of general nuclear war.
1174
  Most force planning scenarios for breaking a Soviet 
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blockade of Berlin included possible tactical nuclear use, after ground probes, and acknowledged 
a high probability of general war as a result.
1175
 
 Kennedy was unprepared for the Vienna meeting and nearly undid all the previous 
eighteen months worth of patient stabilization.   It is worth noting that their meeting in Vienna 
was arranged through back channels; this informal approach called for more informal discussions 
than the earnest but immature ideological approach Kennedy attempted.  The result led to a very 
slippery time.  Kennedy announced a major US arms escalation and Khrushchev authorized the 
construction of the Wall.  Nuclear use advocates made strong cases for forceful response 
demonstrating clear nuclear readiness and even urged Kennedy to consider preemptive action.  
Against that background, the largely nonviolent construction of the Wall was welcomed as a 
pragmatic step to resolve the refugee crisis and quiet the nuclear advocates.
1176
  When it quickly 
became  apparent that neither a forceful response or emergency head of state or ministerial talks 
would be called, it seemed for a moment that neither course was necessary nor did a choice 
between the two need to be made. 
 The Soviet resumption of nuclear testing two weeks after the Wall and renewed Berlin 
harassments soon convinced Kennedy to resume negotiations.  The French and West Germans 
adamantly opposed a new round of negotiations, despite the danger of conflict.  Only Macmillan 
was similarly inclined, but the British were thought too willing to make unacceptable 
concessions regarding East Germany.
1177
  In September 1962, Kennedy resolved to initiate 
exploratory talks with the Soviets for a Berlin resolution.   He also began a private 
correspondence with Khrushchev - the 'pen pal letters' -  which both hoped would guide 
ambassadorial and ministerial talks.  Gromyko's visits to the United States for UN General 
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Assembly sessions allowed for ministerial talks.  These were inconclusive but showed strong 
Soviet interest in negotiations. 
1178
  Khrushchev still wanted a summit but now his prestige 
demanded Western acceptance of his position.  For both sides, disarmament issues were 
explicitly hostage to the Berlin question. 
 The problem of Allied unity also grew more acute in the fall of 1961, and produced some 
of the most important (though largely unproductive) negotiations of the whole Berlin crisis.  US 
Secretary of State Rusk had neither the temperament or inclination to manage foreign policy as 
Dulles had.  Kennedy's inexperience demanded a stronger role than Herter had provided.  Rusk 
was talented but inclined to consider all views and postpone decisions.
1179
  The splitting of policy 
making between the President, his newly influential National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy, 
the clashing instincts of advisors like Dean Acheson and Arthur Schlesinger, and the wild card 
influence of Attorney General Robert Kennedy produced a well informed but largely incoherent 
policy and decision apparatus.
1180
  The President had tried to rein in this process in the fall of 
1961 but it proved too difficult to contain for long.  Rusk ended up doing most of the significant 
discussions with the Allies and Soviets, with good advisors, like Thompson and Kohler 
sometimes, but often in private one on one talks.  He advised Kennedy against an early summit, 
but was basically unprepared to deal with tenacious and immovable veterans like Gromyko and 
the shrewd young Dobrynin,  or even his Allied counterparts.
1181
 
 Intense efforts to get Adenauer's approval of a realistic package of proposals, much less 
commit to good faith support for talks, produced indifferent results.  The French were even less 
cooperative than the West Germans. Adenauer never followed through with his eventually 
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declared willingness to get de Gaulle on board.  In October, Kennedy had hoped to arrange an 
East-West foreign ministers meeting and possible summit by year's end. 
1182
  By the end of 1961, 
after a tank standoff in Berlin, a public humiliation of Khrushchev exposing Soviet nuclear 
inferiority, a rough Party Congress for Khrushchev where he was pilloried for his folly in 
pursuing negotiations, and the near-collapse of Allied unity on Berlin, Kennedy's diplomatic 
initiative was in shreds.  The 'pen pal' correspondence  was sometimes encouraging but vague 
and inconsistent.  Only Soviet readiness to begin confidential talks in Moscow between 
Ambassador Thompson and Gromyko held any promise for diplomatic resolution of the Berlin 
problems.  No other serious East-West discussions were underway; arms control talks were low 
level and intermittent.  Khrushchev's public belligerence at the UN sessions had not augured well 
for high level US-Soviet talks on any other subject.
1183
 
 The resumption of bilateral discussions on Berlin in January 1962 began a long sequence 
that lasted several months.  Thompson  held the Soviets confidence, but had nothing  new to 
offer the Soviets except a proposal for an international access authority over Berlin.
1184
  By this 
time, the US was ready to just seek an interim understanding, modus vivendi, to ease tensions 
and work on small problems that could prevent larger Berlin incidents.  The Soviets soon showed 
that they regarded the talks as a mere formality to prepare the way for the peace treaty.
1185
  Their 
new offer was a transitional mechanism that would allow a temporary continued occupation of 
West Berlin under a UN flag alongside Warsaw Pact troops.  Most of these sessions were held 
with Gromyko, but Thompson did talk briefly with Khrushchev also.  By March 1962, it already 
seemed that negotiations could not last indefinitely. 
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 Still unsure whether the Soviets would soon implement the peace treaty, Rusk began  
new talks with Gromyko in March.  As with the previous fall's ministerial talks, these were 
largely the result of circumstances, with both ministers in Geneva for UN disarmament talks. 
1186
 
Neither the disarmament nor Berlin talks were productive.  Allied support for the US-Soviet 
talks was more forthcoming but still of little practical help. Even more than even in the fall, the 
US realized that West Germans would be key to any solution.  Even Gromyko began to 
acknowledge that the Germans might have to resolve the Berlin problem themselves.  None of 
the Berlin signatories were quite comfortable yet with that prospect.  Harassment in Berlin  grew 
and then ebbed again.  The Soviets  gave no clear sign of whether they would sign their peace 
treaty or would abandon the idea.  The 'pen pal' correspondence continued, though less 




 As frustrating as the negotiating process was, the Berlin status quo remained basically 
intact.  Both sides devoted great time and attention to the process but their new working papers 
had come to resemble theoretical exercises more than practical offers.  A new series of talks 
between the new Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Rusk broke no new ground.  By midsummer 
1962, the ambassadorial, ministerial executive correspondence tracks had all effectively come to 
naught.
1188
 This halt may have reflected other concerns like Southeast Asia demanding more 
attention.  The rote performance and interest on the Soviet part may be proof that they now 
wanted talks only to cover the Cuban adventure.  No other topic replaced Berlin to continue the 
dialogue.   Khrushchev improvised on negotiations.  He may have just sensed, based in part on 
Gromyko's reports, that the West would offer no more concessions.  Rather than just publicly 
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admit defeat, they could keep the Allies guessing on the peace treaty and fate of Berlin. 
1189
 In 
the wake of the effective end of negotiations halt by August 1962 , came another wave of Berlin 
harassments  and then the Cuban missile crisis. These are not the signs of a well organized 
strategy on Khrushchev's part.  The West did not make the same connections between Berlin and 
Cuba that he hoped they would.
1190
  The Cuban gamble indicates that his adventures were 
beginning to interfere with each other, instead of complementing synergistically to reach unified 
policy goals.  Kennedy's ExComm group worried how Cuba might affect Berlin, but the overall 
effect was to chill US interest in negotiations.
1191
   
 An improvised but sustained diplomatic campaign over Berlin seems characteristic of the 
impulsive but determined Khrushchev, who launched bold adventures that came to unsettling 
ends.  The Virgin Lands scheme was a good example of a failed initiative he could not abandon 
easily.  Was the sustained diplomatic engagement over Berlin such a gamble?  His own 
testimony and that of many observers suggests that he was serious about his German goals.  Did 
he realize at some point it wouldn't happen and just decided to keep on negotiating to keep the 
West off guard and hope it might lead to a more productive Summit opportunity? 
1192
  He may 
have just wanted to protect his prestige and not let Mao tell him what to do.  Except for the Wall, 
all of Khrushchev's Berlin steps involved deadlines and postponements.  He may have thought 
that negotiation alone, prodded by occasional harassment would eventually accomplish his 
Berlin goals.  He never devoted as much attention to disarmament, even with his sessions with 
Harriman during the Test Ban treaty debates.  He never pursued a summit over Cuba or Laos or 
the Congo or outer space.   
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 Berlin was Khrushchev's issue and he nursed it till he was deposed in 1964.  He never got 
the Western troops to withdraw, but did succeed in launching the most sustained US-Soviet 
negotiating sequence up to that point, unmatched for at least five more years.
1193
  He also 
fostered the Ostpolitik dialogue Willy Brandt would later explore more fully.
1194
  US concern 
over the implications of Ostpolitik helped  motivate Nixon and Kissinger's 1969 overtures to the 
Soviets.  They benefitted from bilateral diplomatic templates laid out in the 1958-1963 Berlin 
Crisis.  They used backchannel diplomacy, ambassadorial talks, foreign ministers conferences 
and head of state meetings, with mutual visits to the other's countries.  They even continued 
talking about Berlin, but without deadlines
1195
   Khrushchev and Gromyko worked from scratch 
to renew US-Soviet diplomatic engagement.  Brezhnev and Gromyko built on that foundation to 
begin a new, disarmament-centered dialogue with the Americans.  They followed classic Stalin-
era Soviet negotiating techniques, which were built on imperial Russia negotiating tactics. The 
original impetus for detente came from Nikita Khrushchev, whose impulsive and often rude 
tactics actually worked against his aims.
1196
 
 Individual leadership was also important on the Western side.  Eisenhower's correct 
instinct that Khrushchev did not want war, and Dulles' concurrence, helped the West stay its 
guns, remain firm, and be willing, but not too eager, to negotiate.  They emphasized Allied unity 
and were able to hold it together through the 1959 conference.  Despite Eisenhower's attempts to 
make disarmament their priority, Berlin dominated discussions from 1958-60. 
1197
   Even after 
Dulles, Eisenhower was able to sustain unity through the Paris summit, but just barely.  Kennedy 
never had the same disposition or understanding regarding Western unity, thus hampering his 
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Berlin dealings.  He also had to deal with the specific personalities of Macmillan, Adenauer, and 
de Gaulle, who were not only more experienced generally but particularly on the Berlin issue.  
But unlike those leaders, Kennedy proved the only one determined to attempt negotiations 
against other counsel, and who carried them through for long unpromising stretches.  Lawrence 
Freedman says Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, followed twin paths of rearmament and 
negotiation.  It is debatable whether that combination was successful or not, but Kennedy did 
believe in and pursue diplomacy.
1198
   
 Dean Rusk also deserves credit for conducting these negotiations, without having the 
clear mandate of authority that Dulles had enjoyed.  Acheson or Bundy in the same role might 
not have performed as evenly and with as much control.  In the end, Rusk's unassuming 
reasonableness may have proved as much of a challenge to Gromyko as the latter's obdurate 
opacity was to Rusk.  Gromyko could have been much worse too; he was more reasonable and 
patient perhaps than was understood at the time.
1199
  The role of the ambassadors was also 
helpful.  Thompson proved invaluable in Moscow and as an advisor in Washington; he was the 
most needed and longest serving player on the US Berlin  team.  While "Smilin' Mike" 
Menshikov did not help much, Dobrynin earned Washington's confidence.  The veteran Deputy 




 As important as all these individuals were to the avoidance of war over Berlin, the turn to 
diplomacy may have been due to more than just their specific and combined influences.   If 
theoretical perspectives guided leaders, then perhaps the theories were changing without being 
understood at the time.  Massive retaliation doctrine did not suddenly yield to flexible response.  
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Instead, the ideas of limited war served as a transition.
 1201
 Marc Trachtenberg has observed that 
the tactical nuclear plans for defending Berlinof 1958-1962 were replaced by counter-insurgency 
conventional-force Vietnam strategies out of necessity, not ideology.   Exercises in planning 
tempered ideas of limited nuclear war.  Dulles, the supposed brinksman, never really wanted to 
risk the consequences of any kind of use of nuclear weapons.
1202
  Publicly, he declared nuclear-
use commitment over Berlin; privately he was among the most skeptical of containable nuclear 
use in Germany.  Eisenhower held the same views and Kennedy too, though more naively.  So 
did Khrushchev.  For both East and West, growing awareness of the dangers of nuclear war was 
a major reason for the turn to diplomacy over Berlin.
1203
   
 In Paris and in Vienna, heads of state had the chance to talk about disarmament, instead 
of Berlin.  Unfortunately, Khrushchev, despite his sincere wish for disarmament, chose to focus 
on Berlin instead.   Perhaps the US and its Allies could have managed him better; maybe not.   
They did take a diplomatic rather than military course over Berlin without damage to Allied or 
Soviet position or prestige.  Berlin discussions, though tedious, averted war and that was a major 
accomplishment.  The slippery slope did not produce a calamitous fall.  Neither did it allow 
access to higher points. That the negotiations were not more productively linked to progress on 
disarmament may be the greatest loss of the whole Berlin diplomatic sequence.  
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